V 


THE 


BALANCE   OF    POWER 


1715-1789 


BY 


ARTHUR    HASSALL,    M.A. 

STUDENT   OF   CHRIST   CHURCH,  OXFORD 

AUTHOR  OF  "  BOLIXGBROKE  " 

LOUIS  XIV.  AND  THE   ZENITH   OF  THE   FRENCH   MONARCHY,"   ETC 


PERIOD    VI 


THE    MACMILLAX    COMPANY 

LONDON:  MACMILLAN  .k  CO.,  Ltd. 
1907 

All  rights  reserved 


-^0- 


H\8T0R< 


Copyright,  1896, 
By  M  ACM  ill  an  AND   CO. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped  March,  1896.  Reprinted 
August,  1898;  November,  1900;  July,  1903;  January, 
July.  1907, 


NorfajooO  ^rrsa 

J.  S.  CuBhing  k  Co.  -  Berwick  k  Smith 
Norwuud  Mui.  U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

In  attempting  to  write  the  history  of  Europe  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  I  have  been  compelled  for  want  of 
space  to  omit  to  a  great  extent  the  history  of  the 
Papacy  and  Portugal,  and  to  touch  upon  the  internal 
history  of  France  only  so  far  as  it  reacted  upon  the 
foreign  policy  of  Louis  xv.  and  xvi.  I  have,  how- 
ever, endeavoured  to  give  full  prominence  to  the  for- 
eign policy  of  Dubois,  Fleury,  Choiseul,  and  Vergennes, 
to  emphasise  the  full  meaning  of  the  diplomatic  revo- 
lutions of  1 717  and  1756,  and  to  bring  out  clearly 
the  disastrous  effects  upon  France  of  her  entry  into 
the  war  between  England  and  the  revolted  American 
colonies. 

I  have  also  devoted  much  attention  to  showing  the 
close  interdependence  of  Northern,  Eastern,  and  West- 
ern politics,  and  have  in  consequence  endeavoured  to 
bring  into  clear  light  the  first  beginnings  of  the  Eastern 
Question,  the  rise  of  Russia  and  Prussia,  and  the  decay 
of  Sweden,   Poland,  and  Turkey. 

For  the  valuable  Appendices  A,  B,  and  C  —  the  re- 
sults of  very  careful  investigations  —  I  am  indebted 
to  the  courtesy  of  the  Rev.  A.  H.  Johnson  ;  while  to 
Mr.  H.  O.  Wakeman  and  Mr.  A.  N.  Moberley  I  ven- 

▼ 

271931 


vi  Preface 

ture  to  express  my  thanks  for  their  kindness  in  reading 
through  the  proof-sheets. 

It  is  impossible  to  give  a  complete  list  of  the  authori- 
ties which  have  either  been  consulted,  or  which  should 
be  consulted  by  students  of  this  Period.  Monod's 
BibliograpJiie  dc  VJiistoire  de  France  gives  a  most  use- 
ful list  of  the  best  French  works,  while  the  results 
of  the  labours  of  Martin,  Sorel,  Arneth,  Carlyle,  Van- 
dal, Jobez,  Cherest,  Rocquain,  Sybel,  Weber,  Broglie, 
Geffroy,  Baudrillard,  Coxe,  Taine,  de  Tocqueville,  and 
Armstrong  will  be  found  easily  accessible. 

The  valuable  set  of  Instriictiojis  aiix  AmbassadeiirSy 
and  the  admirable  volumes  in  the  Oncken  Series,  are 
in  themselves  a  mine  of  information  as  interesting  as 
they  are  accurate.  I  have  in  the  text  made  frequent 
references  to  various  authorities,  including  often  mono- 
graphs with  which  the  general  reader  may  not  be  well 
acquainted. 

The  difHculties  which  have  presented  themselves  to 
me  will  be  appreciated  by  every  one  who  has  en- 
deavoured to  unravel  the  tangled  skein  of  Continental 
politics  during  the  eighteenth  century ;  but  I  trust  that 
my  attempt  to  sketch  the  condition  of  Europe  during 
the  period  previous  to  the  French  Revolution  will  not 
prove  without  interest  to  students  of  modern  history. 

A.  H. 

Oxford,  February  1896. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.    Europe  at  the  Beginning  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  .  i 

11.    Alberoni  and  Dubois,  i  715-1723 25 

III.  The  Intrigues  of  Elizabeth  Farnese,  i 723-1 733  .        .  64 

IV.  The  War  of  the  Polish  Succession,   i  733-1 735     .        .  87 
V.     The  North  and  East  of  Europe,  i  71 5-1 740  .        .        .  107 

VI.     Prussia   and   the   War   of  the  Austrian    Succession, 

1740-1742 128 

VII.    The  Austrian    Succession   W^\r  after   the   Peace  of 

Breslau,  1 742-1 748        . 156 

VIII.     The  Diplomatic  Revolution,  1748-1756  ....  206 

IX.     The  Seven  Vears'  War,  i  756-1 763 241 

X.    The  Fall  of  the  Jesuits,   1759-1773        ....  280 
XI.    The  Partition  of  Poland  and  the  Treats'  of  Kutchuk- 

Kainardji 298 

Xil.     Europe    and    the    War    of    American    Independence, 

1774-1783 332 

XIII.  Catherine  ii.  .\nd  Joseph  ii.,  i  783-1 789          .        .        •  35° 

XIV.  France  before  the  Revolltion,  i  774-1 789    .        .        .  394 

vii 


viii  Conteftts 

APPENDICES 

PACK 

Appendix  A.  — The  Territories  of  the   House  of  Hapsburg,  and 

their  Government        .........  419 

Appendix  B.  —  Dominions  of  the  Kings  of  Prussia,  and  their  Gov- 
ernment after  the  Reforms  of  Frederick  William  i.    .         .         .  420 

Appendix  C.  —  Constitution  of  the  Empire  in  the  Eighteenth  Century  422 

Appendix  D.  —  Genealogies  of  the  Russian  and  Swedish  Royal  Houses  423 
Genealogy  of  the  House  of  Wittelsbach,  to  illustrate  the 

Bavarian  Succession  Question       .....  424 

Appendix  E.  — Table  of  Contemporary  Sovereigns  ....  425 

Index 427 

MAPS 

1.  Europe  in  1740 to  face  i^o 

2.  Italy  in  1748 201 

3.  North  and  East  Germany,  1 756-1 763 244 

4.  West  Germany,  1 756-1 763 258 

5.  The  North  and  East  of  Europe to  face  351 

6.  Prussia  in  1786 to  face  t^-jt, 


CHAPTER   I 

EUROPE  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY 

The  Balance  of  Power  —  The  Enlightened  Governments  —  Commerce  and  the 
Colonies  —  The  Growth  of  the  Middle  Class  —  The  Causes  of  the  European 
Revolution  —  The  Settlement  of  1713  and  1714 — Position  of  the  Lead- 
ing European  Powers  in  1715  —  The  Empire  —  Austria  —  Prussia  —  Ba- 
varia —  The  Palatinate  —  Hanover  —  Saxony  —  Poland  —  Italy  —  Spain  and 
Portugal  —  The  North  of  Europe  —  The  Eastern  Question  —  Sweden  and 
France  in  1715. 

On  the  ist  of  September  1715  Louis  xiv.  died.  With  his 
death  the  eighteenth  century  may  be  said  to  begin,  just  as  with 
the  meeting  of  the  States-General  on  May  the  5th,  1789,  it 
may  be  said  to  close.  The  years  from  1715  to  1789  were 
preparatory  to  a  period  extending  from  1789  to  1815,  when 
a  revolution  was  carried  out  not  only  in  France  but  in  other 
countries,  and  the  reconstruction  of  the  map  of  Europe  was 
effected.  The  causes  of  this  revolution,  which  has  so  pro- 
foundly influenced  modern  Europe,  are  vev}'  plainly  indicated 
in  the  history  of  the  preceding  years.  During  the  period  from 
1715-1789  certain  leading  ideas  were  accepted  which  differ  in 
many  respects  from  those  propounded  during  the  revolutionary 
epoch.  Of  these  perhaps  the  best  known  is  that  The  Balance 
of  the  balance  of  power.  After  the  Peace  of  West-  of  Power, 
phalia,  it  became  recognised  that  a  number  of  independent 
states  of  various  sizes  and  resources  must  find  a  modus  vive?idi, 
and  that  the  security  of  all  must  be  ensured.  But  the  *  Chris- 
tian Republic '  was  an  ideal  of  philosophers,  and  was  ignored 
by  Louis  xrv.;  it  was  not  till  1688  that  William  in.  headed  a 
successful  opposition  to  the  predominance  of  France.  The 
balance  of  power  in  the  eighteenth  century  has  been  described 

PERIOD   VI,  I  A 


\^ 


/'Z',.:i  }  "t  i     \Eiirpp'San  History,   17 15-1789 

as  *  merely  a  temporary  immobility  produced  by  exhaustion 
after  long  wars.'  Diplomacy  was  corrupt,  and  international 
immorality  was  universal.  The  principles  of  Frederick  the 
Great  and  of  Catherine  11.  were  practised  by  other  governments 
which  had  not  the  audacity  to  avow  them.  The  invasion 
of  Silesia,  the  partition  of  Poland,  the  attempted  dismember- 
ments of  Turkey  and  Sweden,  and  the  suggested  dismember- 
ment of  Prussia,  are  well-known  illustrations  of  the  contempt 
for  estabhshed  rights,  and  the  determination  of  powerful  states 
to  enrich  themselves  at  the  expense  of  their  weaker  neighbours. 
No  consideration  was  paid  to  race  limits  or  to  national  bounda- 
ries. Large  portions  of  Italy  were,  at  the  Peace  of  Utrecht, 
taken  from  Spain  and  given  to  Austria ;  while  the  Spanish 
/-Netherlands  was  handed  over  to  the  care  of  the  distant^ House 
1  of  Hapsburg.  Till  1789  the  supremacy  of  dynastic  interests 
I  remained  practically  unquestioned,  and  it  was  not  till  the  nine- 
J  teenth  century  that  the  idea  of  nationality  became  generally 
recognised.  'They  cut  and  pare  states  and  kingdoms,' wrote 
Alberoni  of  the  ministers  of  his  day,  'as  if  they  were  Dutch 
cheeses.'  And  this  statement  accurately  describes  the  policy 
pursued  with  a  brutal  consistency  by  all  the  great  Powers  from 
the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  to  that  of  Vienna  in  181 5. 

Nevertheless,  the  idea  of  a  balance  of  power  is  founded  on 
reason,  has  been  a  living  force  in  European  politics  since  the 
struggles  of  the  Italian  towns  with  each  other  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  and  exists  in  the  minds  of  all  European  statesmen  at  the 
present  day.  In  171 7  Lord  Stair,  the  English  envoy,  explained 
to  the  Regent  that  Stanhope's  foreign  policy  was  based  on  the 
principle  of  a  balance  of  forces  ;  that  it  was  England's  object  to 
make  Austria  as  far  as  possible  equal  in  power  to  France,  and 
to  prevent  either  country  from  becoming  superior  in  strength 
and  influence  to  the  other.  And  he  frankly  stated  that  if 
France  endeavoured  to  become  more  powerful  than  the  Em- 
peror she  would  lose  her  allies.  Alberoni,  too,  was,  from  the 
beginning  of  his  career  in  Spain,  firmly  resolved  to  annul 
the  Treaties  of  Utrecht  and  Rastadt,  as  being  subversive  to  the 


\ 


The  Begimimg  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  3 

balance  of  power,  and  disastrous  to  Spain  and  Italy.  Though 
this  principle  was  often  enunciated,  its  mere  existence  could 
not  prevent  ac£s  of  aggression  on  the  part  of  the  great  states ; 
and  Europe  has  been  described  as  committing  suicide  by  allow- 
ing the  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession  and  the  Partition  of 
Poland.  *  These  iniquitous  acts,'  says  Albert  Sorel,  *  are  the 
testament  of  old  Europe,  having  signed  which  it  could  not  but 
die.'  Anarchic  principles  were  abroad,  morality  and  religion 
were  at  a  low  ebb,  treaties  were  lightly  broken,  most  European 
states  were,  at  the  time  of  the  French  Revolution,  either  ruined 
or  worn  out ;  and  the  system  of  the  balance  of  power  was  grossly 
perverted  by  the  cynical  and  immoral  policy  of  the  rulers  of 
Austria,  Russia,  and  Prussia.  In  1788  the  wisdom  of  maintain- 
ing within  certain  hmits  a  balance  of  power  was  appreciated  by 
English  statesmen.  By  their  efforts  Turkey  and  Sweden  were 
saved  from  dismemberment,  and  Europe  from  a  serious 
territorial  readjustment.^ 

Side  by  side  with  this  disregard  of  the  rights  of  nationalities, 
it  must  be  observed  that  the  responsibilities  of  rulers  within  their 
own  territories  were  fully  grasped.     The   modern   The  En- 
idea  of  the  state  begins  to  appear.     During  the   Qoye^n!^ 

^  century,  the  conception  that  governments  exist  for   ments. 
the  promotion  of  the  security  and  prosperity  of  the  governed 
was  adequately  appreciated.     The  eighteenth  century  was  an 

_  age  of  enlightenment ;  it  has  been  termed  the  _age  of  reason. 
But  the  idea  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  was  not  recog- 
nised. It  was  held  from  England  to  Russia  that  a  government, 
while  it  existed  for  the  good  of  the  people,  must  not  be 
administered  by  them.  The  eighteenth  century  was  the  period 
of  administrative  despotism.  The  state  was  everything,  the 
people  nothing.  Benevolent  despots  governed  their  countries 
on  humanitarian  principles.  Though,  theoretically,  freedom  of 
individual  thought  and  action  was  allowed  to  be  a  good  thing, 
in  practice  the  principle  of  personal  liberty  was  not  recognised. 

1  Sorel,  L' Europe  et  la  Revolution  Fran^aise,  vol.  i.  chap.  i.      Lecky, 
History  of  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century ^  vol.  v.  pp.  229,  230. 


4  European  History^   171 5-1789 

Feudalism  still  existed  in  many  parts  of  Europe,  and  the 
poorer  classes  were  kept  in  bondage. 

Another  characteristic,  the  importance  of  which  cannot  be 

over-estimated,  was  the  immense  interest  taken  in  commercial 

and   colonial   questions.      Commerce    was    recog- 

Commerce  ^ 

and  the  niscd  as  being  the  road  to  wealth  and  power,  and 

Colonies.  -^  became  the  policy  of  every  European  prince  to 
increase  the  wealth  of  his  country  by  advancing  its  trade. 
The  study  of  political  economy  had  definitely  arisen  in  the 
seventeenth  century,  though  it  had  only  reached  a  very  rudi- 
mentary stage  —  the  prevalent  belief  being  that  the  wealth  of  a 
nation  consisted  in  the  amount  of  specie  which  it  possessed, 
and  that  the  prosperity  of  one  country  was  only  attained  at  the 
expense  of  others.  Consequently,  each  nation  endeavoured  to 
prohibit  the  exportation  of  coin,  and  commercial  jealousy  grew 
apace.  '■  One  man's  gain  is  another's  loss '  became  a  recog- 
nised principle,  and  the  mercantile  theory,  as  it  was  called, 
established  itself  firmly  in  Europe. 

During  the  latter  half  of  the  seventeenth  century  the  great 
value  of  colonial  trade  was  almost  universally  recognised. 
The  unpopularity,  in  England,  of  \\\p  Partition  Treaties  of 
1698  and  1700  was  largely  due  to  the  fact  that,  had  they  been 
carried  out,  the  western  basin  of  the  Mediterranean  would 
have  become  a  French  lake,  and  the  English  trade  there  and 
in  the  Levant  would  have  been  endangered.  The  coolness 
which  existed  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Spanish  Succession 
War  between  England  and  Peter  the  Great  was  caused  in  great 
measure  by  the  apprehension  that  the  appearance  in  the 
Baltic  of  a  Russian  fleet  would  endanger  the  interests  of 
British  commerce  in  the  north.  This  lively  appreciation  — 
shared  with  England  by  Spain,  France,  and  Austria  —  of  the 
value  of  trade  brought  with  it  important  results.  The  posses- 
sion of  strong  navies  became  necessary  for  the  work  of  colonial 
expansion  and  the  development  of  commerce ;  and  already, 
in  the  later  years  of  the  seventeenth  century,  the  fleets  of 
Holland,  England,  and  France  had  been  engaged  in  a  brill- 


The  Begiufting  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  5 

iant  rivalry,  not  only  in  European  waters,  but  in  the  distant 
American  and  Indian  seas.  By  the  beginning  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century  Holland  had  dropped  out  of  the  race,  but 
the  struggle  was  continued  between  England  and  the  navies 
of  France  and  Spain.  Already  the  contests  for  supremacy  in 
America  and  India  had  begun,  and  it  was  not  till  the  century 
was  more  than  half  over  that  it  was  decided  that  England,  not 
France,  should  be  supreme  in  India,  and  that  the  Teutonic 
and  not  the  Latin  element  was  to  control  the  destinies  and 
development  of  North  America.  This  growth  of  the  commer- 
cial and  colonial  interests  of  European  states  brought  with 
it  the  increased  importance,  more  particularly  in  -, 
France,  in  England,  and  in  western  Germany,  of  the  Middle 
the  middle  class.  The  eighteenth  century  was  the 
age  of  great  civilians  —  the  age  of  Walpole  and  of  Pitt,  of 
Alberoni  and  of  Turgot.  Wherever  trade  developed,  the  con- 
dition of  the  agricultural  classes  improved,  and  an  indepen- 
dent, wealthy,  and  intelligent  middle  class  grew  up,  which 
supplied  to  the  various  countries  many  admirable  financiers, 
administrators,  and  soldiers.  The  increased  interest  taken  in 
commerce  tended  to  break  down  barriers  between  nations, 
and  Europe  became  more  united.  Insulation  was,  insulation 
indeed,  impossible  when  Spain  had  an  Itahan  gov-  impossible, 
emment,  England  a  German,  Italy  an  Austrian,  Russia  every- 
thing but  a  Russian  government.  T^^the  eighteenth  century 
was  the  3.ge  of  political  adventur^^^  evident  from  a  very 
cursory  acquaintance  with  the  histoPr  of  the  various  states. 
Scepticism  increased,  and  the  religious  sentiment  was  weakened. 
Bossuet  and  Pascal  were  succeeded  by  Voltaire  and  Diderot ; 
and  the  influence  of  Catholicism  steadily  declined. 

These  characteristics  of  the  European  history  in  the  eigh- 
teenth century  which  have  been  briefly  touched  upon  do  not 
form  a  pleasant  picture.    Territorial  aggrandisement 
was  the  principal    object  of  the    greater  Powers, 
and  any  means  were  considered  justifiable  in  order  to  secure 
their  aims.     Diplomacy,  which  had  taken  the  place  of  religion 


^6  European  History,   i^i^-iySg 

in  the  councils  of  Europe,  was  unscrupulous ;  while  the  secret 
diplo7nacy  of  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  marks  the 
lowest  depths  arrived  at  in  the  history  of  the  relations  of  Euro- 
pean states  to  each  other.  -' 

Two  principal  facts  sum  up  in  themselves  the  character  of 
the  period  :  — The  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession,  and  the 
Partition  of  Poland.  The  one  showed  the  amount  of  faith 
which  could  be  put  iij  the  solemn  engagements  of  European 
Powers,  the  other  illustrated  the  amount  of  respect  which 
states,  if  weak,  could  expect  from  their  stronger  neighbours. 
When  Napoleon  overran  and  conquered  the  greater  part  of 
Europe,  he  was  merely  carrying  out  fully  and  successfully  the 
policy  pursued  by  the  great  European  Powers  before  1789. 
In  this  respect  Napoleon  belongs  to  the  same  category  as 
Frederick  the  Great,  Catherine  11.,  and  Joseph  11.,  and  may  be 
classed  with  the  despots  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

As  the  century  advanced,  it  became  evident  that  the  over- 
throw of  the  old  European  system  was  at  hand.  The  middle 
The  Euro-  classcs,  richer  and  better  educated  than  before,  felt 
peanRevoiu-  thcmselvcs  to  be  fit  for  the  exercise  of  political 
out  in  functions  which  the  theory  of  benevolent  despotism 

France.  denied  them.    The  people  who  provided  from  their 

own  ranks  the  soldiers  who  were  the  instruments  of  the  royal 
tyranny,  were  driven  to  desperation  by  feudal  exaction  and 
social  privilege.  On  ^4ke^  other  hand,  monarchy  had  lost  its 
dignity  and  leadership,  .Ae  nobiUty  was  extravagant,  the  Church 
corrupt,  poHticians  unblwshingly  selfish.  The  old  props  of 
society  were  giving  way.  A  catastrophe  was  inevitable.  But 
from  what  quarter  the  first  shock  of  the  earthquake  would 
make  itself  felt  no  one  could  say. 

What  then  were  the  causes  of  the  revolution  which  burst 
out  almost  simultaneously  in  Belgium,  Poland,  and  France,  and' 
The  Causes  found  the  rest  of  Europe  in  a  condition  of  weak-' 
of  the  Revo-    j^^^g  ^^^  collapsc  ?    The  answer  to  the  question' 

lutionary  ^  ^ 

Epoch.  may  partly  be  found  in  the  political  condition  of 

Europe  as  settled  by  the  terms  of  the  Treaties  of  Utrecht  and' 


TJie  Beginning  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  7 

Nystad,  partly  in  the  struggle  between  England  and  France  for 
colonial  supremacy. 

While  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  introduced  the  principle  of 
partition,  intensified  the  colonial  rivalry  between  England  and 
France  in  North  America,  and  opened  an  unappeasable  con- 
troversy by  assigning  Belgium  to  Austria  on  conditions  intoler- 
able to  the  Hapsburg  House,  the  Treaty  of  Xystad  (17  21) 
marks  the  definite  beginning  of  the  prodigious  growth  of 
Russia,  which  henceforward  took  advantage  of  the  weakness 
of  Sweden,  Poland,  and  Turkey  to  advance  her  boundaries, 
and  to  enter  into  the  politics  of  Europe.  A  revolution  was 
thus  being  effected  in  north-eastern  Europe  of  unexampled 
magnitude  and  importance.  The  rise  of  Prussia,  apparent  to 
Europe  from  1740,  constituted  a  no  less  startling  revolution. 
And  the  union  of  the  Bourbon  Powers  in  the  west  found  after 
1763  that  it  had  to  reckon  with  a  no  less  powerful  league  in 
the  north-east  of  Europe.  Till  1789  England  and  France 
struggled  for  colonial  empire  and  for  supremacv  in  '1 

-r     T  .  •  1-1  1  Summary. 

India  :  Austria  never  ceased  in  her  endeavours  to 
exchange  the  Netherlands  for  Bavaria,  and  Russia  and  Prussia 
advanced  rapidly  to  take  their  place  with  Austria  and  France 
as  leading  European  Powers. 

The  Treaties  of  Utrecht,  Rastadt,  and  Baden,  with  the 
Barrier  Treaty  of  17 15,  registered  and  sanctioned  accompHshed 
facts,  and  completed  the  settlement  of  the  affairs   ^^    ^     , 

'  ^  The  Settle- 

of  Europe.  Though  France  retained  part  of  her  ment  of  1713 
conquests,  great  care  was  taken  to  check  her  ^""^  ^^^'*' 
power  of  aggression.  With  the  grouping  together  of  states 
under  fresh  conditions  new  problems  arose,  which  found  their 
settlement  in  181 5.  By  the  Peace  of  Utrecht,  France,  though 
reserving  Cape  Breton  and  her  share  in  the  fisheries  of  the 
coast  of  Newfoundland,  lost  to  England  Acadia  or  Nova 
Scotia,  Newfoundland,  and  Hudson's  Bay,  and  promised  to 
dismantle  Dunkirk.  While  she  regained  Lille,  Aire,  Bethune, 
and  Saint- Venant,  she  agreed  to  the  cession  of  the  Spanish 
Netherlands  to  Austria,  and  to  the  establishment  of  a  barrier 


8  European  History ^   171 5-1789 

on  the  Belgian  frontier.  She  further  undertook  to  restore 
Savoy  and  Nice  to  Victor  Amadeus  of  Savoy,  acquiesced  in 
the  arrangement  by  which  that  astute  duke,  reserving  his  rights 
to  the  Spanish  Crown,  received  Sicily  with  the  title  of  king ; 
recognised  the  royal  title  of  Frederick  William  of  Prussia, 
and  his  rights  over  Neufchatel ;  and,  while  retaining  her  claims 
on  Orange,  restored  Upper  Guelderland  to  Prussia.  Spain  at 
the  same  time  made  treaties  with  England,  Savoy,  and  Holland. 
To  the  former  she  yielded  Gibraltar  and  Minorca,  and  by  the 
Assiento  agreement  she  granted  the  right  of  importing  for  thirty 
years  into  South  America  4000  negroes,  and  of  sending  a  ship 
annually  to  the  fair  of  Porto  Bello.  With  regard  to  Savoy  and 
Holland  the  terms  of  the  treaties  arranged  by  France  were 
simply  repeated.  It  was  not  till  the  next  year  that  peace 
between  France  and  Austria  was  concluded  at  Rastadt,  followed 
by  a  treaty  between  the  Empire  and  France  at  Baden. 

By  the  Treaty  of  Rastadt  (March  6,  17 14)  France  agreed 
that  Austria  should  possess  Naples,  Sardinia,  the  Tuscan 
ports  (Piombino,  Porto  Ercole,  Porto  San  Stefano,  Orbitello, 
Telamoile,  and  Porto  ftongone  in  Elba) ,  and  Milan.  Further, 
while  recognising  the  ninth  electorate  of  Hanover,  she  secured 
the  restoration  of  the  Electors  of  Bavaria  and  Cologne  to  their 
respective  territories  and  rights.  In  September  of  the  same 
year  at  Baden,  the  Empire  accepted  the  status  quo  ante  beilum, 
and  the  condition  of  things  as  established  at  the  Peace  of 
Ryswick.  France  retained  Alsace  and  Strasburg,  and  restored 
the  places  held  by  her  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine.  In 
November  the  Barrier  Treaty  (17 15)  carried  out  the  arrange- 
ments agreed  to  between  the  great  Powers.  The  United 
Provinces  handed  over  the  Spanish  Netherlands  to  Charles  vi., 
and  it  was  definitely  settled  that  Namur,  Tournai,  Menin, 
Furnes,  Warneton,  Ypres,  and  the  Fort  of  Knocque,  were  to 
be  garrisoned  by  the  Dutch,  while  Dendermonde  was  to  be 
held  by  a  mixed  garrison  of  Dutch  and  Austrians.  It  was 
further  laid  down  that  no  part  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands  was 
ever  to  be  ceded  to  France. 


TJie  Begiimijig  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  9 

This  settlement  of  Utrecht,  though  it  closed  a  period  of  wars, 
opened  new  controversies  and  led  to  fresh  complications.  It 
was  impossible  that  a  settlement  of  the  magnitude  of  that 
carried  out  at  Utrecht,  Rastadt,  and  Baden,  leading  as  it  did 
to  the  reconstruction  of  the  map  of  Europe,  could  be  effected 
without  leaving  behind  it  many  heart-burnings,  and  much  irri- 
tation and  discontent.  Spain  never  acquiesced  in  the  Austrian 
predominance  in  Italy,  and  never  rested  till  the  arrangements 
made  at  Utrecht  were  overthrown ;  Philip,  moreover,  had 
no  intention  of  adhering  to  his  renunciation  of  the  French 
throne,  and  only  awaited  a  favourable  opportunity  for  assert- 
ing his  claim.  The  Hapsburgs  regarded  the  conditions  on 
which  the  Spanish  Netherlands  had  been  assigned  to  them 
as  intolerable,  and,  after  vain  attempts  to  modify  those  con- 
ditions, endeavoured  with  great  persistency  to  exchange  Belgium 
for  Bavaria.  France,  though  compelled  to  give  England  a 
foothold  in  Canada,  was  resolved  to  contest  her  supremacy 
in  North  America,  and  a  struggle  ensued  which  resulted  in 
1763  in  the  loss  of  the  French  possessions  on  the  American 
Continent. 

Nor  were  the  Dutch  satisfied  with  the  Barrier  Treaty,  and  they 
felt  indignant  at  the  position  held  by  Austria,  and  at  the  con- 
duct of  England.  Though  Europe  was  too  exhausted  in  17 15 
to  embark  upon  another  general  war,  it  was  evident  that  the 
renewal  of  hostilities  could  only  be  averted  by  wise  counsels 
and  a  firm  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  leading  powers.  The 
fixed  resolve  of  various  states  to  get  rid  of  the  restraints  im- 
posed and  the  terms  laid  down  at  Utrecht,  together  with  the 
rise  of  the  Russian  monarchy  made  apparent  by  the  Treaty  of 
Nystad,  tended  to  indicate  sources  of  future  complications  in 
the  north  and  east,  as  well  as  in  the  south  and  west  of  Europe. 

For  nearly  a  generation  Europe  was,  on  the  whole,  tranquil ; 
it  was  not  till  1733  that  another  general  war  took  place;  it 
was  not  till  the  accession  of  Frederick  the  Great  to  the 
Prussian  throne  that  a  new  age  in  European  pohtics  definitely 
began ;  it  was  not  till  the  end  of  the  century  that,  through  the 


10  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

destruction  of  the  European  states-system,  the  outbursts  of 
the  militant  democracy  of  France  threatened  the  liberties  of 
Europe. 

The  necessity  of  peace  was  perhaps  more  vital  to  Germany 

than  to  any  other  state  in  Europe.     Before  she  had  recovered 

from    the    disastrous  Thirty  Years'  War,  she   had 

Position  of 

the  leading  been  exposcd  to  the  aggressions  of  Louis  xiv. 
European        j^^j.  ^yeakness  was  in  great  measure  due  to  internal 

Powers  in  o 

1715.   The       divisions,  themselves  the  result  of  her  constitution, 
"^^"^^  which  had  been  made  permanent  by  the  Peace  of 

Westphalia.  All  chance  of  the  establishment  of  a  united 
monarchy  had  been  lost  at  the  time  of  the  Peace  of  Westphalia, 
and  the  Empire,  finally  dismembered,  had  become  a  nominal 
federation  of  independent  princes.  Germany  was  divided  into 
some  three  hundred  petty  states,  the  rulers  of  each  of  which 
had  the  right  not  only  to  tax,  to  impose  custom  duties,  to  coin 
money  and  to  debase  the  coinage,  but  also  to  make  treaties, 
and  to  decide  upon  the  form  of  religion  to  be  professed  within 
their  respective  dominions.  Each  prince  was  absolute  master 
within  his  own  state,  and  many  of  them  were  despots  of  the 
most  despicable  kind.  The  Empire  had  become  a  nominal 
federation  of  independent  princes,  and  the  victory  in  the  long 
struggle  between  the  centrifugal  and  centripetal  tendencies, 
between  monarchy  and  aristocracy,  rested  with  the  centrifugal 
principle.  The  German  kingdom  was,  after  1648,  a  republic 
of  princes  presided  over  by  the  Emperor.  Germany,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  had  lost  all  national 
l^eling,  a  degradation  of  manners  had  set  in,  and  the  dominant 
tone  in  the  small  states  was  fatal  to  the  domestic  life  which, 
previous  to  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  had  proved  the  strength  of 
the  country.^ 

Tyrannical  oppression  was  almost  universal   in  these    small 

states,  many  of  which  were  hotbeds  of  corruption.     In  17 15 

Germany   presented   a   picture   of    hopeless    dismemberment. 

'What  specially  enhanced  the   administrative   and  economic 

1  Sec  Karl  Hillebrand,  Lectures  on  German  Thought,  i.  and  ii. 


The  Beginnijtg  of  the  Eighteenth  Century         1 1 

disadvantages  of  such  a  multiplicity  of  states  was  this  '  —  writes 
Biedermann — 'that  even  those  territories  which  constituted 
a  political  whole  were  geographically  severed,  and  conse- 
quently disunited  in  respect  of  administrative  and  commer- 
cial intercourse.'  At  the  head  of  the  Germanic  body  was 
the  Emperor,  who  represented  the  executive,  and  who  lived 
at  Vienna.^  His  power  since  1648  had  become  purely 
nominal,  and  though  the  prestige  of  the  Imperial  title  still 
carried  some  weight,  the  Austrian  instincts  of  the  Emperors 
had  tended  to  render  their  position  in  the  Empire  a  purely 
ornamental  one.  At  Ratisbon  sat  the  Diet  which  wielded 
the  legislative  power.  The  Diet  was  composed  of  three 
Colleges :  that  of  the  Electors,  that  of  the  Princes,  and  that 
of  the  Imperial  towns.  The  College  of  Electors  was  presided 
over  by  the  Archbishop  of  Mainz,  who,  with  the  Archbishops 
of  Treves  and  Cologne,  formed  the  ecclesiastical  elements 
in  the  College  ;  while  the  five  lay  Electors  included  the  Elec- 
tors of  Hanover,  Brandenburg,  Bohemia,  Saxony,  and  either 
Bavaria  or  the  Palatinate.  The  College  of  Princes  consisted 
of  36  ecclesiastical,  and  64  lay  members ;  and  the  third  Col- 
lege consisted  of  the  representatives  of  52  Imperial  Free  Cities. 
In  each  of  the  two  Upper  Colleges  a  majority  was  required 
to  agree  to  a  resolution,  but  any  opposition  on  the  part  of 
the  College  of  Free  Cities  could  prevent  the  resolution  from 
being  presented  to  the  Emperor  for  his  assent  as  a  Co7ichisu7n 
for  the  Empire.  In  the  eighteenth  century  delegates  repre- 
sented the  members  of  the  three  Colleges,  but  the  knights  not 
being  represented,  refused  to  accept  the  decisions  of  the  Diet, 
formed  themselves  into  separate  circles,  and  dealt  directly  with 
the  Emperor.  The  Diet  had  thus  no  real  influence,  and  be- 
yond declaring  war  had  no  means  of  making  its  power  felt. 
It  had  become  merely  an  assembly  of  envoys  from  the  states, 
and  their  action  carried  little  weight.  The  Imperial  Chamber, 
or  Tribunal,  sat  at  Wetzlar  on  the  Lahn ;  its  weakness  was 
but  a  sign  of  the  weakness  of  the  German  federation.     It  was 

^  See  Appendix  C. 


12  Europea7t  History^   171 5-1 789 

intended  to  decide  disputes  between  the  German  sovereigns, 
but  only  very  trifling  cases  were  laid  before  it,  and  it  was 
powerless  to  prevent  all  important  matters  being  settled  by 
arms.  Moreover,  it  possessed  no  effective  force  or  machinery 
to  carry  out  any  decision  at  which  it  might  arrive.  The  Impe- 
rial administration  still  existed,  and  Germany  was  divided  into 
ten  circles  which  formed  units, in  the  military,  judicial,  and 
financial  organisation.  On  them,  moreover,  devolved  the  duty 
of  carrying  out  the  decisions  of  the  Emperor.  These  circles 
did  not  correspond  to  any  political  divisions,  and  often  the 
states  of  the  same  sovereign  were  distributed  through  different 
circles.  The  Imperial  army  was  itself  formed  from  contingents 
sent  by  the  circles,  but  was  absolutely  useless  and  inefficient. 
*  Not  only  each  regiment  but  each  company  was  formed  of  the 
contingent  of  several  states,  and  each  kept  its  own  uniform 
and  armament.  There  were  states  whose  entire  contingent 
consisted  of  two  men  equipped  at  their  own  expense,  but 
also  in  their  own  fashion.'  The  Imperial  mihtary  system 
was  a  failure,  and  Germany  was  still  powerless  to  defend 
itself  from  attacks.  In  addition,  Germany  was  rent  by  relig- 
ious divisions.  Each  prince,  since  the  Peace  of  Westphalia, 
was  supreme  in  his  own  dominion  in  religion  no  less  than  in 
political  matters ;  and  religious  dissensions,  so  far  from  being 
settled  in  1648,  had  been  perpetuated,  destroyed  all  chance  of 
unity  in  Germany,  and  paralysed  all  attempts  to  place  the 
Empire  in  a  condition  suitable  for  offence  or  defence.  The  elab- 
orate federative  system  had  proved  a  failure.  All  sense  of  Ger- 
man unity  was  lost ;  the  French  had  taken  Strasburg  and  Alsace  ; 
they  were  about  to  take  Lorraine.  The  Imperial  army  could 
not  defend  Germany  from  attack,  nor  could  the  Imperial  forces 
put  down  internal  disorder.  The  Seven  Years'  War  exemplified 
the  weakness  of  the  Germanic  body,  the  utter  decay  of  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  and  the  general  confusion  prevalent 
among  all  the  Imperial  institutions.  The  only  chance  of 
arriving  at  a  better  state  of  things  lay  in  the  rise  from  among 
the  numerous  German  potentates  of  a  prince  who  could  inspire 


The  Beginning  of  the  Eighteenth  Century         13 

his  countrymen  with  that  desire  for  union  which  the  ancient 
and  decaying  system  had  failed  to  supply. 

National  unity  and  national  policy  having  disappeared  from 
Germany  as  a  whole,  the  smaller  princes  tended  for  purposes 
of  defence  to  group  themselves  round  Austria  or  Prussia. 

Of  the  German  states,  Austria  held  the  foremost  place. 
Since  the  accession  of  Albert  11.  in  1437  the  Hapsburgs  had 
held    the    Imperial    dignity.      Vienna   was   conse- 

Dk  list ri 3. 

quently  not  merely  the  chief  town  of  the  Austrian 
dominions  :_  it  was  also  the  capital  of  the  Empire.  Strengthened 
by  all  the  eclat  which  belonged  to  the  Imperial  position,  the 
Emperors  of  the  House  of  Austria  had  used  their  power  for 
the  benefit  of  their  own  dominions,  and  for  the  curtailment 
of  the  rights  of  the  Empire.  They  had  estabhshed  at  Vienna 
an  Aulic  Council  —  a  purely  Austrian  creation  —  which  not  un- 
frequently  trenched  upon  the  prerogatives  of  the  Imperial 
Chamber ;  but  they  had  failed  in  their  endeavour  to  crush  out 
Protestantism,  and  to  impose  a  strict  despotism  upon  the  whole 
of  Germany. 

Since  the  Peace  of  Westphalia  the  tendency  of  the  Emperors 
was  more  and  more  to  neglect  Imperial  for  purely  Austrian 
interests.  Charles  vi.  might  have  recovered  Alsace  and  Stras- 
burg  for  the  Empire  during  the  Spanish  Succession  War,  but  his 
anxiety  to  increase  his  own  Italian  possessions,  to  secure  Sicily 
as  well  as  Naples,  led  him  to  refuse  to  make  peace  at  Utrecht, 
with  the  result  that  Alsace  and  Strasburg  remained  in  French 
hands  till  1870.  Again,  in  1735  Charles,  in  order  to  gain 
Tuscany  as  compensation  for  the  loss  of  Naples,  gave  up  Lor- 
raine without  even  consulting  the  Empire.  Always  jealous  of 
any  attempt  to  curtail  their  privileges,  the  German  princes  had, 
during  the  seventeenth  century,  looked  to  France  to  protect  them, 
until  the  reunion  policy  of  Louis  xrv.,  the  revocation  of  the  Edict 
of  Nantes,  and  the  devastation  of  the  Palatinate,  had  forced 
them  to  rally  round  the  Emperor.  But  Joseph  i.'s  employment 
of  the  ban  of  the  Empire  against  the  Electors  of  Cologne  and 
Bavaria,  his  occupation  of  their  territories  —  foreshadowing  the 


14  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

policy  of  Maria  Theresa  and  Joseph  11.  —  and  his  annexations 
in  Italy,  had  again  roused  their  alarm.  On  Joseph's  death 
his  successor,  Charles  vi.,  was  compelled  to  agree  to  the 
perpetual  capitulation  by  which  the  powers  of  the  Emperor 
were  still  further  curtailed,  and  the  privileges  and  rights  of  the 
princes  still  further  safeguarded.  In  spite,  however,  of  the 
perpetual  capitulation,  in  spite  of  the  growing  influence  of 
several  of  the  princes,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Electors 
of  Prussia,  Hanover,  and  Saxony  had  become  kings,  in  spite 
of  the  suspicious,  if  not  menacing,  attitude  of  Bavaria,  Austria 
held  a  very  influential  position  in  Western  Christendom.  Her 
connection  with  Germany  was  very  intimate  owing  to  the  pos- 
session by  her  rulers  of  the  Imperial  sceptre,  and  to  the  fact 
that,  by  reason  of  her  territories  in  the  Netherlands  and  in 
Swabia,  she  was  regarded  as  the  shield  and  defender  of  the 
Empire  against  France.  As  long,  too,  as  there  was  a  steady 
Catholic  majority  in  the  Diet,  Austria's  predominance  in  Ger- 
many was  secure. 

The  rulers  of  the  House  of  Hapsburg  indeed  occupied  a 
unique  position  in  Europe.^  In  addition  to  Austria  proper 
they  had  acquired  Styria,  Carinthia,  Carniola,  Gorz,  and  the 
Tyrol.  They  held  Bohemia  with  its  dependent  provinces  of 
Moravia,  Silesia,  and  Lausitz ;  and  in  171 1,  at  the  Peace  of 
Szathmar,  they  finally  secured  Hungary,  Croatia,  and  Transyl- 
vania. By  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  they  had  obtained  a  con- 
siderable addition  to  their  possessions  in  Italy,  which  now 
included  Naples,  Sardinia,  the  Tuscan  ports,  and  most  of 
Lombardy  —  i.e.  the  Duchy  of  Mantua,  and  part  of,  the  Duchy 
of  Milan ;  they  had  also  received  the  Spanish  Netherlands. 
Their  territories  in  Swabia  and  the  Breisgau  had  belonged  to 
their  house  for  several  centuries.  The  history  of  the  Haps- 
burgs  in  the  second  half  of  the  seventeenth  century  clearly 
demonstrated  that  the  true  policy  of  Austria  was,  by  taking 
advantage  of  the  weakness  of  Turkey,  to  extend  and  develop 
in  the  direction  of  Constantinople,  and  to  strengthen  its  hold 

1  See  Appendix  A. 


The  Begin7iing  of  the  Eighteenth  Centiuy  15 

upon  southern  Germany.  In  1715  Charles  vi.  was  not  only 
Emperor ;  he  was  also  King  of  Bohemia  and  Hungary,  and 
Archduke  of  Austria.  The  government  of  his  dominions,  which 
contained  many  different  nationahties  —  Belgians,  Itahans,  Ger- 
mans, Czechs,  Magyars,  and  various  branches  of  the  Slav  family 
—  taxed  all  the  resources  and  abilities  of  the  ablest  of  the 
Hapsburg  rulers.  There  was  no  natural  centre,  many  of  the 
territories  were  scattered  and  isolated,  and  the  Austrian  Nether- 
lands was  little  more  than  a  continental  colony.  It  was  im- 
possible to  form  thus  scattered  populations  into  one  centralised 
state  :  it  was  equally  difficult  to  group  them  into  a  federation.^ 

Prussia  consisted  of  several  states  almost  more  divided  than 
the  hereditary  provinces  of  Charles  vi.  In  the  west,  Frederick 
William  i.  possessed  Cleves,  IMark,  and  Ravensburg ; 
in  the  east  Prussia,  united  to  the  Electorate  in 
1618  ;  and  in  the  centre  the  Electorate  of  Brandenburg,  com- 
posed of  the  Kur-Mark  and  the  Neu-Mark.  To  these  dominions 
of  the  kings  of  Prussia,  Farther  Pomerania,  Halberstadt,  and 
Minden  had  been  added  in  1648,  ^Magdeburg  in  1680,  and 
Guelders  in  1713.  To  unite  these  scattered  possessions  was 
the  consistent  aim  of  Prussian  monarchs  during  the  century. 
Between  Brandenburg  and  Cleves  lay  Hanover.  Poland 
thrust  herself  between  Brandenburg  and  Prussia,  while  in 
the  north  the  occupation  by  Sweden  of  the  greater  part  of 
Pomerania  was  a  constant  menace  and  source  of  irritation. 
To  increase  their  dominions  Rhinewards  by  securing  Jiilich 
and  Berg,  to  drive  the  Swedes  from  Pomerania,  and  to  unite 
Brandenburg  and  Prussia  at  the  expense  of  Poland,  became 
the  natural  objects  of  the  Prussian   rulers.- 

Consolidation,  centralisation,  and  expansion  express  the  re- 
sults of  the  long  reigns  of  Frederick  WilUam  i.  and  of  his 
successor,  the  great  Frederick.  In  this  work  Frederick 
WiUiam  played  a  most  important  part,  and  he  succeeded  in 
founding  a  centralised  and  administrative  system,  which,  to  a 
great  extent,  lasted  till  the  Peace  of  Tilsit.  Prussia,  in  spite 
1  See  Appendix  A.  '^  See  Appendix  B. 


1 6  European  History^   171 5-1 789 

of  the  geographical  difficulties,  became  gradually  united, 
gained  a  strength  which  Austria  never  acquired,  and,  after  the 
Seven  Years'  War,  was  recognised  as  the  rival  of  Austria,  and 
her  equal  in  power.  This  extraordinary  development  of  a 
small  German  electorate  into  a  prominent  European  kingdom 
/was  due,  in  the  first  place,  to  the  fact  that  Prussia  was  regarded 
C^as  the  leader  of  the  Protestant  states  in  Germany ;  in  the 
second  place,  to  the  formation  of  the  magnificent  Prussian 
army ;  and  thirdly,  to  the  growth  of  a  national  feeling  itself 
inspired  by  Prussian  victories.  '  The  two  springs  round  which 
the  new  life  in  Germany  gathered  and  grew  up  were  the 
*  ..Russian  State  and  the  Protestant  religion.'  Frederick  the 
Great  succeeded  in  arousing  all  that  makes  a  nation  proud  of 
itself:  heroism,  a  national  spirit,  and  a  love  of  rehgious  liberty  ; 
and  consequently  Prussia  became  in  time  the  recognised 
representative  of  the  German  race.  From  1715  to  1740,  in 
anticipation  of  a  struggle  which  Prince  Eugene  had  foreseen, 
the  relations  of  Prussia  and  Austria  became  more  and  more 
strained;  from  1740  to  1763  the  Austrian  supremacy  in  Ger- 
many was  definitely  challenged,  and  on  the  conclusion  of  the 
Seven  Years'  War  Prussia  was  recognised  as  the  equal  of 
Austria,  and  as  the  defender  of  the  liberties  of  the  German 
states  against  the  encroachments  of  the  Hapsburg  House. 

Bavaria  was  ruled  by  a  branch  of  the  House  of  Wittelsbach, 
and  its  Duke  had,  during  the  Spanish  Succession  War,  supported 
the  French  cause.  In  February  1714  a  close 
aUiance  had  been  formed  between  France  and 
Bavaria,  France  undertaking  to  support  the  Elector  in  his 
claims  on  the  Hapsburg  possessions,  and,  if  occasion  required, 
on  the  eventual  succession  to  the  Empire.  In  March  of  the 
same  year  France  forced  the  Emperor  at  the  Peace  of  Rastadt 
to  restore  the  Elector  to  his  dominions,  from  which  he  had 
been  expelled  after  the  battle  of  Blenheim.  The  relations 
between  the  Hapsburgs  and  Bavaria  had  never  been  cordial. 
Even  during  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  when  the  Elector  fought 
on  the  side  of  the  Emperor,  he   fought  mainly    for   his    own 


The  Begitmijig  of  the  Eighteenth  Century         \y 

hand.  For  a  long  period  his  successor  wavered  between 
allegiance  to  the  Emperor  and  alliance  with  Lx)uis  xrv.  At 
last,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Spanish  Succession  War,  he 
definitely  threw  himself  on  the  side  of  Louis  xrv.,  and  Bavaria 
remained  aUied  to  France  till  success  attended  the  policy  of 
both  Elector  and  King,  and  Charles  Albert  became  Emperor 
in  1742  as  Charles  vii.  He  had  always  refused  to  guarantee 
the  Pragmatic  Sanction,  asserting  that  his  marriage  with  a 
niece  of  Charles  vi.  gave  him,  with  the  Elector  of  Saxony,  a 
claim  upon  the  Austrian  inheritance. 

The  Lower  Palatinate,  the  capital  of  which  was  Heidelberg, 
belonged  to  the  elder  branch  of  the  Wittelsbachs,  and  the 
Elector  had  received  back  part  of  his  territory  at  The  Paiati- 
the  Treaty  of  Westphaha.  On  the  extinction  of  the  "**^- 
reigning  branch  Louis  xiv.  had  claimed  the  Lower  Palatinate  on 
behalf  of  his  daughter-in-law,  the  Duchess  of  Orleans.  Event- 
ually, in  1702,  the  matter  was  settled  by  arbitration,  and  the 
Elector,  John  William,  paid  300,000  crowns  to  the  Duchess. 
On  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Rastadt  he  was  compelled 
to  give  up  the  Upper  Palatinate,  which  had  been  handed  over 
to  him  in  1708,  when  Bavaria  was  put  to  the  ban  of  the 
Empire.  After  Louis  xiv.'s  death  Charles  Phihp,  the  Elector 
Palatine,  wavered  between  France  and  Austria.  Irritated  at 
some  remonstrances  which  Charles  vi.  made  in  consequence 
of  his  persecutions  of  the  Protestants  in  his  territory,  Charles 
Phihp  drew  closer  to  the  Elector  of  Bavaria,  and,  in  1724, 
formed  a  sort  of  Family  Compact  with  him,  an  arrangement 
favoured  by  France.  In  1726,  in  order  to  secure  his  alliance, 
the  Emperor  guaranteed  the  succession  to  Berg  and  Jiilich  to 
the  Sulzbach  branch,  the  presumptive  heirs  to  the  Lower  Pa- 
latinate, while  almost  simultaneously  he  made  similar  promises 
to  Prussia.  The  Emperor's  duphcity  so  alienated  the  Elector 
that,  in  1732,  he  refused  to  guarantee  the  Pragmatic  Sanc- 
tion ;  during  the  Polish  Succession  War  he  remained  neutral, 
and  on  his  death,  in  1 743,  he  was  succeeded  by  Charles  Theo- 
dore of  Sulzbach,  who  definitely  accepted  the  French  alliance. 

PERIOD   VI.  B 


1 8  European  History ^   171 5-1789 

Hanover,  a  Protestant  state,  which  had  at  first  come  into 
prominence  through  its  erection  into  an  Electorate,  and  later 
through  its  Elector  having  become  King  of  Eng- 
land, was  closely  connected  with  Austria,  to  whom 
it  had  given  pledges  on  being  raised  to  the  electoral  dignity. 
But  though  supporting  Maria  Theresa  in  the  Austrian  Succes- 
sion War,  George  11.  viewed  the  position  of  affairs  in  Germany 
from  the  point  of  view  of  a  German  prince,  and  was  not  averse 
to  the  coronation  of  Charles  vii.  (of  Bavaria)  as  Emperor. 
On  the  other  hand,  though  allied  to  Prussia  by  marriage  and 
by  religious  sympathies,  the  relations  of  both  George  i.  and 
George  11.  with  the  Prussian  kings  were  seldom  friendly.  It 
was  not  till  the  Seven  Years'  War  that  the  exigencies  of  the 
political  situation  compelled  George  11.  and  Frederick  the 
Great  to  form  a  close  alliance. 

Saxony  owed  much  of  its  importance  to  its  close  connection 
with  Poland.  Augustus  11.,  Elector  of  Saxony,  was  also  the 
elected  King  of  Poland.  His  son,  afterwards 
'  Augustus  III.,  married  Maria  Josepha,  daughter  of 
the  Emperor  Joseph  i.,  and  in  spite  of  her  renunciations 
raised  a  claim  on  the  death  of  Charles  vi.  to  part  of  the 
Austrian  inheritance. 

The  connection  of  Saxony  and  Poland  brought  the  Elector 
into  great  European  prominence.  For  centuries  Poland  had 
maintained  an  anarchical  government  in  the  centre 
of  monarchical  Europe.  Its  constitution,  though 
nominally  monarchical,  was  in  reality  republican.  Its  kings 
were  elected,  and  were  obliged  to  accept  a  contract  styled 
Pacta  Convefita,  the  provisions  of  which  they  swore  to  observe. 
They  presided  at  the  National  Assembly,  and  if  they  wished 
they  could  lead  the  army.  The  Senate,  which  was  the  real 
executive,  was  practically  free  from  the  control  of  the  king, 
but  was  carefully  supervised  by  the  Diet.  This  body,  which 
formerly  had  included  the  whole  adult  nobility,  was  now  com- 
posed of  400  deputies,  elected  by  the  provincial  assemblies, 
and  given  full  instructions  as  to  their  line  of  conduct  at  the 


The  Beginning  of  the  Eighteenth  Century         19 

Diet.  Every  resolution  of  the  Diet  had  to  be  unanimous,  and, 
consequently,  a  single  deputy  could  by  his  veto  stop  all  busi- 
ness. When  the  state  machinery  was  seriously  interfered  with 
by  the  exercise  of  the  veto,  or  by  obstruction,  recourse  was 
had  to  a  '  Confederation,'  an  extraordinary  assembly  in  which 
the  veto  was  not  allowed.  Thus  the  Polish  constitution  with 
its  liberiun  veto^  its  right  of  private  confederation,  and  its  Pacta 
Conventa,  was  little  more  than  anarchy  indifferently  organised. 
The  king  had  practically  no  power  amid  the  strife  of  parties 
and  the  struggles  of  factions. 

During  the  eighteenth  century  Poland  attracted  the  attention 
of  Europe,  just  as  Spain  had  been  the  centre  of  interest  during 
the  latter  half  of  the  seventeenth  century.  The  question  of  the 
partition  of  the  Spanish  Empire  had  occupied  the  minds  of 
the  sovereigns  of  Christendom  during  Louis  xiv.'s  long  reign ; 
the  question  of  the  partition  of  Poland  was  destined,  even  early 
in  the  eighteenth  century,  to  be  of  vital  interest  and  importance 
to  the  greater  part  of  Europe.  A  kingdom  in  area  larger  than 
France,  whose  people  were  all  soldiers,  and  which  was  placed 
in  the  centre  of  Europe,  between  Prussia,  Austria,  and  Russia, 
was  certain  to  become  the  centre  of  rivalry  between  these  three 
Powers,  a  rivalry  complicated  by  the  interest  always  taken  by 
France  in  Polish  affairs.  The  Polish  Succession  War,  the  dip- 
lomatic struggle  which  raged  in  Poland  during  the  years  imme- 
diately preceding  the  Seven  Years'  War,  and  the  history  of 
the  East  of  Europe,  from  1764  to  1774,  bring  out  clearly  the 
inherent  defects  of  the  Polish  constitution,  and  the  recognition 
by  Europe  of  the  importance  of  Poland,  as  well  as  the  designs 
of  Russia  upon  her  independence,  and  the  inabiUty  of  France 
to  carry  into  effect  her  extravagant  pretensions. 

In   Italy  Austrian  interests  were  of  vast  importance.     The 
Treaty  of  Utrecht  had  temporarily  destroyed  French  and  Span- 
ish influence  in  the  Peninsula.     Naples,  Sardinia, 
the  Milanese,  Mantua,  and  the  Tuscan  Presidencies 
were  given  to  Austria.     The  House  of  Savoy,  now  firmly  estab- 
hshed  in  Piedmont,  and  in  possession  of  Sicily,  was  Italy's  one 


20  European  History^   1715-1789 

hope.  The  House  of  Savoy  was  to  Italy  what  the  Electors  of 
Brandenberg  were  to  Germany.  It  only  required  time  for  the 
Milanese  to  be  absorbed  by  that  astute  House  —  like  an  arti- 
choke, leaf  by  leaf.  Northern  Italy  was,  in  17 15,  divided  be- 
tween Savoy,  Austria,  Venice,  and  the  republic  of  Genoa.  In 
the  centre  were  Modena  ruled  by  the  Estes,  Tuscany  ruled 
by  the  Medici,  Parma  and  Piacenza  ruled  by  the  Farnese,  the 
Tuscan  Presidencies  in  the  hands  of  Austria,  the  Papal  domin- 
ions and  the  republic  of  Lucca.  In  the  south,  Austria  held 
Naples,  and  Savoy  held  Sicily  for  a  few  years.  Spain,  though 
ousted  for  the  moment,  was  only  watching  for  an  opportunity 
of  restoring  her  influence  in  the  Italian  Peninsula. 

To  the  astonishment  of  Europe,  Spain,  so  far  from  accepting 
defeat  and  allowing  herself  to  be  numbered  with  Portugal, 
Spain  and  Venice,  and  indeed  Holland,  showed  unexpected 
Portugal.  vitality,  and  prepared  with  renewed  vigour  to  take 
her  place  among  the  leading  European  nations.  Th^  loss  of 
her  outlying  possessions  in  Italy,  and  of  the  Spanish  Nether- 
lands, was  in  reality  a  gain  to  Spain.  The  expenses  connected 
with  these  possessions  had  been  enormous,  and  men  and  money 
were  frequently  wasted  in  defending  them.  The  establishment 
of  Philip  V.  upon  the  throne  had  been  followed  by  many  neces- 
sary reforms,  carried  out  by  means  of  foreign  statesmen,  who 
for  some  seventy  years  play  an  important  part  in  the  regenera- 
tion of  Spain.  French  ideas  and  methods  of  administration 
were  introduced,  the  obsolete  policy  of  the  Hapsburg  line  was 
thrown  to  the  winds,  the  government  became  more  centralised 
and  better  organised,  obstacles  to  free  trade  between  the  vari- 
ous provinces  were  removed,  the  army  was  reorganised  on 
the  French  model,  and  even  the  privileges  of  the  clergy  were 
viewed  with  jealousy  and  suspicion.  Of  the  ministers  under 
whose  guidance  Spanish  regeneration  was  attempted,  Alberoni 
was  an  Italian,  Ripperda  came  from  Holland,  Patifio's  family, 
though  of  Spanish  origin,  had  long  been  settled  in  Milan,  while 
Squillacci,  the  Finance  Minister  during  the  early  years  of 
Charles  iii.'s  reign,  was  an  Italian. 


The  Beginning  of  the  Eighteenth  Century         21 

From  1 7 13,  too,  the  relations  between  Spain  and  France 
tend  towards  a  distinct  improvement.  As  long  as  Spain  held 
the  Netherlands  a  constant  source  of  friction  existed.  France 
since  the  days  of  Philip  Valois  has  aimed  at  expansion  on  the 
side  of  Flanders,  and  during  the  latter  half  of  the  seventeenth 
century  Louis  xiv.  had  made  consistent  attempts  to  extend  the 
French  frontier  to  the  Rhine  and  the  Scheldt.  From  1713  the 
Netherlands  ceased  to  be  a  bone  of  contention  between  Spain 
and  France,  The  Spanish  power  was  rendered  more  compact 
by  the  loss  of  Flanders,  one  great  obstacle  to  close  and  friendly 
relations  with  France  was  removed,  and  another  step  taken 
towards  the  estabhshment  of  a  state  of  things  summed  up  in 
the  famous  sentence,  '  Henceforth  there  are  no  Pyrenees.' 
As  soon  as  the  dynastic  rivalry  between  the  House  of  Orleans, 
and  the  Spanish  Bourbons  ceased,  Spain  and  France  having  no 
colonial  rivalries  and  no  jarring  interests  in  Europe  to  separate, 
^eiii,  naturally  tended  to  draw  together  and  to  oppose  the 
aggressive  policy  of  England  in  the  colonies  as  well  as  her 
maritime  supremacy.  The  years  between  17 13  and  1733  are 
"  those  in  which  friendly  relations  between  Spain  and  France  are 
at  times  interrupted  by  the  dynastic  ambitions  of  Philip  v.  and 
the  impatience  of  Elizabeth  Farnese,  but  from  1733  the  neces- 
sity of  a  union  between  Spain  and  France  was  gradually  realised 
by  French  and  Spanish  statesmen. 

Between  Spain  and  Portugal  hostilities  had  ceased  in  1713  ; 
and  the  latter  country,  under  John  v.,  remained  at  peace  and 
under  English  protection  for  many  years,  during  which  her 
army,  navy,  and  administration  decayed.  It  was  not  till  the 
accession  of  Joseph  i.  in  1750  that  Portugal,  owing  to  the  abil- 
ity and  energy  of  Pombal,  awoke  from  its  lethargy  and  entered 
upon  one  of  the  most  flourishing  periods  in  her  history. 

The  Treaty  of  Utrecht  brought  no  tranquillity  to  northern 
Europe.     There  the  final  scene  in  the  fall  of  Sweden  was  being 
enacted,  and  it  was  not  till  1721  that  the  Peace  of  The  North 
Nystad  pacified  the  north,  closed  one  epoch,  and   of  Europe, 
opened  another.     \\\\X\  the  death  of  Charles  xii.  the  Swedish 


22  European  History,   171 5-1789 

Government  passed  into  the  hands  of  an  oligarchy ;  the  rise  of 
Prussia  rendered  the  question  of  the  entire  loss  of  the  Swedish 
possessions  in  Germany  a  mere  matter  of  time ;  and  the  rise  of 
Russia  substituted  for  Sweden — henceforth  a  third-rate  Power 
—  a  Slav  state  which  has  produced  a  succession  of  rulers  as 
able  as  those  of  the  Vasa  dynasty,  and  has  resources  and  possi- 
bihties  of  expansion  and  development  on  all  sides  denied  to 
the  Scandinavian  kingdom. 

Under  Peter  the  Great,  who  had  become  Tsar  in  1682, 
Russia  had  made  enormous  strides  in  civilisation.  Her  domes- 
tic policy  and  institutions  had  been  revolutionised.  St.  Peters- 
burg took  the  place  of  Moscow,  western  ideas  and  habits  had 
been  introduced,  the  power  of  the  nobles  curbed,  and  the 
Church  and  army,  now  trained  in  the  European  model  under 
foreign  officers,  brought  definitely  under  the  control  of  the  Tsar. 
The  firm  establishment  of  his  despotic  rule  at  home  was  coin- 
cident with  an  equally  marked  revolution  in  foreign  policy. 
Peter  saw  with  clearness  that  for  the  development  of  Russia 
into  a  commercial  nation  the  first  essential  was  to  obtain  a  foot- 
ing upon  the  Baltic  and  Black  Seas.  As  time  went  on  he 
became  no  less  anxious  to  extend  the  frontiers  of  Russia  at  the 
expense  of  Poland. 

In  1 709,  at  the  battle  of  Poltava,  Sweden's  efforts  for  a  cen- 
tury to  obtain  permanent  mastery  over  the  Baltic  ended  in  fail- 
ure, and  the  work  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  and  Charles  x.  was 
undone.  After  eleven  years,  mainly  occupied  in  Charles  xii.'s 
fruitless  struggles,  the  Treaty  of  Nystad  recognised  the  substi- 
tution of  Russia  for  Sweden  as  the  leading  Power  in  the  Baltic 
and  the  north  of  Europe. 

Against  the  Turks  Peter  the  Great  was  not  so  successful.  In 
1696  the  capture  of  Azov  marked  the  entrance  of  Russia  into 
The  Eastern  the  poHtics  of  south-eastem  Europe ;  and  with 
Question.  '^^  simultaneous  extension  of  the  Russian  and 
Austrian  possessions  at  the  expense  of  Turkey  by  the  Treaty  of 
Carlowitz,  in  1699,  eastern  politics  entered  upon  a  new  phase. 
The  further  expansion  of  Russia  southwards  was  temporarily 


The  Begin7ii7ig  of  the  Eighteenth  Century         23 

checked  by  the  capitulation  of  the  Pnith  in  1711,  but  hence- 
fonvard  Russia  and  Turkey  stand  face  to  face.  As  the  cen- 
tury proceeds,  the  steady  decline  of  Turkey  brings  forward  new 
questions  and  raises  serious  complications.  While  Russia  en- 
deavours to  establish  herself  on  the  Black  Sea,  Austria  simulta- 
neously attempts  to  push  her  way  down  the  Danube.  These 
movements,  together  with  the  united  action  of  the  Courts  of 
St.  Petersburg  and  Vienna,  during  the  greater  part  of  the  cen- 
tury, in  south-eastern  Europe,  rouse  the  alarm  of  France.  From 
Dubois  to  Vergennes  French  statesmen  are  forced  to  realise  the 
significance  of  the  new  developments,  and  to  consider  the  ad- 
visability of  opposing  them  by  vigorous  action  in  conjunction 
with  Turkev.  or  of  aidinsr  them  bv  a  Russian  alliance.  The 
Treaty  of  Kainardji,  in  1774,  marks  the  beginning  of  a  new 
period  in  the  Eastern  Question.  The  objects  of  Russia  were 
openly  avowed,  and  ten  years  later  England  became  alive  to 
the  aims  of  Russian  ambition,  and  apprehensive  of  the  results 
of  the  break-up  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Europe  was  hence- 
forward compelled  to  interest  itself  in  the  Eastern  Question, 
and  to  endeavour  to  decide  whether  the  continued  presence  of 
the  Turks  in  Europe  was  a  lesser  evil  than  the  aggrandisement 
of  Russia. 

The  history  of  northern,  eastern,  and  south-eastern  Europe 
is  thus  of  vast  importance  during  the  eighteenth  century,  and 
the  \dcissitudes  of  the  various  nations  inhabiting  these  portions 
of  Europe  have  far-reaching  effects  upon  the  balance  of  power. 

The  decHne  of  Turkey,  Poland,  and  Sweden  —  countries 
which  had  played  considerable  parts  in  the  seventeenth  century 
—  gave  an  opportunity  for  the  rise  of  younger  nations  with 
greater  natural  advantages,  or  provided  with  a  form  of  govern- 
ment more  suitable  for  an  age  which  was  characterised  by  the 
growth  of  large  states  and  the  establishment  of  so-called  benev- 
olent despotisms. 

The  rise  of  Russia  constitutes,  with  that  of  Prussia,  one  of 
the  most  remarkable  features  of  the  history  of  northern  and 
eastern    Europe  in  the  eighteenth    century.     In  1721,  at  the 


24  European  History,   17 15-1789 

Peace  of  Nystad,  she  became  the  leading  Baltic  power,  and  a 
standing  menace  to  the  independence  of  Sweden ;  with  the 
Treaty  of  Carlowitz  (1699),  ^^^  ^^^  campaign  of  the  Pruth  in 
1 71 1,  the  Eastern  Question  may  be  said  to  have  been  opened  ; 
with  the  outbreak  of  the  Polish  Succession  War  in  1733  the 
idea  of  a  partition  of  Poland  begins  to  take  definite  shape. 
_     J         ^         In    December    171s    Charles    xii.    returned    to 

Sweden  and  '     -^ 

France  in     ^Stockholm  after  an  absence  of  sixteen  years,  and 
^^^^'  the  final  struggle  between  Sweden  and  the  North- 

ern League,  of  which  Russia  was  a  leading  member,  seriously 
began. 

The  year  1715  found  France  at  peace  with  her  neighbours, 
but  torn  by  religious  divisions  and  with  her  provinces  perma- 
nently impoverished.  The  Treaty  of  Utrecht  had  left  her  with 
her  frontiers  strengthened  and  her  position  secure.  She  had 
brought  the  art  of  war  to  a  high  pitch  of  perfection,  and  her 
diplomatic  service  was  the  best  in  Europe.  She  had  dissevered 
the  Empire  from  Spain  ;  she  had  advanced  her  own  boundaries, 
and  still  held  Strasburg  and  Alsace.  She  had  placed  her  own 
candidate  on  the  Spanish  throne,  and  she  had  emerged  from 
the  late  war  with  her  reputation  still  high  and  her  aUiance  still 
courted.  Though  probably  incapable  of  successful  colonisa- 
tion, and  torn  by  internal  divisions,  France  could  boast  of  a 
unity  and  a  concentration  of  resources  which  enabled  her,  till 
the  close  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  to  exercise  very  great  influ- 
ence in  Europe,  and  at  times  to  inspire  alarm  by  her  apparently 
successful  efforts  in  the  direction  of  universal  empire. 


CHAPTER    II 

ALBERONI  AND   DUBOIS 

1715-1723 

The  Regency  —  The  Regent  Orleans  —  The  Religious  Controversy — The  Re- 
action in  Home  Affairs  —  The  Parlement  oi  Paris  —  The  Struggle  between 
the  Jesuits  and  Jansenists  —  Law  and  the  Finances  —  His  Economic  Views 
—  The  Mississippi  Scheme  —  Close  of  the  Reaction  in  Home  Affairs  — 
Dubois  and  French  Foreign  Policy  —  Charles  vi,  and  Spain  —  Alberoni's 
Reforms — His  Foreign  Policy  —  George  I.  —  Hanover  —  The  Treaty  of 
Westminster  and  The  Triple  Alliance  —  George  l.'s  Policy  —  Dubois  at  The 
Hague  and  in  Hanover  —  The  Northern  War  —  The  Triple  AlHance  —  The 
Invasion  of  Sardinia — Its  Justification  —  Triumph  of  Dubois  —  Alberoni's 
Difficulties  —  The  Quadruple  Alliance — Fall  of  Alberoni  —  Spain  joins  the 
Quadruple  Alliance  —  Marriage  Alliances  between  France  and  Spain  — 
Charles  XII.  and  his  Foes  —  Peter  the  Great  and  the  League  —  His  Visit  to 
Paris  —  The  Conference  of  Aland  —  Death  of  Charles  xii.  —  Revolution  in 
Sweden  —  Treaties  between  Sweden  and  the  Members  of  the  League — The 
Treat}'  of  Xystad  —  Success  of  the  Policy  of  Stanhope  and  Dubois  — 
Alberoni,  Goertz,  and  Dubois. 

The  death  of  Louis  xiv.  was  an  event  of  importance  to 
Europe  no  less  than  to  France.  Louis  xv.  was  not  expected 
to  Hve,  and  in  consequence  the  relations  of  The 
France  and  Spain  were  at  once  modified.  Philip  v.  Regency, 
was  set  upon  securing  the  French  crown,  and  regarded  Orleans 
with  unconcealed  dislike.  But  Spain  was  far  from  ready  to 
take  any  hostile  action,  and  Orleans  was  left  to  carry  on  the 
government  of  France  on  principles  diametrically  opposed  to 
those  adopted  by  Louis  xr'.  France  had  emerged  from  the 
Spanish  Succession  War  exhausted  but  intact.  The  great  need 
of  the  country  was  peace,  and  a  change  in  the  character  of  the 


26  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

governmental  system  was  earnestly  desired.     The  Regency  of 
Orleans  endeavoured  to  satisfy  the  country  on  both  these  points. 

The  nephew  of  Louis  xiv.  and  first  prince  of  the  blood, 
PhiHp,  Duke  of  Orleans,  had  been  a  prominent  factor  in 
French  poHtics  during  the  Spanish  Succession  War.  He  had 
been  accused  of  poisoning  the  Dukes  of  Burgundy,  Berry,  and 
Brittany,  and  of  aiming  at  the  Spanish  throne.  Louis  xiv. 
disliked  him ;  and  though  he  had  shown  bravery  and  ability  as 
a  general  during  the  late  war,  with  the  French  nation  he  was 
never  popular.  At  the  beginning  of  1715  Louis  had  signed  a 
will  making  Orleans  regent,  but  giving  the  real  power  to  a 
Council  of  Regency  composed  of  fifteen  supporters  of  the  old 
regime,  including  Maine,  Toulouse,  Villeroy,  Voysin,  Tallard, 
and  Pontchartrain.  To  the  Duke  of  Maine,  son  of  Madame  de 
Montespan,  was  given  the  guardianship  of  the  Dauphin,  with 
the  charge  of  the  Maison  du  Roi,  or  royal  guards ;  to  Villeroy 
was  intrusted  the  execution  of  the  arrangements.  The  history 
of  the  attempts  of  Henry  iv.  and  Louis  xiii.  to  bind  their  suc- 
cessors might  have  warned  Louis  xiv.  that  his  efforts  would  be 
futile.  The  whole  country  since  the  close  of  the  war  had 
impatiently  desired  a  complete  change  from  the  ideas  of  the 
later  years  of  Louis  xiv.'s  reign ;  and  Orleans  found  himself 
the  centre  of  the  aspirations  of  a  generation  weary  of  the 
narrowness  and  rigidity  of  a  court  dominated  by  Jesuits, 
and  ready  to  make  the  Regency  as  notorious  as  the  EngUsh 
restoration  of  1660  by  the  wild  excesses  which  marked  its 
estabHshment. 

Two  days  after  the  death  of  Louis  xiv.  the  Parlemenf  of 
Paris  revoked  the  king's  will  and  declared  Orleans  Regent  with 
full  powers.  Freed  from  the  restraint  which  Louis  had  en- 
deavoured to  impose  upon  his  actions,  Orleans  at  once  recast 
the  government  and  formed  an  administration  on  aristocratic 
lines.  He  nominated  the  members  of  the  Regency  Council, 
who  were,  in  addition  to  himself,  the  Dukes  of  Bourbon  and 
Maine,  the  Count  of  Toulouse,  Chancellor  d'Aguesseau,  Saint- 
Simon,  the  Marshals  Villeroy,  Harcourt,  and  Bezons,  and  the 


Alberofii  and  Dubois  2^ 

Bishop  of  Troyes ;  and  following  the  principles  ascribed  to 
Fenelon  and  the  late  Duke  of  Burgundy,  he  appointed,  with 
the  full  approval  of  Saint-Simon,  seven  Councils :  Finance, 
Foreign  Affairs,  War,  the  Navy,  Conscience,  Commerce,  and 
Home  Affairs  —  each  composed  of  ten  persons  mainly  selected 
from  the  ranks  of  the  noblesse.     In  other  respects   ^^   „ 

^ .  The  Regent. 

Orleans  showed  himself  equally  willing  and  anxious 
to  shake  himself  clear  from  the  traditions  of  the  late  regime. 
He  was  himself  remarkably  intelligent ;  in  the  liberality  of  his 
views  he  belonged  essentially  to  the  eighteenth  centur}' ;  he  was 
interested  in  the  new  ideas,  and  open  to  new  influences;  he  had 
scientific  instincts,  and  was  especially  devoted  to.  the  study  of 
chemistry,  besides  being  an  accomplished  musician  and  painter. 
He  at  once  broke  with  the  principles  and  system  of  the  late 
reign  :  and  in  considering  the  possibility  of  the  recall  of  the  Prot- 
estants, of  the  suppression  of  the  Jesuits,  and  of  the  Convoca- 
tion of  the  States-General,  he  showed  himself  at  least  alive  to 
the  real  needs  of  France.  But  his  indolence,  frivolity,  and 
vicious  life,  in  which  he  had  not  been  checked  by  his  tutor 
the  Abb6  Dubois,  made  him  indifferent  to  reforms  for  their  own 
sake,  and  hindered  the  realisation  of  his  well-meant  projects, 
and  he  left  to  his  successors  the  duty  of  carrying  out  his  liberal 
programme.  In  forming  an  estimate  of  the  government  of  the 
Regency,  the  difficulties  experienced  by  Orleans  must  always 
be  borne  in  mind.  Till  1718  he  was  not  a  free  agent.  His 
home  policy  was  hampered  by  the  jealousies  and  intrigues  of 
the  nobles,  by  the  quarrels  of  the  Jesuits  and  Jansenists,  and 
by  the  obstinacy  of  the  Park?fie?it  of  Paris ;  while  his  foreign 
policy  was  vigorously  attacked  by  all  the  ministers,  headed  by 
d'Huxelles  and  Torcy,  who  were  supported  in  France  by  public 
opinion,  and  elsewhere  by  Alberoni,  the  Pope,  and  Philip  v. 

Not  the  least  of  the  difficulties  which  met  Orleans    at    the 
outset  was  to    be    found   in    the   hostile    relations   The 
subsisting   between    the    Jesuits    and     Jansenists.    confroversy 
The  late  king  had  left  France  torn  by  a  religious   in  France, 
conflict,    which   was    not   appeased    till   the    outbreak    of  the 


28  Europea7i  History y   171 5-1789 

Revolution.  From  a  mistaken  sense  of  duty,  Louis  xiv.  had 
endeavoured  shortly  before  his  death  to  force  upon  France 
absolute  uniformity  in  religious  matters. 

In  1709  Port  Royal,  the  home  of  the  Jansenists,  was  de- 
stroyed, and  in  1713  the  publication  of  the  Bull  Unigenitus  as- 
tonished and  alarmed  all  moderate  men.  By  this  Bull  a  hun- 
dred and  one  propositions  in  a  work  by  the  Jansenist  Quesnel 

—  entitled,  Moral  Reflections  upon  the  New  Testament —  were 
condemned.  The  volume  \mtten  in  1671  had  been  ver}^  gen- 
erally  read,  and  a  new  edition  published  in  1699,  and  dedicated 
to  the  Cardinal  de  Noailles,  the  Archbishop  of  Paris,  was  re- 
garded \\ith  favour  by  Pere  la  Chaise,  Louis'  confessor,  and  even 
received  praise  from  Clement  xi.  himself.  But  Le  Tellier  deter- 
mined to  use  the  book  as  a  ground  for  a  general  attack  on  all 
who  were  not  Jesuits.  The  Jesuit  Society  had  met  with  reverses 
in  China,  and  Le  Tellier  hated  both  De  Noailles  and  the  Jan- 
senists.  By  uniting  the  Pope  and  the  society  closely  together 
in  a  crusade  against  Quesnel's  book,  he  would  be  satisfying  his 
personal  feelings  of  hate  while  raising  the  reputation  of  his  own 
Order.  It  was  only  after  repeated  efforts  that  the  weak  and 
undecided  Pope  could  be  persuaded  to  launch  the  Bull  Uni- 
genitus —  which  was  destined  to  plunge  France  into  a  struggle 
which  had  hardly  died  out  in  1789.  Forty  French  bishops  ac- 
cepted the  Bull,  while  De  Noailles  and  fourteen  others  refused  ; 
and  this  division  of  opinion  was  reproduced  in  all  classes  of  French 
society,  lay  and  ecclesiastical.  Louis  xiv.  having  with  difficulty 
compelled  the  Parleynentoi  Paris  to  register  the  Bull,  proceeded 
to  order  the  suppression  not  only  of  the  Moral  Reflectiotis,  but  of 
all  books  written  in  its  defence.  But  in  this  matter  the  Grafid 
Monarque  found  that  his  authority  was  by  no  means  accepted. 
Neither  imprisonment  nor  banishm_ent  could  restrain  the  fierce 
opposition  —  the  first  encountered  since  the  end  of  the  Fronde 

—  to  all  his  attempts  to  repress  discussion.  The  Regent,  with 
his  easy-going  nature  and  lax  principles,  had  no  hesitation  in 
undoing  his  predecessor's  work,  and  the  first  half  of  the  Re- 
gency saw  a   thorough   reaction.     The  Court  was  transferred 


Albcroni  and  Dicbois  29 

to  Paris,  the  Jansenist  prisoners  were  released,  the  Cardinal  de 
Noailles,  leader  of  the  opposition  to  the  Bull  Uni-  The 
genitus,  was  placed  at  the  head  of  the  Council  of  Reaction. 
Conscience,  into  which  the  Abbe  Pucelle,  a  well-known  Jan- 
senist, was  introduced,  and  Pere  le  Telher  was  driven  into 
exile.  The  recall  of  the  Huguenots  was  mooted,  while  the  sup- 
pression of  the  Jesuits,  and  even  the  summoning  of  the  States- 
General,  was  discussed  in  the  secret  councils  of  the  Regent. 
The  finances  were  taken  in  hand ;  literature,  freed  from  the 
numbing  influence  of  the  last  reign,  showed  signs  of  revival ; 
it  seemed  as  if  an  honest  attempt  was  to  be  made  to  grapple 
with  the  difficulties  of  the  situation  as  left  by  Louis  xiv.  Even 
the  Pai'lement  of  Paris  recovered  its  rights  of  registration  and 
remonstrance.^ 

The  Parle7nent  of  Paris,  and  the  twelve  provincial  Parleinents, 
were  law  courts,  and  in  no  sense  legislative  or  representative 
assemblies.     They  were   judicial    and    mao^isterial   ^^ 

*-'  The 

bodies,  High  Courts  of  Justice,  consisting  of  the  Pariement 
most  eminent  lawyers  nominated  by  the  Crown.  °  Pans. 
Of  these  the  Farlemefit  of  Paris  was  the  most  important,  its 
members  holding  their  offices,  which  were  hereditary,  by  pur- 
chase. In  addition  to  its  judicial  duties  the  Parkme?it  of 
Paris  claimed  the  right  to  exercise  two  functions  of  a  political 
nature  —  the  right  of  remonstrating  against  the  edicts  of  the 
king,  and  the  power  of  veto  upon  legislation.  In  ordinary 
times  a  royal  edict  was  sent  to  the  Farleme?tt,  as  being  the 
highest  court  of  the  realm  for  registration  ;  but  the  Farkmefif, 
not  content  with  merely  performing  its  duty,  claimed  the  right 
of  withholding  or  delaying  its  sanction.  The  French  kings  had 
never  acquiesced  in  this  claim,  and  at  times  annihilated  the 
power  of  the  Pariement  by  holding  a  Lit  de  Justice  and  enforc- 
ing registration.  During  the  greater  part  of  Louis  xiv.'s  reign 
the  Pariement  was  confined  entirely  to  its  judicial  functions ; 
but  with  the  accession  of  Louis  xv.  it  at  once  regained  its  full 

^  See  Aubertin,  V Esprit  Public  an  XVIII"^^  Siecle ;  and  Rocquain, 
V Esprit  RevolutioJinaire  avant  la  Revolution. 


30  Europea7i  History,    171 5-1789 

authority.  Composed  for  the  most  part  of  men  who  belonged 
to  the  richest  famihes  in  France,  the  members  of  the  Parle- 
ment  were  enabled,  owing  to  the  permanent  and  hereditary 
character  of  their  posts,  to  adopt  a  bold  attitude,  to  act  inde- 
pendently of  the  royal  power.  With  the  growth  of  industry 
and  commerce  the  legal  profession  in  France  was  growing  in 
importance ;  and  as  no  States-General  was  summoned,  the 
Parkment  was  given  an  admirable  opportunity  of  posing  as  the 
representative  of  public  opinion  in  such  questions  as  those 
connected  with  the  Bull  Unigenitus  and  the  Jansenists.  The 
Parkment  wisely  took  up  the  popular  cause,  performed  the  use- 
ful function  of  giving  expression  to  the  general  discontent,  and 
throughout  the  century  headed  an  open,  direct,  and  serious 
opposition  to  the  Crown.  In  1718-20,  in  1729-32,  in  1752-56, 
in  1763-71,  and  in  1787-88  the  Parte??iefit  is  found  stoutly 
contesting  the  policy  of  Louis  xv.  and  his  advisers.  Some 
40,000  persons  were  employed  in  the  various  Courts  of  Judi- 
cature which  composed  the  Parkmefit,  and  formed  a  popula- 
tion distinct  from  the  rest  of  the  nation.  Puffed  up  with 
self-importance,  and  renowned  for  its  gravity,  its  severity,  its 
formality,  the  narrowness  of  its  views,  and  its  pride,  the  Parha- 
mentary  society  stood  apart  from  all  other  classes  —  an  isolated 
corporation  which  owed  its  temporary  popularity  to  adventi- 
tious causes.  Though  at  times  acting  as  a  constitutional  check 
upon  misgovernment,  it  was  equally  ready  to  enter  upon  a 
quarrel  with  the  Crown  on  a  question  of  etiquette ;  and  having 
successfully  opposed  the  numerous  attempts  at  reform  in  the 
early  years  of  Louis  xvi.'s  reign,  met  its  well-deserved  fate  at 
the  hands  of  the  revolutionists. 

At  the  outset  of  Orleans'  government,  however,  no  signs  of 
opposition  appeared.  The  nobles,  the  Parkme/it  of  Paris, 
The  struggle  the  Jansenists,  and  the  Philosophers,  as  yet  but  a 
T*esuits  and*  Small  body,  all  had  reason  to  support  the  Regency 
Jansenists.  and  to  look  for  further  and  important  cli^nges. 
Into  the  arms  of  these  sections,  which  had  been  regarded 
during  the  later  years  of  Louis'  reign  with  suspicion,  Orleans 


Alberoni  and  Dubois  31 

threw  himself.  He  had  not  only  reversed  the  system  of  his 
predecessors ;  he  had  practically  recognised  the  right  of  the 
nation  to  fill  a  vacancy  to  the  throne  in  an  edict  which  had 
for  its  primary  object  the  exclusion  of  the  bastard  princes. 
He  had  thus  deserted  the  old  Bourbon  principle  that  the 
state  was  the  property  of  the  king,  and  had  advanced  a  novel 
and  a  popular  theory. 

The  nation  as  a  whole  had  eagerly  welcomed  the  Regency, 
as  marking  the  beginning  of  a  new  era.  Orleans  had  become 
the  representative  of  the  reaction,  and  had  by  his  acts  expressed 
the  national  sentiment.  But  his  well-meant  attempts  were  not 
destined  to  meet  with  that  success  which  he  anticipated.  The 
nobles,  for  the  most  part  unaccustomed  to  administrative  work, 
occupied  themselves  with  intriguing  against  the  Regent.  The 
Parlernent  showed  an  almost  less  statesmanlike  spirit,  allowed 
itself  to  be  involved  in  petty  religious  and  poUtical  squabbles, 
and  made  no  attempt  to  aid  Orleans  in  his  difficult  task  of 
governing  France. 

Nor  did  the  religious  parties  show  more  capacity  or  modera- 
tion in  their  conduct. 

Orleans  had  on  becoming  Regent  imagined  that  religious 
peace  could  easily  be  restored,  and  made  honest  attempts  to 
adopt  a  policy  of  conciliation.  Though  both  the  Jesuits  and 
the  Pope  refused  to  hear  of  any  compromise,  their  determina- 
tion was  shaken  by  the  action  of  four  Jansenist  Bishops  who, 
on  March  5,  1717,  appealed  to  a  general  council.  These 
Bishops,  De  la  Broue  of  Mirepoix,  Soanen  of  Seney,  Colbert 
of  MontpeUier,  and  Langle  of  Boulogne,  were  supported  by 
the  Faculty  of  Theolog}-,  and  their  well-drawn  appeal  afforded 
a  rallying  point  to  the  widespread  opposition  to  the  Bull,  and 
brought  about  negotiations  between  the  Pope  and  Noailles. 
The  consistent  opposition  of  the  Pope  and  Jesuits  to  the 
Regent,  and  their  connection  with  the  Cellamare  conspiracy, 
weighed  against  Dubois'  desire  of  a  Cardinalate,  and  his  in- 
fluence in  favour  of  the  Jesuits.  At  length  Orleans,  wearied 
with   the  endless  discussions  and  interminable   disputes   over 


32  Etiropcaii  History,   171 5-1789 

the  Bull,  ordered  silence  upon  all  parties.  In  1720  a  tem- 
porary agreement  was  come  to,  Noailles  ordered  the  accept- 
ance of  a  certain  exposition  of  the  Bull  Unigenitus,  and 
Dubois  induced  the  Parlement  of  Paris  to  accept  it.  But  the 
four  Bishops,  supported  by  the  clergy  and  Paris,  refused  to 
accept  the  Bull ;  and  a  Council  of  Conscience,  composed 
of  Cardinals  Dubois,  Rohan,  Bissy,  and  the  future  Cardinal 
Fleury,  was  unable  to  secure  adhesion  to  the  proposed  ac- 
commodation. Seven  Bishops  forwarded  to  the  new  Pope 
Innocent  xiii.  an  appeal  to  a  general  Council,  with  the  only 
result  that  the  French  Government,  under  the  influence  of 
Dubois,  threw  all  its  influence  on  the  side  of  the  Pope,  and 
numbers  of  Jansenists  were  evicted  or  imprisoned. 

In  endeavouring  to  give  religious  peace  to  the  country  the 
Pa7-lement  had  supported  the  Regent  so  long  as  his  efforts  were 
directed  against  the  Jesuits.  But  as  soon  as  he  endeavoured 
to  relieve  the  lot  of  the  Protestants,  Orleans  found  l^mself 
opposed  by  the  Jansenists  no  less  than  by  the  Jesuits,  and  by 
the  whole  force  of  public  opinion  in  France.  His  own  posi- 
tion was,  moreover,  by  no  means  unassailable  ;  for,  owing  to 
the  suspicions  directed  against  him  during  the  latter  years  of 
Louis  XIV. 's  reign,  he  was  far  from  being  popular  with  the 
nation,  and  was  even  the  object  of  hatred  to  many  of  the 
nobles. 

In  the  early  years  of  his  rule,  however,  the  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  carrying  out  his  enlightened  views  did  not  appear  on 
the  surface,  and  so  long  as  Philip  v.  did  not  place  himself  at 
the  head  of  the  opposition  Orleans  was  secure. 

During  the  first  half  of  the  Regency,  when  the  reaction  in 
both  home  and  foreign  poHcy  proceeded  apace,  the  two  men 
Law  and  the  ^^'^o  wcrc  mainly  instnmiental  in  carrying  out  the 
Finances.  changes  wcre  Law  and  Dubois.  John  Law  was 
intrusted  with  the  reorganisation  of  the  finances,  while  Dubois 
was  allowed  to  reverse  the  foreign  policy  of  France.  For  the 
success  of  the  schemes  of  both  Dubois  and  Law  the  support  of 
the  Regent  was  indispensable,  and  the  triumph  of  their  viewsi 


Alberoiii  and  Dubois  33 

—  in  the  one  case  a  short-lived  one  —  is  seen  in  the  second 
half  of  the  Regency,  when  the  work  of  the  first  half  was  undone, 
and  the  reaction  came  to  an  end.  Both  men  agreed  in  exclud- 
ing the  nobles  from  the  control  of  affairs,  in  humiliating  the 
Parle  men  f,  and  generally  in  reviving  the  system  of  absolutism. 

The  finances  were,  during  the  early  years  of  the  Regency, 
intrusted  to  the  Due  de  Noailles,  whose  first  measures  were 
the  depreciation  of  the  coinage,  and  the  revision  of  the  float- 
ing debt,  by  means  of  a  Commission  headed  by  the  brothers 
Paris.  The  report  of  this  Commission  led  to  the  appointment 
of  a  Chamber  of  Justice,  known  as  the  Chambre  Ardente,  to 
inquire  into  the  conduct  of  the  farmers  of  taxes.  This  chamber 
did  not  restore  the  public  confidence,  and  was  dissolved  in  171 7, 
an  edict  being  issued  to  reassure  the  farmers  of  taxes  in  the 
future.  Noailles'  attempts  to  diminish  expenditure  and  to  en- 
force rigid  economy  were  equally  doomed  to  failure.  Though 
he  reduced  the  floating  debt  and  the  rate  of  interest,  and  was 
allowed  to  cut  down  the  expenses  of  the  Na^y,  he  found  him- 
self unable  to  touch  the  Court  expenditure.  France  required 
twenty  years  of  peace  and  retrenchment  under  an  administra- 
tion Hke  that  of  Walpole. 

In  1 7 18  D'Argenson  was  given  the  presidency  of  the  Finan- 
cial Council,  but  John  Law  was  the  real  manager  of  the  finances. 
The  year  17 18  in  various  ways  marks  the  close  of  the  reac- 
tion ;  for  it  was  on  August  26  of  that  year  that  the  Pai-lement, 
having  opposed  Law's  schemes,  having  seized  the  control 
of  the  finances,  and  having,  moreover,  for  several  months 
suspended  the  administration  of  justice,  was  punished  by  Or- 
leans, who,  supported  by  Dubois,  D'Argenson,  Saint-Simon, 
and  Bourbon,  declared  his  intentions  to  the  Council  of  Re- 
gency, held  a  Lit  de  Justice,  and  enforced  the  registration  of  an 
edict  forbidding  the  magistrates  to  meddle  with  finances  or 
v\ith  the  administration.  It  was,  too,  on  September  24,  of  the 
same  year  that  the  Councils  of  the  Nobles  were  dissolved,  and 
the  old  system  of  a  single  minister  for  each  department  was 
restored.     In  1720  the  Faf'leme?it  was  exiled,  the  Jansenists, 

PERIOD   VI.  c 


34  European  History ^   171 5-1789 

who  had  never   been   active  supporters  of  the  Regent,  were 
again  attacked,  and  the  Jesuits  were  favoured. 

In  thus  bringing  to  an  end  the  reaction  of  the  early  years  of 
the  Regency  John  Law  played  an  important  part.  In  spite  of 
His  Eco-  the  collapse  of  his  famous  Mississippi  scheme,  and 
nomic  Views,  gf  the  Contempt  which  has  been  poured  upon  the 
financial  policy  of  the  Regency,  John  Law  was  no  mere  charla- 
tan, nor  was  he  indeed  the  master  of  the  Government.  Many 
of  the  acts  attributed  to  him  were  carried  out  in  spite  of  his 
objections.  Law  was  a  firm,  if  not  fanatical,  believer  in  the 
power  of  credit,  and  he  was  keenly  alive  to  the  value  and  use 
of  paper  money.  The  wealth  of  England  and  Holland  was  in 
his  opinion  simply  the  result  of  the  good  credit  enjoyed  by 
both  these  countries ;  and  he  saw  no  reason  why  France,  with 
all  its  natural  advantages,  should  not,  by  a  proper  use  of  credit, 
extricate  herself  from  her  financial  embarrassments.  He  fully 
comprehended  that  credit  must  rest  on  confidence,  and  thaV 
paper  money  issued  without  proper  guarantees  would  fail ;  but 
in  his  anxiety  to  increase  the  supply  of  money  so  as  to  stimu- 
late commerce,  to  lower  the  high  rate  of  interest,  and  generally 
to  relieve  the  state  of  a  large  burden  of  its  debt,  he  overlooked 
some  elementary  economical  truths.  Law  was  a  Socialist,  that 
is  to  say,  he  worked  to  place  the  whole  direction  of  finance  and 
commerce  under  the  direction  of  the  state.  The  Government 
was  to  take  in  hand  the  management  of  a  huge  national  bank 
and  of  a  great  commercial  company.  By  these  means  the 
state  would  be  able  not  only  to  extinguish  the  national  debt,  but 
even  to  dispense  with  taxes.  Law  never  seems  to  have  real- 
ised how  impossible  it  was  for  that  confidence,  the  existence  of 
which  was  absolutely  necessary  for  the  success  of  his  scheme, 
to  subsist  under  the  government  of  the  Regency.  Credit  must 
rest  on  confidence,  which  is  itself  a  very  slow-growing  plant, 
and  which  amid  the  extravagance  and  corruption  of  Orleans' 
Court  could  not  be  expected  to  thrive.  Moreover,  being  under 
the  influence  of  the  Mississippi  system.  Law's  views  on  the 
value  of  a  large  currency  were  full  of  errors,  while  his  belief  in 


Alberoni  and  Dubois  35 

the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  the  state  acting  as  bankers 
was  contrary  to  all  experience.  Ignoring  agriculture  and  man- 
ufactures, he  looked  mainly  to  commerce  as  a  source  of  wealth, 
and  believed  that  the  actual  exchange  of  commodities  was  far 
more  important  than  the  production  of  wealth.  Many  of  his 
theories  undoubtedly  contained  valuable  truths,  but  the  general 
public  seized  upon  those  points  which  were  fallacious  and 
Utopian,  such  as  the  scheme  for  paying  off  the  national  debt 
and  for  abolishing  taxes.  The  collapse  of  his  projects  was  due 
not  so  much  to  the  existence  of  fallacies  in  his  theories  as  to 
the  rotten  state  of  the  French  Government  and  to  the  over- 
confidence  of  the  ignorant  multitude. 

In  1 716  Law  obtained  leave  to  estabhsh  a  private  bank  in 
imitation  of  the  Bank  of  England ;  and  in  spite  of  the  restric- 
tions imposed,  it  proved  ver)'  successful,  and  secured  ^j^^ 
the  patronage  of  the  Government.  In  171 7  he  Mississippi 
was  allowed  to  start  his  famous  *  Compagnie  de  ^  *'"*' 
I'Occident,'  better  known  as  the  ]\Iississippi  Company,  ^^'ith  its 
capital  of  two  hundred  thousand  shares  of  five  hundred  livres 
each.  His  object  was  to  unite  all  the  existing  trading  concerns 
into  one  vast  company,  and  to  get  control  of  the  foreign 
markets.  For  a  time  he  was  enabled  to  carry  out  his  aims. 
In  1 7 1 7  the  company  secured  the  monopoly  of  commerce  with 
Louisiana,  and  trade  in  beaver  skins  ^^'ith  Canada.  In  1 7 1 8  it 
undertook  the  tobacco  monopoly  and  absorbed  the  Senegal 
Company,  while  in  1 7 1 9  it  bought  up  the  East  India  Company. 
It  thus  gradually  monopolised  nearly  all  the  trade  of  France. 
Meanwhile  Law's  bank,  which  was  quite  distinct  from  the  com- 
pany of  the  west,  or  the  Great  India  Company  as  it  was  at  last 
kno^^^l,  had  become  the  state  bank,  which  began  at  once  to 
pour  forth  paper  money,  Law  thinking  that  wealth  could  be 
increased  by  increasing  the  currency,  and  not  realising  that 
paper  money  must  be  redeemable. 

Heedless  of  the  teaching  of  experience.  Law  proceeded  to 
undertake  the  most  gigantic  operations.  He  took  up  the  fund- 
ing of  the  national  debt,  and  all  coining,  as  well  as  the  farming 


36  European  History ^   17 15-1789 

of  the  taxes.  To  extend  the  use  of  paper  money,  an  edict 
was  issued  in  December  17 18  ordering  that,  in  Paris  and  other 
towns  where  the  bank  had  branches,  payment  in  silver  should 
be  limited  to  600  francs,  all  larger  sums  to  be  paid  in  gold  or 
notes. 

The  Company,  which  now  monopoHsed  the  trade  of  France, 
in  order  to  meet  the  expenses  incident  upon  buying  up  all  the 
non-trading  companies,  issued  shares  which  were  eagerly  ab- 
sorbed. In  July  1 718  the  Company  bought  the  control  of  the 
mint  for  five  years,  and  the  shares  doubled  in  value.  The 
Government  then  offered  to  the  Company —  (i)  extension  of 
its  privileges  for  fifty  years;  (2)  the  right  of  farming  all  indi- 
rect taxes.  In  return  the  Company  lent  the  Government  1500 
millions  at  3  per  cent,  to  pay  off  the  funded  debt.  The  Gov- 
ernment creditors  were  forced  to  take  their  payment  in  shares 
at  the  current  price  (the  shares  being  ten  times  their  original 
value).  Though  this  proved  beneficial  to  the  state  it  was  ruin- 
ous to  private  speculators.  A  rage  for  speculation  followed, 
and  the  original  shareholders  made  enormous  fortunes.  In 
1 719  Law  was  the  most  courted  man  in  France.  But  a  reac- 
tion soon  followed  the  speculative  craze,  and  in  the  collapse 
which  took  place  in  1 7  2 1  he  was  ruined  and  forced  to  leave 
the  country. 

Thus  the  reaction  in  home  affairs  had  not  proved  successful. 
The  Councils  of  the  Nobles  had  not  shown  any  aptitude  for 
Close  of  the  busincss,  and  in  17 18  had  been  dissolved;  the 
Reaction         Parle?nent  of  Paris  had  rapidly  fallen  into  disfavour 

in  Home  ^        -' 

Affairs.  with  the  Regent  on  account  of  its  opposition  to 

Law,  and  had  been  exiled  to  Pontoise  in  1720.  The  Jan- 
*  senists  were  again  persecuted,  and  while  Dubois  was  able  to 
secure  the  assent  of  the  Parlejne7it  of  Paris  to  a  temporary  and 
unsatisfactory  compromise,  he  himself  definitely  supported  the 
Jesuits. 

In  appearance  the  Government  at  the  close  of  Orleans' 
regency  had  returned  to  the  principles  and  methods  of  the 
previous  reign.     The   Bull   Unigenitus   had  been  registered ; 


Albero7ti  and  Dubois  37 

the  Farlemenf  of  Paris  had  lost  its  right  of  remonstrance. 
The  changes  effected  by  the  Regent  had  been  superficial. 
Though  the  liberalism  of  the  time  was  concentrated  in  Orleans, 
there  was  no  element  of  popular  hfe  in  the  reaction.  But 
though  the  reaction  may  at  first  sight  be  described  as  a 
*  temporary  oscillation  from  monarchy  to  aristocracy/  it  will  be 
found  on  closer  examination  that,  in  spite  of  its  folhes,  reck- 
lessness, and  apparent  retrograde  tendencies  in  its  later  years, 
the  regency  of  Orleans  was  not  without  valuable  results.  The 
ancient  monarchical  system  had  been  shaken,  and  the  Regent 
had  definitely  broken  with  the  ideas  of  Louis  xiv.'s  reign. 
Henceforward  a  spirit  of  unrest  and  inquiry  pervades  all  ranks 
of  French  society,  new  doctrines  are  openly  discussed,  philos- 
ophy becomes  popular.  The  eight  years  of  Orleans'  ministry 
had  opened  a  new  world  to  Frenchmen.^ 

But  though  the  reaction  in  home  affairs  seemed  to  have 
come  to  a  disastrous   conclusion  with  the  collapse  of  Law's 
schemes  and  the  disappearance  of  Law  himself,   Dubois  and 
the    Resrent   could    cono^ratulate    himself   on    the   !^^.^°'"^*^" 

'^  °  Policy  of  the 

success  of  his  foreign   policy,  which,  directed  by   Regency, 
the  Abbe  Dubois,  estabhshed  a  new  system  based  upon  the 
Triple  Alliance  of  1717. 

The  son  of  an  apothecary,  Dubois  was  born  in  1656  at 
Brive-la-Gaillarde,  and  took  the  tonsure  at  the  age  of  thirteen, 
being  known  as  the  Little  Abbt^.  In  1672  he  began  to  study 
philosophy  and  theology  in  Paris,  and  in  1683  was  appointed 
to  assist  his  friend  M.  de  Saint- Laurent  in  the  education  of  the 
Duke  of  Chartres.  On  the  death  of  Saint-Laurent  in  1687  he 
became  the  duke's  tutor,  and  was  with  him  in  the  campaigns 
of  the  war  of  the  League  of  Augsburg.  In  1698  he  accom- 
panied Tallard  to  London  and  made  the  acquaintance  of  James 
Stanhope.  In  1701  the  Duke  of  Chartres,  having  become  Duke 
of  Orleans,  appointed  Dubois  his  secretary.  During  the  Span- 
ish Succession  War,  the  Abb^  gave  ample  testimony  of  his  abil- 
ity and  trustworthiness.  Once  only  in  1713  were  his  enemies 
^  See  Michelet,  Histoire  de  la  Regettce. 


38  Europea7i  History,   17 15-1789 

able  to  secure  his  temporary  retirement;  but  in  17 14,  after 
the  deaths  of  the  Dukes  of  Burgundy,  Brittany,  and  Berry, 
Orleans  recalled  him  to  the  Palais  Royal,  and  in  1715,  on  the 
death  of  Louis  xiv.,  his  influence  over  his  former  pupil  was  as 
great  as  ever.  Hated  by  Saint-Simon,  and  regarded  with  the 
utmost  jealousy,  if  not  detestation,  by  the  nobles,  Dubois  has 
suffered  unduly  at.  the  hands  of  historians.  Though  deficient 
in  character,  and  a  far  from  admirable  example  of  a  Catholic 
priest,  Dubois'  influence  over  the  Regent  was  not  necessarily 
bad ;  he  had  no  hand  in  the  death  of  any  of  the  royal  family, 
he  was  not  bought  by  England.  Without  being  possessed  of 
any  special  political  genius,  and  always  ready  to  carry  out  the 
views  of  his  master,  Philip  of  Orleans,  Dubois  remains  an  emi- 
nent Frenchman  who  showed  a  remarkable  aptitude  for  foreign 
affairs.  And  it  is  beyond  question  that  the  poHcy,  the  success 
of  which  he  aided  to  assure,  proved  of  the  greatest  advantage 
to  France.^ 

On  succeeding  to  the  supreme  power,  Orleans  had  preserved 
a  neutral  attitude  during  the  Jacobite  rising  in  17 15.  But  he 
was  accused  in  England  of  having  connived  at  James  Edward's 
attempt,  he  was  on  bad  terms  with  the  Court  of  Vienna,  his 
power  was  threatened  at  home  by  the  faction  of  the  Duke  of 
Maine,  and  he  was  regarded  with  feelings  of  undisguised 
hostility  at  Madrid.  The  success  of  the  Whigs  impelled  him 
to  seek,  in  conjunction  with  England,  efficacious  means  to 
preserve  the  Peace  of  Utrecht,  to  prevent  its  terms  from 
being  rashly  and  hastily  revised  or  even  modified,  and  thus 
to  secure  his  own  position  at  the  head  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment in  the  teeth  of  the  opposition  of  Philip  v.  and  his 
partisans  within  France. 

In  1 7 15  there  seemed  every  possibility  of  a  renewal  of  the 
European  struggle.  The  Emperor  had  never  recognised  the 
Charles  VI.  title  of  Philip  V.  to  the  Spanish  crown,  and  he 
and  Spain.  \^^^  formed  ambitious  schemes  for  the  further 
extension  of  his  territory  in  Italy,  which  he  regarded  as  his 

1  Wiessener,  Le  Regent,  VAbbe  Dubois,  et  les  Anglais,  vol.  i.  chap.  xiv. 


Alberojii  and  Dubois  39 

own  by  right ;  he  had  assigned  to  his  son  the  title  of  Prince  of 
the  Asturias ;  he  had  estabhshed  in  Vienna  a  Spanish  Council 
formed  of  Spanish  exiles;  at  his  Court  the  King  of  Spain  was 
known  as  the  Duke  of  Anjou.  Though  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht 
had  assigned  him,  in  addition  to  the  Low  Countries,  the 
Milanese,  the  Tuscan  Presidencies,  with  Mantua,  Naples,  and 
Sardinia,  he  remained  dissatisfied.  He  was  furious  at  the 
recognition  of  Victor  Amadeus  11.  of  Savoy  as  heir  to  the 
Spanish  throne  in  default  of  heirs  to  the  House  of  Bourbon, 
and  he  was  determined  to  secure  Sicily  by  giving  Victor 
Amadeus  Sardinia  in  exchange. 

He  was  now  involved  in  a  war  with  the  Turks,  and  it  was 
not  till  two  years  later  that  he  was  able  to  direct  his  undivided 
attention  to  his  interests  in  the  west  and  south.  Aiberoni's 
To  Philip  V.  and  his  queen,  the  death  of  Louis  Reforms. 
xrV'.,  followed  by  the  quiet  assumption  of  the  Regency  by 
Orleans,  came  as  a  staggering  blow  to  all  their  hopes.  French 
influence  in  Madrid,  already  on  the  wane,  rapidly  declined ; 
Giudice  gave  way  to  the  energetic  Alberoni.  Before  the  end 
of  1 715  this  ambitious  son  of  an  Italian  gardener,  born  in  1664, 
was  given  the  real  authority  in  the  state.  He  became  indepen- 
dent of  the  departmental  secretaries,  and  was  allowed  to  begin 
valuable  administrative  reforms.  The  financial  department  was 
reorganised,  large  reductions  made,  and  the  revenue  increased. 
Agriculture  and  manufacture  were  encouraged ;  Spanish  com- 
merce revived ;  and  most  of  the  reforms  inaugurated  by  Orri 
were  continued  and  expanded.  The  army  was  reorganised, 
but  the  greatest  attention  was  paid  to  the  navy,  for  Alberoni 
was  convinced  that  Spain  should  be  a  naval  and  not  a  military 
power.  In  his  belief  in  the  value  of  Spain's  natural  resources, 
the  Spanish  minister  showed  remarkable  acuteness.  The 
decline  of  Spain  was  due,  in  his  opinion,  to  maladministration 
and  mismanagement  caused  by  the  growth  of  an  oligarchical 
form  of  government,  which,  by  the  establishment  of  a  multi- 
plicity of  useless  councils,  had  well-nigh  ruined  the  empire. 
With   the    encouragement   of  agriculture,    the   foundation    of 


40  Europea7i  History,   171 5-1 789 

vigorous  colonies,  and  the  reorganisation  of  the  Spanish  marine, 
Alberoni  might  with  reason  look  forward  to  a  revival  which 
should  restore  his  adopted  country  to  its  former  prosperity. 
Under  Alberoni's  administration  Spain  advanced  with  rapid 
strides.  The  population  ceased  to  decHne,  and  the  successful 
initiation  of  domestic  reforms  attested  at  once  the  vitality  of 
Spain  as  well  as  Alberoni's  capacity  for  government. 

Not  only  was  Alberoni  intrusted  with  the  work  of  internal 
reorganisation,  he  was  also  given  the  direction  of  foreign 
His  Foreign  affairs.  But  throughout  his  short  and  brilliant 
Policy.  career   his   plans    were    continually  hampered    by 

the  personal  predilections  of  Philip  and  his  queen,  to  whose 
will  he  was  constantly  obliged  to  defer,  since  he  held  office 
only  by  the  royal  favour.  Though  he  recognised  that  friend- 
ship with  France  was  impossible  so  long  as  Philip  persisted 
in  aspiring  to  the  Regency,  Alberoni,  during  the  period  im- 
mediately following  Louis  xrv.'s  death,  avoided  all  hostile 
demonstrations  against  Orleans'  government,  and  turned  his 
attention  to  resisting  the  imperial  encroachments  in  Italy,  and 
to  cultivating  the  friendship  of  England.  In  pursuing  this 
policy  he  was  sure  of  the  support  of  Ehzabeth  Farnese,  whose 
Italian  ambitions  coincided  with  the  general  wish  in  Spain  for 
a  restoration  of  the  Spanish  influeiice  in  Italy.  Charles  vi. 
had  already  begun  to  negotiate  secretly  for  the  exchange  of 
Sardinia  for  Sicily,  and  for  the  eventual  succession  to  Tuscany, 
Parma,  Piacenza,  and  Guastalla.  In  resisting  these  encroach- 
ments, Alberoni  was  no  rash  breaker  of  the  Peace  of  Utrecht 
on  behalf  of  Elizabeth's  dynastic  aspirations ;  he  was,  on  the 
contrary,  taking  all  justifiable  means  to  defend  and  preserve  the 
settlement  of  Utrecht  and  Rastadt  from  the  aggressive  action 
of  the  Emperor.  The  defence  of  Italy  against  the  imperial 
attack  was  a  task  of  enormous  import  to  the  whole  of  Europe 
not  less  than  to  Spain.  The  Turkish  war,  which  for  the  moment 
occupied  the  attention  of  the  Imperialists,  might  at  any  time 
lead  to  the  occupation  of  Italy  by  Austrian  troops,  on  the  pre- 
tence that  the  peninsula  was  liable  to  an  invasion  by  the  Porte. 


Alberoni  and  Dubois  4 1 

But  until  the  King  of  Sicily  and  the  Italian  princes  had 
decided  to  join  with  Spain  in  defending  the  nascent  liberties 
of  Italy,  Alberoni  felt  that  active  Spanish  inten-ention  was 
inadvisable.  Not  yet  supreme  in  Madrid,  he  was  obliged  to 
defer  to  Philip's  unconquerable  hostility  to  the  Regent  Orieans, 
though  he  found  it  impossible  to  encourage  the  hopes  of  the 
king  with  regard  to  the  French  crown.  For  success  in  Italy, 
however,  an  alliance  with  either  France  or  England  was  a 
necessity,  and,  supported  by  Elizabeth  and  by  Phihp,  who 
hoped  to  isolate  Orleans,  Alberoni  determined  to  approach 
England  and  assure  himself  of  her  friendship.  In  December 
1 7 15  a  commercial  treaty  was  concluded  between  the  two 
countries,  and  the  English  were  assured  of  the  trading  privi- 
leges granted  them  at  Utrecht;  in  1716  the  Assiento  Treaty 
was  finally  concluded,  the  close  union  between  France  and 
Spain,  the  aim  of  Louis  xr\,  was  broken,  and  the  Queen  of 
Spain  could  look  forward  to  seeing  her  children  in  ItaHan 
principalities.  But  Alberoni's  hopes  of  a  close  English  aUiance 
were  destined  to  be  disappointed.  Stanhope,  indeed,  agreed 
with  the  Spanish  minister  that  the  encroachments  of  the 
Emperor  in  Italy  necessitated  fresh  safeguards,  but  he  trusted 
by  means  of  negotiations  to  check  the  imperial  aggressiveness 
without  having  recourse  to  arms.  As  a  matter  of  fact  neither 
England  nor  Holland  were  willing  to  undertake  any  action  or 
to  adopt  an  attitude  hostile  either  to  the  Emperor  or  to  the 
French  Regent. 

The  Hanoverian  interests  of  George  i.,  and  his  hope  of 
permanently  securing  Bremen  and  Verden  out  of  the  northern 
conflagration,  rendered  a  breach  with  the  Emperor  well-nigh 
impossible,  while  the  necessity  of  keeping  the  Pretender  at  a 
distance  gave  fresh  force  to  the  advances  already  made  by 
Dubois,  and  a  new  importance  to  a  secret  understanding 
already  arrived  at  between  George  i.  and  Orleans.^ 

By  a  treaty  made  with  Denmark  on  May  17,  1715,  George 
had  received  Bremen   and  Verden,  which   Frederick  iv.   had 

1  Wiessener,  Le  Regent,  t Abbe  Dubois,  et  les  Anglais,  vol.  i.  chap.  i. 


42  European  History,   17 15-1789 

seized.  In  order  to  obtain  the  imperial  sanction,  negotiations 
were  opened  with  Charles  vi.,  and  until  these  negotiations 
Treaty  of  came  to  a  satisfactory  conclusion  the  Hanoverian 
wlth^^  government  was  more  anxious  for  an  imperial  than 

Denmark.        a  French  alliance. 

On  May  25,  1716,  the  Treaty  of  Westminster  was  concluded 
between  England  and  the  Emperor  for  the  defence  of  their 
The  Causes  existing  possessions  and  of  those  which  might  be 
of  the  Treaty   acquired  bv  mutual  consent ;  and  in  November  a 

of  West-  ^  •  1    ,  ^       1        1  1     T- 

minster,  treaty  was  signed  between    England    and    France 

May,  1716;       which,  with  the  adhesion  of  Holland  on  January  the 

the  Triple  '  ■^  •' 

Alliance,  4th,  1717,  became  the  celebrated  Triple  Alliance. 
Jan.  4, 1717.  Various  circumstances  had  contributed  to  bring 
about  this  famous  treaty  between  England  and  France,  which 
established  a  political  system  directly  at  variance  with  that 
pursued  by  Louis  xiv.  since  1688.  The  English  and  French 
Governments  were  both  threatened  by  rival  pretenders,  and 
both  countries,  exhausted  by  the  late  war,  desired  a  period 
of  peace.  The  resumption  of  war  would  interfere  with  trade, 
and,  moreover,  would  afford  the  opponents  of  the  ruling 
dynasties  an  opportunity  of  raising  their  heads.  The  safety 
of  George  i.'s  throne  depended  on  the  expulsion  of  James 
Edward  from  France,  while  Orleans'  position  could  only  be 
rendered  secure  by  decisive  measures  against  Philip  v.  The 
Whig  ministers  were  as  much  interested  in  the  stability  of 
Orleans  in  Paris  as  they  were  in  the  firm  estabHshment  of 
George  i.  on  the  English  throne. 

If  Philip  v.  succeeded  in  ousting  Orleans,  the  interests  of 
France  and  Spain  would  be  closely  united,  and  the  fears  of 
the  Whig  statesmen  of  Queen  Anne's  reign  reahsed.  Even  if 
Orleans  succeeded  unaided  in  holding  his  position  against  the 
machinations  of  his  opponents  in  France,  and  the  intrigues  of 
the  Spanish  Court,  it  was  probable  that  he  might  be  driven  to 
make  an  alhance  with  Peter  the  Great,  the  mere  possibility  of 
which  was  repugnant  to  George  i.,  whose  eyes  were  as  usual 
fixed  upon  his  northern  possessions.     Literary  relations,  which 


Alberoni  and  Dubois  43 

were  to  lead  to  important  results  in  France,  had  already 
been  opened  between  the  two  countries,  and  the  revolution 
in  foreign  policy,  so  far  as  England  was  concerned,  was 
effected  quietly  and  with  little  difficulty.  In  France,  though 
the  opposition  of  d'Huxelles,  the  President  of  the  Council  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  was  outspoken,  the  new  departure  in  foreign 
policy  was  accepted,  though  not  without  some  murmuring. 

Dubois'  ready  and  astute  mind  had  early  in  1716  conceived 
this  plan  of  an  alhance  between  England  and  France  as  the 
best  means  of  thwarting  Philip  v.  and  his  ministers.  Dubois' 
The  dynastic  interests  of  Orleans  were  at  stake.  Policy. 
France,  of  all  countries  in  Europe,  needed  peace,  which  the 
accession  of  Philip  to  the  French  throne  would  terminate. 
Though  the  opponents  of  the  Regency  then,  and  many  French 
historical  writers  since,  have  condemned  Dubois'  poHcy  as 
revolutionary  and  antagonistic  to  the  true  interests  of  France, 
the  wily  minister  of  the  Regent  might  plead,  not  only  that  he 
was  merely  continuing  the  policy  of  Richelieu  and  Mazarin, 
but  that  the  circumstances  of  the  time  fully  justified  the 
EngUsh  alliance,  which  was,  in  fact,  maintained  by  his  suc- 
cessors, the  Duke  of  Bourbon,  and  Fleury.  Dubois  realised 
how  important  to  England  was  the  continuance  of  the  Regent 
in  power.  The  accession  of  Phihp  to  the  French  throne 
would  bring  on  a  European  war,  while  a  union  between  Eng- 
land and  France  would  checkmate  both  the  Spanish  King 
and  the  Enghsh  Pretender.  All  danger  of  a  close  connec- 
tion between  Orleans  and  Peter  the  Great  would  be  re- 
moved, the  fears  of  George  i.  would  be  allayed,  and  the 
government  of  the  Regent  rendered  more  stable. 

But  it  was  only  after  the  exercise  of  a  considerable  amount 
of  tact  on  the  part  of  Dubois  that  George  i.,  still  indignant  at 
the  equivocal  conduct  of  Orleans  during  the  Jaco-  George  i.'s 
bite  rising,  could  be  induced  to  consider  seriously  Policy- 
the  prospect  of  a  French  alliance.  And  had  not  northern  com- 
plications intervened,  even  the  skill  of  the  French  agents  might 
have  proved  unavaihng  to   effect  a  durable  arrangement  be- 


44  European  History^   171 5-1789 

tween  the  two  countries.  The  essence  of  George's  foreign 
poHcy  was  friendship  with  Holland  and  Austria,  and  his  views 
were  in  strict  accordance  with  those  of  the  Whig  party,  in  whose 
eyes  a  close  union  with  Holland,  and  the  re- establishment  of 
friendly  relations  with  Austria,  were  essential  for  the  safety  of 
the  Hanoverian  succession. 

But  a  return  to  the  system  of  the  Grand  Alliance  was  ren- 
dered difficult,  if  not  impossible,  owing  to  the  discontent  felt 
by  the  Court  of  Vienna  at  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  and  the  pro- 
posed Barrier  Treaty. 

George  i.'s  attempt,  on  his  accession  to  the  English  throne, 
to  conciHate  the  Emperor,  had  only  provoked  an  outburst  of 
wrath  at  the  conditions  attached  to  the  Austrian  possession  of 
the  Low  Countries,  and  already  the  possibility  of  an  exchange 
of  Bavaria  for  the  distant  Belgian  provinces  was  hinted  at  in 
Vienna.  The  actual  conclusion  of  the  Barrier  Treaty  on  No- 
vember 15,  1 715,  so  far  from  pacifying  the  Austrian  Court,  only 
increased  its  hostile  attitude  towards  the  Dutch,  which  was  fully 
reciprocated  by  the  Government  of  the  Hague,  and  which  au- 
gured ill  for  the  renewal  of  the  system  of  the  Grand  Alliance. 
Numerous  incidents  tended  to  still  further  intensify  the  ill-feel- 
ing between  the  Hague  and  Vienna,  which,  while  it  rendered 
George  i.'s  attempts  at  a  renewal  of  friendly  relations  between 
England,  Holland,  and  Austria  for  a  time  hopeless,  offered  an 
admirable  opportunity  for  Chateauneuf,  the  French  envoy  at 
the  Hague,  to  make  a  not  unsuccessful  effort  to  regain  for 
France  her  influence  in  Europe. 

Louis  XIV.  had  bequeathed  to  his  successor  a  diplomatic  ser- 
vice far  superior  to  that  of  any  European  country,  as  well  as 
traditions  of  foreign  policy  which  have  varied  but  slightly  dur- 
ing the  many  vicissitudes  through  which  France  has  passed 
Dubois  at  sincc  his  days.  The  names  of  Campredon,  Ville- 
the  Hague       ncuvc,  and  Vergennes  are   sufficient  to  show  that 

and  in  .  . 

Hanover.  the  diplomatists  of  Louis  XV. 's  reign  were  not  in- 
ferior to  the  Gremonvilles,  the  Barrillons,  and  the  Harcourts 
of  the   previous  century.      In   Chateauneuf  Orleans  found  a 


Alberoni  and  Dubois  45 

man  who  was  capable  of  taking  advantage  of  the  divisions 
existing  between  the  Dutch  and  the  Austrians,  and  of  forming 
a  French  party  at  the  Hague. 

Irritated  by  the  dilatoriness  of  the  Dutch  in  acceding  to  his 
views  of  a  Triple  AUiance  between  England,  Holland,  and 
Austria,  and  suspicious  of  the  French  intrigues,  George  hastily 
concluded  the  Treaty  of  Westminster  with  Austria  on  May  25, 
1 716,  and  on  July  20,  accompanied  by  Stanhope,  he  started  on 
his  journey  for  Hanover.  Orleans  had  by  this  time  recognised 
that  no  alliance  with  England  was  possible,  so  long  as  the  Pre- 
tender could  find  a  refuge  in  France.  His  correspondence 
with  the  English  ministers  having  proved  resultless,  he  decided 
to  send  Dubois,  now  Archbishop  of  Sens,  and  a  councillor  of 
state,  to  meet  Stanhope  at  the  Hague.  On  July  21  Dubois 
had  his  first  secret  meeting  with  the  Enghsh  minister,  and  two 
days  later  he  departed  for  Paris,  where  on  the  31st,  he  gave 
the  Regent  an  account  of  his  interview.  The  first  step  had 
been  taken  in  a  revolution  which,  like  that  of  1756,  was  to 
give  Europe  for  some  thirty  years  a  new  political  system.  On 
August  10  Dubois  was  sent  to  Hanover  to  resume  his  negotia- 
tions, which,  though  hopeful,  had  not  as  yet,  owing  to  George 
i.'s  deep-rooted  suspicions  of  the  Regent's  Jacobite  leanings, 
resulted  in  any  definite  propositions.  Before  his  arrival,  how- 
ever, on  August  19,  a  complete  change  had  been  effected  in 
the  attitude  of  the  Enghsh  king,  who,  fearful  of  the  consequences 
to  Hanover  of  the  threatened  occupation  of  Mecklenburg  by 
the  Russians,  had  suddenly  realised  the  possibiUty  of  an  alliance 
between  the  Tsar  and  the  Regent. 

The  contest  round  the  Baltic  had  developed  in  a  manner 
little  anticipated  by  the  opponents  of  Charles  xii.  Wismar 
had  fallen  in  April  1716,  and  the  Russian  troops.  The  struggle 
already  the  objects  of  suspicion  to  their  Hanoverian  ^"  *^^  North, 
allies,  had  encamped  in  Mecklenburg.  In  June  a  convention, 
signed  between  the  Tsar  and  Frederick  iv.  of  Denmark,  was 
followed  by  a  quarrel  between  the  contracting  parties,  and  by 
the  retirement  of  the  Russian  troops  from  the  neighbourhood 


46  European  History,   17 15-1789 

of  Copenhagen  to  Mecklenburg.  The  continued  presence  of 
the  Russian  forces  in  or  near  Mecklenburg  was  disquieting  to 
George,  and  extremely  distasteful  to  Bernsdorf  and  the  other 
Hanoverian  ministers.  A  coolness  sprang  up  between  the 
EngHsh  king  and  the  Tsar,  and  the  former,  haunted  by  the 
prospect  of  a  Franco-Russian  understanding,  saw  in  a  French 
alliance  the  only  means  of  combating  the  new  danger  to 
Hanover.  The  desire  to  secure  Bremen  and  Verden  had  led 
to  the  retention  of  the  Austrian  connection ;  anxiety  for  the 
safety  of  his  German  possessions  now  made  George  an  eager 
advocate  of  an  aUiance  with  France. 

The   suspicious   movements   of  the   Russians   in   Denmark 

and  Mecklenburg,  the  continued  activity  of  the  Jacobites  in 

England,  the  possibility  of  a  leae^ue  between  the 

The  Triple  &  >  r  j  o 

Alliance,  Tsar  and  the  Regent,  directed  at  once  agamst  his 
Jan.  4, 1717-  kingdom  and  his  electorate,  had  thus,  by  the  time 
of  Dubois'  arrival  in  Hanover,  worked  such  a  change  in  George's 
feelings,  that  he  not  only  desired  a  prompt  reconciliation  with 
Orleans,  but  ordered  Stanhope  to  agree  to  a  treaty  with  Frange. 
A  preUminary  convention  was  signed  at  Hanover  on  October  9 
by  Stanhope  and  Dubois ;  and  on  November  28,  Lord  Cado- 
gan  and  Dubois  signed  at  the  Hague  a  defensive  alliance  be- 
tween France  and  England,  which  was  accepted  by  Holland 
on  January  4,  171 7.  The  treaty  consisted  of  eight  articles. 
France  undertook  to  dismantle  Dunkirk,  to  destroy  the  works 
of  Mardyck,  to  expel  the  Pretender  from  Avignon,  and  not  to 
allow  him  to  return  to  French  territory.  All  three  Powers 
engaged  to  carry  out  in  its  main  features  the  Treaty  of 
Utrecht,  especially  those  articles  referring  to  the  Protestant 
succession  in  England  and  the  separation  of  the  crowns  of 
France  and  Spain.  George  i.  was  allowed  to  retain  the  title 
of  King  of  France,  while  Louis  xv.  was  termed  Most  Christian 
King. 

Almost  simultaneously  with  the  return  of  George  i.  to  Eng- 
land, at  the  end  of  January  171 7,  the  famous  conspiracy  of 
Goertz,  Charles  xii.'s  ambassador  in  Holland,  was  discovered, 


Alberoni  and  Dubois  47 

and  the  arrest  of  Gyllenborg,  the  Swedish  envoy  in  London, 
confirmed  the  EngHsh  king  in  his  suspicions  of  the  danger  to 
his  dynasty  from  the  northern  Powers,  and  more  than  ever 
justified  the  wisdom  of  estabhshing  close  relations  between 
England  and  France. 

The  alliance  between  England  and  France  may  be  termed  a 
dynastic  one,  but  dynastic  and  national  interests  in  both  coun- 
tries were  for  the  time  inseparable.  To  the  Whig  ^g  impor. 
Government  the  Triple  AUiance  meant  the  check-  tance. 
mating  of  the  Pretender  and  the  protection  of  the  Hanover 
electorate.  The  estabhshment  of  George  i.  on  the  Enghsh 
throne  was  rendered  more  secure,  and  with  it  the  fortunes  of 
the  Whig  party.  To  Orleans  the  Triple  Alliance  came  at  an 
opportune  moment,  and  dealt  not  only  a  telHng  blow  at  the 
schemes  of  his  numerous  enemies  at  home,  but  also  upset  the 
plans  of  his  opponents  abroad. 

While  the  individual  interests  of  George  and  Orleans  were 
furthered,  their  respective  countries  benefited  in  no  less  degree 
from  their  alliance.  The  Peace  of  Utrecht  was  definitely 
accepted,  and  the  new  order  of  succession  in  England  and 
France  was  recognised.  To  France  the  aUiance  brought 
enormous  advantages.  After  Louis  xiv.'s  death  she  remained 
exhausted  and  isolated,  and  in  danger,  owing  to  the  accession 
of  the  Elector  of  Hanover  to  the  EngHsh  throne,  of  being 
confronted  by  a  revival  of  the  Grand  AUiance.  Aided  by  the 
skill  of  Dubois  and  Chateauneuf,  and  by  the  events  in  the 
north,  the  Regent  had  succeeded  in  securing  for  France  valu- 
able alliances,  and  in  estabhshing  a  new  pohtical  system, 
which  was  in  itself  the  best  guarantee  to  Europe  of  the  pres- 
ervation of  peace.  His  success  was  in  no  small  measure  due 
to  the  skill  of  Dubois,  who  had,  by  anticipating  the  pohcy  of 
Talleyrand  in  1815,  rescued  France  from  a  dangerous  position 
of  isolation,  and  given  her  an  influential  voice  in  the  Councils 
of  Europe.  It  was  seen  that  France  had  found  in  Dubois  a 
statesman,  and  the  skill  with  which  he  guided  French  policy 
to  the  hour  of  his  death  fully  justified  the  confidence  imposed 


48  European  History^   1 71 5-1 789 

in  him  by  Orleans,  and  explains  the  hostihty  with  which  his 
incapable  aristocratic  contemporaries  regarded  him,  and  which, 
hke  the  hatred  felt  by  Whig  historians  for  BoUngbroke,  has  till 
the  present  day  been  perpetuated  by  numerous  writers  on  the 
period.  In  his  diplomatic  labours  he  had  been  vigorously 
supported  by  the  Regent,  and  that  in  the  teeth  of  an  out- 
spoken opposition  of  the  greater  part  of  the  ministers  and 
nobles. 

Though  the  Treaty  was  never  popular  in  France,  and  though 
the  maintenance  of  friendly  relations  w^th  England  depended 
entirely  upon  the  influence  and  goodwill  of  Orleans  and  Dubois, 
and  later  upon  that  of  Fleury,  the  Triple  Alliance  gave  the 
law  to  Europe,  and  largely  contributed  to  maintain  peace  for 
sixteen  years.  Relations  between  English  and  French  writers 
became  closer,  and  both  countries,  especially  the  former, 
benefited  from  a  period  of  rest  from  foreign  wars.  In  spite 
of  the  popular  dislike  of  the  alliance  in  France,  Dubois'  first 
essay  in  foreign  politics  had  proved  an  unqualified  success. 

At  first  the  Emperor  and  the  Court  of  Vienna  were  openly 
indignant  at  the  conduct  of  England  in  allying  with  France. 
The  Jacobites  driven  from  France  were  warmly  supported  by 
the  Emperor's  mother,  while  Charles  vi.  himself  allowed  them 
to  find  a  refuge  in  Belgium.  To  meet  this  difficulty,  George  i. 
offered,  in  consideration  of  the  introduction  into  the  Treaty 
of  Westminster  of  a  secret  additional  article,  by  which  the 
Emperor  bound  himself  not  to  give  asylum  to  rebellious  sub- 
jects, to  pay  to  the  imperial  treasury  the  sum  of  3,250,000 
francs.  This  transaction  was  completed  in  January  1 718,  and 
the  adhesion  of  the  Emperor  to  the  Triple  Alliance  was  assured 
at  a  critical  moment  in  the  history  of  southern  Europe. 

To  Alberoni    the  news  of  the   Triple    Alliance    came    as   a 

surprise.     Dubois  had  won  a  great  diplomatic  victory,  and  had 

scored  a  point  in  his  struggle  against  the  influences 

The  Invasion  ^  oo  o 

of  Sardinia  of  which  Albcroni  was  the  representative.  But  the 
by  Spain.  Spanish  minister  went  on  quietly  with  his  work  of 
reorganisation,  and  only  asked  for  a  few  years  of  peace  in  order 


Alberoni  and  Dubois  49 

to  perfect  his  preparations.  He  brought  about  a  reconciHation 
between  Spain  and  the  Pope,  Clement  xi.,  who  was  equally 
interested  \\ith  Philip  and  Elizabeth  in  checking  the  growth  of 
the  imperial  power,  and  in  opposing  the  Triple  Alliance ;  and 
he  was  giving  ample  proof  of  his  real  capacity  for  government, 
when  an  event  occurred  which  forced  his  hand,  drove  him  into 
war,  and  brought  his  administration  to  a  close.  The  arrest  of 
the  octogenarian  ]\Iolin(^s,  the  newly  appointed  inquisitor-general, 
a  pompous  old  fool  according  to  Alberoni,  by  the  Austrians 
in  the  ^vlilanese  territory  at  the  end  of  May  171 7,  precipitated 
the  rupture  w^hich  it  was  the  interest  of  the  Austrians  to  pro- 
voke and  that  of  Alberoni  to  avert.  The  insult  to  Spain  was, 
however,  one  which  Philip  was  unwilling  to  brook ;  the  Duke 
of  Parma  was  furious,  and  it  was  due  more  to  the  pressure 
which  he  brought  to  bear  than  to  Philip's  indignation  that  the 
war  was  prematurely  begun.-^  In  spite  of  Alberoni's  hatred 
of  the  Germans,  and  his  desire  to  expel  them  from  Italy,  his 
primary  interest  at  that  time  was  the  reorganisation  of  Spanish 
commerce  and  finance,  and  he  bitterly  resented  this  disappoint- 
ing interruption  to  his  labours.  At  the  end  of  July  171 7,  a 
Spanish  fleet  sailed  from  Barcelona,  anchored  before  Caghari 
on  August  22,  six  days  after  Eugene's  victor}^  at  Belgrade,  and 
Sardinia  was  subdued  by  the  end  of  November.  The  con- 
quest of  Sardinia  by  Spain  has  usually  been  itsjustifi- 
regarded  as  a  breach  of  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  and  nation, 
an  act  of  aggression  which  justified  the  severest  measures.  But 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  Spain  had  ample  reasons  for  her  occupation 
of  Sardinia.  It  was  well  known  that  Charles  vi.  aimed  af  the 
acquisition  of  Sicily,  and  as  early  as  September  1716  Stanhope 
had  dra\^Ti  up  a  scheme  for  the  satisfaction  of  the  Emperor 
Phihp  V.  and  Victor  Amadeus.  By  it  the  Emperor  was  to 
accept  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  to  guarantee  the  succession  of 
the  House  of  Orleans  to  the  French  throne  in  the  case  of  the 
death  of  Louis  xv.  without  heirs,  and  to  recognise  Phihp  v.  as 
King  of  Spain.  In  return  he  was  to  receive  Sicily  in  exchange 
1  See  Armstrong,  Elizabeth  Farnese. 
PERIOD  VI.  D 


50  European  History,   171 5-1789 

for  Sardinia,  while  Parma  and  Piacenza  were  eventually  to  be 
set  aside  for  Don  Carlos,  the  son  of  Elizabeth  Farnese.  This 
plan  had  been  discussed  at  a  secret  conference  at  Hanover 
between  Stanhope,  Sutherland,  M.  de  Pentenriedter,  one  of 
Charles  vi.'s  agents,  and  Saint-Saphorin,  the  Enghsh  Minister 
at  the  Court  of  Vienna. 

The  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Westminster  had  contained  allu- 
sions to  the  surrender  of  Sicily  to  the  Emperor,  while,  in  the 
negotiations  for  the  Triple  Alliance,  its  transference  to  Charles 
VI.  had  been  openly  considered.  Had  a  sovereign  and  minis- 
ters of  different  temperaments  to  Philip  and  Alberoni  ruled 
Spain,  it  is  quite  possible  that  the  arrangements  come  to  at  the 
Second  Treaty  of  Vienna  in  1731  might  have  been  anticipated 
in  1 71 7.  As  it  was,  Spain  contemptuously  declined  to  accept 
Parma  and  Piacenza  assigned  to  her  by  Stanhope,  and  was 
only  acting  within  her  rights  in  taking  all  possible  steps  to 
prevent  the  Austrian  seizure  of  Sicily,  and  an  unwarrantable 
modification  in  the  arrangements  of  the  settlement  of  Utrecht. 
But  the  EngUsh  Government,  which  was  bent  on  securing  the 
Hanoverian  succession,  was  as  blind  to  the  general  advantage 
of  Europe  as  it  was  alive  to  its  own  dynastic  interests.  It  was 
willing  to  connive  at  the  Emperor's  aggrandisement  in  Italy, 
provided  it  could  bring  about  peace  in  southern  Europe,  which 
would  enable  it  to  deal  with  the  dangers  arising  in  the  north. 
By  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  Sicily  was  granted  to  the  House  of 
Savoy,  to  revert  to  Spain  in  the  event  of  failure  of  the  line 
of  Victor  Amadeus,  and  as  long  as  it  remained  in  the  hands 
of  the  Savoy  line  its  trade  was  practically  in  the  hands  of  the 
English.  The  northern  and  dynastic  interests  of  the  Whig 
Government,  however,  seem  to  have  blinded  it  to  the  real 
points  at  issue,  and  on  the  occupation  of  Sardinia  by  Spain, 
England  at  once  called  upon  the  members  of  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance to  resist  the  Spanish  aggression.^ 

The  events  in  the  Mediterranean  placed  the  Regent  Orleans  in 
a  difficult  position.  By  no  means  popular  in  Paris,  he  was  aware 
1  Vide  Armstrong,  Elizabeth  Farnese. 


Alberoni  and  Dubois  51 

that  public  opinion  in  France  regarded  Philip  v.  as  the  lawful 
heir  to  the  French  cro%\Ti,  and  would  resent  any  interference 
with  Spanish  action,  especially  when  directed  against  the  House 
of  Hapsburg.  He  determined  to  send  Dubois  to  Dubois  in 
London,  and  in  October  the  French  statesman  had  London, 
many  conferences  with  the  English  ministers.  The 
uncompromising  tone  adopted  by  Zinzendorf  in  Vienna  and 
Pentenreidter  in  London  in  consequence  of  the  victor}-  of  Bel- 
grade only  tended  to  draw  Dubois  and  Stanhope  together,  and 
by  the  end  of  November  a  joint  project  for  the  settlement  of  the 
difficulties  m  southern  Europe  was  drawn  up  and  presented 
to  the  Austrian  envoy.  On  November  29  Dubois  arrived  in 
Paris,  and  having  strengthened  the  Regent  in  his  loyalty  to  the 
English  and  Dutch  alliance,  returned  on  December  31  to  Lon- 
don, where  the  details  of  the  proposed  plan  of  pacification  were 
discussed.  While  the  English  were  inclined  to  favour  the 
Austrian  claims  in  Italy,  the  Regent  insisted  that  the  eventual 
succession  to  Tuscany  should,  in  addition  to  that  of  Parma 
and  Piacenza,  be  reserved  for  the  young  Don  Carlos.  This 
point  being  gained,  Dubois  and  Stanhope  easily  settled  remain^ 
ing  difficulties,  and  the  Emperor  agreed  to  the  proposals. 
Fresh  difficulties,  however,  soon  arose;  a  strong  party  in  France, 
headed  by  the  ^Lirshal  d'Huxelles,  and  supported  by  such  men 
as  Torcy,  the  influential  superintendent  of  the  posts,  being 
opposed  to  any  understanding  with  Austria,  while  the  Regent 
himself,  in  the  absence  of  Dubois,  was,  as  usual,  unable  to  come 
to  any  definite  resolution.  Lord  Stanhope  therefore  decided 
to  go  to  Paris  in  July  to  win  over  the  Regent  to  his  views. 
It  was  not  till  August  17,  after  the  Quadruple  Alliance  had 
been  finally  agreed  to,  that  Dubois  returned  to  Paris,  hav- 
ing arranged  a  treaty  which  was  contrary  to  the  wishes  of  the 
Spanish  party  at  the  French  Court,  and  which  confirmed  the 
former  policy  already  adopted  in  1716.  This  fresh  Triumph  of 
diplomatic  success,  while  it  added  to  the  reputa-  Dubois,  1718. 
tion  already  gained  by  Dubois,  only  intensified  the  hatred  and 
increased  the  attacks  of  the  French  nobles  headed  by  Maine, 


52  Eiiropea7i  Histo7y,   171 5-1 789 

and  of  the  ministers  led  by  d'Huxelles,  against  a  minister  who 
represented  both  at  home  and  abroad  the  principles  to  which 
they  were  steadily  opposed.  His  return  to  France  was  fol- 
lowed by  important  governmental  changes.  The  Parlement 
of  Paris  had  arrogated  to  itself  the  right  of  interfering  in  the 
political  and  financial  administration,  and  obstructed  the  course 
of  justice.  The  whole  system  of  Councils  had  proved  a  failure, 
and  the  Council  of  Foreign  Affairs,  presided  over  by  d'Huxelles, 
had  adopted  a  line  of  policy  which  was  distinctly  detrimental 
to  the  true  interests  of  France.  Encouraged  by  the  return  of 
Dubois  triumphant  in  the  matter  of  the  Quadruple  AUiance, 
Orleans,  having  forced  his  will  upon  the  Parlement  o\\  August  26, 
determined  to  regain  absolute  power  in  the  government,  and  to 
carry  out  certain  necessary  changes.  D'Huxelles  had  opposed 
the  policy  of  the  Triple  and  Quadruple  Alliances.  It  was 
natural  that  the  control  of  foreign  affairs  should  pass  into  the 
hands  of  those  who  had  initiated  and  carried  out  the  new  foreign 
poHcy.  No  confidence  could  be  unreservedly  placed  in  Orleans 
so  long  as  d'Huxelles  was  at  the  head  of  foreign  affairs.  On 
September  24,  with  the  aid  of  Dubois,  Orleans  carried  out  a  min- 
isterial revolution.  The  Councils  were  suppressed,  and  replaced 
by  Secretaries  of  State ;  Dubois  was  appointed  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  though  his  foreign  policy  was 
hampered  and  his  influence  over  the  Regent  shared  by  his 
enemy  Torcy,  till  the  latter's  disgrace  in  October  1721  he  was 
enabled  at  any  rate  to  carry  out,  in  conjunction  with  Stanhope, 
the  terms  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance. 

In  spite  then  of  the  attempts  of  Alberoni  to  gain  over  the 
Regent  by  offering  him  the  Austrian  Netherlands,  and  in 
Aiberoni's  spitc  of  a  natural  inclination,  encouraged  by 
Difficulties.  d'Huxcllcs  and  the  nobles  generally,  to  support 
Philip  v.  against  the  Emperor,  Orleans,  after  much  hesitation, 
decided  in  March  1718,  and  after  a  period  of  uncertainty  again 
in  July,  to  remain  loyal  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  to  oppose 
the  Spanish  Bourbons  by  force  of  arms.  In  March  he  did 
indeed  make  a  last  effort  at  conciliation  by  sending  to  Spain 


Albcroni  and  Dubois  53 

the  Marquis  de  Nancre,  but  the  attempt  ended  in  failure. 
Victor  Amadeus  had  already  entered  into  negotiations  with 
the  Emperor,  who  had  on  April  4  accepted  the  Anglo-French 
proposals,  and  Spain  was  practically  isolated.  Nevertheless 
Alberoni  acted  with  his  accustomed  vigour.  Finding  that 
Victor  Amadeus  would  not  admit  the  Spanish  forces  into  Sicily, 
the  Spanish  fleet  was  ordered  to  occupy  the  island ;  in  June 
1 7 18  the  fleets  left  Barcelona,  and  on  July  5  Sicily  was  taken.  ^ 

Though  the  seizure  of  Sardinia  can  be  defended,  it  is 
difficult  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  the  attack  upon  Sicily 
was  a  mistake.  In  making  it,  Spain  was  prematurely  running 
counter  to  the  aims  of  France,  England,  and  Austria,  and 
thereby  courting  certain  failure.  The  responsibility  for  the 
Sicilian  expedition  must  rest  to  a  great  extent  on  Alberoni. 
He  had  never  believed  in  the  possibility  of  a  close  union  be- 
tween England  and  France  against  Spain.  He  had  convinced 
himself  that  Engli3h  commercial  interests  would  be  opposed 
to  the  occupation  of  Sicily  by  Austria.  Disillusion  came  with 
the  united  action  of  the  members  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  and 
the  acceptance  by  Austria  of  its  terms.  Till  his  fall,  however, 
vigour  and  determination  characterised  Spanish  counsels. 

Though  without  allies,  Alberoni  had  endeavoured  to  occupy 
his  enemies  at  home.  For  some  months  he  had  attempted  to 
reconcile  Peter  the  Great  and  Charles  xii.,  and  between  them 
and  Prussia  to  form  a  league  which  should  attack  the  Emperor 
and  George  i.  As  early  as  17 14  he  had  appreciated  the  value 
of  a  Swedish  alliance,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  in  17 18,  even 
after  the  disaster  of  Cape  Passaro,  he  relied  much  upon  a  Swedish- 
Muscovite  diversion  in  Germany  and  in  England.  The  Aland 
conferences  had  been  opened  in  May,  and  there  was  every 
reason  to  expect  that  the  hostihty  felt  by  the  Tsar  and  King 
of  Sweden  to  England  would  be  of  signal  advantage  to  Spain. 
He  had  negotiated  with  Ragotsky,  Prince  of  Transylvania, 
and  had  good  ground  for  hoping  that  the  Turks  would  con- 
tinue the  war ;  he  had  incited  Cellamare  to  support  the  anti- 
Orleanist  party  in  France,  and  for  a  long  time  his  emissaries 


54  Etiropea7i  History,   171 5-1 789 

in  Paris  had  intrigued  against  Dubois.  He  had  stirred  up  the 
Protestants  in  Languedoc,  the  Cevennes,  Poitou,  and  Dauphin^ 
to  rebeUion,  and  had  entered  into  communications  with  the 
discontented  Bretons.  The  Pretender  had  been  invited  to 
Spain  and  an  expedition  organised  against  England. 

All  Alberoni's  schemes  failed.  The  attack  on  Sicily  led  to 
the  conclusion  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  on  August  2, — 
^^  Stanhope's   great  work.      By  this  Alliance,  which 

Quadruple       cousistcd  of  scvcral  treaties  —  (i)  A  treaty  between 

lance,  171  ^^  Emperor  and  the  King  of  Spain,  (2)  a  treaty 
between  the  Emperor  and  the  King  of  Sicily,  (3)  treaties 
between  the  Emperor  and  the  Kings  of  England,  France,  and 
the  States-General,  —  the  terms  of  the  Peace  of  Utrecht  were 
modified.  Charles  vi.  exchange^  Sardinia  for  Sicily,  and  the 
King  of  Sicily  received  the  title  of  King  of  Sardinia  with  the 
reversion  to  the  crown  of  Spain.  It  was  further  arranged  that 
Charles  should  renounce  his  claims  on  the  Spanish  monarchy 
and  recognise  Philip  as  the  King  of  Spain.  With  regard  to 
the  succession  to  the  Italian  Duchies  of  Parma,  Piacenza,  and 
Tuscany,  the  claims  of  Elizabeth  Farnese  were  recognised. 
The  Peace  of  Passarowitz  had  already  been  made  (July  17 18), 
and  Austrian  troops  poured  into  Italy,  prepared  to  drive  the 
Spaniards  from  Sicily.  On  August  11,  the  overthrow  of  the 
Spanish  fleet  by  Admiral  Byng  off  Cape  Passaro  attested 
the  complete  triumph  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  and  the  suc- 
cess of  the  policy  of  Stanhope  and  Dubois. 

Earnest  efforts  had  been  made  by  the  English  Government 
to  induce  Spain  to  agree  to  the  Quadruple  Alliance.  Stan- 
hope himself  went  to  Spain  in  August,  arriving  at  Madrid  on 
the  1 2th,  but  though  he  offered  to  restore  Gibraltar  he  was  no 
more  successful  than  Nancr^  had  been  in  inducing  Philip  v. 
and  Alberoni  to  agree  to  his  pacific  views.  On  August  27, 
he  left  the  Spanish  capital;  Nancr^  followed  his  example  on 
November  3,  and  Spain  continued  her  struggle  against  the 
allied  Powers. 

All  hope,  however,  of  a  diversion  from  the  north  in  favour 


Alberoni  afid  Dubois  55 

of  Spain  disappeared  with  the  death  of  Charles  xii.  in  Decem- 
ber, followed  by  the  overthrow  of  Goertz  and  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities  between  Sweden  and  Russia.  In  France  France  and 
the  conspiracy  of  Cellamare,  the  existence  of  which  ^^^^^u^ 
had  long  been  known  to  Dubois,  was  suppressed  Spain, 
in  December,  Cellamare  being  arrested,  like  Gyllenborg  tii.- 
preceding  year  ;  the  rising  in  Brittany  had  failed  ;  and  the  onl  v 
results  of  the  discovery  of  the  plot  were  that  Spanish  policy 
was  discredited,  the  opposition  of  Clement  xi.  and  the  Jesuit.-, 
who  encouraged  the  conspirators,  to  the  French  Government, 
was  laid  bare,  the  position  of  the  Regent  was  strengthened, 
and  his  opposition  to  Spain  supported  even  by  Torcy.  The 
Duke  and  Duchess  of  Maine,  the  Duke  of  Richelieu,  the  Cardi- 
nals Polignac  and  Rohan,  and  the  Marquis  of  Pompadour  were 
arrested,  and  either  imprisoned  or  exiled ;  four  of  the  Breton 
leaders  were  executed,  and  on  January  9,  17 19,  after  long- 
continued  hesitation,  France  declared  war  on  Spain.  England, 
threatened  by  a  new  Jacobite  invasion  from  the  coasts  of  Spain, 
had  already  on  December  28,  17 18,  declared  war.  Spain  could 
make  little  resistance  against  the  combined  attack.  A  French 
army  crossed  the  frontier  in  March  17 19,  and  besieged  Fuen- 
tarabia,  while  an  English  squadron  sacked  several  towns  and 
damaged  the  Spanish  shipping.  The  Jacobite  expedition  had 
ended  in  failure,  and  before  the  close  of  the  autumn  the  Austrian 
conquest  of  Sicily  was  assured. 

Alberoni  had  recognised  that  with  the  death  of  Charles  xii. 
all  hopes  of  success  had  disappeared,  and  he  was  anxious  to 
make  peace  with  the  allies  at  the  end  of  1718.  Had  not  the 
arrest  of  Molin^s'  forced  his  hand,  the  development  of  the  re- 
sources of  Spain  might  not  have  been  interrupted  till  the  coun- 
try was  ready  for  an  attempt  to  restore  the  balance  of  power  in 
the  Mediterranean  which,  in  Alberoni's  opinion,  had  been  de- 
stroyed by  the  Treaties  of  Utrecht  and  Rastadt.  His  career 
was  now  ended,  but  his  influence  on  the  history  of  Spain  can- 
not be  overestimated.  Patino  and  the  great  Spanish  adminis- 
trators worked  on  the  lines  laid  down  by  Alberoni,  and  in  1 748 


56  European  History,   1715-1789 

the  establishment  of  Don  PhiHp  in  Parma  and  Piacenza,  and 
Don  Carlos  in  the  kingdom  of  the  two  Sicilies,  is  sufficient 
proof  that  his  foreign  policy  was  by  no  means  a  failure.  The 
development  of  ItaHan  nationahty,  no  less  than  the  revival  of 
Spain,  was  in  no  small  measure  due  to  the  sagacity  of  the 
Italian  statesman. 

The  fall  of  Alberoni  was  insisted  upon  by  the  allies  as  the 
preliminary  to  negotiations,  and  in  the  middle  of  December 
Philip  V.  1 7 19,  he  received  orders  to  leave  Spain.  At  the 
dismisses  beginning  of  1720,  PhiHp,  yielding  to  the  firm  atti- 
and  joins  the  tudc  of  England  and  France,  acceded  to  the  terms 
Amance,^  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  by  the  Treaty  of  London, 
1720.  though  several  important  matters  were  the  subject 

of  negotiations  during  the  whole  year,  and  the  irritation  of 
Philip  and  Elizabeth  was  so  great  that  a  resumption  of  hostili- 
ties was  regarded  as  possible  at  any  moment.  It  was  not  till 
June  1 72 1  that  matters  were  finally  and  satisfactorily  arranged 
by  a  defensive  alliance  between  Spain,  England,  and  Fjiance. 
All  the  disputed  points  between  Spain  and  Austria  touching 
the  investiture  of  the  Italian  duchies,  the  disputed  title  to  the 
crown  of  Spain,  and  the  right  to  confer  the  Golden  Fleece, 
were  to  be  settled  at  a  Congress  which  was  to  meet  at  Ctimbrai. 
Fearful  of  a  possible  aUiance  between  Spain,  England,  and 
Austria,  Dubois  hastened  to  open  negotiations  with  Spain  with 
a  view  to  sealing  the  present  friendship  between  the  two  coun- 
tries by  a  family  compact,  arid  in  September  1721  it  was  openly 
announced  that  the  Infanta — then  five  years  old  —  would 
marry  Louis  xv.,  and  Orleans'  eldest  daughter  Don  Luis,  the 
heir-apparent  to  the  Spanish  throne. 

In  January  1722,  the  marriage  of  Mademoiselle  de  Mont- 
pensier  was  celebrated,  while  the  Infanta  took  up  her  residence 
Marriage  ^^  France.  This  extension  of  French  influence 
Alliances        at  Madrid  caused  alarm  in  English  ministerial  cir- 

between  ,  _  ,  .  .  .  ,      ^       .  ,  ., 

France  and  cles.  In  endeavouring  to  unite  with  Spain,  while 
Spain,  1721-2.  preserving  the  English  alliance,  Dubois,  while  in  a 
manner  returning  to  Louis  xiv.'s  policy,  anticipated  the  policy 


Alberoni  and  Dubois  57 

of  Fleury  in  1729.  In  Februar}'  1723?  on  the  attainment  by 
Louis  XV.  of  his  majority,  he  became  First  ]Minister,  and  held 
that  office  till  his  death,  when  Orleans  succeeded  him  in  the  post 
for  three  months.  But  the  revival  of  the  union  between  France 
and  Spain  was  premature,  and  came  to  a  sudden  end  with  the 
deaths  of  Dubois  in  August,  and  Orleans  in  December,  1723. 

Though  the  high-handed  action  of  Stanhope  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean had  checked  the  danger  to  European  peace  in  the  south 
from  a    collision  between  Spain  and  Austria,   the   „^    .,     ^ 

^  '  The  North 

affairs  in  the  north  remained  a  constant  source  of.  of  Europe, 
anxiety  to  England,  and  an  ever-increasing  menace  ^7^'*"^^- 
to  the  tranquilUty  of  Europe.  There  is  little  doubt  that  the 
policy  of  the  ministers  of  Hanover  had  tended  in  the  direction 
of  the  enlargement  of  the  area  of  the  struggle.  Throughout 
the  eighteenth  century  the  northern  Courts,  owing  to  the  rise 
of  Russia  and  Prussia,  and  the  decline  of  Sweden  and  Poland, 
played  a  very  important  part  in  European  history.  When 
George  i.  succeeded  to  the  English  throne  in  August  1714,  the 
northern  war  was  at  its  height.  Russia  and  Prussia  had  just 
made  a  secret  treaty  (July),  which  was  itself  necessitated  by 
the  prospect  of  the  speedy  return  of  Charles  xii.  from  Bender. 
By  this  treaty  Russia  undertook  not  to  make  peace  till  Prussia 
had  secured  Stettin  with  its  dependencies  up  to  the  river 
Peene,  together  with  Wolgast,  Wollin,  and  Usedom,  while 
Prussia  engaged  to  aid  Russia  to  annex  the  Swedish  provinces 
i:>f  Livonia,  Esthonia,  and  Ingria.  In  November  Charles  ap- 
peared before  Stralsund.  The  effect  of  his  arrival  was  at  once 
felt.  His  enemies  drew  together.  Prussia  made  an  offensive 
aUiance  with  Denmark,  Hanover,  Saxony,  and  Poland,  and 
declared  war  upon  Sweden.  Denmark  handed  Bremen  and 
Verden  to  George  i.,  while  Goertz,  the  Swedish  minister,  deter- 
mined to  break  up  the  League,  and  to  restore  Sweden  to  a 
leading  position  in  northern  Europe.  Stralsund  was  besieged 
by  Frederick  William,  and  on  its  fall  in  December  1715, 
Charles  xii.  with  difficulty  escaped  to  Sweden,  and  it  seemed 
likely  that  the  war  would  become  European,     An  English  fleet 


58  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

was  stationed  in  the  Baltic  to  protect  English  commerce  —  an 
'  oblique  way,'  says  Mr.  Carlyle,  *  for  paying  for  Bremen  and 
The  War  Verdcn  '  —  and  the  various  opponents  of  Charles 
between  xii.    prepared  for  a  serious  struggle.     In  appear- 

Charles  XII.  .it  c  ^    \      ^ 

and  the  ^^^c  the  League  was  powerful,  but  no  sooner  was 

League.  \^  made  than  it  showed  signs  of  breaking  up,  owing 

to  the  coolness  which  arose  between  Peter  the  Great  and  the 
Hanoverian  ministers.  In  April  1716  the  Duke  of  Mecklen- 
burg had  married  Catherine,  niece  of  Peter,  who  at  once  inter- 
fered on  behalf  of  his  nephew  against  the  Mecklenburg  nobles, 
who  were  constantly  at  feud  with  their  ruler,  and  against  the 
Danes  and  Prussians,  whose  ravages  were  ruining  the  country. 
On  the  fall  of  Wismar,  the  last  Swedish  possession  in  Pome- 
rania,  on  April  16,  the  Hanoverians  refused  to  admit  Russian 
troops  into  the  town,  and  accused  Peter  of  carrying  on  secret 
relations  with  Sweden,  and  of  wishing  to  occupy  Mecklenburg 
Quarrel  permanently.     Charles  vi.,.  alarmed  at  the  progress 

between  of  Russian   influence,  supported   the  intrigues   of 

and  Peter  the  Hanoverian  Bernsdorf  against  the  Russians, 
the  Great.  though  Townshend  and  Frederick  William  refused 
to  beheve  in  the  accusations  levelled  against  the  Russian  mon- 
arch. Frederick  William  approved  of  the  presence  of  Russian 
troops  in  Mecklenburg  on  the  ground  that  they  would  defend 
both  Denmark  and  Prussia  against  a  Swedish  attack.  He 
agreed  to  hand  over  Wismar  to  the  Duke  of  Mecklenburg, 
after  having  razed  its  walls  to  the  ground,  but  declined  to  aid 
the  Hanoverians  in  expelling  the  Russians  from  Mecklenburg 
and  with  them  to  occupy  the  duchy.  Having  strengthened 
his  position  by  a  secret  defensive  alliance  with  France  made  in 
September  1716,  he  gave  his  full  approval  to  the  policy  of 
Peter  the  Great,  who  found  himself  an  object  of  suspicion  not 
only  to  the  Emperor  but  to  the  rest  of  the  allies.  The  arrest 
in  London  of  Gyllenborg,  the  Swedish  envoy,  in  January  171 7, 
and  the  discovery  in  his  papers  of  a  plot,  arranged  by  Goertz, 
for  the  invasion  of  Scotland  by  12,000  Swedes  on  behalf  of  the 
Pretender,  rendered  the  crisis  more  acute.     Peter,  who  hoped 


Alberoni  and  Dubois  59 

to  secure  the  friendship  of  England,  was  accused  by  the  Han- 
Dverians  of  being  implicated  in  Gyllenborg's  intrigues,  and  find- 
ing an  English  alliance  was  impossible,  made  his 
celebrated  journey  to  France  in  the  summer  of  Great's  visit 
1 71 7,  hoping  by  means  of  French  assistance  to  *°p*"s,  1717. 
force  from  Sweden  compliance  with  his  terms.  He  urged  the 
French  Government  to  accept  Russia  in  place  of  Sweden  as  its 
northern  ally,  to  form  \\'ith  Russia  and  Prussia  a  close  friend- 
ship which  should  not  necessarily  interfere  with  the  existing 
Triple  Alliance  between  England,  France,  and  Holland.  But 
though  Orleans,  it  is  said,  was  in  favour  of  accepting  the  Rus- 
sian overtures,  Dubois  saw  that  the  stabiHty  of  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance would  be  endangered. 

There  is  httle  room  for  doubting  that  Dubois'  decision  was 
the  right  one.  The  Russian  Power  as  yet  rested  on  no  sure 
foundation ;  its  sudden  rise  to  a  prominent  position  was  due 
in  great  measure  to  the  collapse  of  the  Swedish  arms.  An 
extraordinary  series  of  circumstances  had  led  to  the  arrival 
Df  Russian  troops  at  the  Elbe,  and  it  was  unlikely  that  they 
could  be  maintained  in  Germany  for  any  considerable  period. 
Moreover,  the  future  development  of  Russia  depended  upon 
the  ability  of  her  rulers.  It  would  have  been  the  height  of 
rashness  to  have  substituted  for  the  Triple  Alhance  the  distant 
and  possibly  unstable  Russian  Power,  and  France,  again  isolated 
in  western  Europe,  would  have  deservedly  brought  upon  her 
the  hostiHty  of  England  and  Holland,  aided  by  the  forces  of 
the  Empire  and  probably  by  those  of  Spain. 

In   August   a   simple   treaty   of  amity  was   made   between 
France,  Russia,  and  Prussia,  knowTi  as  the  Treaty  of  Amster- 
dam.^    By  this  treaty  France  engaged  to  use  her 
^ood  offices  to  end   the  northern  war.     But   this   Russia  draw 
treaty,   followed   by  a   supplementary   convention  *°s«*h<''"- 
with   Prussia  in   August    1718,  did   not   prevent   Peter   from 

1  This  treaty,  the  first  of  many  made  between  France  and  Russia,  was 
followed  by  the  establishment  of  regular  diplomatic  relations  between  the 
two  countries. 


6o  Eiiropeaii  History,   171 5-1789 

negotiating  directly  with  Sweden.  Goertz,  who  at  the  time  of 
Gyllenborg's  arrest  had  for  a  short  period  been  imprisoned  in 
Holland,  never  ceased  intriguing  for  a  Russian  alliance,  and 
in  May  1718  he  and  Gyllenborg  met  Bruce  and  Ostermann, 
the  two  Russian  envoys  in  Losoe,  one  of  the  Aland  Islands,  at 
what  is  known  as  the  Aland  Conference.  Goertz  advocated  a 
close  alliance  with  Russia,  the  price  of  which  was  to  be  the 
provinces  of  Ingria,  Carelia,  Livonia,  and  Esthonia.  United 
with  Russia,  Sweden  could  then  disregard  her  other  foes,  pre- 
serve her  German  possessions,  and  remain  the  predominant 
Power  in  the  Baltic. 

Goertz'  views,  admirable  as  they  were  in  many  respects, 
were  not  destined  to  be  carried  out.  The  death  of  Charles  xii. 
Death  of  ^^  Friedrichshall  on  December  11,  17 18,  at  the 
Charles  XII.,  age  of  thirty-six,  was  followed  by  a  revolution 
lution  in  i^  Swcdcu.     In  January  1719  the  Diet  met,  and 

Sweden.  elected  Ulrica  Eleanora,  the  sister  of  Charles  •xii., 

queen,  and  imposed  upon  her  such  stringent  conditions  that 
the  despotism  of  the  Swedish  kings  was  transformed  into  a 
limited  monarchy.  All  chance  of  the  accession  of  the  Duke 
of  Holstein,  who  had  married  Ulrica's  sister,  disappeared ; 
Goertz,  the  advocate  of  the  Holstein  party,  was  executed ; 
and  in  1720  Ulrica  abdicated  in  favour  of  her  husband,  who 
was  elected  king  as  Frederick  i*. 

Sweden  remained  in  a  most  critical  condition.  She  was 
attacked  by  a  powerful  league,  while  a  party  in  the  Diet, 
strengthened  by  public  opinion  and  hoping  for  the  aid  of 
Prussia,  were  disposed  to  further  the  claims  of  the  Holstein 
branch  to  the  throne.  A  decided  policy  at  home  and  abroad 
was  demanded.  The  party  in  power  determined  to  reverse  the 
foreign  policy  of  Charles  xii.  and  Goertz,  and  to  adopt  a  line 
of  conduct  fraught  with  disastrous  consequences  to  Sweden. 
Upon  the  election  of  Ulrica  negotiations  were  broken  off  with 
Russia,  and  steps  were  at  once  taken  to  conclude  treaties  with 
the  various  members  of  the  League. 

Through  the  mediation  of  Carteret,  treaties  were  signed  in 


Alberoni  and  Dubois  6 1 

November  1719  with  Hanover,  and  in  February  1720  with 
Prussia.  By  the  former,  Hanover,  in  consideration  of  a  sum  of 
money,  was  to  retain  Bremen  and  Verden  ;  by  the  latter, 
Prussia,  having  paid  to  Sweden  two  milhons  of  dollars,  was 
to  retain  Stettin,  the  islands  of  Wollin  and  Usedom, 
and  Pomerania  as  far  as  the  Peene.  Treaties  were  between 
also  made  with  Poland  and  Denmark  in   Tanuarv   ^^^^'^^^  ^"'^ 

•^  ■'     the  members 

and  July  1720,  the  latter  Power  being  secured  in   of  the 
the  possession  of  Sleswig,  and   thus  Sweden   was   ^^^^"^• 
free  to  devote  all  her  energies  to  the  war  against  Peter   the 
Great.      But    this    attempt   of    the    Swedish    Government   to 
isolate    Russia    and    avoid   further    concessions   failed    hope- 
lessly.    An  English  fleet  in  the  Baltic  proved  of  little  value ; 
Peter  pursued    his  victorious  career  unchecked,  and  in   1721 
the  Swedes  were  glad  to  accept  the  mediation  of  Campredon, 
the  French    ambassador,  and  make  an  inglorious  peace  with 
Russia.     By  the  Treaty  of  Nystad,  signed  on  Sep-   The  Treaty 
tember  10,   1721,  Sweden  relinquished    to  Russia   °^^J^^^ . 

.  with  Russia, 

Livonia,  Esthonia,  Ingria,  and  Carelia,  part  of  1721. 
Wiborg,  with  the  islands  Ossel,  Dagoe,  and  ]\Ioen,  and  all 
others  from  the  boundary  of  Courland  to  Wiborg.  Russia 
on  her  part  paid  two  millions  of  dollars  and  restored  Finland. 
With  the  signature  of  the  Peace  of  Nystad  a  chapter  in  Euro- 
pean history  is  closed.  The  place  of  Sweden  is  henceforward 
taken  by  Russia  and  Prussia.  Sweden  retired  from  the  com- 
manding position  in  Europe  to  which  she  had  been  raised  by 
the  House  of  Vasa.  Henceforward,  till  the  accession  of  Gus- 
ta\ais  III.,  she  was  alternately  the  ally  of  Russia  and  France, 
and  the  prey  to  internal  faction.  By  the  Act  of  May  2,  1720, 
the  Swedish  monarchy  had  ceased  to  be  absolute  and  had 
become  elective.  Weak  and  disunited,  Sweden  became  the 
prey  to  factions,  one  of  which  not  only  supported  the  claims 
of  Charles  Frederick,  Duke  of  Holstein-Gottorp,  the  son  of 
Hedwiga  Sophia,  and  in  1725  the  son-in-law  of  Peter  the 
Great  and  Catherine,  but  also  advocated  a  close  Russian 
alliance.     The  other  party  supported  Ulrica  and  her  husband, 


62  Europeaji  History^   1715-1709 

and  pressed  for  a  French  connection.  Under  the  titles  of  the 
Hats  and  the  Caps  these  two  parties  struggled  for  supremacy, 
the  miserable  years  of  their  dissensions  being  characteristically 
styled  the  period  of  liberty. 

While  Sweden  dechned,  Russia  and  Prussia  advanced,  and 
both  Powers  became  important  factors  in  the  European  state- 
system.  For  the  moment,  however,  the  Treaty  of  Nystad  gave 
peace  to  the  north,  just  as  the  Quadruple  Alliance  had  secured 
tranquillity  in  the  south,  and  the  foreign  policy  of  Stanhope 
and  Dubois,  so  far  as  the  preservation  of  peace  was  concerned, 
was  crowned  with  success.  The  Anglo-French  alliance  re- 
mained intact,  all  fear  of  a  Jacobite  invasion  was  removed,  the 
French  Government  was  in  no  danger  from  the  intrigues  of 
Philip  and  Elizabeth  Farnese,  Alberoni  had  fallen,  and  Goertz 
had  been  executed.  In  February  1723  Louis  xv.  attained  his 
legal  majority,  and  the  Regency  came  to  an  end.  No  change 
of  government  took  place,  and  Dubois  remained  at  the  head  of 
affairs  till  his  death  in  August.  With  regard  to  the  future,  a 
congress  was  to  meet  and  settle  outstanding  questions,  which 
mainly  concerned  the  Italian  Peninsula. 

The  years  from  1715  to  1725  had  seen  the  councils  of 
Europe  dominated  by  three  adventurers  —  Alberoni,  Goertz, 
Dubois  ^^'^  Dubois.     Of  these  three  the  first  two  worked 

Goertz,  and  definitely  for  the  well-being  of  their  respective 
countries,  and  their  policy  was  dictated  by  national 
rather  than  by  personal  considerations.  Both  failed  to  carry 
out  the  work  they  had  set  themselves  to  do,  the  one  through 
the  death  of  Charles  xii.  and  the  inherent  weakness  of  Sweden, 
the  other  because  the  dynastic  interests  of  Elizabeth  Farnese 
placed  Spain  in  a  false  position  and  hampered  the  work  of 
reform.  With  the  death  of  Goertz  Sweden  retired  to  the  posi- 
tion of  a  third-rate  Power,  from  which  she  has  never  emerged. 
Alberoni's  fall,  on  the  other  hand,  proved  only  a  temporary 
check  in  the  regeneration  of  Spain ;  his  work  was  continued  by 
his  successors,  and  the  eighteenth  century  saw  his  policy  in 
great  measure  realised.     Dubois  stands  in  striking  contrast  to 


Alberoni  and  Dubois  63 

both  his  contemporaries.  His  views  were  not  so  statesmanlike 
as  those  of  Alberoni,  he  was  not  in  the  desperate  position  of 
Goertz,  nor  was  he  so  single-minded  in  his  views  as  the  Spanish 
minister.  His  foreign  poHcy,  though  beneficial  to  France,  was 
dictated  by  personal  considerations,  and  his  domestic  poHcy 
was  selfish  and  opportunist.  His  abihty,  however,  was  un- 
doubted, and  he  carried  France  with  success  through  a  dan- 
gerous period.  But  his  want  of  high  principle,  his  cynical 
contempt  for  religion  and  moraUty,  and  his  unblushing  ambi- 
tion, rendered  the  Abb^  Dubois,  successful  politician  as  he 
was,  a  far  less  interesting  figure  than  Alberoni. 

Before  the  end  of  his  career  Dubois  had  no  rival  at  home  or 
abroad.  Law  had  fled,  Alberoni  was  in  exile,  Goertz  was 
dead.  All  efi'orts  to  remedy  the  internal  evils  from  which 
France  was  suffering  had  ceased,  and  the  Regency  closed  with 
all  the  promise  of  its  early  years  unfulfilled. 

Abroad,  the  Quadruple  Alliance  already  showed  signs  of 
breaking  up,  and  as  long  as  the  interests  of  Elizabeth  Farnese 
dominated  Spanish  pohtics,  and  Charles  vi.  persisted  in  his 
ambitious  schemes,  Europe  could  not  hope  for  any  lengthened 
period  of  tranquillity. 


CHAPTER    III 

THE  INTRIGUES   OF  ELIZABETH   FARNESE 

1 723-1 733 

The  Period  from  1723  to  1733  —  The  Government  of  the  Duke  of  Bourbon  -^ 
The  Congress  of  Cambrai  —  The  Idea  of  an  Austro-Spanish  Alliance — • 
Elizabeth  Farnese's  Reasons  for  allying  with  Austria  —  Charles  vi.'s  Reasons 
for  allying  with  Spain  —  Ripperda's  Instructions  —  His  Career — The  Dis- 
missal of  the  Infanta  by  Bourbon  —  Russian  Overtures  to  France  —  Con- 
ferences in  Vienna  —  The  Treaty  of  Vienna,  1725  —  The  League  of  Hanover 
—  The  Secret  Articles  in  the  Treaty  of  Vienna — Prussia  and  the  Treaty  of 
Wiisterhausen  —  Parties  in  France  —  Fall  of  Ripperda  —  The  Break-up  of 
the  Austro-Spanish  Alliance —  Danger  of  a  General  War  in  1727-28  —  The 
Treaty  of  Seville  —  England  and  Spain  —  The  Second  Treaty  of  Vienna, 

1731. 

The  years  from  the  deaths  of  Dubois  and  Orleans  to  the  out- 
break of  the  Pohsh  Succession  War  (1723-33)  form  a  troubled 
_.    „    .  ^      and  complicated  period,  characterised  by  a  perfect 

The  Period  ^  .  ^  '  .  ^        ^ 

from  1723  network  of  diplomacy.  The  alliance  between  Eng- 
to  1733-  Xdca^  and  France  held  good  under  both  Bourbon  and 

Fleury,  but  the  existence  and  increasing  importance  of  a  strong 
opposition  party  at  the  French  Court  to  the  English  connection 
foreshadowed  complications  in  the  future.  The  growing  coolness 
between  Austria  and  England,  and  between  Austria  and  Prussia, 
tended  to  weaken  the  position  of  Charles  vi.,  who,  intent  upon 
the  pursuit  of  such  shadows  as  the  guarantee  .of  the  Pragmatic 
Sanction  and  the  establishment  of  an  Ostend  East  India  Com- 
pany, neglected  the  real  interests  of  his  country.  • 

In  France  for  the  next  three  years  the  Duke  of  Bourbon 
held  the  reins  of  office,  and  continued  th^  policy  of  Orleans 


The  Intrigues  of  ElizabetJi  Famese  65 

and  Dubois.  Louis  Henry,  Duke  of  Bourbon,  known  as 
Monsieur  le  Due,  the  lineal  heir  of  the  great  Cond^,  had 
hitherto  not  occupied  a  prominent  position  in  the  xhe  Govern 
state,  being  more  interested  in  hunting  than  in  poHt-  ment  of  the 
ical  matters.  He  had,  however,  stoutly  opposed  the  Bourbon 
claims  of  the  legitimes,  had  supported  the  schemes  ^723-26. 
of  Law,  and  had  viewed  with  displeasure  the  rapid  rise  of 
Dubois.  He  had  never  shown  any  conspicuous  ability,  and 
was  a  dull  man,  dominated  by  his  mistress,  the  intriguing 
Marchioness  of  Prie,  and  by  the  financier  Paris-Duverney, 
who,  an  enemy  of  Law,  had  come  prominently  forward  on 
the  collapse  of  the  latter's  system.  On  the  death  of  Orleans, 
Fleury,  the  astute  bishop  of  Frejus,  still  in  charge  of  Louis' 
education,  had  secured  his  appointment  as  First  Minister,  and 
remained  in  the  background  till  1726,  when  he  himself  supplanted 
the  Duke,  whose  government  had  become  intensely  unpopular. 
The  internal  administration  of  France  suffered  under  the  ministry 
of  Bourbon,  in  spite  of  the  attempts  of  Paris-Duverney  to  force 
the  noble  class  to  contribute  its  share  in  the  taxation  of  the 
country,  and  to  organise  a  national  army  by  a  system  of  con- 
scription. Though  excellent  in  conception,  the  former  of  those 
measures  was  abrogated  in  1727,  and  the  latter  was  never 
carried  out.  The  re-establishment  of  the  d?'oit  de  joyeiix 
avhiefuent,  an  obsolete  tax,  paid  on  the  accession  of  a  king 
for  the  confirmation  of  privileges  by  high  and  low  alike,  was 
very  unpopular,  and  was  never  levied  again.  In  religious 
matters,  which  since  the  death  of  Orleans  had  been  under 
the  direction  of  Fleury,  Bourbon  had  little  difficulty  in  making 
his  influence  felt.  One  severe  edict  (May  24,  1724)  was  levelled 
at  those  Protestants  who  still  lived  in  France,  and  who  had  taken 
the  opportunity  of  the  reaction  under  Orleans  to  meet  together 
for  common  worship ;  and  another  supported,  if  not  originated, 
by  Fleury,  was  directed  against  the  Jansenists.  A  fresh  emigra- 
tion of  the  Protestants  followed  the  edict,  and  public  opinion 
ridiculed  tlie  continued  attempts  to  force  the  Bull  Unigenitus, 
in  a  philosophic  and  sceptical  age,  upon  the  French  nation. 

PERIOD    VJ.  E 


66  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

In  his  foreign  policy  Bourbon  was  bent  on  the  preservation 
of  peace,  and  was  at  first  inclined  to  follow  the  lines  of  policy 
laid  down  by  Dubois  in  his  later  years.  He  alone  of  all  the 
Bourbon  princes  had  in  1713  protested  against  Philip  v.'s  com- 
pulsory renunciations/  and  to  the  Spanish  Court  the  accession 
of  the  Duke  to  power  was  an  event  of  no  small  significance. 
Philip  V.  and  Alberoni  had,  by  the  temporary  estrangement  of 
France,  paid  the  penalty  for  their  impatience  and  rashness  in 
1 7 1 7  and  1 7 1 8.  But  before  he  died  Dubois  could  boast  that  not 
only  had  he  maintained  the  peace  of  Europe  when  a  general 
war  seemed  imminent,  but  that  he  had  taken  measures  to  en- 
sure the  gradual  re-establishment  of  the  Spanish  influence  in 
Italy,  and  had  reunited  the  Courts  of  Versailles  and  Madrid 
without  breaking  the  Anglo-French  alliance.  On  Dubois'  death 
the  Comte  de  Morville,  who  had  been  appointed  plenipoten- 
tiary at  the  Congress  of  Cambrai,  took  charge  of  foreign  affairs, 
and  remained  Secretary  of  State  till  1727.  No  change  in  the 
relations  of  France  with  other  nations  followed  the  accession  of 
the  Duke  of  Bourbon  to  power,  and  any  intentions  that  he 
might  have  harboured  for  returning  to  a  close  offensive  and 
defensive  aUiance  with  Spain,  to  the  detriment  of  the  good  re- 
lations subsisting  between  France  and  England,  were  cut  short 
by  the  sudden  abdication  of  Phihp  v.  on  June  14,  1724;  and 
later  in  the  year  the  impatience  of  the  Spanish  queen  again 
tended  to  postpone  indefinitely  any  real  reconciliation  between 
France  and  Spain,  and  to  unite  England  and  France  in  a  firm 
endeavour  to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe.  Elizabeth  Far- 
nese's  irritation  at  the  dilatory  conduct  of  France  and  Spain 
coincided  with  a  growing  dislike  on  the  part  of  Bourbon  to  the 
Duke  of  Chartres,  the  son  of  Orleans,  who  in  the  event  of  Louis' 
death  would  succeed  to  the  French  throne.  It  was  the  dread 
of  this  contingency  which  led  in  1725  to  the  dismissal  of  the 
Infanta. 

During  the  ten  years  from  1723  to  1733  Elizabeth  Farnese 
*  was  the  pivot  upon  which  the  diplomat:y  of  Europe  turned.' 

^Philippe  V.  et  la  cour  de  France-,  par  A.  Baudrillard,  vol.  ii.  540-1. 


The  Intrigues  of  Elizabeth  Farnese  6y 

The  principal  aim  of  her  efforts  was  as  ever  the  aggrandise- 
ment of  her  children,  while,  in  spite  of  all  renunciations  and 
treaties,  Philip    showed    that   he   remained   firmly   ^^    ^ 

^  _  ^1  he  Lon- 

resolved  to  secure,  in  the  event  of  Louis  xv.'s  death,  gress  of 
the  succession  to  the  French  Crown.  On  his  ad-  ^"^  ^^^' 
hesion  to  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  the  King  of  Spain  had  re- 
ceived full  assurance  that  on  the  extinction  of  the  lines  of  Far- 
nese and  iSIedici,  Don  Carlos  should  succeed  at  Parma  and 
Florence.  It  had  been  arranged  that  certain  points  with  regard 
to  the  Italian  duchies,  and  other  questions  still  under  dispute 
between  Spain  and  Austria,  should  be  settled  at  a  European 
Congress,  which,  after  two  years  spent  in  preliminaries,  met  for 
business  at  Cambrai  on  January  26,  1724.  'A  more  inane 
congress,'  says  Carlyle,  '  never  met  in  this  world,  and  never  will 
meet.'  At  the  Congress  the  rival  claims  of  Austria  and  Spain 
were  Hstened  to,  and  Charles  vi.,  throwing  every  possible  diffi- 
culty in  the  way  of  a  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  questions 
awaiting  solution,  demanded  the  guarantee  of  the  Pragmatic 
Sanction  from  all  the  assembled  Powers.  '  There  at  Cambrai, 
for  about  four  years  were  the  poor  delegates  busied  baling  out 
water  with  sieves.'  While  the  Congress  was  thus  sitting  en- 
gaged in  futile  deHberations,  an  event  occurred  which  roused 
the  attention  of  Europe,  and  puzzled  the  diplomatists  of  every 
Court. 

Without  any  previous  warning  Philip  v.  had  suddenly  on  Jan- 
uary 14,  1724,  abdicated  his  throne  in  favour  of  Don  Luis. 
Rehgious  motives  appear  to  have  been  the  imme-  Abdication 
diate  caUse  of  this  unexpected  abdication,  which,  °^  Philip  v. 
however,  proved  to  be  of  short  duration,  as  Don  Luis  only 
enjoyed  his  new  dignity  eight  months,  and  on  his  death  in 
August  Philip  V.  reascended  the  Spanish  throne,  placing  the 
control  of  foreign  affairs  in  the  hands  of  Grimaldo,  who  had 
been  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  since  Alberoni's  fall. 
Finding  that  the  Congress  proceeded  very  deliberately,  and 
being  convinced  that  England  and  France  had  not  bestirred 
themselves   to   advance   her   aims  with  regard  to  the  Italian 


68  European  History ^  171 5-1789 

duchies,  the  Queen  of  Spain  determined  to  follow  Ripperda's 
advice,  which  was  in  agreement  with  her  own  views,  and  to 
negotiate  directly  with  Charles  vi.  The  idea  of  making  an  alli- 
The  Idea  of  ance  with  Austria  was  no  new  one.  Alberoni  at  one 
an  Austro-       period  in  his  career  had  suesjested  it :  Philip  and 

Spanish  ^  *^^  '  j- 

Alliance.  Elizabeth  Farnese  had  in  1721  seriously  considered 

it ;  and  during  the  short  reign  of  Don  Luis,  Ripperda,  in  full 
accord  with  the  old  Spanish  party  which  detested  a  French 
aUiance,  had  dwelt  upon  the  advisability  of  bringing  about 
friendly  relations  between  the  two  Courts.  In  September  1724 
Elizabeth  was,  from  various  reasons,  ready  to  entertain  the 
idea,  and  Francis  Farnese,  the  Duke  of  Parma,  threw  himself 
eagerly  into  the  project.  To  secure  the  eventual  succession  to 
.the  duchies,  and  to  recover  Gibraltar  and  Minorca,  were  the 
'definite  objects  of  the  Spanish  Court.  In  1724  Elizabeth  was 
/orced  to  acknowledge  that  the  French  alhance  of  1721  had 
been  of  little  use  to  Spain,  and  that  no  efforts  had  been  made 
by  either  Orleans  or  Bourbon  to  hasten  the  retirement  of  the 
English  from  Gibraltar.  As  long  as  England  held  Gibraltar, 
supported  by  the  Spanish  nobles,  who  urged  a  marriage  be- 
tween Don  Ferdinand  and  the  new  Princess  of  the  Asturias  and 
an  Austrian  Archduchess,  she  was  ready  to  oppose  English 
policy  in  Europe,  and  to  hamper  English  trade  in  South  Amer- 
ica and  the  West  Indies. 

The  French  were  equally  detested  at  Madrid,  and  the 
old  Spanish  party  incited  the  mob  against  France  and  Tesse, 
Elizabeth's  the  French  envoy.  It  was  recognised  at  Madrid 
Reasons  for     ^^i^it  the  promise  of  George    i.    to  yield  Gibraltar 

allying  with  ^  _     ^  ■'     _ 

Austria.  was  not  likely  to  be  carried  out,  and  this  conviction 

was  forced  upon  EHzabeth  and  Philip  at  the  very  time  that 
the  Spanish  commercial  classes  were  beginning  to  feel  the 
effects  of  the  English  trading  competition.  Since  the  Regent's 
death,  too,  the  ^;^econcihation  with  France,  which  had  been 
premature  and  never  really  sincere,  seemed  less  likely  than 
ever  to  result  in  the  recovery  of  Gibraltar,  or  in  the  establish- 
ment of  Don  Carlos  in  Italy  by  French  aid»     Grimaldo   and 


The  Intrigues  of  Elizabeth  Farnese  69 

the  other  Spanish  ministers  had  been  practically  superseded 
by  John  Baptiste  Orendayn,  formerly  a  clerk  in  the  Foreign 
Office,  and  who,  having  received  the  confidence  of  Elizabeth, 
was  made  Secretary  of  State  for  Finance,  and  consulted  in 
matters  of  foreign  pohcy.  While  Elizabeth,  with  no  fear  of 
opposition  from  the  Spanish  ministers,  was  thus  coming  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  best  means  for  the  successful  attain- 
ment of  her  wishes  were  to  be  found  in  an  Austrian  alliance, 
Charles  vi.  had  almost  decided  to  open  negotiations  with 
Spain.  He  was,  as  always,  bent  upon  securing  the  charies  vi.'s 
adhesion  of  all  the  great  Powers  to  the  Prasimatic   ^^^f°"s  for 

"  °  allying  with 

Sanction.  But  En^nd  and  HoUand  no  less  than  Spain. 
France  showed  no  inclination  to  guarantee  it,  and  he  hoped 
to  secure  the  Spanish  support,  if  only  he  was  able  to  satisfy 
the  aims  of  Elizabeth.  The  Congress  of  Cambrai  had  dis- 
appointed his  expectations.  Not  only  was  he  unable  to  ob- 
tain the  adhesion  of  the  assembled  Powers  to  the  Pragmatic 
Sanction,  but  his  wishes  on  other  points  had  met  with 
opposition.  England  and  Holland  had  run  counter  to  his 
fixed  determination  of  establishing  an  Ostend  East  India 
Company.  Determined  to  secure  a  share  of  the  Indian  trade, 
and  recognising  the  force  of  Eugene's  contention  that  the 
Indian  Company  might  form  the  nucleus  of  a  German  fleet, 
he  had  actually  founded  the  Company  in  1722,  and  given  it 
a  charter  in  1723,  fixing  the  capital  at  one  million.  Between 
1 71 7  and  1722  a  number  of  experimental  voyages  had  been 
made,  and  their  success  had  roused  the  complaints  of  the 
French,  Dutch,  and  English  Companies.  The  Maritime  Pow- 
ers, however,  would  have  none  of  it,  and  their  hatred  of  its 
German  settlements  in  India  was  shared  by  the  French,  who 
at  Pondicherry  and  Chandernagore  assumed  a  threatening 
attitude.  Ships  were  sent  out,  and  two  settlements  —  one  at 
Covelong,  on  the  south-east  coast,  and  the  other  at  Bankipur 
on  the  Hooghly  —  were  founded  in  India,  which  entered 
into  competition  with  the  older  European  Companies.  As 
Charles   was  equally  resolved  to  persevere  in  his  scheme,   he- 


70  Eiiropemi  History,   171 5-1 789 

naturally  drew  near  to  Spain,  the  now  almost  avowed  enemy  of 
England  and  France.  In  firm  alliance  with  Spain,  Charles 
felt  that  Ostend  would  be  to  the  north  German  commerce 
what  Trieste  would  be  to  his  Mediterranean  trade,  and  hoped 
to  make  it  into  a  first-class  naval  station.  The  possession  of 
a  fleet  would  render  Germany  independent  of  the  Maritime 
Powers,  and  give  the  Empire  a  commercial  influence  in  north- 
ern Europe.  The  recognition  of  the  Company  by  Spain  thus 
became  a  matter  of  very  serious  importance  to  both  England 
and  Holland.  Charles,  moreover,  had  vast  imperial  schemes. 
He  hoped  to  reassert  the  old  claims  on  Italy,  to  make  Italy  a 
province  of  the  Empire,  and  to  use  her  resources  for  the  consoli- 
dation of  his  power  in  Germany.  For  the  reaUsation  of  these 
schemes  Spanish  friendship  was  absolutely  necessary.  It  would 
free  him  from  dependence  on  England  and  Holland,  and  it 
would  give  a  considerable  impetus  to  the  growth  of  Catholicism 
in  Europe,  which  itself  might  be  used  on  behalf  of  a  Stuart  res- 
toration, and  in  favour  of  imperial  policy  in  Poland  and  Saxony. 

At  Vienna,  it  is  true,  the  idea  of  an  alliance  with  Spain  met 
with  serious  opposition.  Both  Maria  Theresa  and  the  Empress, 
who  wished  her  daughter  to  marry  the  Duke  of  Lorraine,  were 
hostile  to  the  Spanish  scheme,  and  were  supported  in  their  dis- 
like of  the  project  by  Eugene,  the  Commander-in-chief  and 
President  of  the  Council  of  War,  and  Stahremberg,  the 
Director  of  the  Finances,  while  Charles  vi.  was  aided  by  the 
advice  of  his  Chancellor  and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Zin- 
zendorf.  Independent  circumstances,  coinciding  in  point  of 
time,  were  thus  tending  to  draw  together  the  Courts  of  Vienna 
and  Madrid,  when  two  events  brought  matters  to  a  head,  and 
hastened  the  conclusion  of  an  alhance. 

In  November  1724  Ripperda  arrived  at  Vienna,  armed  with 

elaborate  instructions,  and  early  in  ?^Iarch  of  the  following  year 

the  Infanta,  Maria  Anna  Victoria,  was  sent  back  to 

Ripperda  s  '  '  _ 

instruc-  Spain  from  France.     The  instructions  of  Ripperda, 

*'°"^"  who  had  long  been  in  favour  of  the  establishment 

of  close   relations   between   Austria   and   Spain,   were   dated 


The  hitrignes  of  Elizabeth  Fames e  yt 

November  22,  1724.  He  was  ordered  to  keep  his  negotiations 
secret,  and  if  he  found  that  Charles  vi.  was  disposed  to  enter- 
tain the  idea  of  an  alHance  with  Spain,  he  was  to  propose  that 
Don  Carlos  should  marry  Maria  Theresa,  become  king  of  the 
Romans,  and  on  the  death  of  Charles  vi.  inherit  all  the  heredi- 
tary lands  of  the  Hapsburgs,  while  Don  Philip  should  marry 
the  Archduchess  Maria  Anna,  and  after  Charles  vi.'s  death 
inherit  the  Hapsburg  possessions  in  Italy,  the  Milanese  and  the 
two  Sicilies,  to  which  should  be  added  Tuscany  and  the  duchies 
of  Parma  and  Piacenza.  Other  proposals  with  regard  to  the 
Netherlands,  Gibraltar,  and  IMinorca  were  to  be  made,  but 
modifications  might  be  allowed  so  long  as  the  intermarriages 
were  carried  out. 

This  proposed  union  between  the  Courts  of  Vienna  and 
Madrid  was  intended  by  Elizabeth  Farnese  to  have  a  rehgious 
significance.  An  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  was  to  be 
concluded  against  the  Turks,  against  the  German  Protestant 
princes,  and  against  England.  It  was  also  to  have  an  equally 
distinct  effect  upon  commercial  matters.  England's  maritime 
and  mercantile  interests  were  to  be  attacked,  Gibraltar  and 
Minorca  captured,  and  the  Ostend  East  India  Company  sup- 
ported. These  instructions  were  drawn  up  while  the  Congress 
of  Cambrai  was  sitting,  and  while  Monteleone  was  negotiating 
at  Paris  with  Mor\'ille  against  Austria. 

John  William,  Baron  de  Ripperda,  was  a  Dutchman  by  birth, 
but  a  Spaniard  by  origin.  He  had  represented  his  native  prov- 
ince, Groningen,  in  the  States-General,  and  during  Ripperda's 
the  Spanish  Succession  War  had  become  acquainted  Career, 
with  Prince  Eugene  and  Zinzendorf.  His  knowledge  of  com- 
mercial matters  was  keenly  appreciated  in  Holland,  and  in 
1 715  he  was  sent  to  Madrid  as  ambassador,  for  which  post  his 
command  of  several  European  languages  well  fitted  him.  In 
Spain  he  became  a  warm  supporter  of  Alberoni's  schemes,,  and 
his  knowledge  of  commerce  was  most  useful  to  the  Spanish 
minister.  Having  openly  supported  Alberoni's  foreign  policy 
and  acted  with  considerable  indiscretion,  he  was  recalled,  but 


72  Etiropean  History y   171 5-1789 

before  Alberoni's  fall  returned  to  Spain  and  became  a  Catholic, 
and  offered  his  services  to  Philip  v.,  who  gave  him  a  pension 
and  often  consulted  him.  During  Don  Luis'  short  reign  he 
had  come  prominently  forward,  and  for  a  short  period  played 
an  important  part  in  Spanish  history.  Though  talkative  and 
liable  to  be  carried  away  by  exaggerated  hopes,  he  had  many 
excellent  qualities,  and  both  Alberoni  and  Eugene  recognised 
his  merits.  He  had  considerable  organising  powers ;  he  had 
a  real  knowledge  of  the  commercial  needs  of  Spain,  and,  like 
Alberoni,  determined  to  revive  her  trade  and  encourage  her 
manufactures.  He  urged  upon  Elizabeth  Farnese  the  desira- 
bility of  an  alliance  with  Austria,  and  suggested  the  idea  of 
double  marriages.^ 

The  first  overtures,  indeed,  came  to  Spain  from  Austria 
through  the  mediation  of  the  Pope,  but  Elizabeth,  with  her 
TheDismis-  usual  impetuosity,  had  already  thrown  herself 
sal  of  the  eagerly  into  Ripperda's  plans,  and  his  visit  to 
Bourbon.  Vienna  coincided  with  a  change  in  the  attitude  of 
the  French  Government,  which  afforded  Spain  ample  justifica- 
tion for  its  adoption  of  a  new  policy.  The  second  event  which 
was  the  immediate  cause  of  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  was  the  dis- 
missal of  the  Infanta,  Maria  Anna  Victoria,  by  the  Duke  of 
Bourbon.  The  object  of  Bourbon  and  Madame  de  Prie,  with 
the  full  acquiescence  of  Villars,  Fleury,  and  Morville,  and  the 
support  of  French  public  opinion,  was  to  arrange  a  marriage 
for  Louis  XV.  as  soon  as  possible,  for  if  Louis  died  without  an 
heir  the  Orleanist  House  would  succeed,  and  Bourbon's  influ- 
ence in  the  Government  would  cease.  Moreover,  it  was  advis- 
able to  secure  a  docile  bride  for  Louis,  and  one  who,  owing  her 
position  to  Bourbon,  would  not  attempt  to  remove  him  from 
his  office.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  personal  interest  of  Bour- 
bon, it  is  possible  that  the  wishes  of  Catherine  i.,  the  Tsarina, 
who  was  anxious  that  her  daughter  Elizabeth  should  marry  the 
French  king,  and  that  a  closer  alliance  should  be  made  between 
Russia  and  France,  might  have  been  seriously  considered. 

1  Revue  cC Histoire  Diplomatique,  Nos.  2,  3,  4. 


The  Intrigues  of  ElizabetJi  Farnese  73 

Peter  the  Great  had  left  Russia  practically  isolated  on  his 
death  in  February  1725,  and  the  growing  hostiUty  of  Spain 
and  Austria  to  the  Triple  Alliance  seemed  to  offer   „ 

^  Russian 

an  excellent  opportunity  for  renewing  negotiations  Overtures 
with  France.  Catherine,  inheriting  Peter's  policy,  *°  ^'■^°'=^- 
brought  fonvard  strong  arguments  to  overcome  the  hesitation 
of  Bourbon.  Russian  arms  should  aid  French  enterprises  in 
any  part  of  Europe ;  a  French  prince,  upon  the  next  vacancy, 
should  be  placed  upon  the  throne  of  Poland,  which  should  be 
controlled  by  the  united  action  of  France  and  Russia.  But 
Bourbon  and  Madame  de  Prie,  fearing  that  the  young  Princess 
EHzabeth  might  develop  an  independence  of  spirit  and  oust 
them  from  power,  refused  to  entertain  the  idea  of  a  Russian 
match.  Princesses  of  Modena  and  Lorraine  were  also  discarded 
on  account  of  their  connection  with  the  House  of  Orleans.  At 
length  they  decided  upon  Marie  Leszczynski,  daughter  of  Stan- 
islas, the  ex-King  of  Poland,  who  was  then  living  at  Wissen- 
burs:,  and  who  had  no  relations  with  anv  French  faction.  On 
September  4,  1725,  the  marriage  took  place,  Bourbon  hoping 
that  a  princess  who  owed  her  elevation  to  the  house  of  Bour- 
bon-Conde  would  use  her  influence  on  its  behalf.  Bourbon's 
decision  had  important  results.  France  found  herself  bound 
to  support  the  claims  of  Stanislas  in  Poland,  all  relations  with 
Russia  were  broken  off,  and  the  way  was  prepared  for  that 
close  connection  between  Russia  and  Austria  which  had  such 
an  important  bearing  upon  European  history. 

While,  however,  the  Duke  of  Bourbon  was  playing  into  the 
hands  of  Elizabeth  Farnese,  Ripperda's  mission  was  meeting 
with  unexpected  success.  On  February  9,  1725,  Prince  Eu- 
gene, Stahremberg,  and  Zinzendorf,  the  three  members  of  the 
Secret  Conference,  which  controlled  all  important  conferences 
matters  in  the  Austrian  monarchy,  met  together  i"  Vienna, 
to  discuss  Ripperdd's  proposals.  Prince  Eugene  and  Count 
Gundakar  of  Stahremberg  were  old,  cautious,  and  conservative 
in  temperament.  They  were  fully  cognisant  of  the  condition 
of  the  army  and  the  finances,  they  were  strong  advocates  of  the 


74  Eii7'opean  History,   17 15-1789 

connection  with  the  Maritime  Powers,  and  regarded  the  English 
alHance  as  the  pivot  of  Austrian  foreign  poHcy.  Count  Louis 
of  Zinzendorf  stood  in  striking  contrast  to  his  two  colleagues. 
Steeped  in  the  scepticism  and  dilettantism  of  the  century,  he 
was  hampered  by  no  principles  beyond  the  necessity  of  pleas- 
ing the  Emperor.  The  three  ministers,  however,  on  this  occa- 
sion were  equally  willing  to  consider  carefully  the  Spanish  pro- 
posals, and  were  at  one  with  Charles  vi.  in  recognising  that 
Austria  stood  in  a  perilous  position.  They  were  aware  of  the 
partiality  of  the  Maritime  Powers  for  the  Itahan  scheme  of 
Elizabeth  Farnese  ;  they  suspected  that  the  mysterious  negotia- 
tions of  Monteleone  at  Paris  would  be  followed  by  a  com- 
bined Bourbon  attack  upon  Italy.  They,  moreover,  feared  the 
aggression  of  the  EngUsh  and  Dutch  in  the  Netherlands,  they 
resented  the  continual  demands  by  the  Maritime  Powers  for 
the  abolition  of  the  Ostend  East  India  Company,  and  they  were 
resolved  not  to  yield  to  the  insolent  outcry  of  the  London  and 
Amsterdam  merchants.  At  the  same  time,  they  agreed  with 
the  Emperor  in  opposing  the  marriage  scheme,  which  seemed 
likely  to  result  in  awkward  complications  in  the  near  future. 
They  therefore,  on  February  11,  advised  Charles  to  negotiate 
for  a  treaty  with  Spain  on  the  basis  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance, 
but  to  decline  the  marriage  proposals,  on  the  ground  of  the 
youth  of  the  Archduchesses  and  of  the  engagement  of  Don 
Carlos  to  a  French  princess.  After  negotiations  had  taken 
place  between  Ripperda  and  Zinzendorf,  the  draft  of  a  treaty 
was  sent  to  Madrid  on  March  9.  Already,  however,  on  March 
I,  couriers  had  left  Paris  for  IMadrid,  Turin,  Rome,  and  Lon- 
don to  announce  the  decision  of  the  Duke  of  Bourbon  to  send 
back  the  Infanta  to  Spain. 

The  rupture  of  the  marriage  scheme  between  France  and 
Spain,  the  announcement  of  which  reached  Madrid  in  the  first 
week  of  March,  precipitated  a  crisis  in  the  policy 
of  Vienna,       of  Europe.     A  plausiblc  pretext  had  been  afforded 
^'''^  to  Spain ;    the    Spanish   ambassador  was    recalled 

from  Paris  and  the  Spanish  representatives  from  the  Congress. 


The  Intrigues  of  Elizabeth  Farnese  75 

lII  Austro-Spanish  alliance  was  at  once  made.  The  Treaty  of 
''ienna  included  a  sheaf  of  treaties, — pubUc  ones  signed  on 
Lpril  30,  1725,  and  May  i,  and  a  secret  one  signed  in  Novem- 
er.  By  the  public  treaties  Charles  renounced  his  claim  to 
'hiUp's  dominions,  agreed  to  cede  the  reversion  of  the  Italian 
uchies  to  Don  Carlos,  and  promised  to  do  all  in  his  power  to 
id  in  the  recovery  of  Gibraltar.  Philip,  on  the  other  hand, 
scognised  the  Ostend  East  India  Company,  and  an  offensive 
nd  defensive  alhance  was  signed. 

The  conclusion  of  this  unnatural  alhance  between  the  two 
ivals  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  shocked  the  diplo- 
latic  conscience  of  Europe,  and  was  shortly  after-  ^^^  ^^^ 
^ards  followed  by  a  demand  on  the  part  of  Spain  of  Hanover, 
Dr  the  cession  of  Gibraltar.  The  warlike  enthusi-  ^^^^' 
sm  of  the  Spaniards  was  roused,  and  preparations  made  for 
ostilities.  Threatened  by  this  new  combination,  France,  Eng- 
md,  and  Prussia,  taking  advantage  of  the  widespread  alarm  in 
xermany  at  the  prospect  of  a  revival  of  Charles  v.'s  empire, 
Drmed  a  league  at  Herrenhausen,  which,  known  as  the  alhance 
if  Hanover,  was  joined  later  by  Sweden  and  Denmark,  and  by 
lolland  somewhat  unwillingly.  The  Treaty  of  Hanover,  while 
iirected  against  the  estabhshment  of  the  Ostend  East  India 
Company,  was  mainly  defensive,  but  the  very  formation  of  the 
Uiance  tended  to  unite  the  Courts  of  Spain  and  Austria  still 
nore  closely  together. 

Since  May,  Elizabeth  Farnese  had  arranged  marriages  be- 
ween  Don  Ferdinand,  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias,  and  a 
Portuguese  princess,  and  between  the  Spanish  Infanta  and 
he  Portuguese  "heir-apparent.  She  was  more  than  ever  deter- 
nined  to  secure  the  two  Austrian  Archduchesses  for  her  two 
ons,  Don  Carlos  and  Don  Philip.  In  Vienna  Zinzendorf  was 
upported  by  the  Marquis  de  Rialp,  a  Spaniard,  who  had  great 
nfluence  with  the  Emperor,  and  who  was  the  leader  of  the 
:rowd  of  Spanish  refugees,  always  favoured  by  Charles  w.  but 
lated  by  the  Austrians.  Prince  Eugene  and  Stahremberg,  the 
eaders  of  the  German  party,  which  regarded  with  deep  suspi- 


76  European  History^   171 5-1789 

cion  Rialp  and  the  Spanish  section,  and  which  preserved  a 
traditional  regard  for  the  English  alliance,  were  opposed  to  the 
marriage  project.  But  Eugene  and  Stahremberg  had  already 
agreed  to  the  treaties  of  April  30,  and  the  menacing  attitude  of 
England  with  regard  to  the  Ostend  Company  weakened  their 
opposition  to  the  proposals  of  Ripperda  and  Zinzendorf. 

The  Treaty  of  Hanover  was  a  powerful  argument  in  the 
hands  of  the  supporters  of  the  Spanish  alliance,  and  in  Novem- 
The  Secret  ^^^  ^^  sccret  portion  of  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  was 
Articles  in  signed  by  Ripperda,  Eugene,  Stahremberg,*  and 
of  Vienna^  Zinzcudorf.  Marriages  were  to  be  concluded  be- 
Nov.  1725.  tween  the  Archduchesses  and  Don  Carlos  and  Don 
Philip,  and  both  Powers  were  to  act  conjointly  in  supporting 
the  claims  of  the  Hapsburgs  to  the  Imperial  throne,  in  Polish 
succession  questions,  and  in  questions  relating  to  the  succes- 
sion to  Jiilich  and  Berg ;  while  in  case  of  a  French  defeat, 
France  was  to  be  partitioned,  Spain  taking  Cerdagne,  Rous- 
sillon,  and  Lower  Navarre,  and  Austria  Alsace  and  the  Belgian 
provinces.  Gibraltar  and  Minorca  were  to  be  speedily  restored 
to  Spain,  and  the  Ostend  East  India  Company  was  to  be  sup- 
ported. The  treaties  of  Vienna  were  a  great  triumph  for 
Elizabeth  Farnese,  and  her  schemes  seemed  likely  to  be  suc- 
cessfully carried  out.  A  diplomatic  revolution  had  been 
effected,  which  however,  unlike  those  of  171 7  and  1756,  led  to 
no  permanent  alteration  in  the  relations  of  the  various  Powers 
to  one  another,  and  was  followed  by  no  European  war.  The 
news  of  this  secret  treaty,  contemplating  very  considerable 
changes  in  the  map  of  Europe,  was  received  with  alarm,  and 
a  general  war  seemed  likely  to  ensue.  All  Europe  was  divided 
into  two  camps.  On  the  side  of  Spain  and  Austria,  Russia 
ranged  herself  in  August  1726,  and  the  alliance  of  Vienna  was 
also  joined  by  the  ecclesiastical  Electors,  by  Bavaria  and  the 
Palatinate.  On  the  other  hand,  the  alliance  of  Hanover 
included,  besides  England,  France,  and  Prussia,  Holland, 
Sweden,  Denmark,  and  Hesse-Cassel.  To  the  rulers  of  Spain, 
as  of  Austria,  religious  and  commercial  motives  struggled  for 


The  Intrigues  of  Elizabeth  Farnese  77 

precedence.  The  extermination  of  Protestantism  was  kept 
in  view  at  Madrid  as  well  as  Vienna,  and  it  was  regarded  as 
not  improbable  that  France  might  be  induced  to  join  a  system 
which  had  as  its  basis  the  extension  of  Catholicism.  The 
overthrow  of  the  House  of  Hanover,  and  the  estabhshment 
of  the  Pretender  upon  the  English  throne,  would  be  followed 
by  the  extermination  of  Protestantism  in  North  Germany,  and 
by  the  restoration  of  England  to  its  rank  among  Catholic 
Powers.  In  Madrid  the  news  of  the  alliance  between  Austria 
and  Russia  was  received  with  enthusiasm,  and  it  was  expected 
that  Alberoni's  scheme  for  the  restoration  of  the  Pretender  by 
the  aid  of  the  Russian  fleet  would  be  revived.  The  Duke 
of  Liria  was  sent  in  March  1727  to  St.  Petersburg  to  make  an 
aUiance  with  the  Muscovite  Court,  and  to  arrange  for  a  diver- 
sion against  England  in  the  interests  of  the  Pretender  and  the 
Catholic  religion. 

The  outbreak  of  war  seemed  imminent,  and  of  the  two 
European  leagues  that  of  Vienna  was  the  more  united  and  the 
more  powerful.    Not  only  were  the  rulers  of  Austria,    „       •    •  • 

^  ^  '     Prussia  301ns 

Spain,  and  Russia  actuated  by  fierce  hostility  to  the  Emperor 
France  or  England,  but  while  both  Holland  and  pfwaster^-^^ 
Sweden  were  lukewarm  allies,  Prussia  in  character-  ^hauser^j726. 
istic  fashion  deserted  the  alHance  of  Hanover,  and  in  October 
1726  made  the  Treaty  of  Wlisterhausen  with  the  Emperor,  and 
in  consequence  Hanover  lay  open  to  an  attack  by  the  Im- 
perialists.^ Spain,  under  the  direction  of  Ripperda,  had  entered 
upon  a  fresh  period  of  commercial  development  and  industrial 
activity.  All  she  required  was  freedom  from  foreign  wars  and 
internal  disturbances  to  enable  her  to  stimulate  colonial  trade, 
to  build  a  good  navy,  and  to  restore  the  finances  of  the  country. 
While  Spain  held  firmly  to  her  engagements  with  Austria,  and 
seemed  in  a  fair  way  to  advance  along  the  path  of  industrial 
progress,  the  policy  of  the  French  Government  Parties  in 
was  hesitating  and  uncertain.  In  France,  as  in  France. 
Holland,  there  was  always  to  be  found  a  powerful  Spanish  party, 
1  See  Carlyle,  History  of  Frederick  the  Great. 


78  European  History,    171 5-1 789 

and  at  the  very  time  of  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Hanover 
there  was  in  Paris  an  influential  section  of  Frenchmen  who 
aimed  at  a  return  to  the  policy  of  Louis  xrv.'s  later  years  —  a 
close  union  with  Spain,  the  restoration  of  the  Stuarts,  and  a 
definite  anti-Protestant  attitude.  The  Government  of  Bourbon 
was  weak,  divided,  and  incompetent,  while  the  anti- English  and 
war  party  was  strong,  united,  and  possessed  of  capable  leaders. 
Bourbon's  policy  was  a  feeble  continuance  of  that  of  the  Regent, 
and,  in  face  of  the  rapid  expansion  of  English  trade,  seemed  to 
far-sighted  Frenchmen  highly  detrimental  to  French  interests. 
In  1726  an  English  fleet  under  Hosier  blockaded  the  Spanish 
treasure  fleet  at  Porto  Bello,  while  another  fleet  held  the 
Baltic  and  overawed  Russia;  in  February  1727  the  Spaniards 
besieged  Gibraltar,  and  this  outbreak  of  hostilities  between 
Spain  and  England  seemed  the  prelude  to  a  general  European 
war.  A  variety  of  circumstances,  however,  combined  to  pre- 
serve Europe  from  a  great  struggle  for  some  six  years. 

Though  Spain  allied  with  Austria  was  in  a  stronger  position 
than  in  the  days  of  Alberoni,  she  was  far  from  being  prepared 
The  Fall  of  to  enter  upon  prolonged  and  costly  military  and 
Ripperda.  naval  operations.  To  her  more  than  any  other  of 
the  principal  European  states  peace  was  absolutely  essential. 
In  May  1726  Ripperda  was  dismissed.  A  powerful  opposi- 
tion had  been  formed  against  him ;  the  Imperial  ambassador, 
Konigsegg,  threw  his  influence  on  the  side  of  Spanish  public 
opinion ;  and  Elizabeth,  on  whose  favour  he  had  entirely 
depended,  suddenly  decided  upon  his  overthrow.  Though 
an  opportunist  and  an  adventurer,  Ripperda  had  considerable 
talents.  His  schemes  for  the  regeneration  of  Spain  were  in 
many  respects  admirable,  and  were  carried  out  to  a  great  extent 
by  the  famous  administrators  who  succeeded  him.  That  he 
had  not  a  single  friend  in  Spain  is  itself  ample  testimony  of 
the  thoroughness  of  those  reforms  which,  during  his  short 
period  of  office,  he  was  able  to  initiate.  He  fully  recognised 
the  folly  of  plunging  into  war,  but,  like  Alberoni,  was  forced 
to  adapt  his  views  to  suit  those  of  the  queen.     EHzabeth  alone 


TJie  Intrigues  of  Elizabeth  Farnese  79 

desired  war.  The  alliance  of  Vienna  was  as  unpopular  in 
Spain  as  the  Austrian  alliance  was  in  France  some  thirty  years 
later.  National  feeling  in  Spain  might  be  gratified,  but 
national  interest  would  hardly  be  furthered  by  making  the 
aggrandisement  of  Elizabeth's  children  the  principal  aim  of 
Spanish  policy.  It  was  felt  that  Spain's  true  ally  was  France, 
that  Ripperda  had  sacrificed  the  interests  of  Spain  to  those  of 
the  queen,  while  the  attitude  of  the  Emperor  and  the  general 
relations  between  Madrid  and  Vienna  only  tended  to  confirm 
this  conviction. 

Charles  vi.  discovered  before  Ripperda's  fall  that  he  could 
not  hope  to  obtain  large  supplies  of  money  from  Spain,  and 
during  the  siege  of  Gibraltar  had  taken  no  steps  to   xhe  Break- 
aid  his  aUies.     The  Emperor  was  not  in  a  position   "p  °^  ^^^ 

,  .  ,        ,    .         ,.  Austro- 

to  enter  upon  a  war ;  he  was  mvolved  m  disputes  Spanish 
with  his  new  ally,  Prussia ;  while  Catherine  i.,  who  ^^^-^°^«- 
died  in  May  1727,  had  been  succeeded  by  Peter  n.,  a  mere 
child,  and  Russia  for  the  time  ceased  to  be  ranked  among  his 
active  supporters.  Charles  had  never  Hked  the  idea  of  the 
establishment  of  the  Spaniards  in  Italy ;  he  recognised  that  a 
Spanish  match  was  impossible  ;  he  was  opposed  to  the  siege 
of  Gibraltar.  With  the  opening  of  1727  peaceful  counsels 
began  to  prevail  in  Vienna,  and  the  Austro-Spanish  alliance 
became  sensibly  weakened.  The  influence  of  Fleury  and 
Walpole  was  also  used  to  bring  about  a  general 
pacification.  In  June  1726  Fleury  had  overthrown 
Bourbon,  who  had  endeavoured  to  exile  him,  and  though 
seventy-three  years  old,  he  governed  France  with  ability  till 
his  death  in  1743.  Within  France  he  endeavoured  with  some 
success  to  preser\'e  tranquillity,  and  by  economy  and  good 
administration  to  temper  the  despotic  ?'egime  and  to  improve 
the  condition  of  the  country.  His  foreign  policy  was  peaceful. 
Till  1733  he  managed,  though  with  difficulty,  to  continue  the 
Orleanist  system  of  peace  and  friendship  with  England.  After 
1733  the  war  party  proved  too  powerful  for  the  pacific  minister. 
The  system  of  Louis  xr*.  was  adopted.     Fleury  was  forced 


8o  European  History,   171 5-1789 

into  the  Polish  and  Austrian  Succession  Wars,  and  before  his 
death  saw  the  renewal  of  the  ancient  hostility  between  England 
and  France.  The  almost  simultaneous  disappearance  from  the 
political  stage  of  Ripperda  and  Bourbon  in  1726  had  paved  the 
way  for  the  resumption  of  friendly  relations  between  France 
and  Spain.  While  Fleury,  whose  knowledge  of  the  politics  of 
Europe  was  considerable,  and  whose  appreciation  of  the  true 
needs  of  France  was  accurate  and  complete,  had  convinced 
himself  that  the  continuance  of  the  English  alliance  was  the 
right  policy,  he  remained  honestly  anxious  to  bring  about  a 
reconciliation  with  Spain.  The  secret  mission  of  Montgon,  in 
consequence  of  Louis  xv.'s  dangerous  illness,  like  the  embassy 
of  Cellamare,  bore  witness  not  only  to  the  existence  of  a  power- 
ful opposition  in  France  to  the  policy  of  the  Government,  but 
also  to  the  continued  determination  of  Phihp  to  secure  the 
French  succession  in  the  event  of  Louis'  death. 

France  held  the  key  of  the  situation,  and  Fleury's  position 
as  First  Minister  added  strength  to  his  argument  in  favour  of 
peace.  But  though  he  was  sufficiently  strong  to  prevent  the 
formation  of  a  close  alhance  between  France  and  Spain  to  the 
detriment  of  England,  he  was  unable,  in  the  teeth  of  a  fierce 
opposition,  to  use  French  forces  to  aid  the  English  Power 
against  the  Court  of  ^Madrid.  Though  he  entered  into  a  secret 
correspondence  with  Elizabeth,  he  refused  to  desert  the  Eng- 
lish alliance,  and  in  May  1727  the  French,  Spanish,  Dutch,  and 
Imperial  ministers  signed  preliminaries  of  peace  at  Vienna. 

It  was  agreed  that  the  Ostend  East  India  Company  should 
be  suspended  for  seven  years,  that  the  siege  of  Gibraltar  should 
be  raised,  and  that  these  and  other  matters  should  be  referred 
to  a  general  congress  for  a  definite  settlement.  Elizabeth  her- 
self was  opposed  to  peace ;  she  still  hoped  to  detach  England 
from  France,  and  on  the  death  of  George  i.  in  June  anticipated 
a  successful  Jacobite  invasion  of  England.  But  Walpole  was 
fully  alive  to  the  danger  from  the  adherents  of  the  exiled 
Stuarts.  English  policy  remained  unchanged,  and  the  English 
and  French  ministers  devoted  all  their  efforts  to  preserve  peace, 


The  hiU'igucs  of  ElizabetJi  Faniese  8 1 

and  to  separate  the  Courts  of  Vienna  and  Madrid.  But  the  dif- 
ficulties of  Walpole  and  Fleury  were  enormous.  In  England,  as 
in  France,  the  national  desire  for  war  was  stimulated  by  a  power- 
ful party  among  the  opposition.  The  negotiations 
between  England  and  Spain  would  have  failed  had  General  War 
not  Fleury  and  Konigsegg  used  all  their  influence  '"  ^'^^^'^  ' 
with  Elizabeth  in  favour  of  peace,  and  in  March  1728  Spain 
signed  the  Convention  of  the  Pardo,  accepted  the  Prelimina- 
ries of  Vienna,  and  thus  the  short  war  between  England  and 
Spain  came  to  an  end. 

The  alliance  between  Spain  and  Austria  had  been  rudely 
shaken,  and  Elizabeth  found  herself  isolated  in  Europe.  It 
only  required  the  Congress  of  Soissons  to  complete  the  breach 
between  the  two  countries.  That  Congress,  which  opened  on 
June  14,  1728,  proved  as  useless  as  its  predecessor  at  Cambrai. 
It  acted  with  the  greatest  deliberation,  and  Patino,  Ripperda's 
successor,  took  advantage  of  the  slowness  of  its  proceedings  to 
hasten  the  Spanish  preparations  for  war.  Chauvelin,  an  active 
supporter  of  the  anti-English  and  the  anti-Austrian  parties  in 
France,  became  Keeper  of  the  Seals,  and  succeeded  Morville 
as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  autumn  of  1727,  and  a 
family  alliance  between  the  Bourbons  seemed  to  be  within 
measurable  distance.  The  year  1728  was  a  critical  one  in  the 
history  of  Europe.  But  the  Austro-Spanish  aUiance  was  fast 
breaking  down,  and  Fleury  proved  strong  enough  to  resist  the 
pressure  of  ChauveHn  and  his  supporters.  Elizabeth  had  now 
realised  that  the  marriage  schemes  arranged  by  the  secret  treaty 
of  1725  would  never  be  carried  out,  and  Patifio  attacked  the 
Austrian  alliance  with  vigour.  In  December  1728  Elizabeth,  on 
receiving  formal  notification  that  the  marriages  could  not  at 
present  take  place,  recognised  at  once  that  her  aims  in  Italy 
could  not  be  attained  by  the  help  of  the  Emperor,  and  with 
characteristic  impetuosity  turned  to  France  and  England  to  aid 
her  in  securing  the  Italian  duchies  for  Don  Carlos.  The  birth 
of  a  Dauphin  removed  the  last  obstacle  to  a  renewal  of  friendly 
relations  with  France,  all  real  causes  of  dispute  between  the 

PERIOD    VI.  F 


82  European  History y   171 5-1789 

two  countries  were  removed,  and  dynastic  interests  and  dynas- 
tic jealousies  no  longer  stood  in  the  way  of  an  alliance. 

In  England  Walpole  was  ready  to  consider  favourably  the 
direct  application  for  assistance  from  Elizabeth,  who,  irritated 
at  Fleury's  slowness,  had  placed  all  her  hopes  upon  England. 
Patiiio,  too,  was  willing  to  accept  an  English  alHance  till  Spain 
was  thoroughly  prepared  to  contest  British  encroachments  in 
South  America. 

To  obtain  the  settlement  of  Don  Carlos  in  Italy,  and  to 
revenge  herself  on  Charles  vi,,  was  the  fixed  resolution  of  Eliz- 
abeth  in  1729.  Walpole,  in  spite  of  the  clamour  of 
of  Seville,  the  opposition,  was  as  ready  as  Patiiio  to  cultivate 
*^*^'  friendship  between  England  and  Spain.     The  great 

colonial  questions  had  not  as  yet  reached  a  very  acute  phase, 
and  he  persuaded  the  French  minister  to  insist  upon  the  intro- 
duction of  Spanish  troops  into  Parma  and  Piacenza.  On 
November  9  the  negotiations  between  the  three  Courts  cul- 
minated in  the  Treaty  of  Seville, — joined  a  few  days  later  by 
Holland.  By  this  treaty  the  privileges  granted  to  the  Ostend 
East  India  Company  in  1725  were  revoked,  the  English  trade 
to  the  Indies  as  well  as  to  the  Assiento  were  placed  on  their 
former  footing,  the  Spaniards  virtually  resigned  all  claim  to 
Gibraltar  and  Minorca,  the  succession  of  Don  Carlos  to  the 
Italian  duchies  was  guaranteed,  and  the  occupation  of  Leghorn, 
Porto  Ferrajo,  Parma,  and  Piacenza  by  6000  Spanish  troops  was 
arranged  for.  Elizabeth  Farnese  had  apparently  triumphed, 
and  the  succession  of  Don  Carlos  was  assured.  And  though 
her  satisfaction  was  modified  by  a  delay  of  some  years  before 
the  execution  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  the  importance  of  that 
treaty  is  undoubted.  The  unnatural  Austro-Spanish  alHance 
came  to  an  end,  and  its  place  was  taken  by  an  arrangement  far 
more  in  consonance  with  Spanish  interests.  For,  though  dif- 
ferences might  arise,  the  relations  of  France  and  Spain  were 
henceforward  more  cordial,  and  the  saying  of  the  Spanish 
ambassador  in  1700  —  henceforward  there  are  no  Pyrenees  — 
seemed  likely  to  be  reaUsed.     The  interests  of  the  Courts  of 


The  Intrigues  of  Elizabeth  Farnese  83 

Paris  and  Madrid  were  in  many  respects  identical ;  in  the  New 
World  their  claims  did  not  clash,  and  both  were  united  in  hos- 
tility to  the  encroachments  of  England.  The  treaty,  moreover, 
was  a  triumph  of  Fleury's  pohcy,  which  since  1726  had  aimed 
at  enlarging  the  Anglo-French  alliance  by  the  introduction  of 
Spain.  He  had  now  succeeded  in  returning  to  the  later 
Orleanist  policy,  he  had  come  to  a  better  understanding  with 
Spain,  while  keeping  France  firm  to  the  alliance  of  Hanover. 
France  again  stood  before  Europe  as  the  leading  Bourbon 
Power,  with  Spain  in  due  subordination.  Peace  had  been  pre- 
served, and  the  credit  of  averting  a  European  war  could  be 
equally  shared  by  him  and  by  Walpole.  But  for  two  years  it 
did  not  seem  at  all  improbable  that  the  Treaty  of  Seville  would 
be  followed  by  a  struggle  in  Italy  between  the  forces  of  Aus- 
tria and  Spain.  The  treaty  left  Charles  vi.  isolated  and  furious 
at  the  conduct  of  Spain ;  in  France  the  anti-Hapsburg  party 
clamoured  for  war ;  in  England  the  ministry  was  far  from  har- 
monious. Both  Fleury  and  Walpole  had  difficult  tasks  to  per- 
form. The  former  was  not  yet  prepared  for  a  close  offensive 
and  defensive  alliance  with  Spain ;  though  resolved  not  to 
guarantee  the  Pragmatic  Sanction,  he  was  by  no  means  anxious 
for  war  with  Austria;  at  the  same  time  he  was  jealous  of 
England's  influence  at  Madrid,  and  showed  no  desire  to  carry 
out  the  Treaty  of  Senile.  Walpole,  like  Fleury,  was  hampered 
by  a  powerful  opposition.  Though  prepared  to  fulfil,  if  neces- 
sary, his  engagements  with  Spain,  he  had  no  sympathy  with  the 
views  of  Townshend,  who,  Hke  Villars,  desired  an  England  and 
immediate  attack  on  the  Emperor.  The  English  Spain. 
Government  feared  that  the  outbreak  of  a  general  European 
war  would  be  followed  by  an  attack  on  Hanover,  and  by  the 
occupation  of  the  Austrian  Netherlands  by  the  French.  It 
desired  that  all  miUtary  operations  should  be  confined  to  the 
bone  of  contention, — the  Emperor's  Italian  dominions,  —  and 
that  at  all  hazards  no  French  invasion  of  the  Austrian  Nether- 
lands should  take  place.  But  the  English  opposition,  led  by 
Wyndham  and  Pulteney,  hampered  the  Government  by  attacks 


84  European  History,   171 5-1789 

on  the  close  connection  subsisting  between  England  and 
France,  and  it  became  evident  that  there  was  a  s'-rong  feeling 
in  the  country  that  Austria,  a  country  without  colonies  or  a 
fleet,  and  since  1688  closely  connected  with  Great  Britain,  was 
England's  true  ally,  and  that  France  and  Spain,  with  their  enor- 
mous colonial  possessions  and  their  weak  navies,  were  her  real 
foes.-^  The  continued  outrages  of  the  Spanish  guardacostas 
upon  English  traders  and  sailors  in  Spain  and  in  Spanish 
America  in  1730  and  1731,  together  with  disputes  about  the 
boundaries  of  Georgia  and  the  cutting  of  logwood,  afforded 
justification  for  the  attitude  of  the  opposition.  English  trade 
was  harassed,  and  not  altogether  unjustly,  for  the  smuggling 
carried  on  by  Englishmen  had  reached  very  considerable 
lengths.  As  long  as  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  Seville 
remained  a  dead  letter,  the  Spanish  Government  paid  no  at- 
tention to  the  EngUsh  grievances.  But  neither  EHzabeth  nor 
Patifio  were  prepared  to  break  with  England.  Philip,  whose 
views  were  far  more  national  than  those  of  his  wife,  was  always 
anxious  for  a  close  union  with  France,  but  Elizabeth  was  only 
intent  upon  carrying  out  her  Italian  projects,  while  Patino,  like 
x'Xlberoni,  and  Ripperda,  though  reahsing  the  full  import  of  Eng- 
lish trading  rivalry,  was  as  anxious  as  Walpole  to  solve  the 
present  difficulties  without  recourse  to  arms.  In  January  1731 
the  death  of  the  Duke  of  Parma  brought  matters  to  a  crisis. 
Imperial  troops  occupied  the  duchies,  while  Elizabeth  demanded 
that  England  and  France  should  fulfil  their  engagements. 

A  European  war  seemed  inevitable  if  Spanish  soldiers  landed 

in  Italy.     It  was,  however,  averted  by  the  offer  of  England  to 

guarantee  the  Pragmatic  Sanction.     Though  Fleury 

Treaty  of        was  determined  to  give  Charles  no  guarantee,  Wal- 

Vienna,  1731.   p^j^  j^^j  ^^  ^Mc^  objection.    For  the  sake  of  a  direct 

guarantee  of  his  family  arrangement  by  the  ^Maritime  Powers, 
Charles  agreed  to  withdraw  his  troops,  and  to  allow  Don  Carlos 
to  take  possession  of  Parma,  and  to  sign  a  treaty  to  that  effect 
with  England,  Holland,  and  Spain.  This  settlement,  known  as 
1  See  Jobez,  La  France  sous  Louis  XV. 


The  hitrigues  of  Elizabeth  Farnese  85 

the  second  Treaty  of  Vienna,  consisted  of  two  treaties,  the  first 
made  with  England  and  Holland  in  March  1731,  the  second 
with  Spain  in  July.  By  the  former  England  and  Holland  rec- 
ognised the  Pragmatic  Sanction,  while  the  Emperor  granted 
George  11.  formal  investiture  of  Bremen  and  Verden,  agreed  to 
suspend  the  Ostend  East  India  Company,  and  to  permit  6000 
Spanish  troops  to  enter  the  Italian  duchies.  In  the  latter  treaty 
no  direct  guarantee  of  the  Pragmatic  Sanction  was  insisted  upon. 
In  December  1731  Don  Carlos  and  Spanish  troops,  escorted  by 
an  English  fleet,  landed  in  Italy,  and  early  in  1732  entered  into 
quiet  possession  of  Parma.  Elizabeth  had  won  a  great  triumph. 
Don  Carlos  was  secure  in  Parma  and  Piacenza,  and,  by  an  ar- 
rangement with  the  Grand  Duke,  his  succession  to  Tuscany  had 
been  assured.  The  arrangements  made  at  Utrecht  had  been 
modified  through  the  pertinacity  of  the  queen,  the  Austrian 
hold  on  Italy  had  been  weakened,  and  a  Spanish  dynasty  intro- 
duced into  Parma.  Her  success  had  been  secured  in  the  face 
of  overwhelming  difficulties  both  at  home  and  abroad.  In  17 13 
Spain  was  weak  and  divided,  and  of  little  account  in  Europe. 
In  1 731  she  had  become  a  powerful  nation,  whose  policy  was 
independent,  and  whose  alliance  was  valuable. 

The  second  Treaty  of  Vienna  is  important,  not  only  in  the 
history  of  Spain,  but  also  in  reference  to  the  attitude  and  policy 
of  the  other  European  Powers.  The  establishment  of  a  young 
Spanish  dynasty  in  Italy  was  fraught  with  important  consequences 
to  Austria,  as  well  as  to  Italy  itself.  Charles  vi.  had  again  illus- 
trated his  willingness  to  retire  from  strong  positions  for  the 
sake  of  phantoms,  and  had  withdrawn  his  support  from  the 
Ostend  Company.  In  1733  the  INIohammedan  Government, 
incited  by  the  rival  European  Companies,  destroyed  Bankipur. 
The  shareholders  endeavoured  in  vain  to  transfer  the  centre  of 
their  European  trade  to  Hamburg  or  to  Trieste,  but,  after  a 
long  struggle  against  adverse  fortune,  the  Company  became 
bankrupt  in  1784,  and  was  finally  extinguished  in   1793. 

In  1 731  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  was  thought  to  assure 
to  Europe  some  years  of  tranquillity.     The  dreaded  union  of 


S6  European  History,   171 5-1789 

France  and  Spain  did  not  appear  likely  to  take  place,  for 
France  and  Spain  were  not  on  good  terms.  The  settlement 
of  the  question  of  the  Itahan  duchies  had  been  effected  with- 
out the  co-operation  of  France,  whose  influence  was  for  the 
moment  lessened,  while  the  dreaded  growth  of  Bourbonism, 
which  since  1729  had  been  a  source  of  alarm  at  Vienna  no  less 
than  at  London  and  the  Hague,  seemed  to  have  received  a 
decided  check.  The  friendship  between  England  and  Spain 
and  between  Spain  and  the  Emperor  appeared  likely  to  con- 
tinue. Colonial  disputes  had  been  peacefully  adjusted,  and 
the  affairs  in  the  Itahan  Peninsula  offered  no  opening  for 
hostile  manifestations. 

But  the  calm  of  1732  was  the  calm  which  preceded  a  storm. 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE  WAR  OF  THE   POLISH    SUCCESSION 

1733-1735 

Austria  from  1720  to  1733  —  The  Views  of  Fleun',  Walpole,  and  Patino  — 
Europe  in  1732  —  Growth  of  Hostihty  letween  England  and  Spain  —  The 
Death  of  the  Polish  King,  1733  —  Sardinia  under  Victor  Amadeus  I.,  1715- 
1730 — France  makes  Treaties  with  Sardinia  and  Spain —  Opening  of  the 
War  —  France  attempts  to  gain  the  Co-operation  of  Turkey  —  Fleun,' fails 
to  grasp  the  Situation  —  Success  of  the  Russian  and  Austrian  Pohcy  in 
Poland  —  Success  of  tlie  French  in  Italy  and  on  the  Rhine  —  Divergent 
Interests  of  Spain  and  Sardinia  —  The  Third  Treaty  of  Vienna,  1735  — 
Death  of  Eugene  —  Fall  of  Chauvelin  —  Death  of  Patiiio — The  European 
Importance  of  the  War  of  the  Polish  Succession. 

The  happiest  years  of  Charles  vi.'s  reign  were  probably  those 
which  fell  between  i72o^and  1733.  The  Hungarians  were  tran- 
quil, and  no  troubles  on  the  eastern  frontier  dis-  Austria  from 
turbed  the  Court  of  Vienna.  His  territorial  gains  ^720  to  1733. 
at  the  expense  of  tTie~TurIcrwere  still  intact,  and  Prince  Eugene 
was  at  the  height  of  his  fame.  Though  the  terms  of  the  Bar- 
rier Treaty  and  the  opposition  of  the  Maritime  Powers  to  the 
Ostend  East  India  Company  had  caused  a  certain  amount  of 
friction,  and  though  the  treaty  of  1725  had  alarmed  Europe, 
Charles  had  allowed  his  desire  to  secure  the  guarantee  of  the 
Pragmatic  Sanction  to  overmaster  all  questions  of  higher  pohcy. 
His  army  was  weak,  his  treasury  was  empty,  and  in  case  of  war 
Austria  was  in  a  pecuharly  defenceless  position.  Charles  had 
every  reason  to  desire  peace.  The  second  Treaty  of  Vienna 
seemed  to  bring  with  it  the  certainty  of  the  preservation  of  the 
European  status  quo  for  many  years  to  come.     The  advantages 

S7 


88  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

of  peace  were  no  less  clearly  appreciated  by  the  English  and 
Spanish  ministers,  while  in  France  Fleury's  pacific  views  were 
The  Views  of  wcU  known.  He  had  no  taste  for  adventurous 
Fieury,  wai-    schemes,  and,  moreover,  he  was  engaged  in  a  bitter 

pole,  and  '  '  '  o   o 

Patifio.  Struggle  with  the  Parlement  of  Paris.    France,  thus 

ensraared  at  home,  and  without  anv  alhes  on  whom  she  could  de- 
pend  in  the  event  of  the  outbreak  of  hostihties,  seemed  unlikely  to 
disturb  the  harmony  of  Europe.  England,  fully  occupied  with 
the  development  of  her  trade  and  the  expansion  of  her  colonies, 
was  governed  by  a  minister  who,  in  spite  of  the  attacks  and 
denunciations  of  a  formidable  opposition  and  the  warhke  ideas 
of  George  11.,  was  resolved  to  maintain  peace,  and,  if  pos- 
sible, friendly  relations  with  France.  Like  Fieury  and  Wal- 
pole,  Patino  held  pacific  views  ;  Spain  and  England  appeared  to 
be  on  friendly  terms,  and  the  relations  of  both  countries  with 
France  w^e  outwardly  satisfactory.  In  spite,  however,  of  this 
reassuring  outlook,  the  year  1732,  though  undisturbed  by  actual 
war,  saw  the  gathering  together  of  a  storm  which  burst  upon 
Europe  in  1733,  and  was  followed  by  a  long  period  of  conflict. 

In  reality  the  political  situation  after  the  second  Treaty  of 
Vienna  was,  if  examined  closely,  far  from  reassuring.  In 
Europe  France    the    existence    of  a   powerful   war   party, 

in  1732.  v/hich    each   year   became    more   beUicose   in    its 

views  and  more  popular  with  the  nation,  was  a  distinct  menace 
to  the  peace  of  Europe,  while  Louis  xv.'s  determination  to 
place  Stanislas  Leszczynski  on  the  Polish  throne  whenever  a 
vacancy  occurred,  was  a  warning  to  Europe  that  France  was 
ready  to  return  to  the  policy  of  Louis  xrv.  This  war  party, 
headed  by  Villars  in  the  French  Council,  advocated  union 
with  Spain  and  alliance  with  the  small  German  states  and 
with  Sardinia.  The  union  with  Spain  would  bring  about  the 
ruin  of  England's  commerce,  while  the  friendship  of  the  lesser 
German  Powers  would  prevent  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  on 
the  part  of  the  Emperor.  ^" 

These  views  acquired  fresh  importance  owing  to  the  growing 
irritation  between  Spain  and  the  Eaiperor,  and  the  increasing 


The  War  of  the  Polish  Succession  89 

commercial  and  colonial  rivalry  between  England  and  France, 
and  between  England  and  Spain.  "^ 

The  presence  of  Don  Carlos  in  Parma,  and  the  occupation 
of  the  Duchy  of  Tuscany  by  6000  Spanish  troops,  naturally 
gave  rise  to  constant  friction  between  the  Courts  of  ]\Iadrid 
and  Vienna.  The  dynastic  aims  of  Elizabeth  Farnese  in 
Italy  had  by  no  means  been  entirely  fulfilled,  and  she  was 
watching  for  an  opportunity  to  make  fresh  acquisitions.  She 
and  PhiHp  soon  realised  that  for  the  furtherance  of  their 
aggressive  schemes  a  French  alHance  was  eminently  desirable. 
The  French  Government  on  its  part  was  equally  anxious 
to  make  a  treaty  with  Spain  which  should  unite  the  Bour- 
bons against  England.  The  commercial  and  colonial  rivalr}^ 
between  France  and  England  rendered  a  colhsion  between 
the  -two  Powers  in  the  not  very  distant  future  inevitable ;  it 
became  the  object  of  both  nations  to  secure  the  Spanish 
alliance ;  and  at  ISIadrid  Keene  and  Rothenburg,  the  rival 
ambassadors,  engaged  in  a  great  diplomatic  duel.  Walpole 
and  Patino  were  both  bent  on  the  presen-ation  of  peace,  — 
the  former  in  order  to  maintain  the  House  of  Brunswick  on 
the  EngHsh  throne,  the  latter  in  order  that  Spain  should  have 
time  to  gain  strength  and  to  improve  her  na\7.  Phihp  was, 
as  usual,  inclined  towards  a  French  aUiance,  while  Elizabeth, 
who  hated  Fleur}-,  desired  with  Patino  to  preserve  friendship 
wath  England.  But  as  the  year  proceeded  the  Spanish 
Court  changed  its  policy,  and  declared  boldly  Growth  of 
aojainst    Endand  and  in  favour  of  France.      For   Hostility  be- 

,  .  .  ,     °       ,  ,  .        .  ,  tween  Eng- 

this  sudden  change  dynastic  interests  and  na-  land  and 
tional  considerations  were  equally  responsible,  spam. 
English  ministers  gave  no  encouragement  to  the  extensive 
designs  of  Elizabeth  Farnese,  while  the  French  Government, 
holding  out  hopes  of  further  acquisitions  in  Italy,  incited  the 
queen  against  the  Emperor.  At  the  same  time  commercial 
disputes  with  England  had  entered  an  acute  phase.  A  state 
of  things  existed  in  South  America  somewhat  similar  to  the 
position  of  affairs  in  North  America  during  the  years  immedi- 


90  European  History,   1 71 5-1789 

ately  preceding  the  Seven  Years'  War.  In  1732  England  and 
Spain  were  practically  at  war  in  the  Pacific,  just  is  in  1754, 
two  years  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Seven  Years'  War, 
hostilities  had  definitely  broken  out  between  the  English  and 
French  colonists  in  North  America.  The  Assiento  Treaty 
had  never  been  popular  in  Spain ;  while  the  English  right  to 
send  annually  a  ship  to  South  America  was  the  cause  of  a 
vast  amount  of  smuggUng.-^  Additional  circumstances  com- 
bined to  increase  the  irritation  between  the  two  countries. 
The  English  and  Dutch  objected  to  a  proposed  new  Philippine 
Company.  English  men-of-war,  often  on  the  flimsiest  pre- 
texts, seized  guardacostas,  while  the  Spaniards  replied  by  capt- 
uring English  merchantmen.  In  1731  the  famous  Jenkins 
had  lost  his  famous  ear,  and  the  only  explanation  given  by 
the  Spaniards  was  that  such  outrages  were  the  work  of  pirates, 
and  not  of  Spanish  guardacostas. 

Spanish  susceptibilities  throughout  these  trying  years  received 
scant  recognition  from  the  English  merchants,  furious  at  the 
right  of  search  claimed  by  the  guardacostas,  while  the  whole 
influence  of  the  Enghsh  press,  backed  up  by  a  powerful  and 
unscrupulous  opposition,  was  employed  to  force  England  into 
a  war  with  Spain. 

Had  it  not  been  for  Philip's  illness  in  August,  war  with  Eng- 
land would  have  broken  out  in  September  1732.^  The  efforts 
of  the  English  ministers  to  bring  about  a  satisfactory  reconcilia- 
tion between  the  Courts  of  Vienna  and  Seville  never  ceased, 
but  they  were  now  opposed  by  the  French  Government  anxious 
to  conclude  a  treaty  with  Spain,  and  to  embroil  that  country 
The  Death  with  Austria.  In  spite  of  aU  the  efforts  of  Patiiio, 
°^^!^t,,.         it  became   clear  at  the  beginning  of   1733  that  a 

Polish  King,  °  *="  ^^ 

Feb.  1733.  European  war  was  near  at  hand.  In  February, 
Augustus  II.,  King  of  Poland,  died ;  his  death  gave  the  signal 
for  the  outbreak.  France  at  once  took  the  initiative.  Though 
occupied  with  a  religious  struggle  with  the  Parlement  of  Paris, 
though  financial  disorders  remained  unchecked,  the  French 
1  See  Armstrong,  Elizabeth  Farnese. 


The    War  of  the  Polish  Succession  9 1 

Government  only  expressed  the  national  feeling  when  it  de- 
cided, in  pursuance  of  the  traditional  policy  of  France,  to 
defend  the  independence  of  Poland,  and  to  support  by  force  of 
arms  the  candidature  of  Stanislas  Leszczynski,  the  father-in-law 
of  Louis  XV. 

In  face  of  the  certain  opposition  of  Russia,  Austria,  and  the 
probable  opposition  of  Prussia,  the  problem  before  the  French 
Government  was  not  how  to  get  Stanislas  elected,  but  how  to 
maintain  him  on  the  throne  when  elected.  Since  the  beginning 
of  the  century  Russia  and  Austria  had  taken  a  deep  interest  in 
PoHsh  affairs,  they  were  prepared  vigorously  to  resist  French 
interference  in  Poland,  and  they  could  easily  find  means  to 
nullify  the  election  of  a  French  candidate.  Saxony,  moreover, 
lent  itself  to  the  furtherance  of  Russian  and  Austrian  designs, 
and  Poland,  with  no  clear  poHcy,  and  the  prey  to  internal  divi- 
sions, was  totally  unable  to  resist  the  forces  of  the  two  Imperial 
Powers.  *The  Poles,'  said  Stanislas,  'will  nominate  but  will 
not  support  me.'  Stanislas  could  not  hope  to  retain  Poland 
unless  France  supported  him,  not  only  by  her  alliance,  but  also 
by  force  of  arms.  In  spite,  however,  of  the  pacific  assertions 
of  Fleury,  the  French  Government  adopted  the  views  of  Chau- 
velin  and  Villars,  and  determined  to  place,  and  if  possible  to 
maintain,  Louis'  father-in-law  on  the  Polish  throne,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  deal  a  telling  blow  at  the  House  of  Hapsburg. 

Preparations  were  made  to  attack  Philipsburg  in  the  summer 
of  1733,  while  negotiations  were  hurried  on  with  Spain  and  Sar- 
dinia. In  the  former  country,  the  warhke  aspirations  of  Philip 
carried  the  day  against  Elizabeth  and  Patiiio ;  in  the  latter,  to 
the  surprise  of  Charles  vi.,  Charles  Emanuel,  the  young  king  of 
Sardinia,  consented  to  admit  the  French  into  Italy. 

But  the  young  king  of  Sardinia  was  wise  in  his  generation. 
His  father,  Victor  Amadeus,  with  consummate  skill  had  placed 
the  young  kingdom  of  Sardinia  in  a  fairly  strong   Sardinia 
position.    By  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  he  was  author-   Amadeus"",*"' 
ised  to  build  strong  places  in  his  states  wherever   1715-30. 
he   pleased,  and  with  the  addition  of  Sicily  and  the  title  of 


92  Enropean  History,   171 5-1789 

king  he  might  hope  for  the  rapid  development  of  his  kingdom. 
The  forced  exchange  of  Sicily  for  Sardinia  was  in  reality  not  a 
loss,  for  the  latter  island  was  close  to  his  Italian  lands,  and  the 
royal  position  enabled  him  to  keep  envoys  at  the  principal  Euro- 
pean capitals,  watch  his  interests,  and  take  part  in  the  diplomacy 
and  intrigues  of  the  time.  From  17 18  to  1730  he  had  devoted 
himself  to  the  work  of  legislation  and  administration,  and  car- 
ried out  important  reforms,  which  a  tedious  quarrel  with  the 
Papacy  over  his  undoubted  right  to  nominate  to  vacant  bene- 
fices —  which  was  finally  recognised  by  Benedict  xiv.  —  did  not 
interrupt.  Financial  reforms  were  boldly  dealt  with  ;  the  exemp- 
tion from  taxation  enjoyed  by  the  nobles  was  removed  ;  the  rev- 
enue was  augmented ;  venality  was  checked ;  agriculture  and 
sheep-farming  were  encouraged.  All  owners  of  land  were 
compelled  to  exhibit  their  titles,  and  the  slightest  irregularity 
resulted  in  the  confiscation  of  the  property.  By  these  and 
similar  measures  feudahsm  in  his  dominions  was  in  great  meas- 
ure destroyed,  and  Victor  Amadeus  succeeded  in  enforcing 
equality  before  the  law,  and  that  without  any  revolt,  conspir- 
acy, or  civil  war.  In  many  other  ways  the  new  Italian  king- 
dom profited  from  the  wise  rule  of  Victor  Amadeus.  An 
Hotel  des  Invahdes  for  old  soldiers  was  estabhshed.  Pubhc 
archives  were  organised,  and  the  study  of  Italian  literature  was 
encouraged.  On  September  30,  1730,  the  abdication  of  the 
king  removed  from  the  councils  of  Sardinia  that  serious  and 
practical  spirit  which  had  been  mainly  instrumental  in  laying 
firmly  the  foundations  of  the  rising  Italian  kingdom  and  gave 
a  distinct  impetus  towards  the  growth  of  the  sentiment  of  Italian 
nationality.  His  son  and  successor,  Charles  Emanuel  i.,  who 
occupied  the  throne  till  1773,  had  hitherto  been  regarded  as 
frivolous  and  unlikely  to  guide  his  affairs  with  discretion.  He 
showed,  however,  from  the  first  a  keen  sense  of  the  real  inter- 
ests of  his  country,  which  he  guided  through  a  stormy  period 
with  consummate  success;  and  after  1748  emulated  his  father 
in  his  desire  to  carry  out  measures  for  the  improvement  and 
well-being  of  his  people. 


The    War  of  the  Polish  Succession  93 

On  September  i  Stanislas  was  elected  King  of  Poland ; 
on  September  26  the  League  of  Turin  was  concluded  between 
France  and  Sardinia.  Chauvelin's  general  policy  at  this  mo- 
ment recalls  that  of  Richelieu  during  the  Thirty  Years'  War. 
Austria  was  to  be  driven  out  of  Italy;  the  King  of  Sardinia 
was  to  occupy  the  Tvlilanese  and  Mantua ;  Don  Carlos  was  to 
have  Naples,  Sicily,  and  the  Tuscan  ports ;  Don  Philip,  Parma, 
Piacenza,  and  Tuscany;  while  France,  as  a  reward  for  her 
assistance,  should  receive  Savoy.  But  Charles  Emanuel's  views 
were  not  strictly  identical  with  those  of  Chauvelin.  Aware  of 
the  desire  of  the  Spanish  Court  to  become  supreme  France 
in  Italy,  he  was  opposed  to  the  introduction  of  the  Treaties 
Spaniards  into  northern  Italy  ;  they  should,  he  de-   '^'*^  s^""- 

1         J  1  ^  ■  •  11-  diniaand 

clared,  occupy  themselves  m  conquermg  the  kmg-  Spain, 
dom  of  the  Two  Sicilies,  and  the  Tuscan  ports.  With  French 
aid  he  proposed  to  conquer  Lombardy  and  ^^lantua  for  himself. 
On  November  7  the  secret  treaty  of  the  Escurial  was  signed 
between  France  and  Spain.  It  was  nothing  less  than  a  solemn 
family  compact  between  the  two  branches  of  the  House  of 
Bourbon.  United,  France  and  Spain  were  to  present  a  firm 
opposition  to  the  colonial  extension  and  the  commercial  aggres- 
sions of  Great  Britain,  and  at  the  same  time  to  act  together 
against  the  Emperor.  Each  Power  guaranteed  the  possessions 
of  the  other.  Gibraltar  was  to  be  recovered,  the  exclusive 
privileges  granted  by  Spain  to  English  merchants  were  to  be 
revoked,  and  the  combined  Bourbon  fleets  jyere  to  repel  any 
attack  of  the  English  navy. 

The  secret  treaty  of  November  7,  1733,  resembles  in  many 
points  the  family  compact  of  1721  made  by  Dubois.  It  is 
important  as  indicating  the  natural  "tendency  of  the  Bourbon 
Powers  to  resist  not  only  the  expansion  of  the  trade  of  Eng- 
land, which  was  thrusting  itself  into  South  America,  but  also 
the  rapid  development  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  in  North 
America.  The  commercial  interests  of  England  had  definitely 
clashed  with  those  of  Spain  even  before  1588,  and  with  those 
of  France  since  1688.     But  during  the  Polish  Succession  War 


94  European  History ,   171 5-1789 

the  Bourbon  arms  were  mainly  directed  against  the  Emperor, 
and  the  open  hostiUty  of  Spain  to  England  was  not  declared  to 
the  world  before  1739. 

To  the  surprise  of  all  the  combatants,  England  remained 
neutral.-^  The  opposition,  declaring  that  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht 
had  been  too  favourable  to  France,  demanded  that  another 
Grand  AUiance  should  be  formed  against  the  aggressions  of 
the  House  of  Bourbon.  But  France  had  carefully  guaranteed 
the  neutrality  of  the  Austrian  Netherlands  now  denuded  of 
Austrian  troops,  and  the  States-General,  realising  their  inability 
to  defend  the  Barrier  towns,  decided  to  remain  neutral.  With- 
^      .       ,      out  the  co-operation  of  the  Dutch,  Walpole  reso- 

Opening  of  '■  ^ 

the  War,  lutely  refused  to  move.  Fleury  had  already,  how- 
Oct.  1733.  ever,  been  forced  to  take  action,  and  on  October  23 
war  was  declared  against  the  Emperor.  But  though  Fleury 
could  boast  of  having  organised  a  league  of  Powers  against  the 
union  of  Austria  and  Russia,  and  though  the  Emperor  could 
be  attacked  in  Italy  and  on  the  Rhine,  France  had  so  far 
done  nothing  for  Stanislas,  and  had  been  helpless  to  prevent 
50,000  Russian  troops  from  invading  Poland.  Louis'  unfortu- 
iiate  father-in-law  and  his  French  auxiliaries  had  already  been 
driven  from  his  kingdom,  and  had  taken  refuge  in  Danzig, 
while  Augustus  of  Saxony  was  in  October,  by  Russian  and 
Saxon  arms,  forced  upon  the  unwilling  Poles.  It  was  impos- 
sible for  a  French  army  to  march  through  Germany ;  a  fleet 
sent  to  the  Baltic  would  arouse  the  hostiUty  of  England.  If 
France  really  meant  to  stand  by  her  candidate,  an  alliance 
must  at  once  be  made  with  Prussia,  Sweden,  or  Turkey.  Of 
these  three  Powers  Frederick  William  had  the  best  army,  he 
was  jealous  of  Russia,  he  distrusted  Charles  vi.  But  he  had 
already  decided  that  the  mission  of  the  Hohenzollerns  was  to 
unite  the  detached  portions  of  the  Prussian  monarchy  by  seiz- 
ing Polish  Prussia,  and  he  was  unwilling  to  take  any  step  to 
hinder  the  inevitable  progress  of  Poland  towards  dismember- 

1  See  Heeren,  Historical  Treatises.     Ranke,  History  of  England,  prin- 
cipally in  the  Seventeenth  Century,  vol,  v. 


The  War  of  tJie  Polish  Succession  95 

ment,  Sweden,  torn  by  internal  dissensions,  was  for  the  time 
incapable  of  offering  an  adequate  resistance  to  Russian  schemes, 
and  Fleury  recognised  that  though  diplomacy  might  in  time 
convert  Sweden  into  an  effective  ally,  the  French  Government 
could  not  expect  efficient  aid  from  any  of  the  Baltic  Powers. 
Turkey,  however,  remained,  and  Turkey,  owing  to  prance 
its  geographical  position  and  its  large  army,  its  attempts  to 
natural  hostility  to  Russia,  and  its  fears  of  the  co^.op^raUon 
advance  eastwards  of  Austria,  had  every  reason  to  °^  Turkey, 
join  France  in  protecting  PoHsh  independence.  Russia  had 
in  1 72 1  partially  dismembered  Sweden;  she  was  preparing  the 
downfall  of  Poland,  and  that  accomplished  she  proposed  to 
concentrate  her  attention  upon  the  continuance  of  Peter  the 
Great's  policy  with  regard  to  Turkey.  Whenever  the  Russian 
attack  took  place  the  Porte  would  find  itself  quite  unable  to 
withstand  200,000  disciplined  Russian  troops,  unless  it  could 
obtain  the  support  of  one  of  the  great  European  Powers. 
Poland  and  Turkey  stood  and  fell  together.  At  the  time  of 
the  capitulation  of  the  Pruth,  Peter  the  Great  had  solemnly 
promised  that  Russia  should  not  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs 
of  Poland.  In  1733  Turkey  had  every  reason  for  apprehension 
and  every  inducement  to  take  active  measures.  In  the  Tartar 
tribes,  Turkey  possessed  an  immense  if  somewhat  undisciplined 
army.  The  prestige  of  France  was  high  among  these  tribes, 
and  in  1730  the  Khan  had  assured  the  French  ambassador 
Villeneuve  of  his  readiness  to  aid  France  in  placing  Stanislas 
on  the  Polish  throne. 

The  neutrahty  of  England  was  bitterly  resented  by  the  Court 
of  Vienna,  and  especially  by  Prince  Eugene.  He  was  con- 
vinced that  the  House  of  Austria,  without  the  assistance  of 
the  Maritime  Powers,  could  not  resist  the  combination  brought 
against  it,  and,  in  letters  which  were  laid  before  George  11.,  he 
graphically  described  the  result  upon  the  empire  and  Europe 
of  England's  non-intervention.  It  had  been  for  many  years 
a  fixed  principle  with  the  English  parUament  to  maintain  an 
equiUbrium  between  Austria  and  France,  and  though  Walpole 


96  European  History,   171 5-1789 

might  say  with  truth  that  the  succession  to  Poland  did  not 
affect  England,  it  could  not  be  denied  that  England  was  inter- 
ested in  the  fate  of  Italy  and  the  aggrandisement  of  France. 
Walpole's  policy  at  this  juncture  may  have  been  consistent  with 
the  momentary  advantage  of  Hanoverian  dynasty,  but  it  is  open 
to  the  charge  of  being  detrimental  to  the  general  interests  of 
England  and  Europe.  It  is  a  tenable  view  that  had  Austria 
been  vigorously  supported  by  the  Maritime  Powers,  Europe 
might  have  been  spared  the  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession.^ 
The  Emperor  was  thus  left  to  combat  the  forces  of  France, 
Spain,  and  Sardinia  in  Italy  and  on  the  Rhine  —  a  combination 
seemingly  due  to  the  aged  and  pacific  French  minister. 

In  1733  Villeneuve  urged  the  Turks  to  move.  But  though 
Fleury  had  issued  a  manifesto  declaring  that  any  interference 
in  Poland  would  be  regarded  by  France  as  a  menace  to  the 
general  peace,  and  had  secretly  despatched  Stanislas  to 
Poland,  the  Porte  refused  to  take  action  till  France  declared 
war  against  Austria  and  made  a  defensive  league  wilh  Turkey. 
But  Fleury,  a  prince  of  the  Church,  was,  like  Louis  xrv.,  un- 
willing to  make  an  alliance  with  the  Infidel ;  and  the  Turks, 
fearful  of  being  attacked  by  Russia  and  Austria  simultaneously 
—  as  indeed  happened  a  few  years  later — absolutely  refused  to 
move  unless  France  would  at  least  engage  not  to  make  peace 
with  Austria  so  long  as  Russia  was  at  war  with  the  Porte.  The 
renegade  Pacha  Bonneval,  then  in  the  Turkish  service,  urged 
a  close  alliance  between  France  and  Turkey.  Sweden  would 
join  it,  while  England,  he  said,  will  soon  recognise  that  in  Rus- 
sia she  has  a  dangerous  rival  in  the  distant  regions  of  Asia, 
for  Russia,  having  crossed  the  Caucasus  and  the  Caspian,  will 
try  and  seize  the  trade  of  India  and  will  spread  all  over  the 
far  east.  Thus,  with  the  adhesion  of  England,  Holland,  and 
Spain,  a  great  western  coalition  will  assure  the  integrity  of  the 
Sultan's  dominions. 

1  Ranke,  History  of  England^  principally  in  the  Seventeenth  Century, 
vol.  V.  p.  238;  Coxe,  House  of  Aus/ria,  vol.  iii.  p.  133 ;  Heeren, 
Historical  Treatises,  p.  299. 


The    War  of  the  Polish  Succession  97 

But  the  colonial  and  Italian  interests  of  France  and  Spain 
seemed  of  greater  moment  to  those  Powers  than  the  integrity 
of    the   Turkish    empire,    and    Fleurv   but   slowlv   ^, 

^  •'  '      Fleury  fails 

realised  the  immense  importance  to  France  of  an  to  grasp  the 
alliance  with  the  Porte.  Russia,  however,  quickly  ^^*"^*>°°- 
perceived  that  her  plans  in  Poland  would  be  seriously  inter- 
fered with  by  a  flank  attack  from  the  south-east,  and  accord- 
ingly sent  an  embassy  to  Nadir  Shah  in  order  to  foment  a 
war  between  Persia  and  Turkey  which  should  occupy  the  latter 
Power  till  the  PoHsh  Succession  question  was  settled.  Officers, 
engineers,  soldiers,  and  ammunition  were  forwarded  to  Persia, 
and  till  1741  Nadir  Shah  remained  the  close  friend  and  ally  of 
Russia.  The  election  of  Augustus  iii.  in  October  under  Russian 
and  Austrian  influence  was  followed  by  the  siege  of  The  siege 
Danzig  by  Russian  troops.  It  is  round  this  siege,  °f  Danzig, 
which  continued  from  October  1733  to  June  1734,  that  the 
interest  of  the  war  in  the  north  centres.  Had  the  Turks  entered 
Poland  from  the  south  during  the  siege,  a  general  rising  in 
favour  of  Stanislas  would  have  resulted,  and  Danzig  would 
have  been  saved.  A  few  lines  written  by  Fleury  agreeing  to 
the  Turkish  demands  would  have  given  Stanislas  200,000 
soldiers.  But  the  French  minister  refused  to  act  decisively, 
and  contented  himself  with  an  ineffectual  attempt  to  induce 
Sweden  to  send  aid  to  the  beleaguered  town.  But  Sweden, 
menaced  by  Denmark,  refused  to  move.  The  despatch,  how- 
ever, of  a  few  ships  and  three  battahons  into  the  Baltic  to 
succour  Danzig,  though  unproductive  of  good  results,  led  to 
one  of  the  few  interesting  episodes  in  the  war.  The  ships 
having  retired  to  Copenhagen,  Count  Plelo,  the  French  repre- 
sentative there,  took  command,  sailed  back  to  Danzig,  and  on 
May  21  he  attacked  the  Russians  and  was  killed.  French 
troops  had  for  the  first  time  in  modern  history  met  the 
Russians  in  battle.  At  length  it  was  decided  to  send  the 
written  declaration  demanded  by  the  Turks,  to  the  effect  that 
'  France  would  not  make  peace  until  assured  of  the  safety 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire.'     But  Fleury  very  characteristically. 

PERIOD   VI.  G 


98  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

instead  of  sending  it  overland  with  all  possible  despatch,  pre- 
ferred to  send  it  by  sea.  For  forty-six  days  the  ship  was  tossed 
about  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  only  arrived  at  Constantinople 
on  July  10.  On  July  2  Danzig  had  capitulated,  and  Stanislas 
had  fled  into  Prussian  territory.^ 

It  is  doubtful  if  Fleury  ever  really  cared  much  for  the  cause 
of  the  ex-king  of  Poland,  and  during  these  critical  months  in 
Success  of  ^^  history  of  Poland  he  was  busy  diverting  the 
the  Russian     mind  of  Louis  XV.  from  the  failure  in  Poland   to 

and  Austrian     ^y        t^  -y  •        t^   i  r^\         t--      i  u 

Policy  in  the  i*rench  successes  m  Italy,  ihe  lurks,  who 
Poland.  were  occupied  during  the  last  months  of  1734  in 

bringing  the  Persian  war  to  a  conclusion,  proposed  at  the  be- 
ginning of  1735  to  enter  Poland,  and  Sweden  appeared  ready 
to  join  in  armed  intervention.  But  Fleury,  irritated  at  the 
slowness  of  the  Porte,  and  not  at  all  sure  of  its  sincerity, 
opened  direct  negotiations  with  Russia  in  favour  of  Stanislas. 
France  thus  in  1735  refused  to  profit  from  the  readiness  of 
the  Turks  to  attack  Russia,  and  six  months  were  occupied 
in  useless  negotiations.  During  these  six  months  the  cause  of 
Stanislas  was  irrevocably  lost,  and  the  Russians  carried  out  suc- 
cessfully their  policy  in  Poland.  The  policy  of  Charles  vi. 
was  no  less  successful.  Augustus  iii.  was  not  only  firmly 
established  on  the  Polish  throne ;  he  had  guaranteed  the 
Pragmatic  Sanction,  and  handed  over  Courland  to  Russia 
to  be  formed  into  a  dukedom  for  Anne's  favourite  Biren,  and 
all  this  had  been  accomplished  without  a  single  Austrian  sol- 
dier being  sent  into  Poland. 

The  War  of  the  Polish  Succession,  so  far  as  the  interests 
of  France  in  the  east  of  Europe  were  concerned,  was  a  serious 
blow  to  French  prestige ;  it  was  at  the  same  time  a  solemn 
warning  to  the  rulers  of  Turkey.  The  vacillating  and  contra- 
dictory action  of  Pleury,  accompanied  by  the  slowness  of  the 
Turks,  in  the  latter  part  of  1734,  had  decided  the  fate  of 
Stanislas,  and  the  ancient  policy  of  France  in  the  east  sus- 
tained a  defeat  from  which  it  never  recovered.  Henceforward 
^  Vandal,  Une  Atnbassade  Fran^aise  oi  Orient  sous  Louis  XK,  pp.  223-5. 


The    War  of  tJie  Polish  Succession  99 

the  partition  of  Poland  was  assured,  and  all  French  efforts  to 
prevent  it  useless.  The  irresolution  and  short-sightedness  of 
the  Porte  likewise  recoiled  upon  its  own  head,  for  no  sooner 
was  the  Polish  Succession  War  ended,  than  it  became  the 
object  of  an  attack  by  the  combined  forces  of  Russia  and 
Austria,  and  was  forced  to  realise  in  a  very  unmistakable 
manner  the  close  connection  between  the  fortunes  of  Poland 
and  Turkey. 

In  the  west,  however,  matters  were  reversed.     There  the 
successes   of  the    French,    Sardinians,  and   Spaniards   at   the 
expense  of  Charles  vi.  and  the  empire,  indicated   success  of 
considerable  changes  in  the  balance  of  power   in   ^^e  French 

°  _  -^  in  Italy  and 

Italy.  In  Italy  the  Austrian  ruler  had  never  been  on  the  Rhine, 
popular.  The  Italian  regiments  had  been  disbanded,  and  the 
interests  of  Italy  had  in  various  ways  been  subordinated  to 
those  of  Austria.  The  discontent  in  Lombardy  and  in  the 
kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies  augured  ill  for  Austrian  operations 
against  Sardinia  or  Spain.  The  Emperor,  too,  contrary  to  the 
advice  of  Eugene,  had  moved  the  greater  part  of  his  troops 
from  Tuscany  and  the  Two  Sicilies  in  order  to  place  them  on 
the  Polish  frontier.  Hardly  12,000  Austrians  remained  in  the 
Mincio.  In  the  autumn  of  1733  Charles  Emanuel  took  Milan; 
and  reinforced  by  Villars,  who  now  bore  like  Turenne  the  title 
of  marshal-general,  and  a  French  army,  he  occupied  all  the 
Milanese  territory  and  invaded  that  of  Mantua.  In  the  south 
the  Spaniards  showed  no  less  acti\dty.  Under  the  leadership 
of  Don  Carlos  they  marched,  in  the  spring  of  1734,  from  the 
Tuscan  coast  through  the  Papal  States  to  Naples,  and,  like 
Charles  viii.,  conquered  Italy  'with  a  piece  of  chalk.'  Monte- 
mar  defeated  the  Austrians  at  Bitonto  on  May  27,  1734;  in 
May  1735  ^^^  Spaniards  invaded  Sicily,  and  in  July  of  that 
year  Don  Carlos  was  crowned  king  at  Palermo.  The  kingdom 
of  the  Two  SiciHes  had  been  conquered,  and  Don  Carlos  had 
founded  a  d}Tiasty  which  was  to  last  till  our  own  days. 

In  the  north  of  Italy  the  Spaniards  were  not  so  successful, 
and  the  opposition  of  the  King  of  Sardinia  proved  disastrous  to 


lOO  European  History ^   171 5-1 789 

their  hopes.  Spain  wished  to  recover  her  supremacy  in  Italy^ 
and  Ehzabeth  Farnese  hoped  to  appropriate  Man'tua.  Charles 
Divergent  Emanuel  desired  Mantua  for  himself  or  for  the 
Interests  of      Elector  of  Bavaria ;    he  was    determined    that  it 

Spain  and  ^ 

Sardinia.  should  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  Spain.  He  had  no 
wish  to  see  the  sons  of  Elizabeth  Farnese  established  in  Italy. 
He  preferred  the  continuance  of  the  Austrians  in  Lombardy  to 
the  formation  of  an  independent  Tuscan  state.  Not  receiving 
satisfactory  assurance  on  this  point  from  Fleury,  he  refused  to 
undertake  the  siege  of  Mantua,  and  Villars  threw  up  his  com- 
mand and  retired,  only  to  die  in  June  1734  at  Turin,  five  days 
after  Berwick,  at  the  age  of  ninety-two. 

In  the  same  month  the  battle  of  Parma  was  fought;  the 
Gallo-Sardinian  army  under  Coigny,  Villars'  successor,  held  its 
own,  and  Merci  was  killed ;  in  September,  Konigsegg  was 
defeated  at  Guastalla.  Early  in  1735  a  temporary  reconcilia- 
tion was  brought  about  between  Spain,  Sardinia,  and  France, 
owing  to  the  arrogant  attitude  of  the  English  and  Dutch  ;  a 
Spanish  force  marched  northwards,  and  the  siege  of  INIantua 
was  begun.  But  the  Spaniards  had  now  reached  the  limit  of 
their  successes.  At  the  siege  of  Mantua,  though  they  were 
aided  by  the  French  under  Noailles,  who  had  succeeded  Coigny 
in  the  command,  they  received  no  assistance  from  the  King  of 
Sardinia.  Charles  Emanuel  was  fully  alive  to  the  undesirability 
of  being  enclosed  between  two  strong  Bourbon  Powers  like 
France  and  Spain.  He  had  already  adopted  the  accepted 
policy  of  his  House,  and  had  made  secret  overtures  to  the 
Emperor  behind  the  backs  of  his  alHes.  He  refused  to  lend 
the  Spaniards  the  artillery  necessary  for  the  siege  of  Mantua, 
and  the  siege  artillery  had  to  be  dragged  from  Leghorn  and 
Naples.  All  hope  of  the  fall  of  Mantua  was  finally  destroyed 
by  the  action  of  Fleury.  who,  in  consequence  of  the  general 
outlook,  without  consulting  his  alhes,  had  suddenly  signed  pre- 
liminaries of  peace  with  the  Emperor. 

The  French  campaign  on  the  Rhine  in  1733  and  1734  had 
been  successful.     Berwick,  now  an  old  man,  occupied  Lorraine 


The    War  of  the  Polish  ■^nj:t'ei!^iatt.'  ''.'*'. ''ib'^  J /' 

and  the  electorate  of  Treves,  took  Kehl,  and  besieged  Pfeilips- 
burg,  where  he  was  killed  five  days  before  the  death  of  Villars. 
Philipsburg  fell  in  spite  of  the  presence  of  Eugene, 
and  100,000  imperial  troops.  But  the  French  won  of  Vienna, 
no  further  striking  success  in  Germany,  and  Fleury  ^735-38- 
was  wise  in  coming  to  terms  with  Charles  vi.  The  Protes- 
tant electors  were  bringing  up  reinforcements  for  the  im- 
perial army,  and  fresh  troops  were  being  sent  to  Konigsegg 
in  Italy;  16,000  Russians  had,  by  order  of  the  Tsarina  Anne, 
marched  across  Germany,  and  joined  the  Austrians,  while  Seck- 
endorf,  one  of  Eugene's  lieutenants,  had  defeated  the  French 
at  Klaussen.  The  fear  of  a  diversion  on  the  part  of  England 
and  Denmark  in  favour  of  the  Emperor  was  constantly  before 
his  eyes.  He  was  aware  that  negotiations  had  been  carried  on 
for  some  time  past  between  the  Emperor  and  Patino,  who, 
representing  Elizabeth  Farnese,  had  endeavoured  to  obtain  the 
h^nd  of  Maria  Theresa  for  Don  Carlos  ;  Sardinia  could  never 
be  trusted,  and  had  already  di\Tilged  the  terms  of  the  Treaty 
ot  ^he  Escurial  to  the  Enghsh  Government.  On  October  5  the 
preliminaries  of  the  third  Treaty  of  Vienna,  between  France 
and  the  Emperor,  were  signed,  though  the  definitive  treaty  was 
not  concluded  till  November  18,  1738.  Stanislas  renounced 
his  claim  to  Poland,  and  received  the  Duchy  of  Bar  with  the 
promise  of  Lorraine  for  his  Hfe,  as  soon  as  the  death  of  the 
Duke  of  Tuscany  enabled  that  Grand  Duchy  to  be  given  to 
the  Duke  of  Lorraine.  To  Don  Carlos  in  exchange  for  Tus- 
cany were  given  the  kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies,  the  Tuscan 
ports  and  the  island  of  Elba.  He  further  gave  up  the  Duchies 
of  Parma  and  Piacenza,  which  were  restored  to  the  Emperor, 
who  also  received  back  the  Milanese,  with  the  exception  of 
Novara  and  Tortona,  which  were  handed  over  to  Charles  Eman- 
uel. France  engaged  to  guarantee  the  Pragmatic  Sanction,  and 
on  the  death  of  Stanislas  was  to  take  possession  of  Bar  and 
Lorraine. 

On  the  1 2th  February  1736  Maria  Theresa  married  Francis 
Stephen,  Duke  of  Lorraine,  who,  on  the  death  of  Gian  Gas- 


103  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

ton,  Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany,  in  June  1737,  exchanged  Lor- 
raine for  the  Grand  Duchy;  and  on  April  21,  1736,  Prince 
Eugene  died  at  the  age  of  seventy-two.  His  moral,  physical, 
and  intellectual  gifts  had  marked  him  out  for  many 
Eugene,  years  as  the  most  distinguished  figure  in  Vienna. 

^'^^^'  He  was  probably  the  greatest  statesman  of  his  time, 

and  his  career  coincided  with  the  most  glorious  period  of 
Austrian  history.  With  remarkable  foresight  he  had  urged 
Charles  vi.  to  devote  his  energies  to  crushing  the  Turks,  and 
extending  the  Austrian  power  still  further  down  the  Danube. 
He  had  no  confidence  in  the  Pragmatic  Sanction,  though  by 
his  skill  he  gained  for  it  whatever  success  it  met  with. 

Though,  owing  to  the  hostility  of  England  to  the  Ostend 
East  India  Company,  he  had  been  drawn  into  an  unwilling  and 
half-hearted  support  of  Ripperda's  schemes,  he  did  not  approve 
of  the  Spanish  alliance,  and  firmly  believed  in  the  value  of  the 
English  connection. 

He  was  convinced  that  Austria  had  erred  in  going  to  war 
over  the  Polish  Succession  question,  foreseeing  that  the  French 
and  Spanish  schemes  in  the  west  would  be  furthered ;  he  was, 
as  we  have  seen,  indignant  at  England's  desertion  of  her  ally. 
He  was  of  opinion  that  Maria  Theresa  should  have  married 
the  Bavarian  prince,  and  that  Lorraine  should  never  have 
been  yielded  to  France.  Had  such  a  marriage  been  carried 
out,  Austria  would  have  been  immensely  strengthened  in  Ger- 
many, and  the  Austrian  Succession  War  in  all  probability  averted.^ 
In  Eugene,  Austria  lost  a  soldier  and  a  statesman  of  the  first 
order,  and  the  collapse  that  followed  his  death  speaks  vol- 
umes for  his  wisdom  and  prudence.  It  was  not  till  the  rise 
of  Kaunitz  that  the  Hapsburgs  again  found  a  statesman  capable 
of  guiding  the  destinies  of  Austria.  Eugene  was  succeeded  by 
Bartenstein,  who  was  a  diplomatist  and  jurist  rather  than  a 
statesman. 

Important  changes  also  took  place  in  the  French  Govern- 
ment. Chauvelin,  who  above  all  others  had  been  mainly 
^  Vide  Von  Arneth,  Pruiz  Eugen  von  Savoyen. 


The  War  of  the  Polish  Snccesszofi  1 03 

instrumental  in  inducing  the  French  Government  to  enter 
upon  the  war,  who,  Uke  d'Argenson,  desired  the  freedom  of 
Italy  from  the  Germans,  who  opposed  the  Cardinal's  peace 
pohcy,  and  to  whose  representations  was  due  the 
arrangement  with  regard  to  Lorraine,  was,  on  Chauveiin, 
February  20,  1737,  dismissed  and  exiled  to  his  ^^^^" 
estates  through  the  instrumentality  of  Fleur}"  himself,  who  ac- 
cused him  of  carrying  on  secret  negotiations  with  Spain  and 
England.  He  was  succeeded  by  Amelot  de  Chaillou,  who  held 
office  till  June  1744.  With  the  fall  of  Chauveiin  the  influence 
of  the  war  party  in  France  for  some  years  declined,  and  it  did 
not  raise  its  head  again  till  the  death  of  the  Emperor  Charles 
VI.  In  Spain  the  news  of  the  signature  of  the  pre- 
liminaries  had  been  received  with  the  utmost  indig-  Patino, 
nation.  Elizabeth  had  always  hated  the  French ;  ^^^^' 
she  now  contemplated  a  close  alHance  with  England.  Bitterly 
disappointed  at  her  failure  to  bring  about  the  marriage  of  Don 
Carlos  and  Maria  Theresa,  and  at  the  postponement  of  her 
schemes  with  regard  to  North  Italy,  she  declared  that  Spain  had 
been  duped  by  France.  Charles  Emanuel  was  no  less  indignant, 
and  refused  to  accept  Fleury's  explanation  of  what  he  called 
the  French  perfidy.  Throughout  1736  affairs  in  Italy  had 
remained  in  a  very  unsettled  condition.  There  was  no  har- 
mony between  the  French,  Spanish,  and  imperial  generals,  and 
a  collision  leading  to  a  fresh  conflict  was  thought  to  be  not  at 
all  unlikely.  On  May  18  Spain  assented  to  the  preliminaries  of 
Vienna  ;  on  November  3  Patino  died.  His  loss  was  for  the  time 
being  irreparable.  Clear-sighted,  disinterested,  hard-working, 
and  full  of  resource,  Patino  had  laid  Spain  under  a  great  debt. 
Under  his  ministry  the  country  had  made  rapid  progress.  Pos- 
sessed of  a  remarkable  power  of  mastering  detail,  he  also  held 
statesmanlike  views  of  the  requirements  of  Spain,  and  a  clear 
conception  of  the  lines  on  which  her  foreign  and  colonial  poHcy 
ought  to  march.  His  influence  over  Elizabeth  Farnese  had 
been  again  and  again  used  for  the  benefit  of  Spain.  He  must 
be  classed  uith  Walpole  and  Fleury  as  one  of  the  great  peace 


104  European  History ^   171 5-1789 

ministers  of  the  day.  Like  Fleury  he  was  forced  into  the  Polish 
Succession  War,  and  hke  him  he  brought  his  country  out  of  it 
with  her  prestige  heightened,  and  her  territories  increased.  He 
was  succeeded  by  La  Quadra,  afterwards  Marquis  of  Villarias, 
and  the  government  of  Spain  was  placed  almost  entirely  in  the 
hands  of  Spaniards. 

The  Polish  Succession  War  was  over,  and  Europe  might 
hope  to  enjoy  a  period  of  peace.  Charles  vi.,  though  his 
_.    ^  armies  had  suffered   defeat,  had  not  been  unsuc- 

The  Euro-  ' 

pean  impor-  cessful.  His  Candidate  sat  on  the  Polish  throne, 
w"a"o°  the^  ^^<^  ^^  ^^*^  received  guarantees  of  the  Pragmatic 
Polish  Sue-  Sanction  from  Louis  xv.  no  less  than  from  Augustus 
III.  Though  the  empire  had  lost  Lorraine,  its  Duke, 
the  husband  of  Maria  Theresa,  had  obtained  Tuscany,  which  was 
now  united  to  the  Austrian  possessions.  Charles  vi.  had  cer- 
tainly been  forced  to  relinquish  the  kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies 
and  the  Tuscan  ports,  but  he  had  regained  Parma  and  Piacenza, 
and  his  dominions  in  Italy  were  consolidated.  The  Bourbon 
Powers  of  France  and  Spain  had  the  greatest  cause  for  con- 
gratulation. Fleury  had,  in  securing  the  reversion  of  Lorraine, 
gained  for  France  an  acquisition  of  enormous  value ;  while 
Spain  had  not  only  conquered  a  kingdom  and  founded  a  dy- 
nasty in  Italy,  but  had  shown  Europe  that  her  soldiers,  when 
well  led  by  generals  hke  Montemar,  had  not  lost  their  ancient 
courage  and  skill  in  war.  Though  various  circumstances  had 
caused  a  temporary  coolness  between  France  and  Spain,  the 
union  of  the  French  and  Spanish  Bourbons  was  patent  to  the 
world,  and  till  the  French  Revolution  the  possibility  of  their 
domination  in  Europe  haunted  the  minds  of  English  states- 
men. 

During  the  war  the  alliance  of  Russia  and  Austria  was  seen 
to  be  of  first-rate  importance.  These  two  Powers  had  success- 
fully carried  out  their  policy  in  Poland,  and  the  presence  of 
Russian  troops  on  the  Rhine,  for  the  first  time  in  European 
history,  revealed  to  startled  Europe  the  value  of  the  Russian 
alliance,  and  undoubtedly  hastened  the  conclusion  of  peace. 


TJie  War  of  the  Polish  Succession  105 

Henceforward  Poland  enters  upon  the  first  stage  of  the  period 
of  the  Partition  Treaties.  Owing  to  the  dedine  of  Sweden, 
the  rise  of  Russia  and  Prussia,  and  the  aUiance  between  the 
Courts  of  St.  Petersburg  and  Vienna,  the  fall  of  Poland  becomes 
merely  a  question  of  time.  Austria  has  to  find  that  her  inter- 
ests in  Poland  and  Silesia  are  as  important  as  those  in  Italy, 
while  it  is  henceforth  a  cardinal  point  in  the  policy  of  Prussia 
to  neglect  no  means  whereby  her  scattered  dominions  may  be 
united.  During  the  war  Savoy  had  acted  with  characteristic 
treachery,  and  had  secured  fresh  leaves  of  the  north  Italian 
artichoke. 

The  war  had  also  illustrated  the  growing  coolness  between 
the  Courts  of  Vienna  and  Berlin.  Frederick  WilHam  had,  in 
accordance  ^\'ith  his  treaty  obligations,  sent  10,000  men  to  the 
imperial  army.  But  he  was  much  imtated  at  the  course  of 
events  in  Poland,  throughout  the  peace  negotiations  he  had 
been  entirely  ignored,  and  he  declared  that  he  had  been  de- 
serted by  Russia  and  Austria.  He  was  very  suspicious  of 
Charles  m.'s  poHcy  in  respect  of  the  Jlilich-Berg  succession, 
and  the  end  of  the  war  found  his  relations  with  the  Emperor 
considerably  strained. 

With  the  close  of  the  seventeenth  century  far-sighted  Aus- 
trian ministers  had  seen  in  the  rising  Brandenburg  Electorate 
the  rival  of  the  Hapsburg  state.  The  Polish  Succession  War, 
while  justifying  their  apprehensions,  forms  a  definite  epoch  in 
the  history  of  the  growth  of  that  rivalry.  Before  many  years 
were  over  the  conflict  between  Prussia  and  Austria  opened  a 
new  period  in  the  history  of  Europe. 

The  Polish  Succession  War  thus  affected  in  various  des^rees 
every  important  European  state.  The  union  of  Naples  and 
Sicily  under  one  king,  and  the  growth  of  the  power  of  Sardinia, 
rendered  the  war  peculiarly  important  for  Italy.  The  rising 
influence  of  Russia  had  been  demonstrated,  the  importance  of 
the  Bourbon  House  fully  vindicated,  while  the  Eastern  Question 
was  rapidly  becoming  a  factor  demanding  the  consideration  of 
every  European  cabinet. 


io6  European  Histojy,   171 5-1 789 

Thjugli  the  third  Treaty  of  Vienna  seemed  likely  to  give 
Europe  a  period  of  peace,  it  was  evident  before  1736  had  run 
its  course  that  hostilities  in  the  east  were  on  the  verge  of 
breaking  out,  while  in  1738  it  was  equally  apparent  that 
England  and  Spain  were  drifting  into  war. 


CHAPTER   V 

THE  NORTH   AND   EAST  OF  EUROPE 

171 5-1740 

The  Eastern  Question  —  Turkey  at  War  with  Venice  and  Austria  —  The 
Peace  of  Passarowitz  —  Turkey  and  Persia  —  Nadir  Shah — War  between 
Turkey  and  Persia — European  Importance  of  the  War — The  Treaty  of 
1726  between  Russia  and  Austria — Tlie  Reigns  of  Catherine  I.,  Pt-ter  ll., 
and  Anne  Ivanovna  —  Causes  of  the  Turkish  War  of  1736-39  —  Marshal 
Munich  —  The  Opening  of  the  Turkish  War,  1736  —  Austria  joins  Russia, 
1737  —  The  Campaign  of  1739  —  The  Diplomacy  of  Villeneuve  —  The  Politi- 
cal Condition  of  Sweden  —  The  Diet  of  1738  and  the  French  Alliance  — 
Austria  deserts  Russia  —  The  Peace  of  Belgrade  —  Success  of  French  Di- 
plomacy. 

The  war  between  Turkey  on  the  one  hand  and  Russia  and 
Austria  on  the  other,  which  began  in  1736  and  continued  till 
1739,  affords  striking  indications  of  the  character  The  Eastern 
of  the  political  forces  at  work  in  the  east  and  north  Question, 
of  Europe.  During  its  continuance  the  value  of  the  French 
connection  with  Turkey  was  tested,  and  ample  illustrations 
were  afforded  of  the  decadence  of  Sweden  and  the  corruption 
of  its  government.  The  close  interdependence  of  eastern  and 
western  Europe  is  clearly  seen,  while  the  prominent  position  of 
Russia  and  its  close  alliance  with  Austria  foreshadow  their  union 
against  Prussia  in  the  Seven  Years'  War,  and  their  combined 
action  against  Turkey  in  1787.  But  above  all,  the  war  forced 
upon  the  attention  of  Europe  the  growing  importance  of  what 
since  the  Treaty  of  Kainardji  in  1774  became  gradually 
known  as  the  Eastern  Question.  From  the  close  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  Russia  and  Austria  had  definitely  come  forward 

107 


io8  European  History,   171 5-1789 

as  claimants  for  portions  of  Turkish  territory.  The  possibiHty 
of  a  partition  of  the  SuUan's  dominions  was  openly  discussed, 
and  the  Treaty  of  Carlowitz  in  1699  inaugurated  that  systematic 
dismemberment  of  the  Turkish  empire  which  has  been  consist- 
ently pursued  down  to  the  present  day.  But  Austria  was  neither 
strong  nor  united,  and  Russia  was  not  as  yet  a  consolidated 
state.  Peter  the  Great,  indeed,  attempted  in  171 1,  with  insuf- 
ficient resources,  to  destroy  the  Ottoman  power  at  one  blow. 
He  paid  the  penalty  for  his  audacity,  and  the  Treaty  of  the 
Truth,  which  alone  saved  him  and  his  army  from  complete  de- 
struction, relegated  the  Russians  to  their  northern  steppes,  and 
averted  all  danger  to  the  Turks  from  St.  Petersburg  for  upwards 
of  twenty-five  years. 

Since  the  Treaty  of  Passarowitz  in  1718  Turkey  had  been 
at  peace  in  Europe.  That  treaty  had  ended  a  war  declared  by 
Turkey  at  Turkey  against  Venice  in  December  17 14  in  order 
Venice  and  ^^  rccovcr  the  territory  lost  in  the  previous  century 
Austria.  to  the  Itafiau  Repubhc.   By  the  Treaty  of  the  Truth 

(July  1 711)  Turkey  under  Achmet  iii.  (1703-30)  had  humili- 
ated Peter  the  Great  and  regained  Azov.  In  1715  she  was 
equally  successful  against  Venice,  and  her  armies  under  Ali 
Cumurgi,  'the  dauntless  Vizier,'  easily  conquered  the  Morea 
and  expelled  the  Venetians  from  Crete. 

The  Venetian  appeal  to  Austria  was  supported  by  Prince 
Eugene,  and  Charles  vi.  early  in  1716  formed  an  offensive  and 
defensive  alliance  with  the  Republic.  In  spite  of  the  opposition 
of  many  of  the  Turkish  statesmen  and  generals,  the  Grand 
Vizier  carried  the  day,  and  war  was  declared  against  Austria. 
But  the  confidence  of  the  Grand  Vizier  was  not  justified,  and 
the  Turks  failed  in  all  their  enterprises.  Corfu,  attacked  by  a 
Turkish  fleet  and  army,  was  defended  by  the  Austrian  Schulen- 
berg,  and  in  August  1716  the  siege  was  raised.  '  It  was,'  it  is 
said,  'the  last  glorious  mihtary  exploit  in  the  annals  of  the 
Republic,  and  it  was  achieved  by  a  German  soldier.' 

gainst  Austria  an  army  was  assembled  in  July  1716,  and 
marched  to  besiege  Peterwardein.     In  the  first  encounter  with 


TJic  XortJi  and  East  of  Europe  109 

the  enemy's  troops,  under  General  Pfalfy,  the  Turks  were  suc- 
cessful. On  August  13  the  battle  of  Petenvardein  was  fought, 
and  Prince  Eugene  won  a  decisive  victory  over  the  Porte. 
After  five  hours'  fighting  the  Grand  Vizier  was  killed,  and  a 
general  rout  took  place.  Twenty  days  later  Eugene  besieged 
Temesvar,  \yhich,  after  the  failure  of  a  Turkish  attempt  to  save 
it,  capitulated  on  November  28,  1716, — its  fall  being  followed 
by  a  rising  of  Ser\da  in  favour  of  the  Austrians.  But  the  princi- 
pal event  of  the  war  was  the  capture  of  Belgrade.  Invested  in 
June  by  Eugene  and  80,000  men,  Belgrade,  with  a  garrison  of 
30,000  Turks,  held  out  till  August  18.  Two  days  previously 
Eugene  had  totally  defeated  a  large  army  which,  under  the 
new  Grand  Vizier  Ibrahim,  had  attempted  to  save  the  be- 
leaguered city,  the  fall  of  which  attracted  the  attention  of 
Europe.  With  this  splendid  triumph  the  war  closed.  The 
Porte  was  anxious  to  treat,  and  England,  alarmed  at  the  ag- 
gressive attitude  of  the  Spanish  Court,  desired  to  mediate  a 
peace  between  Turkey  and  Austria. 

Charles  w.  had  already  determined  to  exchange  Sardinia  for 
Sicily,  and  wished  to  have  his  hands  free  in  view  of  impending 
complications  consequent  on  the  occupation  of  Sar- 
dinia  by  Alberoni.     In  July  1718  the  Peace  of  Pas-    of  Passaro- 
sarowitz  was  signed.     Venice  yielded  the   Morea,   ^*^^'  ^^^^' 
and  the  districts  of  Zarine,  Ottovo,  and  Zubzi.     All  that  re- 
mained to  her  of  her  former  possessions  were  the  Ionian  Islands, 
while  on  the  Albanian  coast  she  kept  Corfu  and  a  few  cities 
and  districts  enclosed  in  a  strip  of  land  four  leagues  broad  and 
twenty  in  length.     Austria  not  only  completed  her  conquest  of 
Hungar}'  by  obtaining  the  city  and  Banat  of  Temesvar,  she 
also  secured  Belgrade,  two-thirds  of  Servia,  and  portions  of 
Wallachia  and  Bosnia. 

In  Belgrade  Austria  held  a  well-nigh  impregnable  position  on 
the  Danube,  the  conquest  of  the  greater  part  of  Servia  was  a 
menace  at  once  to  Salonica  and  Constantinople,  while  her  oc- 
cupation of  both  banks  of  the  Save  placed  Bosnia  at  her  mercy. 
The  increase  of  her  influence  in  the  Roumanian  lands   still 


no  European  History,   17 15-1789 

further  strengthened  her  hold  on  the  Danube,  and  placed  her 
in  close  proximity  to  the  Black  Sea. 

The  skilful  generalship  of  Eugene  had  given  Charles  vi.  a 
dominant  position  in  eastern  Europe,  and  afforded  Austria  a 
magnificent  opportunity  of  extending  and  consolidating  her 
conquests. 

Had  Charles  vi.  foregone  his  western  ambitions  and  con- 
tinued the  war,  the  Austrian  kingdom,  freed  from  any  fear  of 
French  intervention,  would  have  gained  an  enormous  advan- 
tage over  Russia  in  the  race  to  Constantinople,  and  might 
have  reached  the  .'Egean  and  Black  Seas.  But  Charles  vi.'s 
mistake  was  as  valuable  to  the  Ottomans  as  their  success  at 
the  Pruth,  and  the  Austrian  attack  was  not  renewed  for  twenty 
years,  and  then  under  peculiarly  unfavourable  circumstances. 
An  admirable  opportunity  to  extend  Austrian  interests  on  the 
Danube  and  in  the  Balkan  states  was  lost,  and  henceforward 
any  Austrian  advance  eastwards  was  made  in  conjunction  with 
Russia. 

After  the  Peace  of  Passarowitz  the  Turks,  refusing  all  pro- 
posals to  attack  Russia,  turned  their  attention  to  the  Persian 
Turkey  and  empire,  which,  in  consequence  of  misgovernment, 
Persia.  ^y^g  \^  ^  State  of  anarchy  and  the  prey  to  the  at- 

tacks of  the  Afghans.  In  1 722-23  Russia  and  Turkey,  appealed 
to  by  Shah  Tahmas  for  aid  against  his  rival  Mahmud,  had  little 
difficulty  in  occupying  portions  of  the  Persian  territories,  for  in 
addition  to  the  disputed  succession,  the  Armenians  had  risen 
against  Shah  Tahmas  and  looked  to  the  Turks  for  aid. 

The  death  of  Mahmud  and  the  succession  of  his  cousin 
Ashraf  to  all  his  claims  was  followed,  in  June  1724,  by  a  Parti- 
tion Treaty  between  Turkey  and  Russia,  according  to  which 
the  Tsar  was  to  take  the  provinces  lying  near  the  Caspian  Sea, 
an.i  the  Turks  the  provinces  of  Georgia  and  Azarbijan.^ 

Till  1727  the  cause  of  the  Sunnite  Ashraf  gained  ground, 

1  Turkey,  alarmed  at  the  successes  of  the  Russians,  who  had  taken 
Baku,  etc.,  had  only  been  prevented  from  attacking  them  by  Bonnac,  the 
1-  rench  envoy,  who  mediated  a  treaty. 


The  North  a7id  East  of  Europe  in 

and  in  that  year  the  Porte,  in  deference  to  popular  opinion  in 
Constantinople,  decided  to  recognise  his  claim  to  the  Persian 
throne  as  against  that  of  the  Shiite  Tahmas.  This  decision, 
however,  proved  ineffectual  to  settle  the  succession  question, 
for  the  sudden  rise  of  the  famous  Nadir  Shah  restored  the 
fortunes  of  Tahmas,  and  brought  about  the  overthrow  of 
Ashraf  in  1729,  and  the  expulsion  of  the  Turks  in  1735. 

The  famous  adventurer  was  endowed  with  an  indomitable 
courage  and  energy  which  carried  all  before  it.  With  an 
unhesitatinsj  belief  in  his  own  future,  he  possessed 

.      ?  ,       .  ,         T  .   .  r     \  •  ,      Nadir  Shah. 

a  keen  msight  mto  the  dispositions  of  those  with 
whom  he  was  brought  into  contact.  From  1727  he  had 
obtained  a  firm  ascendancy  over  the  weak  Shah  Tahmas,  and 
laid  the  foundation  of  his  future  greatness.  Whatever  his 
personal  aims  at  this  epoch  may  have  been,  his  patriotic 
determination  to  rid  Persia  of  the  foreigners,  whether  Afghan 
or  Turk,  to  put  down  all  rebellion,  and  to  form  Persia  into  a 
strong  consolidated  state,  admit  of  no  doubt.  In  the  battles 
of  Damaghan  and  Mourchakor  in  1729  the  Afghans,  under 
Ashraf,  were  completely  overthrown.  In  1 730  a  further 
defeat  of  Ashraf  at  Istaker  was  followed  by  his  death  in 
Beloochistan.  The  Afghan  power  being  destroyed  and  Persian 
independence  assured.  Nadir,  still  nominally  acting  in  behalf  of 
Shah  Tahmas,  was  able  to  turn  his  arms  against  the  Turks,  and 
to  regain  the  lost  provinces  of  the  empire.  After  the  capture 
of  Herat  in  1728,  Nadir  had  sent  to  Constantinople  an  em- 
bassy, which  proved  a  failure,  owing  to  the  strength  of  the 
war  party  in  the  Turkish  capital. 

The  Sultan  Ahmed,  though  himself  anxious  for  peace,  was 
forced  by  the  Janissaries  to  seek  new  opportunities  for  Turkish 
aggression  in  Persia,  while  Nadir,  recognising  that 
the  hostility  of  the  Porte  was  unappeasable,  attacked  tween  Persia 
and  defeated  the  aged  Topal  Osman  at  Nehavend,  ^"'^  Turkey, 
and,  having  overthrown  two  armies  under  Timur  and  Mustapha 
Pacha  at  Azarbijan,  occupied  Tabriz.  Ahmed,  seeing  the 
hopelessness   of    continuing   the    struggle,    was    preparing    to 


ri2  Ewvpean  History ^   171 5-1789 

make  peace  on  Nadir's  terms,  when,  in  September  1730 
he  was  forced  by  the  discontented  Janissaries  to  abdicate. 
During  the  first  year  of  the  reign  of  Mahmud  i.  (1730-54) 
some  transient  successes  were  gained  by  the  Porte.  Tabriz, 
during  Nadir's  absence  at  the  siege  of  Herat,  was  again  occu- 
pied by  the  Turks,  and  Shah  Tahmas  in  1731  agreed  to  a 
treaty  which  provided  that,  in  return  for  a  Turkish  contingent 
against  the  Russians,  a  great  portion  of  Azarbijan,  and  all  the 
territory  north  of  the  Ara,  should  be  handed  over  to  the 
Porte.  On  hearing  of  these  events  Nadir  was  furious.  He 
at  once  repudiated  the  treaty  and  deposed  Shah  Tahmas  in 
1732,  replacing  him  by  his  son  Abbas,  an  infant  eight  months 
old,  and  resumed  the  war  against  Turkey  with  the  utmost 
vigour.  In  the  spring  of  1733  he  besieged  Bagdad,  but  in 
consequence  of  his  rashness  was,  on  July  19,  defeated  at 
Sumera  by  Topal  Osman,  who  again  defeated  the  Persians  at 
Leitan  the  same  year. 

Regarding   their  victories   as   decisive,  the   Turks   took  no 

necessary  precautions,  and  in  the  end  of  the  year  were  totally 

defeated  at  MendeH,  the  erallant  Topal  Osman  be- 

European  ^  o  r 

Importance  ing  killed.  The  war  party  was  still  predominant  in 
^^'  Constantinopl'e,  and  after  a  short  interval  the  strug- 
gle was  renewed,  and  became  one  of  great  European  in- 
terest. Fleury  was  anxious  to  bring  about  peace  between 
Turkey  and  Persia,  in  order  to  use  the  former  as  a  check  to 
the  Russian  designs  in  Poland.  The  Tsarina  Anne  was  equally 
desirous  to  see  the  Turks  occupied  in  Persia  until  the  end  of 
the  Polish  Succession  War ;  she  therefore  allied  with  Nadir 
Shah,  yielding  the  Persian  provinces  assigned  to  Russia  by  the 
treaty  of  1724  between  Peter  the  Great  and  Ahmed  iii.,  and 
supplied  him  with  siege  material.  In  1734  and  1735  Nadir 
succeeded,  after  several  severe  battles,  in  expelling  the  Turks 
from  Georgia.  These  reverses,  coupled  with  the  menacing 
attitude  of  Russia  and  Austria,  decided  the  Porte,  at  the  close 
of  1735,  to  make  peace,  and  a  treaty  with  Nadir  was  signed 
at  Erzerum,  by  which  Turkey  yielded  the  provinces  of  Georgia 


The  North  and  East  of  Europe  113 

and  Azarbijan.  In  the  following  year  Nadir  Shah,  the  restorer 
of  Persian  independence  and  the  integrity  of  the  empire,  was 
elected  king.^ 

It  would  have  been  far  better  for  Turkey  if  she  had  made 
peace  with  Persia  in  1729.  Her  policy  since  the  Peace  of 
Passarowitz  had  been  short-sighted  and  suicidal.  The  treaty 
with  Russia  in  1724  for  the  partition  of  Persia  failed  entirely 
to  avert  the  danger  from  the  north,  and  the  Persian  war  not 
only  occupied  her  when  she  might  have  attacked  Russia  dur- 
ing the  Polish  Succession  War,  but  left  her  weakened  in  face 
of  the  impending  attack  from  the  combined  Russian  and  Aus- 
trian forces.  The  aims  of  Ahmed  iii.  and  his  vizier,  Ibrahim 
Pacha,  had  lain  in  the  direction  of  peaceful  relations  with  the 
European  Powers.  Failing  to  appreciate  the  imminence  of  a 
Russian  attack,  Ibrahim  contented  himself  with  a  policy  of 
conciliation,  if  not  of  submission,  to  both  Austria  and  Russia, 
which  brought  with  it  a  series  of  attacks  upon  the  French  re- 
ligious and  commercial  interests  in  the  Levant.  This  policy 
was  obviously  short-sighted,  for  Russian  hostility  ^^^  Treaty 
never  slept.  On  August  25,  1726,  was  signed  that  051726 
treaty  between  Russia  and  Austria  which  gives  the  Russia  and 
keynote  of  the  eastern  policy  of  those  Powers  Austria, 
throughout  the  century.  By  the  terms  of  this  agreement,  each 
Power  was  to  aid  the  other,  in  case  of  attack,  with  30,000  men. 
In  the  event  of  a  Turkish  war  all  available  forces  were  to  be 
used.  Turkey  had  henceforward  to  fear  the  simultaneous  on- 
slaught of  the  Austrian  and  Russian  empires,  to  both  of  which 
the  partition  of  the  Ottoman  dominions  was  a  matter  of  vital 
interest.  But  while  Austria,  involved  in  German  affairs,  was 
unable  to  devote  her  full  attention  to  her  eastern  development, 
the  Russian  rulers  continued  to  seize  every  opportunity  of  ad- 
vancing their  territory  and  interests  at  the  expense  of  the  Porte. 

The  treaty  of  1726  with   Austria  was  the    most   important 
event  in  the  reign  of  Catherine    i.,  who   had    succeeded    her 

1  The  treaty  between  Nadir  Shah  and  the  Turks  was  finally  concluded 
in  September  1736. 

PERIOD   VI.  H 


i  1 4  European  History,   1 7 1 5  - 1 7 89 

husband,  Peter  the  Great,  upon  his  death  on  January  28,  1725. 
During  her  reign  she  made  no  attempt  to  check  the  power  ot 
The  Reigns  of  the  ohgarchy  of  nobles  headed  by  Menshikov, 
Catherine  I.,  Apraksin,  Tolstoi,  Gohtsin,  Golovkin,  and  Oster- 
and  Anne  mann,  who  composcd  the  Upper  Secret  Council, 
ivanovna.  jj^  ^121  shc  died,  and  Peter  ii.,  grandson  of  Peter 
the  Great,  succeeded  to  the  throne.  During  his  short  reign,  in 
which  he  showed  an  excellent  understanding  though  a  lack  of 
resolution,  first  Menshikov  and  then  Alexis  and  Ivan  Dolgo- 
ruki  ruled  in  his  name.  The  latter's  regijne  marked  the  tri- 
umph of  the  old  Russian  party  who  were  opposed  to  the  in- 
troduction of  western  civilisation,  and  regarded  Moscow  and 
not  St.  Petersburg  as  the  true  capital  of  Russia.  On  Peter's 
death  on  January  30,  1730,  the  nobles  found  in  the  absence 
of  any  male  representative  of  the  line  of  Peter  the  Great  an 
opportunity  of  still  further  increasing  their  influence.  After  a 
rule  of  118  years  the  main  line  of  the  House  of  Romanov  had 
come  to  an  end.^  Peter's  eldest  daughter  Anne  had  married  the 
Duke  of  Holstein  and  had  died  in  1728  leaving  a  son  —  after- 
wards Peter  iii.;  the  youngest,  Elizabeth,  was  popular  with  the 
nation  and  the  army.  But  the  Dolgoruki  and  Golitsin  families 
determined  to  change  the  order  of  succession,  and  accordingly 
in  1730  proclaimed  Empress  Anne  Ivanovna,  the  widowed 
Duchess  of  Courland  and  daughter  of  Ivan,  the  elder  brother 
of  Peter  the  Great.  A  document  was  drawn  up  which,  while 
introducing  important  constitutional  changes,  would  have  placed 
all  the  power  in  the  hands  of  the  greater  nobility.  Opposed  to 
the  Golitsin  and  the  two  Dolgoruki  were  the  Chancellor  Go- 
lovkin and  the  Vice-Chancellor  Ostermann,  who  favoured  the 
lesser  nobihty.  Had  she,  on  her  arrival  at  Moscow,  been 
forced  to  place  all  the  powers  of  state  in  the  hands  of  a  high 
council  composed  of  members  of  the  nobility,  Anne's  position 
would  have  been  similar  to  that  of  the  ruler  of  Sweden,  and  the 
fate  of  Russia  might  have  been  that  of  Poland.  On  February 
26  Anne  entered  Moscow,  and  on  March  8,  having  secured  the 

1  See  Appendix  D. 


The  North  and  East  of  Europe  1 1 5 

support  of  the  clergy  and  the  army,  and  being,  moreover, 
popular  with  the  nation,  she  successfully  carried  out  a  coup 
d'etat,  suppressing  the  council  of  nobles,  and  securing  her 
position  as  absolute  sovereign.  All  chance  of  the  establish- 
ment of  an  ohgarchical  republic  was  over,  and  the  autocratic 
rule  of  the  Tsars  was  resumed.  The  Dolgorukis  were  ruined, 
and  Anne  threw  herself  into  the  hands  of  German  favourites 
of  whom  the  Courlander  Biren  is  the  best  known.  Her  for- 
eign policy,  guided  by  Ostermann,  himself  the  son  of  a  West- 
phalian  clergyman,  was  a  continuance  and  expansion  of  that  of 
Catherine  i. 

While  the  Austrian  alliance  was  preserved  intact,  friendly 
relations  were  opened  with  Prussia,  and  a  treaty  of  commerce 
was  made  with  England  in  1732.  By  the  treaties  of  1726  and 
1732  the  foreign  poHcy  of  Peter  the  Great  was  completely 
reversed,  and  the  influence  of  France  at  St.  Petersburg  had 
received  a  palpable  check.  Fleury  cared  little  for  northern 
politics,  and  after  the  recall  of  Campredon  at  the  end  of  1726, 
a  secretary,  Magnan,  acted  as  charge  d'affaires.  Gradually, 
however,  a  party  headed  by  Marshal  Munich,  a  distinguished 
German  soldier,  was  formed  at  St.  Petersburg  opposed  to  the 
Austrian  aUiance  and  in  favour  of  a  renewal  of  the  French  con- 
nection. In  1732,  without  the  knowledge  of  the  Russian  min- 
ister, Munich  and  the  Tsarina  entered  upon  secret  negotiations 
with  France,  the  Tsarina  demanding  as  the  price  of  the  Rus- 
sian alliance  and  of  the  maintenance  of  Stanislas  in  Poland,  a 
free  hand  in  rectifying  the  PoHsh  frontier  to  the  advantage  of 
Russia,  a  recognition  of  Russian  sovereignty  over  Courland,^ 
and  the  assistance  of  French  influence  in  obtaining  from  the 
Turks  the  restoration  of  Azov.  Fleury  had  thus  before  him  the 
problem  which  throughout  the  century  puzzled  French  states- 
men.    France  was  again  offered  the  choice  of  an  alliance  with 

1  In  1727  Maurice  de  Saxe,  son  of  Augustus  n.  of  Saxony  and  Aurora 
de  Konigsmark,  was  expelled  by  the  Russians  from  Courland  when  he 
had  been  elected  Duke,  and  the  country,  though  under  Poland,  became 
dependent  on  Russia.     In  1737  Biren  was  made  Duke  of  Courland, 


Ii6  Etiropeaji  History^   ^7'^S~'^7^9 

Russia  or  the  continuance  of  her  ancient  pohcy  in  the  north 
and  east.  As  might  have  been  expected,  Fleury  was  unable  to 
decide  between  the  alternative  proposals.  He  refused  to  make 
any  definite  engagement.  The  negotiations  dragged  on,  with 
the  result  that  Russia  became  more  firmly  allied  than  ever  to 
Austria,  and  the  Polish  Succession  War  formed  an  admirable 
illustration  of  the  effects  of  the  procrastinating  and  uncertain 
policy  of  France  in  the  east. 

The  Courts  of  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  having  succeeded 
in  the  establishment  of  a  prince  of  their  choice  at  Warsaw  — 
Causes  of  the  first  act  in  the  enslavement  and  partition  of 
the  Turkish  Poland  —  there  was  nothing  after  the  conclusion 
of  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  in  1735  to  prevent  them 
from  carrying  out  the  second  portion  of  their  poHtical  schemes, 
an  attack  on  the  Sultan,  with  the  ultimate  intention  of  dis- 
membering his  empire.  Poland,  the  plank  along  which  Peter 
the  Great  had  hoped  to  march  against  the  Turks,  was  now  sub- 
missive, and  its  submission,  combined  with  the  difficulties  of 
the  Turks  in  Persia,  seemed  to  Anne  and  her  advisers  to  offer 
an  admirable  opportunity  for  wiping  out  the  disgrace  of  the 
Pruth  and  returning  to  the  policy  of  Peter  the  Great.  In 
attacking  Turkey,  Russia  could  rely  on  the  fulfilment  by 
Austria  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  1726.  During  the  late 
war  Russia,  by  occupying  Warsaw  and  Danzig,  and  by  taking 
upon  herself  the  task  of  repressing  all  hostile  movements  in 
Poland,  had  left  Austria  free  to  combat  her  enemies  on  the 
Rhine  and  in  Italy.  She  was  therefore  justified  in  expecting 
Austrian  co-operation  in  the  east, 

Charles  vi.  himself  was  by  no  means  opposed  to  the  idea  of 
a  Turkish  war,  and  the  whole  train  of  events  since  1648  tended 
to  impel  Austria  to  look  for  expansion  eastwards.  To  recom- 
pense herself  for  her  loss  of  power  and  influence  in  Germany 
in  the  years  following  the  Peace  of  Westphalia,  Austria,  by  the 
Peace  of  Utrecht  and  by  the  terms  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance, 
had  succeeded  in  securing  a  firm  hold  upon  Italy.  But  in 
1735  the  House  of  Bourbon  had  obtained  the  kingdom  of  the 


The  North  mid  East  of  Europe  1 1 7 

Two  Sicilies  and  the  Tuscan  ports,  while  the  young  kingdom  of 
Sardinia  had  also  asserted  its  claim  to  a  share  of  northern  Italy. 
A  Turkiih  war  seemed  to  Charles  vi.  to  afford  a  sure  means  for 
restoring  the  Austrian  prestige  and  securing  territorial  compen- 
sation for  losses  in  Europe  and  in  Italy.  The  Peace  of  Passaro- 
witz  had  left  Austria  in  a  position  well  adapted  for  a  further 
advance  down  the  Danube ;  and  Russia,  after  the  close  of  the 
PoHsh  Succession  War,  could,  in  1737,  rely  with  confidence 
upon  the  hearty  co-operation  of  Charles  vi.  Indirect  assistance 
might  be  expected  from  Xadir  Shah.  That  successful  advent- 
urer had  not  as  yet  made  peace  with  the  Turks,  and  in  1735  he 
assured  a  Russian  agent  at  Tiflis  that  he  would  never  act  against 
the  Tsarina.  Within  the  Turkish  empire  itself  Russia  could 
look  for  allies. 

Russian  emissaries  had,  in  the  time  of  Peter  the  Great,  been 
found  among  the  Bulgarians,  Servians,  and  Roumanians,  and 
when  in  1735  rumours  of  the  coming  war  reached  even  the 
distant  Montenegrins  and  Greeks,  all  the  subject  Christian  pop- 
ulation of  the  Turkish  empire  were  stirred  with  the  prospect  of 
freedom  from  their  oppressors.  Russian  appeals  to  the  patri- 
otic and  religious  aspirations  of  the  subject  races  in  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  continued  from  this  time  to  be  used  as  a  powerful 
and  successful  lever  in  every  attempt  to  dismember  the  Turkish 
empire. 

It  was  not  difficult  to  find  plausible  reasons  for  an  attack 
upon  Turkey.  The  Polish  troubles  had  merely  postponed  the 
war  which  had  been  arranged  on  the  accession  of  Anne  in 
1 730.  To  the  ambiguous  conduct  of  the  Porte  during  the 
Pohsh  Succession  War  Russia  had  taken  exception,  for  Turkey, 
outwardly  a  friendly  Power,  had  sent  munitions  of  war  to  the 
opponents  of  Augustus  iii. 

The  periodical  invasions  of  the  Tartars  across  the  frontiers 
of  the  Ukraine  furnished  in  itself  a  casus  belli  which,  in  default 
of  a  better  reason,  could  always  be  used  by  the  ruler  of  Russia. 
But  there  was  a  more  serious  dispute  with  regard  to  the  unset- 
tled claims  of  Russia  to  Daghestan  and  the  Kabartas  provinces 


Ii8  Europe  a7i  His  toy,   17 15- 1789 

situated  to  the  north  of  the  Caucasus.  During  the  war  with 
Nadir  Shah,  Tartar  troops  had  marched  through  these  Cauca- 
sian provinces,  and  coUisions  had  taken  place  with  the  Russian 
forces.  In  1735  Russia,  freed  from  the  PoHsh  war,  opposed 
the  march  of  a  large  Tartar  army  through  the  Caucasian  prov- 
inces to  Armenia,  attacked  the  Tartar  territory,  and  prepared 
for  the  outbreak  of  hostilities. 

Munich  was  made  commander-in-chief,  and  commands 
were  given  to  Lacy,  an  Irishman,  to  Lowendal,  a  Swede,  to 
Marshal  two  Scotsmcn,   Douglas  and  Leslie,   to  Brigny,   a 

Munich.  Frenchman,  and  to  Spiegel,  a  German.     Negotia- 

tions were  at  once  opened  with  Austria  to  secure  the  aid 
promised  in  1726.  Of  the  cosmopolitan  list  of  Russian 
generals,  ^Marshal  Munich  was  the  most  remarkable.  He 
was  an  excellent  example  of  the  eighteenth-century  adventurer. 
Born  a  German,  he  had  sensed  under  the  Austrian,  Polish, 
and  Russian  flags,  and  had  attracted  the  notice  of  Peter  the 
Great  by  his  military  qualities.  The  capture  of  Danzig  in  the 
Polish  Succession  War  had  added  to  his  reputation  as  a  good 
tactician  and  a  leader  of  men.  His  boldness,  amounting  often 
to  rashness,  endeared  him  to  his  soldiers,  who  had  the  fullest 
confidence  in  their  impetuous  giant  general.  With  a  thorough 
belief  in  his  own  powers,  he  ignored  all  difficulties,  and  was 
determined  to  succeed  where  Peter  the  Great  had  failed,  to 
cross  the  Danube  and  to  rouse  the  Bulgarians,  but  above  all 
to  capture  Azov. 

Azov,  situated  near  the  mouth  of  the  Don,  commanded  one 
of  the  river  routes  which  seemed  to  the  Muscovite  imagination 
to  be  the  pathway  of  Russia  to  the  Mediterranean.  Secured 
by  Peter  the  Great  in  1699,  Azov  had  been  lost  in  1711  ;  its 
recapture  was  one  of  the  dearest  wishes  of  the  Tsarina  Anne 
Ivanovna. 

During  the  winter  of  1735-36,  Munich  made  all  his  prep- 
arations, and  in  the  spring  of  1736  burst  suddenly  upon  the 
Crimea,  leaving  Lacy  to  besiege  Azov.  In  May  the  news  of 
the  Russian  invasion   reached   Constantinople,   and   war  was 


The  North  and  East  of  Europe  1 1 9 

declared  on  May  28,  the  very  day  on  which  Munich  stormed 
the  Unes  of  Perekop,  following  up  this  success  by  the  capture 
of  the  city  itself.  He  then  plunged  rashly  into  The  Open- 
the  heart  of  the  Crimea,  taking  the  rich  city  of  Turkish*^ 
Koslof  on  June  1 7.  Lacy  had  already  captured  War,  1736. 
Azov,  Kinburn  had  fallen  to  Leontiew,  and  the  warlike  Tartars 
of  the  Kuban  had  been  defeated.  The  invasion  of  the  Cri- 
mea proved  costly  to  the  Russians,  for  they  lost  by  disease 
and  privation  nearly  30,000  men,  and  after  destroying  libraries 
and  schools,  pubhc  buildings  and  monuments  of  antiquity,  and 
after  committing  atrocious  cruelties,  Munich  was  compelled  to 
evacuate  the  Crimea  on  August  25,  1736.  In  their  extremity 
the  Turks  appealed  to  Fleury,  the  Dutch,  and  Prince  Eugene 
as  President  of  the  Aulic  Council.  Austria  at  once  offered  its 
mediation,  and,  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the  famous  Pacha 
Bonneval,  a  French  renegade  of  considerable  astuteness,  who 
exercised  at  various  times  great  influence  in  the  Turkish  coun- 
cils, the  offer  was  accepted.  The  retirement  of  the  exhausted 
Russian  army  from  the  Crimea,  and  the  conclusion  of  peace 
with  Nadir  Shah  (September  1736)  had  placed  the  Porte  in 
a  more  hopeful  position ;  but  indecision  prevailed  in  the  coun- 
cils of  the  Sultan,  and  his  advisers  blindly  trusted  the  Austrian 
assurances.  They  were  soon  to  be  undeceived.  Austria  joins 
On  January  9,  1737,  a  secret  treaty  of  alliance  Russia,  1737. 
was  signed  between  Russia  and  Austria  confirming  the  engage- 
ments entered  into  in  1726.  By  this  treaty  Charles  vi.  agreed 
to  join  in  the  war  against  Turkey,  and  not  to  make  peace  with- 
out the  knowledge  of  his  ally.  Austria  continued  throughout  the 
year  1737  to  profess  anxiety  for  a  pacific  termination  of  the 
war,  and  a  congress  was  opened  at  Nimirof  in  Polish  Ukraine, 
and  sat  till  November  in  a  vain  endeavour  to  bring  about 
peace.  The  terms  demanded  by  Russia  and  Austria  would, 
if  granted,  have  destroyed  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  left  Con- 
stantinople defenceless,  and  the  Turks  acted  wisely  in  refusing 
to  discuss  them.  This  attempt  at  a  peaceful  settlement  did  not 
check  the  warlike  operations.     While  Lacy  ravaged  the  Crimea 


I20  Eitropeaii  History ^   1 71 5-1 789 

in  July,  Munich  in  August  besieged  and  took  Ochakov,  and  the 
Austrians  began  a  treacherous  attack  upon  Servia,  Bosnia,  and 
Wallachia.  In  this  campaign  the  Turks,  headed  by  a  new 
Grand  Vizier,  and  aided  by  the  advice  of  Bonneval,  retook 
Nissa  and  drove  the  Austrians  out  of  Bosnia. 

The  Turks  had  found  their  best  security  in  offering  a  firm 
resistance  to  their  enemies,  and  at  the  close  of  1736  Munich 
with  his  shattered  forces  had  been  compelled  to  withdraw  to 
the  Ukraine,  while  Seckendorf,  the  defeated  Austrian  general, 
was  recalled  and  imprisoned.  The  resistance  of  the  Turks 
astonished  Europe,  and  cut  short  the  numerous  prophecies  of 
the  impending  partition  and  ruin  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
With  the  rejection  of  the  extravagant  terms  of  peace,  a  sudden 
change  had  come  over  the  Turks.  Bonneval's  advice  was 
sought  and  followed,  Villeneuve's  council  was  taken.  A  new 
spirit  pervaded  all  classes,  and  the  Porte  resolved  not  to  enter- 
tain the  idea  of  opening  the  Black  Sea  to  Russian  ships. 

In  order  to  raise  Hungary  against  the  Emperor,  the  Sultan 
recognised  the  young  Joseph  Ragotsky  as  Prince  of  Transyl- 
vania and  ruler  of  Hungary.  The  year  1 738  saw  in  some 
respects  a  repetition  of  the  events  of  the  jprevious  year.  The 
new  Grand  Vizier,  Yegan  Mohammed  Pacha,  attacked  the 
Austrians  and  captured  Meadia  in  Hungary.  Though  the  Aus- 
trians, under  Konigsegg,  won  a  small  success  at  Kornia,  in 
July  the  Grand  Vizier  captured  Semendria,  and,  after  an  attack 
of  eighteen  days,  Orsova  on  August  15,  and  drove  back  the 
enemy  to  Belgrade.  Several  encounters  took  place  during  the 
year  between  the  Turks  and  Russians,  in  which  neither  side 
gained  any  signal  advantage,  and  Munich  retired  to  the  Ukraine 
in  the  autumn  without  having  accomplished  anything  of  impor- 
tance. Lacy  indeed  succeeded  in  again  invading  the  Crimea, 
but  failed  in  his  object  of  capturing  Kaffa,  the  strongest  place 
in  the  peninsula. 

Undeterred  by  the  failure  of  the  campaign  of  1738,  Munich 
was  strongly  in  favour  of  a  continuance  of  the  war,  confident 
that  Russia  could  succeed  in  her  designs  against  the  Ottoman 


The  North  and  East  of  Europe  1 2 1 

Empire.  Anticipating  the  schemes  of  Potemkin  and  Catherine 
II.,  he  laid  before  Anne  an  *  Oriental  project,'  which  implied 
the  rising  of  the  Greeks  against  the  Turks,  and  The  Cam- 
the  triumphal  march  of  the  Russians  to  Constan-  P^ign  of  1739. 
tinople  itself.  On  August  12,  1739,  he  entered  Moldavia  with 
largely  increased  forces,  defeated  a  Turkish  army  at  Khoczim 
on  August  18,  and  proclaimed  a  descendant  of  the  ancient 
rulers  of  the  province,  Prince  of  Moldavia.  But  before  he  was 
able  to  proceed  further  with  his  plans  for  the  dismemberment 
of  the  Turkish  empire  he  was  checked  by  the  news  of  the  Aus- 
trian disasters  and  the  opening  of  peace  negotiations.  Konigs- 
egg's  failure  in  1737  had  been  followed  by  his  disgrace,  and 
the  appointment  of  Count  Wallis  to  the  command  of  the  Aus- 
trian forces.  But  he  was  as  unsuccessful  as  both  of  his  prede- 
cessors. On  July  2  7  the  Austrian  army  was  totally  defeated  at 
the  battle  of  Crocyka,  and  the  Turks  followed  up  their  victory 
by  besieging  Belgrade. 

At  this  moment  negotiations  of  peace  were  resumed  under 
the  mediation  of  Villeneuve,  the  French  ambassador,  and  re- 
sulted in  a  briUiant  diplomatic  triumph  for  France.   _,     _   , 

^  The  Diplo- 

In  172S  Villeneuve  had  been  despatched  by  Fleury  macy  of 
to  Constantinople,  charged  to  procure  the  re-estab-  "^'^^^"^"^«- 
lishment  of  the  French  privileges  unth  regard  to  religion  and 
commerce,  and  generally  to  restore  French  credit,  which  had 
suffered  owing  to  the  rapprocheme?it  of  the  Turkish  and  Rus- 
sian Courts.  With  the  opening  of  the  Russo-Turkish  war,  fol- 
lowed by  the  rapid  successes  of  Munich  and  Lacy,  European 
interests  in  the  Levant  seemed  likely  to  be  affected.  The 
Tsarina  had  made  no  secret  of  her  intention  of  securing  the 
right  of  navigation  from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  Mediterranean 
both  for  ships  of  war  and  for  merchantmen.  The  French  sus- 
ceptibiUties  were  at  once  aroused,  and  Villeneuve  was  instructed 
to  oppose  such  demands  by  every  means  in  his  power.  The 
Court  of  Vienna  refused  to  see  that  the  extension  of  Russian 
influence  over  the  Turkish  empire  was  detrimental  to  the  inter- 
ests of  Austria  in  the  east.     It  was  not,  however,  till  July  i  737 


122  Etcropean  History,   171 5-1789 

that  the  Turks,  in  face  of  the  conditions  of  peace  offered  by 
Russia  and  Austria  at  the  Congress  of  Nimirof,  demanded  the 
mediation  of  France.  In  spite  of  the  fall  of  Chauvelin,  the 
Court  of  Versailles  acted  with  vigour,  and  accepted  the  rol^  of 
mediator,  though  it  remained  as  determined  as  ever  to  strengthen 
the  opposition  of  the  Turks  to  the  opening  of  the  Black  Sea  to 
Russian  ships. 

The  close  of  1737  found  the  Turks  triumphant  at  their 
successes  over  the  Austrians.  Villeneuve's  duty  was  to  urge 
moderation  and  the  necessity  of  making  peace.  But  the 
Grand  Vizier  felt  that  his  reputation  depended  upon  a  con- 
tinuance of  the  war,  and  Bonneval  was  equally  anxious  to 
continue  the  struggle.  He  hoped  to  raise  Hungary  against 
Austria,  and  to  defeat  the  Emperor  by  means  of  his  own 
subjects.  The  quarrel  between  the  Grand  Vizier  and  Bonneval 
made  the  former  more  willing  to  listen  to  the  advice  of 
Villeneuve,  while  the  Court  of  Vienna  became  more  and 
more  anxious  to  bring  the  war  to  an  end.  Fleury  felt  no 
hostility  to  Austria,  and  did  not  regard  the  interests  of  France 
and  Austria  as  irreconcilable.  Charles  vi.,  astonished  at  the 
Turkish  resistance,  anxious  about  the  Pragmatic  Sanction,  and 
in  want  of  money,  was  extremely  desirous  of  peace.  The 
campaign  of  1738  had  cut  short  all  possibility  of  negotiation, 
and  at  the  close  of  the  year  peace  seemed  to  be  indefinitely 
postponed.  Even  if  Austria  consented  to  treat,  Russia  might 
prolong  the  war,  and  Turkey,  unable  to  force  the  Tsarina  to 
conclude  peace,  might  eventually  be  induced  to  concede  to 
the  Russian  terms.  What  the  Ottoman  arms,  however,  could 
not  produce  was  accompHshed  by  French  diplomacy.  Though 
the  Russians  might  remain  unaffected  even  by  Turkish  suc- 
cesses, the  French  could  influence  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg 
by  means  of  the  Swedes.  No  deserts  separated  Sweden  from 
Russia.  The  Swedes,  masters  of  Finland,  were  within  a 
few  days'  march  from  St.  Petersburg,  and  to  Sweden  the 
fate  of  Poland  and  Turkey  was  a  matter  of  considerable  impor- 
tance. 


The  North  a7id  East  of  Europe  123 

Since  the  revolution  of  1720  and  the  Peace  of  Nystad, 
Sweden  had  been  in  a  state  of  semi-anarchy,  due  in  great 
measure  to  her  constitution.  Nominally  liberal  ^^^  Politic  1 
and  anti-monarchical,  the  constitution  in  reality  condition  of 
was  in  favour  of  government  by  the  aristocracy.  ^^ 
The  whole  power  was  theoretically  vested  not  in  the  Crown 
or  Senate,  but  in  the  Diet,  consisting  of  four  orders  —  the 
nobles,  the  clergy,  the  citizens,  and  the  peasants.  Each  order 
or  estate  sat  and  deliberated  apart,  and  as  a  natural  con- 
sequence, the  work  of  legislation  was  rendered  exceedingly 
difficult.  The  Government,  however,  soon  lost  its  democratic 
character  and  became  an  oligarchy.  During  the  session  of 
the  Diet  the  supreme  executive,  judicial,  and  legislative  power 
was  in  the  hands  of  a  secret  committee  composed  of  fifty 
nobles,  twenty-five  clergy,  and  tw^enty-five  citizens.  During 
the  parUamentary  recess  and  on  the  dissolution  of  the  Diet, 
the  executive  power  was  wielded  by  the  Senate,  which  was 
itself  dependent  on  the  popular  assembly.  At  first,  however, 
the  disastrous  effects  of  the  constitution  of  1720  did  not  show 
themselves.  The  leader  of  the  nobility  and  chancellor,  Count 
Arvid  Horn,  who  was  distinguished  as  a  soldier  and  as  a 
statesman,  governed  wisely,  and  gave  his  country  a  period  of 
twenty  years'  peace,  during  which  the  work  of  restoration 
proceeded  apace.  He  dehberately  made  no  attempt  to  keep 
up  the  French  connection,  but  maintained  peaceful  relations 
with  Russia  and  a  friendly  connection  with  England.  Like 
Fleury  and  Walpole,  the  cautious  Horn  found  himself  in  the 
course  of  years  confronted  by  an  opposition  jealous  of  his 
powder  and  bent  on  a  more  vigorous  foreign  policy.  The 
leader  of  this  opposition  was  Count  Gyllenborg,  the  member 
of  a  new  family,  and  he  was  supported  by  Count  Tessin 
and  other  representatives  of  the  younger  generation.  Like 
Belleisle,  Gyllenborg  was  vain,  was  anxious  for  war,  and  was 
determined  to  exchange  the  cautious  policy  of  the  Government 
for  one  more  adventurous,  and  better  calculated  to  restore  Swe- 
den to  her  former  position.     He  and  his  followers  therefore 


124  Etiropcaii  History^    17 15-1789 

inveighed  against  Horn's  peaceful  attitude,  declared  that  the 
disgraceful  Treaty  of  Nystad  must  be  v/iped  out,  and  openly 
favoured  a  French  alliance. 

Nicknaming  their  opponents  the  Night- Caps,  or  Caps,  and 
taking  themselves  the  title  of  Hats,  the  party  headed  by  Gyl- 
lenborg,  supported  by  French  gold,  definitely  attacked  Horn 
and  his  supporters  in  the  Diet  of  1738. 

This  Diet  marks  an  epoch  in  Swedish  history.  The  war 
between  Russia  and  Turkey  was  at  its  height.  France, 
The  Diet  of  alarmed  at  the  Russian  successes  and  fearful  of 
the  French  ^^X  Jricrcasc  of  Russian  influence,  was  anxious 
Alliance.  to  iuducc  the  Tsariua  to  make  peace.  The 
divisions  and  dissensions  in  Sweden  gave  her  the  desired 
opportunity,  and  before  many  months  were  over  her  influence 
was  paramount  in  Stockholm,  and  Russia,  threatened  by  an 
attack  from  Sweden,  consented  to  make  peace  with  Turkey. 
Where  the  Ottoman  arms  had  failed  French  diplomacy  suc- 
ceeded. The  Swedish  nobles  were  poor,  and  venality  and 
corruption  were  rampant  in  Sweden,  where  the  saying  that 
every  man  had  his  price  was  almost  literally  true.  Of  700 
members  of  the  Diet  only  100  refused  to  be  bribed.  Foreign 
ministers  were  not  slow  in  finding  out  this  weakness  of  the 
Swedish  Government,  and  in  1738  France  succeeded  in  prac- 
tically buying  the  votes  of  the  majority  of  the  Diet,  in  bringing 
about  a  ministerial  revolution,  and  in  placing  Count  Gyllenborg 
at  the  head  of  the  administration.  The  author  of  this  coup 
d'etat  was  the  French  ambassador,  Saint-Severin,  who  showed 
consummate  skill  in  the  delicate  task  of  bribing  the  Swedish 
deputies.  He  succeeded  in  procuring  the  election  of  Count 
Tessin  to  the  office  of  Land-Marshal  or  Marshal  of  the  Diet, 
among  whose  duties  was  that  of  presiding  over  the  secret  com- 
mittee ;  he  gained  also  the  leader  of  the  order  of  peasants,  he 
procured  the  practical  exclusion  of  the  Caps  from  the  secret 
committee,  and  a  treaty  was  signed  with  France  in  October 

1738. 

In  return  for  a  close  alliance,  and  as  long  as  Swedish  foreign 


TJie  NortJi  and  East  of  Europe  125 

policy  was  directed  from  Paris,  France  agreed  to  pay  an 
annual  sum  of  300,000  crowns  to  Sweden  for  the  rehabilitation 
of  her  army  and  navy.  Sweden  was  gained,  and  the  influence 
of  Russia  and  England  had  been  checked.  Horn  retired, 
Gyllenborg  became  Chancellor,  Tessin  ambassador  at  Paris, 
and  the  Hats  were  supreme. 

At  Versailles  the  party  of  action  urged  the  necessity  of 
hurling  the  Swedes  against  St.  Petersburg,  while  at  Stockholm 
the  triumphant  Hats  sent  to  Constantinople  proposals  for  a 
league  between  Sweden  and  Turkey. 

The  beginning  of  the  year  1739  found  the  Russian  Court 
profoundly  suspicious  of  the  intentions  of  Sweden ;  and  the 
murder,  by  the  orders  of  Biren,  of  Major  Malcolm    ;, 

'      -'  '  •'  Austria 

Sinclair,  an  officer  in  the  Swedish  army,  on  his  way  deserts 
back  from  Constantinople  to  Sweden,  was  at  once  ^"^^'^• 
the  effect  of  these  suspicions,  and  the  cause  of  anti-Russian 
demonstrations  in  Sweden,  and  of  Swedish  preparations  for 
war.  Hoping  to  bring  Turkey  to  terms  before  Sweden  could 
place  an  army  in  the  field,  the  two  imperial  Courts  began  their 
third  campaign  against  the  Porte.  But  though  the  audacious 
plan  of  Munich  was  partly  successful,  the  Austrians  failed,  and 
the  possibilities  of  peace  were  increased  by  the  fall  of  the  Grand 
Vizier  and  the  appointment  of  Elviaz-Mohammed,  a  man  of  less 
obstinate  character.  The  Austrian  defeat  at  Crocyka,  and  the 
failure  of  the  Turkish  attack  on  Belgrade,  rendered  both  com- 
batants anxious  for  peace,  and  Charles  vi.  consented  to  sepa- 
rate his  cause  from  that  of  the  Tsarina.  Villeneuve's  mediation 
was  demanded,  and  after  long  negotiations  the  Peace  of  Bel- 
grade was  agreed  to  by  Austria  and  the  Porte  on  September  i. 
The  news  of  the  conclusion  of  peace  with  the  Turks,  and 
of  the  brilliant  victory  of  Munich  at  Stavoretchani  or  Khoten, 
reached  Vienna  almost  simultaneously.  Charles  vi.  was  over- 
whelmed with  grief  at  having  agreed  to  so  disastrous  a  peace 
with  Turkey.  The  second  portion  of  Villeneuve's  task  was 
to  persuade  the  Russians  in  the  midst  of  their  triumphant 
course  to  make  peace.     In  what  seemed  a  well-nigh  hopeless 


120  European  History^   171 5-1 789 

task  several  circumstances  unexpectedly  aided  him.  The  de- 
termination of  the  Swedes  to  attack  Russia  at  the  end  of  the 
Th   p  y^^^^  ^^^^  undoubted,  while  a  plot,  headed  by  the 

Belgrade,  DolgOFukis  and  GoHtsius,  for  the  dethronement  of 
ept.  1739-  Anne,  bore  witness  to  the  existence  of  grave  discon- 
tent within  the  empire  itself  The  signature  of  peace  by  Austria 
was  an  additional  blow  to  Russian  hopes ;  and,  abandoned  by 
her  ally,  isolated  in  Europe,  and  threatened  by  a  Swedish 
attack,  the  Tsarina,  on  September  18,  accepted  the  mediation 
of  Villeneuve  and  the  terms  proposed  by  him. 

By  the  treaty  signed  by  Charles  vi.  Austria  yafced,  with 
Belgrade  and  Orsova,  all  Servia  and  Bosnia  taken  in  1718,  and 
the  Danube  and  Save  became  the  boundaries  of  the  two  empires. 
North  of  the  Danube,  Austria  lost  her  holding  in  Wallachia,  but 
kept  the  Banat  of  Temesvar.  In  the  history  of  Austrian  advance 
eastwards  the  Peace  of  Belgrade  was  a  disastrous  check  to  the 
policy  so  persistently  advocated  by  Eugene. 

In  her  treaty  with  Turkey,  Russia  obtained  few  advantages. 
Azov  was  handed  over  to  her,  but  its  fortifications  were  to  be 
destroyed  ;  the  Russian  troops  were  to  retire  from  the  Crimea ; 
Moldavia,  Crocyka,  Ochakov  and  Kinburn,  with  a  strip  of 
territory  between  the  Boug  and  Dnieper,  was  given  her,  but  no 
Russian  ships  were  to  be  allowed  on  the  Black  Sea. 

Peace   made   between  Russia  and  Turkey,   the    position  of 

Sweden  became  one  of  extreme  difficulty.     Her  Government 

had  relied  on  the  co-operation  of  Turkey,  and  now 

Success  of  ^  -' ' 

French  found  itsclf  cxposcd  to  the  vengeance  of  the  ex- 

ip  omacy.  asperated  and  disappointed  Muscovites.  All  the 
skill  and  energy  of  Villeneuve  were  required  to  save  Sweden 
from  the  impending  attack.  After  the  expenditure  of  infinite 
tact  he  succeeded.  On  July  17,  1740,  a  treaty  of  alliance 
between  Turkey  and  Sweden  was  signed,  and  Sweden  was  for 
the  moment  safe.  By  the  treaty  of  Belgrade  between  Austria 
and  Turkey,  Russia  had  been  checked  in  her  advance  to  Con- 
stantinople ;  by  the  treaty  between  Sweden  and  Turkey  a  barrier 
was  placed  in  the  way  of  Russian  revenge  at  the  expense  of 


TJie  Xorth  and  East  of  Europe  127 

^weden.  The  Peace  of  Belgrade  was  'the  chef-d'odiivre  of 
^ench  diplomacy '  in  the  eighteenth  century,  and  increased 
pi§stige  of  the  earlier  years  of  Louis  xv.  France  had 
darkly  contributed  to  the  safety  of  her  old  ally  Turkey,  and 
that  \Po\ver  had  shown  unexpected  vitality  and  vigour  during 
the  war.  As  a  reward  for  her  successful  efforts,  Turkey  was  to 
enjoy  thirty  years  of  peace.  Recognising  its  debt  to  France, 
the  Turkish  Government  consolidated  and  extended,  by  capitu- 
lations signed  on  May  28,  1740,  the  religious  and  commercial 
privileges  hitherto  accorded  to  Frenchmen  in  the  east,  and  thus 
the  objects  for  which  Villeneuve  had  come  to  Constantinople 
in  1728  were  attained.  As  the  influence  of  France  on  the 
shores  of  the  Bosphorus  grew,  that  of  Russia  and  Austria  de- 
clined. France  reaped  a  further  advantage  from  her  successful 
diplomacy.  The  close  union  between  Russia  and  Austria  was 
shaken.  The  Court  of  Vienna  declared  that  it  had  been  de- 
serted by  Russia,  and  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  complained 
of  the  conduct  of  Austria  in  making  a  separate  peace.  Though 
the  Imperial  Courts  proclaimed  the  continuance  of  their  alliance, 
each  endeavoured  to  make  a  treaty  with  France.  A  secret  treaty 
had  already  been  made  between  Austria  and  France  in  January 
1739,  relative  to  the  Jiilich-Berg  succession,  while  between 
Fleury  and  Bartenstein  a  correspondence  sprang  up  which,  if 
Charles  vi.  had  not  died  the  following  year,  might  have  recon- 
ciled Austria  and  France,  and  anticipated  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
of  1 756.  In  Russia  too  French  influences  tended  to  assert  them- 
selves. Munich,  the  hero  of  the  last  war,  had  always  been  an 
advocate  of  a  French  connection,  and  he  headed  the  French 
party  in  St.  Petersburg.  Prince  Cantemir  came  as  Russian  envoy 
to  Paris,  and  a  French  ambassador,  La  Ch^tardie,  was  sent  to 
the  Russian  capital.  Fleury  had  succeeded  beyond  his  expec- 
tations in  his  role  of  mediator,  and  France  occupied  in  1740  a 
position  in  Europe  which  she  was  not  again  to  hold  till  the  wars 
of  the  French  Revolution. 


.¥ 


^ 


CHAPTER   VI 

PRUSSIA  AND  THE  WAR  OF  THE  AUSTRIAN  SUCCESSION 

1 740-1 742 

The  Accession  of  Frederick  the  Great  —  The  Reforms  of  Frederick  William  I. 

—  Foreign  Policy  of  Frederick  William  I.  —  The  Salzburg  Protestants  — 
The  Youth  of  Frederick  the  Great  —  Rivalry  of  Austria  and  Prussia  — 
Frederick  the  Great's  Character  —  Frederick  the  Great  and  Louis  XIV. — 
The  Death  of  Charles  VI.  —  The  year  1740  a  Landmark  in  German  History 

—  The  years  1740-63  in  America,  India,  and  the  West  Indies  —  The 
Immediate  Causes  of  the  Invasion  of  Silesia  —  Maria  Theresa  and  her 
Ministers — Fleury's  Attitude  —  Decisive  Action  of  Frederick  the  Great  — 
The  Invasion  of  Silesia — Molhvitz  and  its  Results  —  Fleury's  Policy — The 
French  ally  with  Prussia  and  invade  Germany  —  A  Revolution  in  Russia 
places  Elizabeth  on  the  Throne  —  Maria  Theresa  in  Hungary  — The  Treaty 
of  Klein-Schnellendorf — The  Election  of  Charles  Albert  to  the  Imperial 
Throne  —  Frederick's  Invasion  of  Moravia — Carteret's  Foreign  Policy  — 
The  Failure  of  French  Policy  in  Russia.  The  Peace  of  Abo  —  The  Pre- 
liminaries of  Breslau  and  the  Treaty  of  Berlin. 

On  May  31,  1740,  Frederick  the  Great  succeeded  his  father, 
Frederick  WilUam  i.,  on  the  Prussian  throne.  Born  on  January 
TheAcces-  24,  1713,  he  was  tweuty-seven  years  old  when  he 
Frederick  became  king.  Of  his  character  httle  was  known, 
the  Great.  His  father's  despotic  and  brutal  regi7ne  had  com- 
pelled Frederick  to  turn  his  attention  to  literature  and  music, 
and  during  the  whole  of  his  reign  he  delighted  in  the  com- 
pany of  literary  men.  His  first  acts  showed  a  liberal  spirit. 
The  declaration  of  freedom  of  the  Press,  abohtion  of  legal 
torture,  and  religious  toleration,  was  followed  by  the  disband- 
ment  of  the  regiment  of  Potsdam  Guards,  and  by  a  distribution 
of  com  at  low  rates  to  the  poor  of  certain  famine-stricken 
districts.     In  the   autumn   his   A7iti-Machiavel  was  published 

128 


TJie    War  of  the  Austrian  Succession  129 

anonymously.  Before  many  months  were  over  it  was  seen  that 
Frederick  was  possessed  of  business-Hke  qualities,  that  he  was 
keenly  interested  in  poHtical  and  military  affairs,  and  that  he 
intended  that  the  government  should  be  more  centred  in  him- 
self than  it  had  been  in  his  father.  Frederick  William  i.  had 
ruled  with  a  strong  hand ;  Frederick  the  Great  intended  that 
his  power  should  be  every  whit  as  strong.  No  alteration  was 
made  in  the  fabric  of  government,  which  was  admirably  suited 
to  a  country  like  Prussia.  Frederick  William  i.  The  Reforms 
had  carried  out  many  essential  reforms,  which  re-  of  Frederick 
fleet  great  credit  on  his  business-Hke  qualities,  his  ^  '^"^ 
indomitable  will,  and  his  keen  sense  of  what  was  to  the 
advantage  of  his  country. 

The  Privy  Council,  which  stood  at  the  head  of  the  Prussian 
administrative  system,  had  been  reorganised  by  Joachim  Fred- 
erick, and  further  reformed  by  the  great  Elector,  who  made  it  a 
national  advisory  board,  the  governors  of  the  different  territo- 
ries having  seats  in  it.  Under  Frederick  William  i.  the  Privy 
Council,  while  remaining  first  in  dignity  and  importance,  was 
found,  like  the  EngUsh  Privy  Council  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury, too  large  for  its  new  duties ;  and,  accordingly,  a  small 
body  similar  to  the  English  Cabinet  was  formed  within  it,  the 
members  of  which,  in  close  touch  with  the  king,  supervised 
finance,  foreign  affairs,  and  war  and  justice.  Of  these  depart- 
ments those  of  finance  and  justice  had  subordinate  chambers 
or  councils  throughout  the  country.  Under  the  minister  of 
finances  came  the  general  directory  of  finance,  war,  and  domains 
(General  -  ober  -  Finanz  -  Kriegs  -  und  -  Domainen  -  Directorium), 
which  had  been  formed  in  1722  by  the  union  of  the  war  direc- 
tory and  finance  commissions,  which  had  hitherto  been  treated 
separately,  each  having  its  own  accounts,  oiificers,  and  revenues. 
This  general  directory  became  at  once  the  most  important 
department  in  the  state  ;  and  with  the  king  as  president,  five 
ministers,  a  number  of  councillors — each  section  of  whom  had 
special  duties  and  responsibihties  —  and  an  elaborate  code  of 
instructions,  the  Prussian  administrative  system  became  at  once 

PERIOD  VI.  I 


130  Enrofean  Hist07y^   171 5-1 789 

siaiplified  an.l  improved.  Under  it  worked  the  Provincial 
Chambers  for  war  and  domains  (Kriegs-und-Domainen-Kam- 
mern),  and  under  them  were  arranged  the  county  and  town 
organisations.  The  landraths  and  the  burgomasters  were  prac- 
tically royal  officials ;  the  town  councils  had  little  real  power ; 
the  royal  will  was  felt  throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  the 
land.  The  king's  authority  was  equally  felt  in  the  matter  of 
justice.  Above  the  manorial  and  city  courts  came  the  provin- 
cial courts,  and  from  these  lay  an  appeal  to  the  judicial  depart- 
ment of  the  Privy  Council.^ 

With  infinite  trouble  Frederick  WiUiam  had  organised  a  sys- 
tem of  government  pecuhar  to  Prussia,  and  dependent  on  the  will 
and  intelligence  of  a  single  man,  which  may  be  characterised 
as  one  of  the  most  successful  and  best  administered  despotisms 
of  the  eighteenth  century.  Owing  to  her  geographical  position 
Prussia  was  forced  to  keep  up  a  large  army,  and  her  govern- 
ment assumed  a  military  character.  Since  the  days  of  the  great 
Elector  a  strong  centralised  state  had  been  gradually  formed 
by  means  of  a  military  despotism,  and  Frederick  William  i. 
had  wisely  created  an  army  which  was  henceforth  to  play  so 
important  a  part  in  European  history.  The  northern  war  of 
1 718-2 1  had  shown  him  the  necessity  of  a  powerful  force  capa- 
ble of  defending  Prussia  against  all  attacks.  In  characteristic 
fashion  he  formed  an  admirable  army,  and  before  his  death, 
while  the  peace  establishment  of  England  was  17,000  men,  that 
of  Prussia  was  80,000  men.  This  large  army  was  not  only  a 
great  and  increasing  burden  to  the  people,  it  created  and  en- 
sured the  absolute  power  of  the  government.  Most  of  the 
public  revenues  were  devoted  to  its  maintenance,  and  Fred- 
crick  the  Great  not  only  found  on  his  accession  a  well-drilled 
army  but  also  a  treasure  of  twenty-six  millions.  Frederick 
WiUiam  i.  \\\\  created  a  remarkable  army  and  a  new  form  of 
government,  which  rested,  like  Napoleon's  government,  entirely 
on  the  army,  and  drew  from  it  unlimited  power. 

To  Frederick  William  belongs  the  credit  of  having  formed 
1  See  Appendix  B. 


TJie  War  of  the  Austrian  Siiccession  131 

an  efficient  administrative  system,  which  was  admirably 
adapted  for  the  Prussia  of  his  day.  Out  of  existing  materials 
and  systems  he  had  slowly,  laboriously,  and  cautiously  carried 
out  a  series  of  skilfully  organised  administrative  reforms  which 
enabled  Prussia  to  bear  the  weight  of  her  enormous  army  and  to 
hold  her  own  against  a  European  coalition.  Frederick  William 
not  only  bequeathed  to  his  son  the  most  complete  despotism 
to  be  found  in  Europe,  —  he  left  behind  him  the  Foreign 
traditions  of  a    foreign  poHcy  which,  successfully   predYricl 

I     carried  out,  has  placed  Prussia  among  the  leading;   Wiiuam. 

JM  European  Powers.     Though  himself  knowing  little  of  foreign 

j^  politics  or  diplomacy,  and  though  neither  the  Treaty  of 
Wiisterhausen   nor  •  the    Polish    Succession    War    had    raised 

►^  Prussia  in  the  estimation  of  Europe,  he  had  gained  valuable 
territorial  acquisitions  from  Sweden  after  the  death  of 
Charles  xii.,  and  he  had  struggled  hard  to  secure  the 
eventual  succession  to  Berg  and  the  seigniory  of  Ravenstein. 
Though  the  rising  Prussian  state  was  regarded  with  envy, 
and  opposed  and  hampered  on  every  possible  occasion  by 
Austria   and    Hanover,  the  latter   still   aspiring   to   a   leading 

"  position  among  the  provinces  of  the  empire,  Frederick  William 
remained,  for  the  greater  part  of  his  life,  imbued  with  a  strong 
sense  of  German  patriotism.  It  was  only  shortly  before  his 
death  that  he  realised  that  Prussia  had  as  yet  little  influence 
in  the  councils  of  Europe,  and  that  Charles  vi.  had  outwitted 
him  in  the  affair  of  Berg.  But  though  his  diplomacy  proved  a 
failure,  he  had  in  various  ways  placed  Prussia  in  a  position 
which  would  enable  her  to  make  her  influence  felt.  Not  only 
had  he  formed  one  of  the  best  armies  in  Europe,  he  had 
taken  every  opportunity  for  introducing  colonists  of  various 
nations  into  Prussia.  In  1731  a  cruel  persecution,  xheSaizburg 
instituted  by  Archbishop  Firmian  of  Salzburg,  was  Protestants, 
followed  by  the  flight  of  thousands  of  Protestants  from  the 
country.  Frederick  William  had  early  interested  himself  on 
behalf  of  the  Salzburg  Lutherans,  whose  complaints  the  Im- 
perial Diet,  with  characteristic  callousness,  treated  with  con- 


132  European  History y   171 5-1 789 

tempt.  His  threats  and  appeals  roused  even  some  Catholic 
princes,  and  while  the  archbishop  was  compelled  to  modify 
his  policy,  some  15,000  Salzbiirgers  were  welcomed  by  the  far- 
sighted  king,  and  settled  in  the  towns  and  agricultural  districts 
of  the  former  duchy  of  Prussia  (Preussen).  The  Salzburg 
Pilgrimage  has  been  immortaUsed  by  Goethe  in  his  poem  of 
Hermann  attd  Dorothea;  the  repeopling  of  Prussia  by  the 
peasants  and  artisans,  distinguished  by  intelligence,  thrift,  and 
industry,  is  not  the  least  of  Frederick  William's  acts,  which, 
like  the  welcome  given  to  the  Huguenots  by  the  great  Elector, 
has  placed  the  present  German  empire  under  a  debt  of  grati- 
tude to  the  father  of  Frederick  the  Great. 

The  social  and  domestic  relations  of  the  great  Prussian  re- 
former are  not  pleasant  reading.     His  wife,  Sophia  Dorothea, 
bore  him  fourteen  children,  of  whom  ten  lived  to 

The  Youth 

of  Frederick  mature  ycars.  The  eldest,  Wilhelmma,  whose 
the  Great.  mcmoirs  give  a  vivid  account  of  Frederick  the 
Great's  childhood,  married  the  Marquess  of  Bayreuth ;  and  of 
her  four  sisters,  Louisa  married  the  Marquess  of  Anspach, 
Charlotte  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  Maria  the  Marquess  of 
Schwedt,  and  Ulrica  became  Queen  of  Sweden  and  mother  of 
Gustavus  III.  Frederick  the  Great,  who  was  two  and  a  half 
years  younger  than  Wilhelmina,  was  born  on  January  24,  1712, 
his  brothers  being  Augustus  William,  the  father  of  Frederick 
William  11.,  Henry,  and  Augustus  Ferdinand.  Frederick 
William  conceived  an  intense  dislike  of  his  eldest  son,  and 
on  one  celebrated  occasion  the  young  Frederick  narrowly  es- 
caped the  fate  of  Alexis,  son  of  Peter  the  Great.  At  length, 
after  going  through  an  apprenticeship  in  the  Prussian  civil 
service,  Frederick  was  restored  to  favour,  and  in  1732  was 
betrothed  to  Princess  Elizabeth  of  Brunswick-Bevern.  He 
served  in  the  Rhine  campaign  during  the  War  of  the  PoHsh 
Succession,  and  \\atnessed  the  last  operations  of  Prince  Eugene, 
then  seventy-three  years  old,  '  an  old  hero  gone  to  a  shadow  of 
himself.'  It  is  quite  possible  that  if  Frederick  had  been  in 
command  on  the  Rhine,  a  successful  attempt  would  have  been 


TJie    War  of  the  An  stria  Ji  Succession  133 

made  to  relieve  Philipsburg.  But  Eugene  was  rendered 
cautious  by  age  ;  having  little  confidence  in  his  army,  com- 
posed of  contingents  fi-om  various  states,  he  was  unwilling 
to  run  any  risks,  and  with  the  fall  of  Philipsburg  the  first 
campaign  of  the  Crown  Prince  lost  all  its  interest.  From 
the  end  of  17  "^4  to  1740  Frederick  pursued  peace- 

•  J  u-  ir  1  V  Rivalryof 

ful  avocations,  devotmg  hmiself  mamly  to  litera-  Austria 
ture  ;  while  his  father  found  himself  at  the  end  ^"'^  Prussia, 
of  his  days  the  dupe  of  Charles  vi.  in  the  Berg  affair,  and  in 
173S  confronted  by  a  coaHtion  which  included  England, 
France,  Holland,  and  Austria  to  prevent  the  seizure  of  the 
duchies  of  JliHch  and  Berg  by  Prussian  arms.  On  his  death 
Frederick  William  bequeathed  to  his  successor  not  only  the 
duty  of  avenging  the  double-dealing  of  Austria,  and  of  defeat- 
ing the  consistent  endeavours  of  Hanover  to  oust  Prussia  from 
her  leading  position  in  north  Germany,  but  also  the  task  of 
utihsing  the  magnificent  Prussian  army  for  the  extension  and 
consoHdation  of  the  territories^f  the  rising  state. 

Prussia  owes  its  greatness^  10  Frederick  William  i. ;  it  was 
left  to  Frederick  the  Great  to  develop  his  father's  work,  to 
streno;then  the  boundaries  of  his  kingdom,  and  to   ^    ,    .  , 

°  "^  '  Fredenck 

place  Prussia  in  the  first  rank  of  European  nations,  the  Great's 
This  revolution  in  the  European  states-system  was  ^^''^'^^er. 
not  eftected  till  1 763,  after  Europe  had  experienced  two 
mighty  wars.  Frederick  the  Great  occupies  a  very  prominent 
position  in  the  history  of  the  eighteenth  century.  The  impor- 
tance of  his  reign  is  due  to  the  revolution  in  international 
politics  in  which  he  took  a  prominent  part,  as  well  as  to  his 
administrative  qualities,  his  statesmanship,  his  military  talents, 
and  his  courage  under  misfortunes.  His  personal  character 
presents  few  pleasant  traits.  The  brutal  and  suspicious  treat- 
ment of  his  father  had  soured  and  hardened  a  nature  naturally 
gentle  and  high-minded,  and  as  he  grew  older  he  became 
more  and  more  hard,  selfish,  cynical,  and  sarcastic.  But  when 
he  chose  he  could  always  exercise  a  great  influence  on  those 
around  him  by  his  charm  of  manner,  and  his  conversational 


i34  European  History^   171 5-1 789 

talents  ;  while  with  his  subjects,  and  especially  with  his  soldiers, 
he  was,  during  most  of  his  reign,  exceedingly  popular.  As  a 
ruler  he  was  essentially  an  opportunist,  and  a  most  successful 
one.  Like  Hyder  Ali,  whom  he  resembled  in  many  respects, 
he  preserved  all  his  faculties  to  the  very  last,  and  died  in  a 
ripe  and  vigorous  old  age.  Like  George  in.  he  was  indus- 
trious, and  capable  of  attending  to  the  smallest  details.  UnHke 
George  he  could  originate  and  carry  out  the  most  extensive 
Frederick  the  P^^^j^^^s.  He  resembled  Louis  XIV.  in  the  way  in 
Great  and  which  he  identified  himself  with  the  welfare  of  his 
country.  Till  within  a  few  years  of  the  end  of  his 
reign  there  is  no  doubt  that  Louis'  despotism  was  popular  and 
well  adapted  for  keeping  order  at  home,  and  for  carrying  out 
ambitious  schemes  of  foreign  conquest.  Similarly  it  is  certain 
that  the  Prussian  system  of  government,  tyrannical  as  in  many 
respects  it  was,  was  the  only  one  under  which  Frederick  the 
Great  could  have  guided  his  country  safely  through  the  storms 
of  the  Austrian  Succession  and  the  Seven  Years'  War.  His 
absolutism  was  as  complete  as  that  of  Louis,  but  it  differed  from 
it  in  many  essential  particulars. 

In  both  France  and  Prussia  popular  rights  were  practically 
non-existent ;  in  both  countries  the  nobles  and  clergy  were 
powerless  to  check  the  crown.  But  while  the  French  nobility, 
with  little  or  no  share  in  the  government  of  the  country,  were 
reduced  to  practical  impotence  by  Louis  xiv.,  the  Prussian 
nobles,  in  spite  of  the  diminution  of  their  privileges  by  Fred- 
erick William  i.,  remained  powerful  against  all  except  their  sov- 
ereign. Many  of  their  privileges  were  preserved,  they  took  a 
leading  part  in  the  administration,  they  held  high  commands  in 
the  army,  and  it  was  not  until  the  French  revolutionary  epoch 
that  the  new  reforming  spirit  effected  drastic  changes  in  the  con- 
dition of  the  Prussian  aristocracy.  There  was  indeed  nothing 
in  common  in  the  general  point  of  view  of  the  two  monarchs. 
While  Louis  was  possessed  by  a  narrow  intolerant  spirit  in 
religious  matters  which  proved  so  disastrous  to  the  internal 
peace  of  France  under  his  successor,  Frederick  was  in  favouj 


The    War  of  the  Austrian  Sticcession  135 

of  universal  religious  toleration.  He  was  the  first,  and  per- 
haps the  most  successful,  of  that  generation  of  philosophic 
rulers  who  tried  to  carry  out  reforms  founded  on  the  pre- 
cepts of  the  theorists  of  the  age,  and  intended  to  benefit  the 
peoples  whom  they  governed. 

Both  kings  estabhshed  a  bureaucratic  system  which  broke 
down  after  they  themselves  had  passed  away.  Frederick's 
ministers  were  reduced  to  the  position  of  clerks,  without  the 
power  of  initiation,  and  deprived  of  all  independence.  Each 
department  felt  the  effects  of  the  increased  supen'ision  carried 
out  unceasingly  by  the  vigilant  and  energetic  young  king. 
While  Frederick  the  Great  was  responsible  for  the  prominent 
position  attained  by  his  young  kingdom  in  the  middle  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  he  was,  it  has  been  said,  also  the  cause  of 
its  fall  at  the  beginning  of  the  present  century.  Be  that  as  it 
may,  there  is  no  doubt  that  without  his  clear-sightedness,  his 
calm  judgment,  his  relentless  will,  and  the  development  of  his 
mihtary  talents,  Prussia  would  never  have  risen  to  a  higher 
position  than  that  attained  by  Saxony  or  Bavaria. 

On  October  20  Charles  vi.  died,  and  that  event,  together 
with  the  death  of  Frederick  William,  marks  the  beginning  of 
a  fresh  period  in  European  and  colonial  history.  The  Death  of 
Between  1740  and  1763  questions  of  momentous  Charles  vi. 
importance  were  solved  which  profoundly  affected  the  European 
balance  of  power.  In  the  New  World  and  in  India  the 
struggle  of  England  against  France  was  fought  out.  After  the 
estabhshment  of  the  maritime  supremacy  of  the  former,  the  loss 
of  Canada  by  the  latter,  and  the  defeat  of  her  policy  in  India,  the 
rivalry  between  Great  Britain  and  the  Bourbons  remained  dor- 
mant until  the  outbreak  of  the  contest  between  England  and  the 
American  colonies.  The  question  of  the  command  of  the  sea, 
together  with  the  further  questions  concerning  the  supremacy  of 
the  Teutonic  or  Latin  race  in  North  America,  and  the  estabhsh- 
ment of  English  or  French  influence  in  India,  awaited  decision 
in  1740.     They  were  decided  in  1763  in  favour  of  England. 

In  Europe  itself  the  years  between  1740  and  1763  were  also 


136  Enropeaii  History,   171 5-1 789 

of  supreme  importance.  Abundant  illustrations  are  afforded  of 
the  leading  characteristics  of  the  eighteenth  century.  In  Italy, 
Germany,  France,  Spain,  and  elsewhere  the  new  ideas  of  reform, 
furthered  by  enlightened  sovereigns  and  statesmen,  were  loudly 
proclaimed,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  seizure  of  Silesia 
ushered  in  an  epoch  of  high-handed  and  unblushing  acts  of 
spoliation  which  reached  its  height  under  Napoleon. 

For  Germany  1740  is  an  important  date.  For  with  the  ac- 
cession of  Frederick  the  Great  may  be  dated  the  starting-point 
The  Year  0^  modcm  Germany.  The  Thirty  Years'  War  had 
1740  a  Land-  igft  ^ej.  dismembered,  humiliated,  and  in  a  condi- 
German  tion  of  material,  intellectual,  and  moral  ruin.     The 

History.  feeling  of  nationality,  almost  extinct,  was  partially 

awakened  by  the  aggressive  acts  of  Louis  xiv.  But  Catholic 
Austria,  busied  with  her  own  schemes  of  aggrandisement,  and 
neglectful  of  the  interests  of  the  Empire,  was  unable  to  offer  to 
Germans,  irrespective  of  creed,  any  hope  that  she  would  recog- 
nise her  imperial  responsibilities.  The  possibility  of  a  moral 
and  political  restoration  was  first  afforded  by  the  rise  of  the 
Prussian  state,  which,  if  not  bound  up  with  Protestantism,  at  any 
rate  secured  for  all  liberty  of  religious  thought.  Between  1740. 
and  1763,  owing  to  the  rise  of  Prussia,  'the  German  national 
spirit  was  roused  to  new  life.'  The  Seven  Years'  War  showed  Ger- 
many that  in  Frederick  the  Great  she  possessed  a  national  hero, 
and  the  national  enthusiasm  found  expression  in  Lessing's  Minna 
von  Barnhelm,  and  in  Gleim's  Grenadiers'  Songs.  It  was  during 
the  Seven  Years'  War  that  the  Germans  began  to  feel  themselves 
a  nation  again.  From  1740  may  be  dated  that  avowed  hostility 
between  the  Courts  of  Berlin  and  Vienna  which  continued  till  our 
own  day.  The  early  misfortunes  and  trials  of  Maria  Theresa,  it  has 
been  well  said,  form  '  the  opening  scenes  of  the  drama  of  which 
Sadowa  was  the  close  and  Sedan  the  epilogue.'  ^  And  with  the 
successful  resistance  of  Prussia  to  Austria  wa,s  swept  away  all 
the  hopes  entertained  by  George  11.  and  his  ministers  of  placing 
Hanover  in  the  position  henceforward  occupied  by  Prussia 
in  north  Germany. 

1  Karl  Ilillebrand,  Lectures  oti  German  Thoii^^kt.     Lecture  II. 


TJic    War  of  the  Austrian  Succession  137 

While  the  period  from  1715  to  1740  had  been  a  period  of 
feverish  unrest,  of  diplomatic  activity,  and  of  preparation  for 
the  great  struCTale  in  which  Europe,  America,  and 

^^  ,  ,  The  Years 

India  were  involved,  the  years  between   1740  and   1740-6310 
176^  form  one  drama  in  three  acts.     From  1740  to   f"J.^"'^^'. 

I     ^  '  '  xnaia,  ana 

174S  Frederick  the  Great  was  fully  occupied  with  the  West 
his  two  Silesian  wars,  and  France  was  engaged  in 
a  double  struggle.  On  the  one  hand  she  pursued  her  ancient 
policy  of  opposition  to  Austria,  and  in  league  with  many  of  the 
lesser  German  princes  made  a  definite  attempt  to  end  the 
rivalry  of  221  years  by  partitioning  the  Hapsburg  dominions; 
on  the  other  hand  she  was  compelled  to  defend  her  position 
in  Xorth  America  and  the  West  Indies,  her  policy  in  India, 
and  her  claim  to  equaUty  with  England  on  the  sea.  The 
Silesian  question,  the  rivalry  of  France  and  Austria,  and  the 
colonial  and  commercial  struggle  between  England  and  the 
Bourbons  of  France  and  Spain,  are  all  fought  out  simultane- 
ously. In  1748  the  combatants,  exhausted,  draw  apart,  and 
the  years  between  1748  to  1756  mark  a  period  of  peace,  unrest, 
and  intrigue  preparatory  to  the  final  struggle  of  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  which  opens  with  France  and  Austria  allied  against  Eng- 
land and  Prussia,  and  which  concludes  in  1763  with  the  triumph 
of  the  latter  Powers,  England  victorious  at  all  points,  and  Prussia 
retaining  Silesia. 

On  Frederick  the  Great's  accession  England  and  Spain  were 
at  war  on  the  Spanish  Main,  and  though  France  was  making 
warlike  preparations,  there  were  no  signs  of  any  general  Euro- 
pean conflagration.  From  the  first  Frederick  recognised  the 
necessity  of  securing  the  friendship  or  neutrality  of  France  and 
Russia,  and  negotiations  were  opened  with  both  countries.  In 
the  autumn  of  1740,  however,  two  events  occurred  which 
decided  Frederick  to  invade  Silesia.  On  October  ^^^  j^^ 
20,  Charles  VI.  suddenly  died,  and  on  the  28th  of  mediate 

.  O311S6S  of  the 

the  same  month  the  Empress  Anne  of  Russia  died    invasion  of 
also.     With  Charles  vi.  the  male  line  of  the  Haps-   siiesia. 
burg  House  came  to  an  end,  while  the  death  of  the  Empress 


138  Europe a7i  History,   17 15-1789 

Anne  left  the  Russian  crown  in  the  hand  of  a  minor,  the  young 
Grand  Duke  Ivan.  There  was  every  reason  to  expect  that  dur- 
ing Ivan's  long  minority  the  Russian  Government,  at  the  head 
of  which  (after  a  revolutio7i  de  palais  on  November  i>8,  which 
resulted  in  the  overthrow  and  exile  of  Biren,  who  had  seized 
the  regency  on  the  death  of  Anne)  was  the  German  Miinich, 
who  had  been  gained  over  by  Frederick,  would  not  interfere 
on  behalf  of  the  Pragmatic  Sanction,  and  accordingly  that  the 
King  of  Prussia  would  for  a  time  be  free  to  devote  all  his  atten- 
tion to  carry  out  his  deeply  laid  schemes,  and  to  take  advantage 
of  the  position  of  affairs  at  Vienna.  The  death  of  Charles  vi. 
had  thrown  open  to  Europe  the  imperial  crown  and  the  Austrian 
possessions.  Since  1718  Charles  had  made  it  the  principal  aim 
of  his  poHcy  to  obtain  from  all  the  European  Powers  a  guar- 
anty that  his  daughter  Maria  Theresa  should,  on  his  death, 
enter  into  quiet  possession  of  his  hereditary  estates.  His  efforts 
had  been  crowned  with  success.  The  Pragmatic  Sanction  had 
received  the  guarantee  of  Europe,  and  Maria  Theresa's  posi- 
tion seemed  assured.  He  had  also  attempted,  though  without 
success,  to  secure  for  his  son-in-law,  Francis  Stephen,  now 
Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany,  the  reversion  to  the  imperial  throne. 
Upon  Charles'  death  England,  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Holland  at 
once  recognised  Maria  Theresa's  succession  to  the  Austrian 
fands,  while  Spain,  Sardinia,  Saxony,  and  Bavaria  claimed  the 
whole  or  a  portion  of  the  Hapsburg  territories.  Of  the  claim- 
ants the  only  serious  one  was  Charles  Albert  of  Bavaria,  who, 
however,  failed  to  establish  his  contention  that  the  Emperor 
Ferdinand  i.  had,  on  his  death  in  1564,  settled  his  dominions 
on  his  daughter  Anna  and  her  descendants  (of  whom  Charles 
Albert  was  one)  in  the  event  of  the  failure  of  male  heirs.  But 
though  Elizabeth  Farnese  might  desire  a  kingdom  in  Lom- 
bardy  for  Don  Philip,  and  the  King  of  Sardinia  look  forward  to 
securing  the  Milanese,  neither  Spain  nor  Sardinia  were  ready 
for  hostilities,  and  Austria  would  have  been  secure  from  aggres- 
sion had  not  Prussia  and  France  inv^aded  her  dominions  and 
given  the  signal  for  a  general  attack  upon  the  scattered  estates 
of  Maria  Theresa. 


The    War  of  the  Austrian  Succession  139 

Maria  Theresa  was,  on  the  death  of  Charies  w.,  proclaimed 
Archduchess   of  Austria,   Queen  of  Hungary,   and   Queen   of 
Bohemia,  and   sovereign   of  all   the  various  lands    Maria 
included   in   the  Austrian   possessions.      She    was   '^^"^^a 

^  and  her 

twenty-three  years  old,  was  strikingly  handsome.  Ministers, 
and  had  a  charming  manner  which  attracted  all  with  whom 
she  came  in  contact.  Open-hearted  and  sincere,  virtuous 
and  patriotic,  with  a  determination  and  energ}''  almost  mas- 
culine, animated  by  an  unfailing  courage,  deep  religious  prin- 
ciples, and  a  stern  sense  of  duty,  the  young  qugen  might  well 
expect  to  be  treated  with  consideration  by  those  European 
Powers  which  had  solemnly  promised  to  respect  her  rights. 
She  at  once  named  her  husband,  Francis  Stephen,  co-regent 
in  all  the  hereditary'  dominions,  and  confirmed  the  ministers, 
most  of  whom  were  over  seventy  years  of  age,  in  their  posts. 
Of  these  Zinzendorf,  the  Chancellor  and  nominal  Chief  Min- 
ister, and  Stahremberg,  the  Chief  of  the  Finance  Department, 
were  both  men  .of  experience.  But  neither  they  nor  Count 
Joseph  Harrach,  the  President  of  the  Council  of  War  (1738- 
1764),  nor  Kinsky,  the  Bohemian  Chancellor,  had  clear 
views  ^Axki  regard  to  the  European  situation,  for,  habituated 
to  routine,  they  were  lacking  in  decision  and  enterprise,  and 
absolutely  unfit  to  cope  with  the  crisis  of  1740.  In  Barten- 
stein  and  Herberstein,  the  young  queen  placed  at  first  her 
greatest  confidence.  The  former,  an  Alsatian,  who  by  his 
energ}'  and  devotion  to  Austria  had  risen  to  the  position  of 
minister,  had  a  deep  distrust  of  Frederick  the  Great.  *  The 
queen,'  he  said,  '  has  no  enemy  to  fear  except  the  King  of 
Pnissia.'  Zinzendorf  died  in  1742,  Stahremberg  in  1745, 
Kinsky  in  i  748.  While  Uhlfeld  became  on  Zinzendorf  s  death 
nominally  Chancellor,  Bartenstein  remained  from  1740  to 
1753  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  had  the  greatest  influ- 
ence in  the  Secret  Conference  of  ministers.  He  was  more  of 
a  jurist  than  a  statesman,  and  on  the  rise  of  Kaunitz  he  was, 
with  Uhlfeld,  dismissed  from  the  position  of  minister.^ 

^  See  Wolf  and  Zwiedineck,  Oesterreich  tinter  Maria    Theresia,  Josef 
II,  unl  Leopold  II.,  p.  27. 


140  European  History,   17 15-1789 

The  late  war  against  Turkey  had  left  Austria  weakened  and 
humiliated  by  the  ignominious  Treaty  of  Belgrade.  Her  army 
was  crippled,  her  finances  were  exhausted.  She  required,  as 
Eugene  had  declared,  200,000  men  and  an  ample  treasure  ; 
ill  1740  she  had  an  inexperienced  queen,  an  army  practically 
disbanded,  and  incompetent  ministers. 

But  if  the  internal  condition  of  Austria  was  calculated  to 
inspire  anxiety,  the  relations  of  the  Court  of  Vienna  with  foreign 
Powers  were  in  no  less  critical  position.  Spain  under  a  Bour- 
bon was  tending  to  a  close  alliance  with  France ;  Ehzabeth 
Farnese  aimed  at  narrowing  still  further  the  Austrian  domin- 
ions in  Italy ;  the  ambition  of  the  House  of  Savoy  was  a 
perpetual  danger ;  while  in  the  Polish  Succession  War  the 
honour  of  the  imperial  arms  had  not  been  enhanced,  and 
England  had  shown  no  readiness  to  assist  her  ancient  ally. 

The  real  and  immediate  danger  to  Austria,  however,  came 
from  Prussia  and  France.  In  1738  the  latter  Power  had 
Fleury's  guaranteed  the  Pragmatic  Sanction  in  the  strong- 

Attitude,  est  terms,  and  in  exchange  for  her  guarantee  had 
secured  Lorraine  for  Stanislas  with  reversion  to  France.  The 
cession  of  Lorraine  by  Germany  was  the  most  successful  act 
of  the  administration  of  Fleur}^,  who,  aware  of  the  exhaustion 
of  France  by  her  late  efforts,  and  keenly  alive  to  the  proba- 
bility of  war  with  England,  desired  peace  on  the  continent. 
No  better  illustration  could  be  found  of  Fleury's  methods 
than  his  conduct  on  the  death  of  Charles  vi.  He  was  a 
master  in  the  arts  of  duplicity  and  evasion,  and  though  in 
January  1740  he  had  promised  to  observe  his  engagements 
made  with  Charles  vi.,  on  the  latter's  death  he  refused  to 
recognise  Maria  Theresa,  and  assured  the  Elector  of  Bavaria 
that  France  would  not  uphold  the  Pragmatic  Sanction  against 
the  rights  of  third  parties,  and  further,  that  she  would  not 
prevent  him  from  competing  for  the  imperial  crown.  He 
undoubtedly  hoped  to  preserve  peace,  but  declared  in  casuis- 
tical fashion  that  if  it  was  proved  that  any  third  party  had 
better  claims  to  the  Hapsburg  dominions  than  Maria  Theresa, 


i) 


The   War  of  the  Austrian  Succession  141 

the  French  guarantee  of  the  Pragmatic  Sanction  fell  to  the 
ground.  Fleury's  equivocal  attitude  is  explained  partly  by 
the  existence  at  Court  of  a  strong  war  party,  partly  by  the  / 
previous  relations  between  France  and  Bavaria.  In  1714  by 
a  secret  treaty  the  King  of  France  had  promised  to  support 
the  candidature  of  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  to  the  imperial 
throne  in  the  event  of  a  vacancy.  In  1727  this  treaty  had 
been  renewed,  and  France  further  engaged  to  support  the 
claims  of  the  Elector  to  the  Hapsburg  inheritance.  Em- 
boldened by  this  alliance,  Charles  Albert  had,  at  the  Diet  of 
1732,  refused  his  adhesion  to  the  Pragmatic  Sanction,  and  in 
1733  France  made  with  him  another  treaty  promising  still 
more  explicitly  her  support  in  case  he  was  attacked  when 
attempting  to  make  good  his  claims.  In  1 738  in  order  to 
justify  and  explain  the  French  guarantee  of  the  Pragmatic 
Sanction  and  the  apparent  desertion  of  Bavaria,  Fleury 
elaborated  a  fine  distinction  between  a  claim  and  a  lawful 
possession,  and  introduced  a  reservation  about  the  rights  of 
third  parties.  It  was  impossible,  according  to  Fleury's  reason- 
ing, for  France  to  defend  Maria  Theresa  if  it  could  be  proved 
that  she  was  not  legally  entitled  to  her  possessions.  In  1 740, 
not  feehng  sure  of  his  ground,  Fleur}',  after  Charles  vi.'s 
death,  hesitated  and  equivocated.  He  told  the  Bavarian 
minister  that  the  Elector  could  aspire  to  the  imperial  crown, 
as  the  Pragmatic  Sanction  contained  no  stipulations  about  the 
election  to  the  Empire.  Very  characteristically  he  determined 
to  wait  the  course  of  events  before  taking  any  decided  action 
with  regard  to  the  hereditar}^  possessions  of  Charles  w} 

Frederick  the  Great  had,  on  the  contrary,  no  scruples  and 
felt  no  hesitation.     He  was  not  hampered  by  the  existence  of 
any  opposition  at  his  Court.     He  resolved  to  seize   Decisive 
Silesia.     Like  Maria  Theresa,  in  1749  he  invited    Frederick 
from  Podewils  his  chief  adviser  in  diplomacy  and   the  Great, 
foreign  affnirs.  and  from  the  field-marshal  Schwerin,  the  expres- 
sion of  their  views.     They  agreed  on  October  29  in  advising 
1  See  Tuttle,  History  of  Prussia,  vul.  i.  p.  51, 


142  Einvpean  History,    171 5-1789 

the  king  to  open  negotiations  with  Austria,  and  to  offer  in 
return  for  Silesia  to  give  up  all  claim  to  Berg,  and  to  support 
the  Pragmatic  Sanction  and  the  candidature  of  the  Grand 
Duke  Francis  to  the  imperial  throne.  But  the  death  of  the 
Empress  Anne  of  Russia  decided  Frederick  to  act  first  and 
negotiate  afterwards.  If  Austria  refused  to  treat,  then  he 
would  ally  with  Bavaria  and  Saxony,  invoke  the  aid  of  France, 
support  the  election  of  Charles  Albert  as  Emperor,  and  hold 
Russia  in  check  by  an  understanding  with  Sweden.  On 
December  16  the  Prussian  army  invaded  Silesia,  and  the  War 
of  the  Austrian  Succession  began. 

It  is  impossible  to  justify  Frederick's  action.  He  himself 
declared  that  the  desire  to  make  a  name  was  one  of  his 
The  Invasion  Hiotives.  In  cxtcnuation  of  the  invasion  it  has 
of  Silesia.  been  urged  that  the  conduct  of  Charles  vi.  with 
regard  to  Jiilich  and  Berg  had  been  the  reverse  of  straightfor- 
ward. But  the  violation  of  the  Treaty  of  1728  is  certainly  not 
a  justification  for  the  seizure  of  Silesia.  Austria  and  Prussia 
were  united  by  a  long  series  of  treaties.  They  had  fought 
together  in  the  Polish  Succession  War,  and  Frederick  William  i. 
had  guaranteed  the  Pragmatic  Sanction.  With  regard  to  the 
Prussian  claims  to  Silesia,  it  cannot  for  a  moment  be  asserted 
that  Frederick's  invasion  had  anything  to  do  with  any  sup- 
posed claims  which  he  might  have  had.  Jagerndorf  had  been 
confiscated  from  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg  by  Frederick  11. 
in  1623,  and  in  1675  Leopold  i.  had  seized  the  duchies  of 
Liegnitz,  Brieg,  and  Wohlau.  When  Frederick  iii.  found  him- 
self compelled  to  restore  Schwiebus  to  Leopold  in  1694,  he 
formally  resumed  his  claims  upon  the  Silesian  duchies, — which 
shadowy  claims  rested  upon  an  agreement  made  in  1537  be- 
tween Joachim  11.,  Elector  of  Brandenburg,  and  the  Duke  of 
Liegnitz.  Frederick  William  i.  had  never  upheld  these  sus- 
pended claims ;  there  is  no  proof  that  they  continued  to  sur- 
vive in  the  traditions  of  the  House  of  Hohenzollern,  nor  is 
there  any  evidence  that  the  question  of  his  right  to  Silesia  ever 
entered   Frederick's    mind.     It  has  also  been  suggested    that 


TJie    War  of  the  Austrian  Succession  143 

Saxony  might  have  seized  Silesia,  and  that,  as  a  general  Euro- 
pean war  was  certain,  Frederick  showed  his  wisdom  in  seizing 
Silesia  before  the  other  Powers  moved.  Whether  a  general 
European  war  was  inevitable  is  open  to  very  serious  doubt,  but 
even  in  that  event  the  seizure  of  Silesia  would  not  be  justified. 
Frederick  acted  on  his  own  responsibility,  and  his  cause  never 
called  forth  any  real  enthusiasm  in  England  or  Germany  till  he 
stood  forth  in  the  Seven  Years'  War  to  defend  his  new  posses- 
sion against  the  combined  efforts  of  France,  Austria,  and  Russia. 
The  invasion  of  Silesia  was  carried  out  most  successfully,  and 
by  the  end  of  January  all  the  province,  including  Breslau  the 
capital,  was  with  the  exception  of  Glogau,  Brieg,  and  Xeisse  in 
Prussian  hands,  and  Frederick  returned  to  Berlin.  In  spite  of 
his  remarkable  success,  he  found  himself  in  a  most  precarious 
position.  Maria  Theresa  had  refused  to  negotiate  with  him  as 
long  as  a  Prussian  soldier  remained  in  Silesia ;  England  was 
negotiating  with  Austria  for  the  formation  of  a  powerful  coali- 
tion against  him  ;  the  Austrian  preparations  for  the  recovery 
of  Silesia  were  prompt  and  extensive,  and  the  fall  of  Munich 
in  March  1741  seemed  to  threaten  him  with  a  Russo-Austrian 
alliance.  At  the  beginning  of  April  Neipperg,  a  brave  pedantic 
soldier  of  the  old  school,  led  an  Austrian  army  into  the  heart 
of  Silesia,  and  on  April  10  the  battle  of  Mollwitz  was  fought 
and  won  by  the  Prussian  infantry.  This  famous  victory  brought 
in  its  train  many  important  results.  The  equivocal  Moiiwitzand 
reputation  of  the  Prussian  soldiers  was  established,  ^^^  Results, 
and  it  was  recognised  in  Europe  that  in  Prussia  a  new  Power 
had  arisen  which  could  withstand  and  overthrow  the  Hapsburg 
veterans.  Frederick  had  now  secured  Lower  Silesia  and  Brieg, 
and  it  was  evident  to  Enghsh  statesmen  that  Maria  Theresa's 
wisest  policy  would  be  to  sacrifice  Silesia  and  to  make  terms 
with  Frederick. 

j  But  though  defeated,  INIaria  Theresa  refused  to  entertain  the 
idea  of  sacrificing  Silesia,  and  prepared  to  face  the  new  situa- 
tion created  by  her  defeat  at  Mollwitz.  Spain,  Bavaria,  Sar- 
dinia, and  Saxony  determined  to  pursue  their  own  en. Is  at  the 


144  Ettropean  History,   17 15-1789 

expense  of  Austria,  and  the  French  Government  came  to  a 
momentous  decision  —  namely,  to  repudiate  the  Pragmatic 
Sanction,  to  actively  support  the  candidature  of  Bavaria  for 
the  imperial  throne,  and  to  destroy  for  ever  the  power  of  the 
Hapsburgs.  I 

As  early  as  December  1740  Fleury  had  so  far  yielded  to  the 
active,  noisy,  and  influential  section  who  were  in  favour  of  an 
Fieury's  attack  upon  Austria  as  to  assure  the  brilliant,  en- 

Poiicy.  terprising,  and  unscrupulous  leader  of  that  section, 

Charles  Louis  Fouquet,  Count  of  Belleisle,  that  France,  while 
recognising  Maria  Theresa  as  Queen  of  Hungary  and  Bohemia, 
would  support  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  in  his  candidature  for  the 
imperial  throne  ;  and  at  the  same  time  informed  him  that  Louis 
XV.  had  appointed  him  plenipotentiary  to  the  German  Diet  in 
order  to  secure  the  support  of  that  body  for  the  furtherance  of 
the  French  policy.  Frederick's  invasion  of  Silesia  had  been 
regarded  at  the  French  Court  as  doomed  to  failure,  and  Louis 
XV.  had  declared  that  the  King  of  Prussia  was  mad.  Various 
courses  of  action  had  suggested  themselves  to  Fleury.  France 
could  carry  out  the  treaty  of  1735  and  reserv^e  her  strength. 
This  line  of  policy  would  have  proved  the  best  for  France,  then 
about  to  engage  in  a  great  struggle  with  England.  Another 
course  was  to  promote  the  election  of  Francis  Stephen  to  the 
imperial  throne  on  the  understanding  that  Maria  Theresa  should 
give  France  a  portion  of  the  Low  Countries  or  Luxemburg.  A 
third  course  was  to  carry  out  the  Pragmatic  Sanction  strictly, 
but  in  accordance  with  French  traditions,  and,  in  agreement 
with  the  secret  treaty  of  17 14  with  Bavaria,  to  support  Charles 
Albert's  candidature  for  the  imperial  throne.  Such  a  line  of 
action  would  be  difficult  to  pursue  owing  to  the  Elector's  claim 
to  all  Maria  Theresa's  inheritance.  The  last  and  the  worst 
course  open  to  France  was  to  break  through  all  engagements 
and  seize  the  opportunity  to  dismember  Austria. 

'I  ill  the  battle  of  Mollwitz,  Fleury,  as  has  been  said,  had 
iiclined  towards  the  third  alternative,  and  had  sent  Belleisle  to 
meet  the  Diet  at  Frankfort  in  order  to  promote  the  election  of 


The    Wai'  of  the  Austrian  Successiott  145 

the  Elector  of  Bavaria,  The  objections  to  this  course  were 
obvious.  England's  jealousy  would  be  aroused  at  the  interfer- 
ence of  France  in  Germany ;  she  would  be  forced  to  support 
Austria  warmly,  and,  if  possible,  to  repeat  her  policy  in  the 
Spanish  Succession  War  of  forming  a  great  alliance  of  all  the 
states  of  Germany  against  France.  Fleury's  indecision  had 
disastrous  effects  upon  France,  and,  indeed,  upon  Germanv. 
Maria  Theresa,  fully  convinced  of  his  pacific  intentions,  refused 
uith  scorn  Frederick's  attempts  to  treat  after  Mollwitz,  and 
declined  to  be  guided  by  the  advice  of  Walpole,  who  urged  her 
to  accept  the  loss  of  Silesia  and  to  unite  N^ith  Prussia  against 
France;  while  the  Prussian  king,  isolated  in  the  midst  of  his 
successes,  was  forced  to  turn  definitely  to  France. 

To  Belleisle  Frederick's  victory  afforded  the  opportunity 
which  he  had  long  looked  for  of  earning  out  his  elaborate 
policy.  A  league  was  to  be  formed,  including  ^^e  French 
France,  Prussia,  Spain,  Bavaria,  Sweden,  and  Sax-  aiiy  with 
ony.  Austria  was  to  be  dismembered,  the  Elector  and  invade 
of  Bavaria  was  to  become  Emperor,  and  Germany  Germany, 
was  to  be  di\-ided  into  several  equal  kingdoms  all  incapable  of 
resisting  France.  France  herself,  the  arbiter  of  Europe  and 
the  protectress  of  German  independence,  was  to  receive  the 
Low  Countries.  On  April  20  he  appeared  in  Frederick's  camp, 
where  foreign  envoys  had  already  assembled,  but  it  was  not  till 
June  4  that  Frederick  agreed  to  sign  a  convention  with  France. 
The  \'ictor  of  Mollwitz  had  no  desire  to  make  the  Elector  of 
Bavaria  too  powerful,  or  to  set  France  in  the  place  of  Austria 
in  Germany.  It  was  not  till  the  efforts  of  Enghsh  mediation 
had  completely  broken  down  that,  with  a  protracted  war  with 
Austria  in  prospect,  he  consented  to  an  alliance  ^vith  France. 
On  June  4  the  treat}-  was  signed,  and  Frederick  agreed  to  vote 
for  the  election  of  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  and  to  give  up  her 
claims  in  Jiilich  and  Berg.  The  King  of  France,  on  his  part, 
undertook  to  guarantee  to  Frederick  the  possession  of  Lower 
Silesia  with  Breslau,  to  send  an  army  into  Germany  to  support 
Bavaria,  and  to  induce  Sweden  to  declare  war  on  Russia  in 

PERIOD   VI.  K 


146  European  History y   171 5-1 789 

order  to  prevent  the  latter  from  joining  Maria  Theresa  against 
Frederick.  Belleisle  had  already,  on  May  28,  come  to  an 
understanding  —  usually  termed  the  Treaty  of  Nymphenburg 
—  with  Spain  and  Bavaria,  and  had  promised  that  France 
would  support  the  Elector  with  men  and  money.  France  did 
not  declare  war,  for  she  simply  proposed  to  act  as  the  auxiliary 
of  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  in  his  attempt  to  secure  the  imperial 
crown  and  a  share  of  the  Austrian  possessions  in  Germany.  In 
spite  of  Fleury's  hesitation  and  indecision,  Belleisle  succeeded 
in  his  efforts,  and  on  August  16  a  French  army  entered  Ger- 
many as  the  auxiliary  of  Bavaria ;  and  a  month  later  another 
army  under  Maillebois  advanced  into  Westphalia,  ready  to 
co-operate  with  Prussia  and  to  hold  Holland  and  Hanover  in 
check.  From  Passau  the  Franco-Bavarian  army  marched  into 
Upper  Austria  and  took  Linz  on  September  11.  So  far  no  diffi- 
culties had  been  met  with.  Though  English  feeling  was  enthu- 
siastic on  behalf  of  Maria  Theresa,  and  though  England  was  on 
the  verge  of  a  great  struggle  \\dth  France,  neither  George  11. 
nor  Walpole  showed  any  appreciation  of  the  necessity  of  check- 
ing the  action  of  France  or  Germany.  George  11.,  as  Elector 
of  Hanover,  was  not  averse  to  the  election  of  Charles  Albert  as 
Emperor.  Like  many  other  German  princes  he  was  opposed 
to  the  preponderance  of  Hapsburgs  in  Germany,  and,  more- 
over, his  anxiety  for  the  safety  of  Hanover  caused  him  to  make, 
on  September  7,  a  treaty  of  neutrahty  with  France  for  his 
electorate.  Walpole,  too,  disliked  foreign  pohtics,  and  devoted 
all  his  energies  to  mediating  a  peace  between  Prussia  and 
Austria.  This  dilatory  conduct  of  England  inspired  Belleisle 
with  the  hope  that  his  plans  would  be  successfully  carried  out 
before  England  and  Holland  moved.  More  definite  measures 
were  taken  to  secure  the  inaction  of  Russia,  which  Power,  in 
accordance  with  the  treaty  of  1726,  proposed  to  send  30,000 
men  to  aid  Maria  Theresa.  Frederick  the  Great,  in  the  treaty 
lately  made  with  France,  had  stipulated  that  she  should  use 
her  influence  with  Sweden  to  bring  about  an  attack  on  Russia, 
and,  on  August  4,  1741,  the  Swedes  declared  war  against  Russia. 


The  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession  147 

The  allies  were  now  free  from  all  danger  of  Russian  inter- 
vention, and  events  in  Russia  tended  still  further  to  occupy 
the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg.  On  the  fall  of  Biren  on  Novem- 
ber 18,  1740,  Munich  took  the  office  of  first  minister,  while 
Ostermann  became  High  Admiral.  The  retirement  of  the 
former  in  March  1741  testified  to  the  strength  of  the  feeling 
at  St.  Petersburg  in  favour  of  Austria.  But  the  German  in- 
fluence was  very  unpopular  in  Russia,  and  a  plot  was  organised 
by  Lestocq,  a  French  surgeon,  which  had  the  full  ^  Revolution 
support  of  Russian  national  feeling,  and  in  Decem-  in  Russia 
ber  a  palace  revolution  placed  Elizabeth,  daughter  be^"on  the*' 
of  Peter  the  Great,  on  the  throne,  and  marked  the  Throne, 
triumph  of  French  influence  at  St.  Petersburg.  The  young 
Prince  Ivan  was  imprisoned,  and  Munich,  Ostermann,  Golov- 
kin,  and  others  were  exiled  to  Siberia ;  and  the  accession  of 
Elizabeth  marked  the  resumption  of  the  work  of  Peter  the 
Great,  which  had  been  in  abeyance  under  his  immediate 
successors.^ 

A  certain  amount  of  difficulty  was  anticipated  from  the 
German  states  in  consequence  of  the  'sullen  and  jealous  irrita- 
tion '  felt  towards  France  ever  since  the  second  Beiieisie's 
devastation  of  the  Palatinate  under  Louis  xrv.  '  In  Success, 
the  minds  of  several  of  the  German  princes,'  Frederick  the 
Great  remarked  to  A^alori,  '  the  support  of  France  would  do 
the  Elector  of  Bavaria  more  harm  than  good.'  Belleisle  was 
well  aware  of  the  existence  of  this  feeling.  *  The  attachment 
to  the  House  of  Austria,'  he  wrote  to  Fleury  from  Germany, 
Ms  general.  It  is  impossible  to  uproot  the  prejudices  of 
the  country  against  France.'  In  no  respect  was  the  tact  of 
Belleisle  more  signally  shown  than  in  the  way  in  which  he 
overcame  the  hostility  of  the  German  states  to  France. 
The  conduct  of  the  French  troops  during  their  march  across 
Germany  was  most  exemplary,  while  by  intrigues  and  bribery 
the  wily  diplomatist  secured  the  support  of  the  Electors  of 
Trier,  Koln,  .and  Mainz  to  the  French  policy.  Of  the  German 
^Vandal,  Louis  XV.  et  Elisabeth  de  Rtissie,  pp.  134-135. 


148  Etiropea7i  History,   17 15-1789 

states,  the  alliance  of  Saxony  was  of  immense  importance  for 
the  allies.  The  tendency  of  the  King  of  Poland  and  Elector 
of  Saxony  was  to  ally  with  Austria,  and  his  minister  Brlihl 
was  jealous  of  the  Prussian  aggression.  But  the  Saxon  court 
had  been  thunderstruck  at  the  victory  of  Mollwitz,  and  a  visit 
of  Belleisle  to  Dresden,  combined  with  the  influence  exerted 
by  Maurice  de  Saxe,  and  the  effect  produced  by  the  march  of 
the  Franco- Bavarian  army  into  Upper  Austria,  had  the  desired 
effect;  and  on  September  19,  five  days  after  the  fall  of  Linz, 
Saxony  joined  the  allies.  Similar  activity  was  shown  by  the 
opponents  of  Austria  in  the  south  of  Europe.  Spain  had,  on 
Charles  vi.'s  death,  made  its  claim  a  pretext  for  extensive 
preparations  for  an  attack  upon  the  Austrian  possessions  in 
Italy,  with  the  object  of  giving  Don  Philip  an  establishment  in 
Italy.  Fleury,  as  usual,  hesitated,  proposed  to  Charles  Eman- 
uel a  partition  of  the  Austrian  states  in  Italy,  and  only  gave 
Spain  a  half-hearted  support.  Though  Charles  Emanuel 
strongly  objected  to  the  increase  of  the  Spanish  power  in 
Italy,  Spanish  troops  were  landed  at  Orbitello  in  December 
1 741,  and  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the  King  of  Sardinia 
and  the  Austrians,  formed  a  junction  with  the  Neapolitan  troops, 
and  marched  towards  the  Po.  Maria  Theresa  was  thus  threat- 
ened at  all  points,  and  Belleisle  had  succeeded  almost  beyond 
his  hopes.  The  election  of  Charles  Albert  of  Bavaria  seemed 
assured  ;  Prussia  and  Saxony  were  allies  of  France,  Spain  was 
preparing  to  partition  the  Austrian  dominions  in  Italy,  Russia 
and  Sweden  were  at  war,  and  George  11.  had  made  a  treaty  of 
neutrality  for  Hanover.  Moreover,  the  loyalty  of  the  Viennese 
was  shaken,  and  in  the  autumn  of  1741  Maria  Theresa's 
position  seemed  hopeless.  But  from  the  end  of  September 
Maria  ^^^  fortuncs   began   to   improve.     She    had   spent 

Theresa  in  the  summcr  at  Pressburg,  where  she  had  been 
ungar  .  crowncd  Quccn  of  Hungar}'  on  June  25.  Upon 
the  invasion  of  Upper  Austria  she  had  resolved  to  throw  her- 
self upon  the  generosity  of  the  Hungarians.  On  September 
1 1  the  Diet    decreed    the    insurrection,  and    elected    Francis 


The  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession  149 

Stephen  as  co-regent ;  and  on  September  2 1  that  memorable 
scene  took  place  when  the  queen  presented  to  the  Hunga- 
rian magnates  her  infant  son  and  was  received  with  the  cry, 
'  Moriamur  pro  rege  nostro  Maria  Theresia.'  The  resolution 
of  the  young  queen  to  appeal  to  the  ^Magyars  was  worthy  of 
a  statesman,  and  did  much  to  bridge  over  the  hostility  which 
had  for  ages  existed  between  the  Hungarians  and  the  Austrians. 
Their  devotion  to  her  cause  did  not  prevent  the  members  of 
the  Diet  from  securing  valuable  concessions  from  the  helpless 
queen,  who  however  found  herself  at  the  head  of  masses  of 
undisciplined  warriors,  soon  to  become  the  terror  of  western 
Europe. 

While  Maria  Theresa  was  gaining  from  her  eastern  subjects 
those  promises  of  support  which  were  to  prove  so  invaluable, 
signs  of  discord  were  appearing  in  the  ranks  of  her  enemies. 
Frederick  the  Great  had  been  unwillingly  forced  into  an 
alliance  with  France  whom  he  distrusted,  and  it  soon  became 
apparent  that  his  aims  and  those  of  Belleisle  were  by  no  means 
entirely  in  harmony. 

After  taking  Linz  the  allies  should  have  pushed  on  and 
occupied  Vienna.  But  Belleisle  was  not  desirous  of  making 
Bavaria  too  strong,  and  he  distrusted  Frederick,  The  Treaty 
who,  convinced  that  the  capture  of  Vienna  would  slh^neiTe'n- 
end  the  war  and  ensure  him  Silesia,  urged  that  dorf. 
the  Austrian  capital  should  be  attacked.  Belleisle,  who  was 
supported  by  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  in  his  objection  to  a 
march  upon  Vienna,  carried  his  point,  and  the  combined 
Franco- Bavarian-Saxon  army,  leaving  a  strong  force  in  Linz, 
marched  to  Prague,  which  they  besieged  (November  19-26). 
While  the  combined  army  was  committing  this  huge  strategic 
blunder,  Frederick  had  allowed  himself  to  be  detached  from 
his  alUes.  He  had  discovered  that  Fleury  was  opposed  to 
his  possession  of  Glatz,  the  key  of  the  Bohemian  country,  and 
almost  simultaneously  with  this  discovery  came  Maria  Theresa's 
consent  to  a  secret  treaty  —  brought  about  through  the  efforts 
of  the  English  envoy.  Lord  Hyndford  —  in  accordance  with 


150  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

which  Neipperg,  whose  army,  then  successfully  guarding  Neisse, 
was  required  for  the  defence  of  Vienna,  was  to  be  allowed  to 
retire  into  Moravia,  while  Neisse,  after  a  sham  siege,  was  to  be 
given  up  to  Frederick,  and  all  Silesia  ceded  to  him.  This 
treaty  was,  on  October  9,  agreed  to  at  Klein-Schneliendorf  by 
Frederick,  who  stipulated  that  it  should  be  kept  secret,  otherwise 
he  declared  he  would  disavow  it.  The  motives  which  prompted 
Frederick  to  act  so  treacherously  towards  his  aUies  will  prob- 
ably never  be  known,  while  Carlyle's  defence  of  his  action  will 
hardly  be  considered  to  be  adequate.  The  possession  of 
Neisse  was  indispensable  to  him,  and  its  seizure  was  impossi- 
ble while  Neipperg's  army  lay  in  front  of  it.  The  capture  of 
Neisse  enabled  him  to  strengthen  his  position  in  Lower  Silesia, 
recruit  his  exhausted  troops,  and  to  make  further  acquisitions. 
Frederick  was  opposed  to  the  preponderance  of  the  French  in 
German  politics,  and  he  seems  to  have  expected  that  the  allied 
army  would  fail  in  its  invasion  of  Bohemia.  His  treachery  was 
soon  known  all  over  Europe,  and  the  united  forces  of  Neipperg 
and  the  Grand  Duke  Francis  advanced  into  Bohemia  and 
checked  the  successes  of  the  allied  army.  Meanwhile  Fred- 
erick had  occupied  the  county  of  Glatz  —  a  fief  of  the  Bohe- 
mian crown  —  and  on  November  i  took  possession  of  Neisse. 
Though  the  convention  of  Klein-Schnellendorf,  on  becoming 
generally  known,  was  repudiated  by  Frederick,  Maria  Theresa 
had  derived  considerable  benefit  from  the  arrangement,  which 
enabled  her  to  employ  her  one  Austrian  army  ;  while  Frederick, 
having  gained  his  end  and  shaken  himself  free  from  his  engage- 
ments with  Austria,  again  turned  to  the  allies.  On  November  i 
he  agreed  to  a  treaty  with  Saxony  and  Bavaria  for  the  dismem- 
berment of  Austria ;  he  made  an  arrangement  with  Charles 
Albert,  by  which  the  latter,  who  considered  himself  the  rightful 
king  of  Bohemia,  ceded  to  him  Glatz,  the  conquest  of  which 
was  completed  in  December ;  he  effected  the  reorganisation 
of  Silesia  on  the  Prussian  system  ;  and  on  December  27  he 
advanced  into  Moravia  and  seized  Olmiitz. 

But  Frederick's  successes  had  not  alarmed  Maria  Theresa. 


TJie  War  of  the  Atistrian  Succession  151 

Though  Prague  had  fallen  on  November  29,  there  was  a  want  of 
vigour  and  decision  in  Fleury's  policy  at  a  time  when  vigour 
and  decision  were  required  to  keep  the  coalition 

T-       1      •    ,  ,  J  11  T       ,         The  Election 

together.      rredericks    conduct  had    aroused   the   ofcharies 
deep  suspicion  of  the  French,  while  his  futile  cam-   ^^^^'■^.  \°  *h« 

^  '■  '  Imperial 

paign  in  Moravia  early  in  i  742  owed  its  failure  in   Throne, 
great  measure  to  the  conduct  of  his  French  and  ^^'  ^''^'' 

Saxon  allies.  After  the  capture  of  Prague,  Fleury  had  appointed 
the  Marshal  Broglie  to  take  the  command  in  Bohemia.  The 
marshal  was  in  his  seventieth  year,  was  disliked  by  his  officers, 
and  the  object  of  Frederick's  detestation.  He  had  at  once 
formed  an  entrenched  camp  at  Pisek,  where  his  force  of  some 
16,000  men  was  held  in  check  by  an  Austrian  army.  At  the 
same  time  Khevenhuller  had  taken  Linz,  and  was  advancing  on 
Munich,  Charles  Albert  had  been  elected  Emperor  on  January 
24,  1 742,  the  day  of  the  fall  of  Linz. 

It  was  to  counteract  the  movements  of  the  Austrian  army  in 
Bohemia,  and  to  check  the  advance  of  the  Hungarians  upon 
Vienna,  that  Frederick  proceeded  to  Olmiitz  on  January  28, 
and  opened  his  second  campaign.  But,  hampered  by  the 
attacks  of  the  Moravian  peasants,  and  checked  by  Frederick's 
the  advance  of  an  Austrian  force  asrainst  De  Brodie,   J"^^^^°"  °^ 

o  o       >     Moravia, 

and  by  the  conduct  of  the  Saxons,  and  perhaps  of  1742- 
the  French,  Frederick  found  himself  obliged,  without  having 
fought  a  single  battle,  in  April  to  retreat  from  Moravia  and  to 
give  up  Olmiitz. 

Meanwhile,  though  Belleisle  had  succeeded  in  securing  the 
coronation  of  Charles  Albert  as  Emperor  on  February  12,  he 
could  not  prevent  the  capture  of  Munich  the  same  day  by 
Menzel's  wild,  irregular  forces.  The  unfortunate  Emperor  was 
forced  to  seek  refuge  in  Frankfort,  where  his  appeal  for  men 
and  money  to  support  the  imperial  dignity  was  a  curious  com- 
mentary on  Belleisle 's  elaborate  plans. 

In  other  directions  Maria  Theresa's  fortunes  continued  to 
improve.  Walpole's  fall  in  February  1742  had  been  at  once 
followed  by  the  adoption  of  more  vigorous  measures.    Though 


152  European  History,    171 5-1 789 

Wilmington  was  nominally  Prime  Minister,  Carteret  directed 

the   foreign  policy  of  the    Government.      He    was   known   to 

be  in   favour  of  active    intervention  on  behalf  of 

Carteret  s 

Foreign  ^laria  Theresa,  and  his  entry  into  office  was  fol- 

°  ^^^'  lowed  by  a  considerable  increase  in  both  the  army 

and  navy.  Sixteen  thousand  English  troops  were  sent  into 
the  Low  Countries,  the  same  number  of  Hanoverians  were 
employed,  the  States-General  prepared  for  hostilities,  and  it 
became  clear  that  the  struggle  over  Silesia  was  about  to  develop 
into  a  war  in  which  wider  issues  would  be  involved. 

Carteret  found  on  taking  office  that  Vienna  was  safe,  that 
Bavaria  was  occupied  by  Maria  Theresa's  cavalry,  that  the 
French  in  Bohemia  were  in  a  precarious  position,  and  that 
Frederick's  Moravian  campaign  was  proving  a  failure.  In  his 
desire  to  prevent  Maria  Theresa's  overthrow,  he  had  the  support 
of  the  king  and  nation ;  but  he  proposed  to  reassert  England's 
influence  on  the  continent,  to  bring  about  peace  between  Aus- 
tria and  Prussia,  and  to  form  a  coalition  of  German  Powers  to 
secure  the  humiliation  of  France.  Like  George,  he  had  no  ob- 
jection to  the  election  of  Charles  Albert ;  the  principal  aim  of 
his  policy  was  to  reduce  France  to  the  condition  in  which  she 
was  at  the  time  of  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht.  The  effect  of 
Carteret's  energetic  policy  was  also  seen  in  Italy  where  the 
Austrians  were  opposed  by  the  Spaniards,  who  received  encour- 
agement from  Fleury,  then  as  ever  pursuing  a  policy  of  half 
measures.  But  Fleury  was  unable  to  secure  the  adhesion  of 
Charles  Emanuel  to  a  further  extension  of  the  Spanish  power 
in  the  north  of.  Italy,  and  on  February  i,  1742,  the  King  of 
Sardinia  concluded  a  treaty  with  Maria  Theresa,  pledging  him- 
self to  aid  the  Austrians  to  defend  the  Milanese,  Modena, 
Parma,  and  Piacenza  against  the  Spaniards.  Against  the  com- 
bined Spanish  and  Neapolitan  army,  Charles  Emanuel  and  the 
Austrians  proved  successful,  capturing  Modena  and  Mirandola, 
while  the  Eniirlish  fleet  under  Admiral  Matthews  commanded 
the  Mediterranean.  Don  Carlos  was  compelled  by  the  threat- 
ened bombardment  of  Naples  by  five  Enghsh  ships  to  sign  a 


TJic    War  of  the  Austrian   Succession  153 

convention  withdrawing  his  Xeapohtan  troops  from  the  north 
of  Italy.  All  chance  of  establishing  a  kingdom  of  Lombardy 
was  lost ;  Ehzabeth  Farnese  was  forced  to  content  herself  with 
a  less  ambitious  programme  ;  Charles  Emanuel  had  freed  him- 
self from  a  very  real  danger  to  his  hopes  of  territorial  aggran- 
disement ;  and,  by  the  end  of  the  year,  Maria  Theresa,  though 
unable  to  induce  the  Sardinians  or  the  English  or  the  Pope  to 
aid  her  in  substituting  Austrian  for  Spanish  influence  in  southern 
Italy,  was  at  least  in  secure  possession  of  all  her  territories,  and 
of  Modena  in  addition. 

The  improvement  in  the  outlook  for  Austria  was  not  con- 
fined to  central  and  southern  Europe.     In  Russia  the  Austrian 
prospects  were  improving  in  consequence  of  a  grow-   T^e  Failure 
ins:  coolness  between  the  Courts  of  St.  Petersburg   °^  French 

...       Policy  in 

and  Versailles.  Had  a  close  Franco-Russian  alii-  Russia.  The 
ance  been  made,  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  Peaceof  Abo. 
Maria  Theresa  to  have  detached  Frederick  from  the  coahtion. 
France  had  ever}'  reason  to  use  her  best  endeavours  to  presen-e 
her  friendship  with  Russia.  But  the  want  of  tact  shown  by 
the  French  Government  proved  disastrous  to  friendly  relations 
between  the  two  countries.  The  accession  of  Elizabeth,  itself 
a  triumph  of  French  diplomatic  skill,  was  a  victory  of  the 
Russian  as  opposed  to  the  German  party  ;  and  Alexis  Bestuzhev 
became  chief  minister.  The  position  of  affairs,  though  favour- 
able to  France,  required  skilful  handhng.  Russia  was  at  war 
with  Sweden,  and  Sweden  had  entered  upon  the  war  at  the 
instigation  of  France,  and  in  expectation  of  recovering  some  of 
her  lost  territory. 

On  Elizabeth's  accession  France  would  have  acted  wisely  in 
mediating  a  peace  between  the  two  countries  on  the  basis  of 
the  status  quo.  A  conference  between  Russia  and  Sweden  was 
opened  in  1742  at  St.  Petersburg,  but  the  French  Government 
adopted  a  most  unfortunate  and  ill-advised  policy.  Ch^tardie 
backed  up  the  Swedish  claims,  a  treaty  was  concluded  v^nth 
Denmark  in  March,  and  an  attempt  was  made  to  establish  a 
close  union  between  Denmark  and  Sweden,  while  the  French 


154  European  History,   17 1 5-1789 

envoy  at  Constantinople  exerted  all  his  efforts  to  form  an 
offensive  alliance  between  Sweden  and  Turkey.  A  letter  from 
Amelot,  the  French  minister,  to  the  envoy  at  Constantinople 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Russian  Government,  and  the  French 
intrigues  stood  revealed.  Bestuzhev  violently  opposed  Che- 
tardie,  French  mediation  was  dechned,  the  friendly  relations 
between  France  and  Russia  came  to  an  end,  and  Chetardie 
left  St.  Petersburg  in  June  1742.  The  peace  of  Abo,  concluded 
between  Russia  and  Sweden  on  August  17,  1743,  gave  Russia 
South  Finland  as  far  as  the  river  Kiumen.  Adolphus  Frederick, 
Administrator  of  the  Duchy  of  Holstein,  was  elected  Crown 
Prince  in  preference  to  the  Crown  Prmce  of  Denmark.  Thus 
Russia  prevented  all  possibihty  of  a  union  of  Sweden  and  Den- 
mark, and  assumed  her  influence  over  the  former  country.  In 
December  1743  Chetardie  returned  to  St.  Petersburg,  only  to 
be  ordered,  on  June  12,  1744,  to  leave  Russia  within  twenty- 
four  hours.  With  his  disgrace  all  chance  of  a  Franco-Russian 
alliance  disappeared  for  the  time ;  and  France,  deprived  of 
Russian  and  Prussian  support,  found  herself  attacked  by  Eng- 
land and  Austria. 

After  Frederick's    retirement   from    Moravia,    negotiations 

had,  by  means  of  Lord  Hyndford,  been  carried  on  between 

Prussia  and  Austria.     Frederick  probably  realised 

naries  of         that  with  England  and  Holland  about  to  enter  the 

Bresiau,  and   ^^^j.  ^^  French  chanccs  of  success  were  small,  and 

the  Treaty  ' 

of  Berlin,  that  his  bcst  coursc  was  to  make  peace.  Maria 
1742-  Theresa,  however,    was  anxious    to   try  again   the 

fortunes  of  war,  and,  after  some  preliminary  manoeuvres,  the 
two  armies,  commanded  respectively  by  Frederick  and  Charles 
of  Lorraine,  met  at  Chotusitz,  or  Czaslau,  in  Bohemia,  on  May 
17.  The  Prussians  gained  a  complete  victory  ;  Maria  Theresa 
consented  to  treat;  on  June  11,  1742,  preliminaries  for  peace 
were  signed  at  Bresiau ;  and  the  definitive  treaty  at  Berlin  on 
July  28.  By  this  treaty  Austria  yielded  to  Prussia  the  territories 
of  Upper  and  Lower  Silesia,  with  the  city  and  county  of  Glatz  ; 
the  principahties  of  Teschen,  Troppau,  and  Jagerndorf  being, 


The   War  of  tJic  Austrian   Succession  155 

however,  reserved  and  united  to  Bohemia.  Frederick  agreed 
to  withdraw  all  Prussian  troops  from  Bohemia  within  sixteen 
days,  and  to  be  responsible  for  the  repayment  of  a  loan  ad- 
vanced by  English  and  Dutch  capitalists  upon  the  revenues 
of  Silesia.  The  Prussian  king  had  secured  the  objects  for 
which  he  had  embarked  upon  war ;  as  the  fortunes  of  his  allies 
now  seemed  desperate,  he  felt  justified  in  deserting  them  and 
providing  for  the  safety  and  welfare  of  himself  and  his  country. 


CHAPTER    VII 

THE    AUSTRIAN    SUCCESSION    WAR  AFTER  THE    PEACE  OF 

BRESLAU 

I 742-1 748 

The  Defection  of  Prussia  and  Saxony  from  the  French  Cause  —  The  Retreat 
from  Prague  —  The  Death  of  Fleury  —  Failure  of  the  French  Attack  upon 
Austria  —  Louis  XV.  refuses  to  appoint  a  Successor  to  Fleury  —  The  Due  de 
Richelieu  —  The  Secret  Diplomacy  of  Louis  XV. — The  Austrians  secure 
Bavaria,  June  1743  —  The  Battle  of  Dettingen,  June  26,  1743  —  The  Project 
of  Hanau,  July  1743  —  The  Treaty  of  Worms,  Sept.  13,  1743J  — The  Treaty 
of  Fontainebleau,  Oct.  25,  1743  —  The  War  enters  upon  a  'New  Phase  — 
France  declares  War  upon  England,  March  15,  and  upon  Austria,  April 
4,  1744  —  The  War  in  Italy,  in  the  Netherlands,  and  on  the  Rhine  —  The 
Causes  of  the  Second  Silesian  War  —  The  Union  of  Frankfort  —  Treaty 
between  Prussia,  France,  and  the  Emperor — Marriage  of  the  Russian 
Grand  Duke  Peter  and  the  Princess  of  Anhalt-Zerbst —  Marriage  of  Ulrica 
of  Prussia  to  the  Heir- Apparent  of  Sweden — The  Second  Silesian  War  — 
The  Death  of  the  Emperor  —  The  Treaty  of  Fiissen  —  Isolation  of  Frederick 
the  Great  —  The  Battle  of  Fontenoy  —  The  Convention  of  Hanover  —  The 
Election  of  Francis  Stephen  as  Emperor  —  The  Treaty  of  Dresden  — 
DArgenson's  Failure  in  Italy  —  The  Battle  of  Bassignano  —  DArgenson's 
Italian  Project  —  The  Expulsion  of  the  French  and  Spaniards  from  North 
Italy  —  Death  of  PhiUp  v.,  July  9,  1746  —  The  French  Campaign  in 
Flanders  — Fall  of  DArgenson  —  The  War  in  1747  —  Revolution  in  Holland 
—  Close  of  the  War  —  The  Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  —  Relative  Position  of 
the  Great  Powers  in  1748  —  The  Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  only  a  Truce. 

The  Treaty  of  Berlin,  signed  July  28,  1742,  was  quickly 
followed  by  a  treaty  signed  on  September  7,  between  Saxony 
The  Defec-  ^^^  Austiia.  Belleisle's  schemes  for  the  dis- 
tion  of  memberment    of    Austria   were    ruined,    and    the 

Saxony  from    Spanish   prospects   in  Italy   seemed   likely   to    be 
the  French       seriously  affected.     The  defection  of  Prussia   and 

Cause.  ■' 

Saxony  from   the     French    cause    enabled    Maria 
Theresa  to  reinforce  the  Austrian  forces    in    Lombardy,    and 

156 


Austrian  War  after  the  Peace  of  B  res  laic       i^j 

left  the  French  troops  in  Bohemia  in  a  precarious  position. 
Fleury,  realising  the  danger,  endeavoured  to  bring  about  an 
arrangement  between  Elizabeth  Farnese  and  Charles  Emanuel, 
and  made  an  undignified  and  unsuccessful  attempt  to  con 
elude  peace  with  Austria.  Maria  Theresa  having  unwisely 
refused  to  listen  to  Fleury's  proposals,  and  having  published 
his  letters,  nothing  remained  for  the  French  Government  but 
to  extricate  the  Prague  garrison  by  means  of  energetic 
measures  in  Bavaria,  and  by  an  advance  on  the  part  of 
Maillebois  from  the  Lower  Rhine.  Encouraged  by  Barten- 
stein  and  Stahremberg,  Maria  Theresa  showed  her  usual  spirit, 
and  England  determined  upon  a  more  active  participation 
in  the  war.  The  advance  by  Maillebois'  corps  to  the  borders 
of  Bohemia  forced  the  Grand  Duke  Francis  to  raise  the  siege 
of  Prague,  and  enabled  Broglie,  with  eight  or  ten  thousand 
men,  to  escape. 

After  Maurice  de  Saxe  captured  Eger,  Maillebois  left  Prague 
to  its  fate,  and  joined  Broghe  in  Bavaria,  where  the  Emperor, 
owing  to  the  temporary  success  of  his  general,  The  Retreat 
Seckendorf,  against  the  Austrians,  had  been  again  from  Prague. 
enabled  to  occupy  INIunich  on  October  7,  and  to  recover  all 
Bavaria  except  Scharding  and  Passau.  The  situation  of 
Prague,  defended  by  18,000  men  under  Belleisle,  seemed 
desperate,  especially  when  Lobkowitz  with  reinforcements 
was  sent  to  strengthen  Festetics,  who  was  observing  the 
city  with  12,000  men.  Taking  advantage  of  the  care- 
lessness of  Lobkowitz,  Belleisle,  on  the  night  of  December 
16,  skilfully  retired  from  the  city  with  all  his  troops,  save 
5000  who  were  left  behind  under  Chevert.  After  suffering 
terrible  hardships  from  the  intense  cold  and  the  attacks 
of  the  enemy's  light  cavalry,  Belleisle,  who  showed  con- 
spicuous courage  during  this  famous  retreat,  succeeded, 
after  losing  1500  men,  in  reaching  Eger  on  December  27. 
Early  in  February  he  and  his  troops  safely  crossed  the  Rhine, 
while  in  the  meantime  the  firm  attitude  taken  by  Chevert 
had    secured    from    Lobkowitz    honourable    terms,    and    on 


158  European  History,   171 5-1789 

December  25  Austria  regained  possession  of  Prague,  Chevert 
and  his  garrison  retiring  to  Eger,  which  the  French  con- 
tinued to  hold. 

The  Austrians  had  thus  by  the  end  of  1742  practically 
recovered  Bohemia,  though  they  had  been  compelled  to 
rehnquish  most  of  their  conquests  in  Bavaria.  After  this 
disaster  to  the  French  arms,  Broglie,  who  had  superseded 
Maillebois  in  the  command,  made  an  unsuccessful  attempt 
to  recover  Passau,  while  the  Austrians  on  their  part  failed 
to  win  any  striking  success. 

Before  the  campaign  of  1743  opened,  two  events  occurred 
which  had  considerable  bearing  on  the  future  operations.  In 
The  Death  November  1742  Frederick  the  Great  signed  a 
of  Fieury.  defensive  alliance  with  England,  it  being  under- 
stood that  the  advance  of  the  Enghsh  army  into  Germany 
was  directed  not  against  the  Emperor  but  against  the  French. 
On  January  29,  1743,  Fieury  died  at  the  age  of  ninety-three, 
after  a  ministry  of  seventeen  years.  Though  the  principal 
aim  of  his  policy  was  peace  at  home  and  abroad,  he  had  with 
difficulty  allayed  for  the  time  the  ever-recurring  struggle  be- 
tween the  Parkffient  of  Paris  and  the  clergy ;  and  he  left 
France  involved  in  a  bitter  struggle  on  the  continent,  in  the 
colonies,  in  India,  and  on  the  sea. 

By  strict  economy  he  had  endeavoured  to  relieve  France, 
still  suffering  from  the  disastrous  financial  policy  of  Louis  xiv. 
and  the  Regent,  and  aided  by  Orry,  who  was  controller- 
general  from  1730  to  1745,  he  took  in  hand  the  work  of 
financial  reorganisation.  But  he  failed  to  remove  any  of  the 
most  pressing  evils,  or  the  more  flagrant  inequalities  in  the 
system  of  taxation,  and,  by  having  recourse  to  the  corvee  royale 
—  or  system  of  forced  labour  by  the  peasants  —  for  the  im- 
provement of  the  roads,  threw  an  additional  burden  on  the 
agricultural  districts,  and  added  one  more  to  the  many 
grievances  of  which  the  lower  orders  complained. 

His  most  successful  diplomatic  achievements  were  the 
Treaty  of  Seville,  the  establishment  of  Stanislas  Leszczynski 


Austrian   War  after  the  Peace  of  Breslau      159 

in  Lorraine,  with  the  reversion  of  the  duchy  to  France,  and  the 
Treaty  of  Belgrade.  He  had  placed  Spain  in  her  former 
position  of  dependence  on  France,  and,  though  allied  with  her, 
Louis  XV.  had  not  supported  the  Court  of  Madrid  energetically 
either  against  England,  or  in  its  Italian  enterprises.  Cautious 
and  h^lf-hearted,  French  policy  during  Fleury's  ministry  is 
devoid  of  clearness  and  consistency.  Militant  Bourbonism 
was  viewed  by  him  with  suspicion ;  intricate  negotiations  were 
his  delight ;  half  measures  were  the  result  of  his  deliberations.  • 

He  had  continued  the  policy  of  Dubois  and  Bourbon  with 
regard  to  England,  and  as  long  as  he  lived  open  hostilities  did 
not  break  out  between  the  two  countries.  He  had  even  suc- 
ceeded where  Dubois  and  Bourbon  had  failed,  in  bringing 
Spain  into  friendly  relations  with  both  England  and  France. 
But  though  he  never  cared  for  the  Spanish  alliance,  the  out- 
break of  war  between  England  and  Spain  in  1739  was  the 
beginning  of  the  end  of  a  political  system  which  had  been 
created  in  1 7 1 7  by  the  dynastic  exigencies  of  the  Houses  of 
Hanover  and  Orleans. 

To  the  war  party  at  the  French  Court  the  continuance  of 
the  English  alliance  was  as  distasteful  as  Fleury's  refusal  to 
return  to  the  policy  of  Henry  iv.,  Richelieu,  Mazarin,  and 
Louis  XIV.  towards  Austria.  Even  the  action  of  France  in  the 
Polish  Succession  War  did  not  satisfy  them.  In  their  opinion, 
when  Charles  vi.  established  the  Ostend  East  India  Company, 
Fleury  should  have  encouraged  Spain  and  the  Maritime  Powers 
to  force  the  Emperor  into  active  hostilities,  and  then  have 
aided  in  his  destruction.  In  their  opinion  Fleury  had  missed 
an  admirable  opportunity  of  inflicting  a  telling  blow  upon 
Austria  in  1 734,  when  the  French,  successful  in  Italy,  had 
captured  Philipsburg.  Contented  with  the  reversion  of  Lor- 
raine, he  had,  instead  of  finally  overthrowing  the  ancient  foe 
of  France,  guaranteed  the  Pragmatic  Sanction. 

His  conduct  four  years  later  was  also  bitterly  criticised. 
According  to  the  militant  party,  the  Cardinal,  instead  of  medi- 
ating the  Peace  of  Belgrade,  ought  to  have  united  with  Spain 


i6o  Ejiropeaii  History,   17 15-1789 

and  Sardinia  to  co-operate  with  the  Turks,  and  once  and  for 
all  to  have  destroyed  the  Austrian  power. 

Fleury's  whole  hne  of  policy,  therefore,  ran  counter  to  the 
views  of  Villars,  Chauvelin,  Belleisle,  and  their  supporters. 
So  far  from  aiming  at  the  destruction  of  the  Hapsburg  mon- 
archy, he  had  shown  in  1739,  and  again  in  1742,  signs  of  not 
being  averse  to  drawing  together  the  French  Bourbons  and  the 
Hapsburgs,  and  to  anticipate  the  work  of  Kaunitz.  But  cir- 
cumstances proved  too  strong  for  him,  and,  like  Walpole,  his 
hand  was  forced  by  the  war  party.  He  must  share  with  that 
party  the  blame  of  having  concentrated  all  the  attention  of  the 
French  Government  upon  the  continental  struggle,  when  the 
true  policy  of  France  was  to  have  left  the  Prussians  and 
Spaniards  to  protect  their  own  interests  in  Germany  and  Italy 
respectively,  and  to  have  devoted  all  her  resources  to  a  vigorous 
defence  of  the  French  colonies  and  establishments  in  India, 
North  America,  and  the  West  Indies.  Though  he  shares  with 
other  French  statesmen  before  and  after  him  the  charge  of 
shortsightedness,  he  stands  personally  guilty  of  the  grave  charge 
of  having  neglected  the  army  and  navy. 

Throughout  his  career  he  showed  no  appreciation  of  the 
important  issues  at  stake  between  England  and  France  in 
North  America  and  India  and  in  the  Mediterranean.  He 
never  seems  to  have  realised  that  a  struggle  between  the  two 
countries  was  inevitable,  and  that  one  of  the  first  conditions 
of  French  success  was  a  close  alliance  with  Spain.  Fleury 
stands  convdcted  of  a  fatal  want  of  foresight  at  a  most  critical 
epoch  in  French  history.  He  made  no  attempt  to  strengthen 
or  reconstruct  the  fleet,  he  took  no  steps  to  aid  in  the  reorgani- 
sation of  Spain,  and  to  encourage  Spanish  ministers  to  make 
their  navy  efiicient.  Till  his  death  he  devoted  all  his  energies 
to  skilfully  and  successfully  advancing  the  Bourbon  interests 
on  the  continent.  Had  French  colonial  interests  and  aspira- 
tions been  non-existent,  the  diplomatic  skill  shown  by  Fleury 
in  1729,  in  1735,  and  in  1739,  would  go  far  to  place  him  in 
the  rank  of  great  French  ministers.     But  his  subordination  of 


Austrian    War  after  the  Peace  of  Breslau      i^ 

the  \'ital  interests  of  France  to  the  lesser  important  continental 
ambitions  of  the  Bourbons,  his  bhnd  trust  in  diplomacy  to 
postpone  indefinitely  a  war  with  England,  his  utter  incapacity 
to  gauge  national  instincts  or  to  appreciate  popular  forces, 
resulted  in  the  break-down  of  his  policy,  in  his  inability  to  aid 
Spain  in  the  war  of  1739,  or  to  prevent  the  supremacy  of  the 
EngUsh  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  the  ultimate  triumph 
of  the  British  in  India  and  North  America.  He  left  France 
unable  to  give  the  Stuarts  any  efficient  aid,  or  to  provide  La 
Bourdonnais  with  a  strong  fleet,  without  which  French  success 
in  India  was  impossible.  In  spite  of  his  many  diplomatic 
successes,  Fleury's  foreign  pohcy  in  the  later  years  of  his 
•  career  was  totally  inadequate  to  the  needs  of  France.  And 
though  in  174S  the  French  frontiers  were  indeed  safe,  the 
position  of  France  in  North  America  and  in  India  had  been 
shaken.  The  rise  of  Prussia,  to  which  Fleury  and  his  succes- 
sors contributed,  was  a  doubtful  compensation  for  losses  at  sea 
and  in  the  colonies. 

Such  a  statesman  could  have  few  friends  in  his  own  country 
and  no  admirers  abroad.  Up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Austrian 
Succession  War,  France  benefited  from  his  knowledge  of  foreign 
pontics,  his  sagacity,  and  his  caution,  but  from  1740  his  fall 
was  almost  generally  desired.  In  Spain  his  half  promises  and 
half-hearted  alliance  incurred  the  contempt  of  Elizabeth  Far- 
nese,  who  recognised  that  the  so-called  Family  Compact  of  i  733 
had  proved  as  abortive  as  that  of  172 1.  He  failed  equally  to 
command  the  respect  of  the  English  ministers  or  the  confidence 
of  the  Sardinian  king. 

From  the  outbreak  of  the  Austrian  Succession  War,  the  pol- 
icv  of  Fleurv  and  Belleisle  had  proved  disastrous  to  the  French 
interests.     The  failure  to  attack  Vienna  was  a  seri-    Failure  of 
ous  blunder  ;  it  gave  Maria  Theresa  breathing  time,    ^uf/k  "pon 
and  proved  very  disastrous  to  the  French    cause.   Austria. 
Though   France    had   secured   the    election    of  the  Emperor, 
Charles  vii.  had  no  authority,  and  had  suffered  severe  reverses ; 
the  attack  on  Lombardy  had  failed ;  Frederick  the  Great  had 

PERIOD   VI.  ^ 


1 62  European  History,    171 5-1789 

withdrawn  from  his  aUiance  with  France  ;  Sardinia  was  prepar- 
ing to  vigorously  support  the  Austrian  cause ;  and,  with  the 
exception  of  the  loss  of  Silesia,  Maria  Theresa  had  upheld  the 

1    Pragmatic  Sanction  and    recovered    her   possessions.     France 

'  had  suffered  a  diplomatic  defeat  in  Russia,  and  the  Swedish 
war   had    proved   unsuccessful.     The    death    of  Walpole    had 

I  thrown  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  in  England  upon  Carteret, 
and  under  his  direction  an  English  army  was  about  to  take  an 

j  active  part  in  the  war,  which  had  now  entirely  changed  its 
character.  From  being,  on  the  part  of  England  and  Austria, 
a  war  to  resist  an  attempt  to  partition  the  Hapsburg  territo- 
ries, it  had  become  a  war,  from  the  English  point  of  view,  to 
free  Germany  from  the  French  armies,  and,  from  the  Austrian 
point  of  view,  to  take  vengeance  for  the  unprovoked  attacks  of 
Louis  XV.,  and  to  secure  adequate  compensation  for  the  loss 
of  Silesia  by  the  conquest  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  and  the  Three 
Bishoprics. 

Though  the  outlook  seemed  black  for  France,  some  comfort 
could  be  derived  from  the  lack  of  unanimity  between  the 
English  and  Austrians,  from  the  more  active  poHcy  of  Spain 
after  Fleury's  death,  and  from  the  attitude  of  Charles  Emanuel, 
who  was  fully  determined  not  to  continue  the  war  without  se- 
curing definite  promises  of  territorial  compensation  from  Aus- 
Louis  XV.  ^^i^-  I^  ^'^y  case,  a  capable  successor  to  Fleury 
refuses  to        ^y^s  urgently  demanded.     Louis  xv.,  not  recognis- 

appoint  a  .  ....  .        .         .  .    .    ^  .  , 

Successor  mg  the  Critical  situation  in  which  r  ranee  was  placed, 
to  Fleury.  declared  he  would  take  the  government  into  his 
own  hands,  and  that  the  Cardinal  should  have  no  successor. 
The  results  of  this  decision  were  disastrous.  All  unity  in  the 
administration  was  lost,  and  rival  claimants  contended  for  the 
chief  influence  over  the  king.  The  permanent  ministers  were 
the  Chancellor  d'Aguesseau ;  the  Controller-General  Orry ; 
Amelot,  minister  of  foreign  affairs ;  Maurepas,  minister  of  ma- 
rine ;  Count  d'Argenson,  minister  of  war.  Of  these  the  Count 
d'Argenson  had  come  into  office  on  the  death  of  the  Marquis 
de  Breteuil  on  January  7,  1743,  when  the  failure  of  Belleisle, 


Austnan    War  after  the  Peace  of  Breslati      163 

Noailles,  and  Broglie  rendered  energetic  measures  necessary. 
Throughout  his  ministry,  which  continued  till  February  i,  1757, 
he  showed  considerable  energy,  carried  out  many  excellent 
reforms,  and  by  his  active  co-operation  not  a  little  contributed 
to  the  \dctories  of  Marshal  Saxe.  Till  the  Marquis  d'Argenson 
was,  in  November  1744,  appointed  minister  of  foreign  affairs, 
the  home  and  foreign  policy  of  the  Government  was  mainly 
directed  by  the  Marshal  de  Noailles,  who  held  no  official 
position. 

Noailles,  who  had  married  one  of  Madame  de  Maintenon's 
nieces,  aimed  at  once  at  being  a  financier  and  a  soldier.  He 
aimed  at  rousing  Louis  from  his  lethargy ;  and  to  The  Due  de 
his  influence,  supported  by  that  of  the  Duchesse  de  Richelieu. 
Chateauroux,  was  due  the  king's  decision  to  place  himself,  like 
Louis  XIV.,  at  the  head  of  his  army.  Opposed  to  Noailles  was 
the  Due  de  Richeheu,  whose  influence  on  the  king  proved  most 
disastrous  to  the  interests  of  France.  Richelieu  represented 
the  worst  type  of  the  French  noble  class.  A  briUiant  man  of 
fashion,  and  the  friend  of  Voltaire,  he  had  in  his  youth  seen  life 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Regent  Orleans.  Thoughtless,  frivo- 
lous, and  vicious,  with  no  sense  of  responsibihty,  and  actuated  by 
no  patriotic  feelings,  Richeheu,  in  spite  of  his  personal  bravery 
and  military  instincts,  was  an  admirable  type  of  those  nobles 
who,  by  their  neglect  of  their  duties,  by  their  foohsh  support  of 
the  so-called  philosophic  movement,  by  their  general  incapacity, 
and,  above  all,  by  their  want  of  sympathy  with  the  classes  below 
them,  were  in  a  special  sense  answerable  for  the  revolution  which 
swept  them  away.  He  exercised  a  most  pernicious  influence 
over  Louis  xv.,  and  when  the  temporary  triumph  of  Noailles 
ended  with  the  king's  illness  at  Metz,  he  successfully  encouraged 
the  weak  monarch  to  devote  himself  to  a  life  of  pleasure,  and 
by  so  doing  dealt  a  fatal  blow  at  the  stability  of  the  royal  power 
in  France.  It  remains,  however,  true  that  though  his  popularity 
disappeared  after  his  illness,  and  though  the  disgrace  of  Noailles 
in  the  autumn  of  1 744  removed  a  good  influence  from  his  side, 
Louis  continued  to  take  in  international  questions  a  personal 


164  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

interest,  which  led  to  curious,  and,  for  France,  unfortunate 
developments. 

From  the  death  of  Fleury  began  the  famous  secret  corre- 
spondence of  Louis  XV.,  which  was  in  great  part  answerable  for 
the  weakness  of  French  foreign  policy  during  the 
Diplomacy  rest  of  the  reign.  Intelligent  in  many  respects,  the 
o  ouis  .  j[^jj^g  \^^^  certain  ideas  of  his  own  about  foreign 
policy.  Disliking  the  restraining  influence  of  his  regular  min- 
isters, he  attempted  to  carry  out  his  crude  schemes  by  means 
of  intrigue  and  a  system  of  deception.  Choosing  confidential 
agents,  he  opened  secret  communications  with  them,  and  issued 
instructions  which  often  ran  counter  to  the  official  orders  trans- 
mitted to  them  from  the  French  Foreign  Office.  Till  his  ill- 
ness at  Metz  in  1 744,  Louis  reigned  without  a  chief  minister, 
transacting  all  business  himself  through  the  agency  of  clerks. 
The  inconveniences  of  such  a  system  are  obvious,  and  it  was 
unlikely  that,  with  this  recrudescence  in  a  feeble  form  of  Louis 
XIV. 's  determination  to  be  his  own  minister,  the  French  arms 
could  hope  for  successes  against  the  Austrians  and  English  in 
1743  and  1744. 

The  year  1743  witnessed  three  campaigns  —  in  Bavaria,  in 
western  Germany,  and  in  Italy.  In  order  to  save  France  from 
The  invasion,  to  effect  if  possible  a  junction  with  Broglie, 

Austrians  ^^d  to  prevent  the  Pragmatic  Army  from  uniting 
Bavaria,  with  Prince  Charles  of  Lorraine  in  Bavaria,  Noailles 
June  1743.  |g^  ^^^  army  across  the  Rhine  and  advanced  between 
the  Neckar  and  the  Maine.  But  the  Bavarians  under  Secken- 
dorf  were  surprised  in  May  by  the  Austrians  under  Charles  of 
Lorraine,  acting  in  conjunction  with  the  columns  of  Kheven- 
huller  and  Lobkowitz  ;  and  Broglie,  refusing  to  give  Seckendorf 
any  assistance  or  to  wait  for  reinforcements  from  Noailles,  aban- 
doned Ingolstadt  and  Donauworth  without  striking  a  blow,  and 
recrossed  the  Rhine.  The  Bavarian  army  was  compelled  to  re- 
tire into  Suabia,  Munich  was  again  occupied  by  the  Austrians, 
the  Emperor  fled  to  Frankfort,  and  on  June  27  Seckendorf 
signed  the  Convention  of  Niederschonfeld,  by  which  hostilities 


Austrian    War  after  the  Peace  of  Breslau      165 

were  suspended,  the  neutrality  of  the  Bavarian  army  was  agreed 
to,  and  all  Bavaria  except  Ingolstadt  was  left  in  Austrian  hands 
till  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty.  Broglie's  irresolution  and  timid- 
ity had  resulted  in  the  abandonment  and  loss  of  Bavaria,  and 
he  soon  afterwards  fell  into  disfavour.  In  August  Eger,  the  last 
relic  of  the  French  invasion  of  Germany  in  1741,  was  taken  by 
the  Austrian  troops. 

In  western  Germany  the  French  arms  were  equally  un- 
successful. A  mixed  force  of  English,  Hanoverians,  and 
Hessians  had  entered  Germany  from  the  Nether-   ^^   „  ^ , 

■'  ^  ^  The  Battle 

lands  early  in  1743,  and  was  joined  in  March  by  ofDettingen, 
Neipperg,  and  in  April  by  20,000  Austrian  auxilia-  ^""^  ^^'  ^^^^' 
ries  under  the  Duke  of  Aremberg,  the  commander-in-chief  in 
the  Austrian  Netherlands.  These  troops,  known  as  the  '  Prag- 
matic Army,'  were  commanded  by  Lord  Stair,  who  had  served 
under  Marlborough.  The  presence  of  this  army  on  the  Rhine 
secured  the  election  in  April  of  an  Austrian  partisan  to  the 
See  of  Mainz. 

Having  obtained  from  Holland,  in  May,  the  promise  of 
20,000  men,  Sfeair  began  his  march  towards  Bavaria,  his 
intention  being  to  cut  BrogHe's  communications  with  France. 
But  Noailles  frustrated  this  design  by  seizing  the  Hne  of  the 
Neckar ;  and  Stair,  on  attempting  to  march  south-east  and 
join  Charles  of  Lorraine,  found  the  upper  waters  of  the  Maine 
in  the  hands  of  the  French.  On  June  20  George  11.  took  com- 
mand of  the  *  Pragmatic  Army,'  on  June  26  Noailles  blocked 
the  way  to  Hanau,  and  George  was  compelled  to  fight  the 
battle  of  Dettingen.  Though  the  news  of  the  battle  caused 
great  enthusiasm  in  England  and  Austria,  and  corresponding 
depression  in  Bavaria  and  Prussia,  no  important  result  flowed 
from  the  French  defeat.  Charles  of  Lorraine  prepared  to 
occupy  Alsace,  but  a  French  army  under  Coigny  proved  suf- 
ficient for  the  defence  of  that  province  ;  while  Noailles  and 
another  army  guarded  France  against  an  invasion  by  Wade, 
who  had  succeeded  Lord  Stair  in  the  command  of  the  English 
army.     The    French,  however,  had    been  driven  out  of  Ger- 


1 66  European  History y   1715-1789 

many ;  their  ally,  the  Emperor,  had  been  forced  to  make  a 
treaty  of  neutrality  with  the  Austrians  ;  while  in  Italy  Traun 
had,  on  February  8,  defeated  the  Spaniards  at  Campo  Santo, 
Don  Phihp  had  failed  to  penetrate  into  Piedmont ;  and  there 
seemed  every  probabiUty  of  an  advance  by  the  allies  into  the 
heart  of  France. 

While,  however,  matters  remained  in  this  balanced  con- 
dition, George  11.  and  Carteret  made  a  determined  effort  in 
The  Pro'ect  ^^^  ^°  bring  about  a  reconciliation  between  Maria 
of  Hanau,  Theresa  and  the  Emperor.  Known  as  the  Project 
Ju  y  1743-  q£  Hanau,  this  scheme  of  pacification,  which  re- 
ceived the  full  assent  of  the  Emperor  and  his  representative, 
William  of  Hesse-Cassel,  had  much  to  recommend  it  to  the 
German  princes.  Between  Austria  and  Bavaria  there  were  to 
be  mutual  renunciations  of  claims  and  mutual  restitutions  of 
territory.  While  Charles  vii.  retained  the  imperial  title,  he 
was  to  allow  the  validity  of  the  Bohemian  vote  ^  in  all  matters 
relating  to  the  Empire.  Bavaria  was  to  be  erected  into  a 
kingdom,  and  the  Emperor,  in  return  for  abandoning  France, 
would  receive  from  England  large  subsidies  equal  to  those 
which  he  was  then  drawing  from  France,  to  enable  him  to 
support  the  imperial  dignity. 

As  a  German  prince,  George  had  no  objection  to  seeing  the 
imperial  crown  in  other  hands  than  those  of  the  Hapsburgs, 
and  to  him,  as  Elector  of  Hanover,  an  admirable  opportunity 
now  presented  itself  for  supporting  the  rights  of  the  princes 
against  Austria,  of  bringing  about  the  general  pacification  of 
Germany,  and  of  uniting  the  Empire  against  France.  Though 
this  plan  might  appear  intelligible  and  even  statesmanlike 
to  the  inhabitants  of  Germany,  which  had  suffered  during  the 
previous  two  hundred  years  from  the  repeated  invasions  of  the 
French,  there  is  no  doubt  that  George,  in  regarding  the  situa- 
tion from  a  purely  German  point  of  view,  incurred  the  charge 

1  At  the  election  of  Charles  vii.  the  Bohemian  vote  had  been  expressly 
excluded  on  the  ground  that  Maria  Theresa  could  not,  as  a  woman,  either 
vote  or  transfer  her  vote  to  her  husband. 


Aiistriaii    War  afte7>  the  Peace  of  Breslau     167 

of  subordinating  the  interests  of  England  to  those  of  the 
Electorate  of  Hanover.  Carteret,  taking  advantage  of  the 
accident  which  gave  George  11.  a  position  in  the  Empire,  and 
ignoring  the  immense  importance  to  England  of  the  colonial 
and  maritime  issues  then  at  stake,  wished  not  only  to  return 
to  but  even  to  expand  the  policy  of  the  Whigs  in  Anne's  reign. 
Germany  united  was  to  hurl  itself  against  France,  and  to  com- 
plete the  work  interrupted  by  the  Peace  of  Utrecht.  Had 
this  policy  been  carried  out,  George  11.  would  have  appeared  as 
a  paramount  power  among  the  other  Electors,  and  as  one  of 
the  leading  princes  in  Germany. 

But  Frederick  the  Great  had  no  intention  of  acting  as  the 
subordinate  of  Hanover  ;  Maria  Theresa,  in  the  flush  of  victory, 
was  naturally  reluctant  to  grant  Charles  vii.  a  full   _^.   ^ 

-'  °  The  Treaty 

indemnity  for  the  past;  while  the  Whig  ministers,  of  worms, 
under  Henry  Pelham,  who,  on  the  death  of  \\'il-  ^^*'  ^^'  ^^'*^' 
mington  in  July,  had  become  prime  minister,  supported  by 
public  opinion,  were  distrustful  of  the  German  tendencies  of 
George  11.  and  Carteret,  disliked  the  idea  of  a  Hanoverian 
army,  and  refused  to  assent  to  the  proposed  arrangement  with 
Bavaria.  All  parties  in  England  denounced  the  very  idea  of 
paying  a  subsidy  to  Charles  w\.,  the  avowed  enemy  of  Maria 
Theresa  and  the  hereditary  friend  of  France.  The  real  enmity 
of  the  English  people  was  directed  against  France  and  Spain, 
and  war  at  sea  was  far  more  popular  than  land  operations  in 
Germany.  Carteret,  already  violently  opposed  in  the  cabinet, 
could  not  withstand  the  attacks  on  his  policy,  and  the  negotia- 
tions were  broken  off.  In  place  of  Carteret's  proposed  arrange- 
ments, the  English  cabinet  determined  to  bring  about  a  close 
alliance  between  Sardinia  and  Austria,  to  unite  closely  with 
Maria  Theresa,  and  to  carry  on  the  war  against  France  with 
vigour.  In  Italy  all  depended  upon  the  action  of  Charles 
Emanuel.  He  was  negotiating  with  the  French  and  Spanish 
Governments,  and  refused  to  join  the  Austrians  unless  definite 
territorial  compensation  was  assured  him.  He  demanded  Finale, 
Piacenza,  and  part  of  Pavia.    English  mediation  was  again  called 


l6S  European  History y   171 5-1 789 

in  to  adjust  this  difficulty,  and  to  put  pressure  upon  the  Court 
of  Vienna.  Maria  Theresa,  who  had  bitterly  resented  the  English 
attitude  with  regard  to  the  cession  of  Silesia,  was  furious  at 
this  second  attempt  of  England  to  force  her  to  make  unwelcome 
cessions  to  Sardinia.  During  the  negotiations  at  Worms  she 
held  out  firmly  till  Charles  Emanuel  threatened  to  accept  the 
French  proposals.  Recognising  most  reluctantly  the  necessity 
for  making  the  required  sacrifices,  Maria  Theresa  yielded,  and 
on  September  13  the  Treaty  of  Worms  was  signed  by  England, 
Austria,  Holland,  Sardinia,  and  Saxony,  all  of  whom  agreed  to 
uphold  the  Pragmatic  Sanction  and  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe.  Maria  Theresa  ceded  to  Charles  Emanuel  the  cities 
and  part  of  the  territories  of  Pavia  and  Piacenza,  Vigevano, 
Anghiara,  and  the  right  of  repurchasing  Finale  from  Genoa,  a 
right  reserved  by  Charles  vi.  when  he  bought  the  marquisate 
from  the  republic.  Charles  Emanuel  undertook,  with  40,000 
men,  the  armed  defence  of  Maria  Theresa's  dominions  in  Italy, 
and  the  Austrian  forces,  numbering  some  30,000,  were  placed 
under  his  command.  He  withdrew  all  claims  on  the  Duchy  of 
Milan,  and  by  some  secret  articles  arranged  with  Austria  for  the 
expulsion  of  the  Bourbons  from  Italy.  After  Don  Carlos  had 
been  driven  out  of  the  kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicihes,  Sicily  was 
to  be  given  to  Sardinia  and  Naples,  and  the  Tuscan  ports  to 
Austria.  In  order  to  facilitate  these  arrangements,  England 
agreed  to  advance  the  money  necessary  for  the  redemption  of 
Finale,  and  to  furnish  subsidies  during  the  remainder  of  the 
war.  Thus  the  lifework  of  Elizabeth  Farnese  was  endangered, 
and  southern  Italy  was  threatened  with  the  restoration  of  the 
unpopular  German  regifne. 

The  Treaty  of  Worms  was  at  once  met  by  the  counter  Treaty 

of  Fontainebleau  —  a  family  compact  between  France  and  Spain 

concluded  on  October  25  by  the  express  wish  of 

of  Fon-  Louis  XV.  himself.     In  spite  of  the  Treaty  of  1733 

tainebieau,      j^q  ^^^  alHancc  subsistcd  between  the  Courts  of 

Oct.  25,  1743. 

Versailles   and    IMadrid   during    Fleury's    lifetime. 
But   the  new  League   of  Worms,  in   itself  a  serious  blow  to 


Austrian    War  after  the  Peace  of  Brcslaii       i6^ 

France  and  Spain,  brought  the  two  Courts  together  pledged 
to  a  permanent  union.  Both  branches  of  the  House  of  Bourbon 
agreed  to  mutually  guarantee  their  possessions  present  or  future. 
France  recognised  the  somewhat  extensive  claims  and  rights  of 
Philip  and  Elizabeth  Farnese  to  portions  of  Italy,  and  under- 
took to  aid  in  the  conquest  of  the  Milanese,  Parma,  and  Pia- 
cenza  for  Don  Philip,  while  Gibraltar,  Port  Mahon,  and  Georgia 
were  to  be  retaken  from  England,  and  the  territory  given  to 
Savoy  by  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  from  Charles  Emanuel.  France 
agreed  to  declare  war  formally  upon  Sardinia  and  England,  and 
this  new  family  compact  was  to  remain  binding  on  both  parties 
till  by  common  consent  they  made  peace  with  their  enemies. 

With  the  Treaties   of  Worms   and   Fontainebleau  the  war 
entered  upon  a  new  phase,  and  the  European  contest  assumed 
a  more   inteUigible    form.     England,  no  longer  a  The  War 
mere  auxihary  of  Austria,  headed  a  great  league   ^"^^''^  "p°° 
against  France  and  Spain,  and  it  was  recognised  in   Phase. 
London  and  at  Versailles  that  the  questions  at  issue  involved 
not  merely  the  preservation  of  the  Pragmatic  Sanction,  but  the 
supremacy  of  the  sea,  the  superiority  of  the  Latin  or  Teutonic 
element  in  North  America,  and  the  growth  of  the  influence  of 
England  and  France  in  India.     Abandoning  the  sophisms  of 
Fleury,  France  stood  forth  as  the  rival  of  Austria  on  the  con- 
tinent, and  of  England  on  the  sea  and  in  the  colonies. 

A  fresh  impulse  was  now  given  to  the  war,  which  was  vigor- 
ously prosecuted  in  all  directions.  The  national  feeling  was 
roused  in  France  by  the  threatened  invasion  of  the  Austrians, 
and  by  the  ancient  hatred  of  England,  while  Philip  v.,  who 
shortly  before  the  Treaty  of  Worms  had  contemplated  the 
conclusion  of  peace  with  England,  was  stirred  up  to  fresh  exer- 
tions. In  October  1743  a  mixed  Spanish  and  French  force, 
which,  under  Don  Philip,  was  assembled  in  southern  France, 
occupied  Savoy,  and  attempted  without  success  to  force  its 
way  through  the  Alps.  Louis  xv.,  inspired  by  the  Duchess  of 
Chateauroux  and  Noailles,  determined  to  emulate  Louis  xrv., 
and  to  take  an  active  and  pcrsoml  share  in  the  campaigns; 


I/O  Etu'opeait  History ^   171 5-1 789 

and  the  year  1744  opened  with  many  indications  of  the  enthu- 
siasm felt  throughout  France  for  the  war. 

An  invasion  of  England  by  15,000  men  from  Dunkirk  on 
behalf  of  the  Pretender  was  attempted  by  Maurice  de  Saxe 
France  de-  at  the  beginning  of  1 744,  while  in  February  the 
Clares  War      combined  French  and  Spanish  fleets,  which  durinof 

upon  Eng-  -^  '  ° 

land,  March  the  greater  part  of  1743  had  been  blockaded  in 
triat^Aprn  V,  Toulon,  attacked  the  English  fleet  under  Matthews, 
1744-  and   gained    the   open   sea.     The  Brest  fleet   ap- 

proached the  English  coast ;  Kent  was  unguarded,  and  Eng- 
land only  owed  its  immunity  from  attack  to  a  violent  storm. 
War  was  formally  declared  against  England  on  March  15,  and 
against  Austria  on  April  4.  France  had  definitely  challenged 
England's  naval  and  commercial  supremacy,  and  Austria's 
claim  to  the  leadership  in  Europe.  Till  the  middle  of  the 
The  War  in  year  when  Frederick  the  Great  began  the  second 
Italy,  in  the  Silcsian  War,  the  principal  miUtary  operations  took 
and  on  the  placc  in  Italy,  in  Flanders,  and  on  the  Rhine.  In 
Rhine,  1744.  j^^jy  great  vigour  was  shown  by  both  sides  in  the 
north  as  well  as  in  the  south.  In  the  south  Lobkowitz,  the 
Austrian  general,  made  an  attempt  to  gain  Naples,  but  was 
foiled  by  the  efforts  of  Don  Carlos  aided  by  a  Spanish  army, 
and  was  defeated  at  Velletri.  In  the  north,  where  Gages  had 
superseded  Montemar  in  the  command  of  the  Spanish  troops, 
the  fighting  was  more  severe.  Gages,  however,  failed  to  cut  off 
the  retreat  of  Lobkowitz  to  the  Adriatic,  and  Don  Philip,  after 
a  desperate  attempt  to  conquer  Piedmont,  was  forced  to  retreat 
into  Dauphin^. 

But  though  the  results  of  the  year's  warfare  were  more  or 
less  balanced  in  Italy,  in  the  Netherlands  and  on  the  Rhine 
the  French  had  the  advantage.  In  May  a  large  and  formid- 
able army,  commanded  by  Maurice  de  Saxe,  though  nomi- 
nally headed  by  Louis  xv.,  who  was  still  under  the  influence  of 
Madame  de  Chateauroux,  set  out  to  combat  the  allied  forces. 
Want  of  unanimity  between  Wade,  Aremberg,  anel  Louis  of 
Nassau,  the  commanders  of  the  English,  Austrians,  and  Dutcli 


Aiistria?i    War  after  the  Peace  of  Breslau      171 

respectively,  coupled  with  the  withdrawal  of  several  English 
regiments  to  defend  England,  the  indecision  of  the  Dutch,  and 
the  lack  of  ability  among  the  generals,  favoured  the  advance 
of  the  French  army,  and  Courtrai,  Ypres,  Menin,  Fumes,  and 
other  fortified  places,  fell  easily  into  its  hands.  The  whole 
country  would  have  been  conquered  had  not  the  Austrian  in- 
vasion of  Alsace,  an  event  which  Frederick  the  Great  had  pre- 
dicted, recalled  the  main  portion  of  the  French  army  under 
Louis  XV,  While  the  Netherlands  were  being  invaded  by  the 
French  king,  Prince  Charles  of  Lorraine,  advised  by  that  cau- 
tious strategist  Marshal  Traun,  and  with  an  army  of  nearly 
70,000  men,  had  determined  to  conquer  Alsace.  Deceiving  a 
Bavarian  force  under  Seckendorf,  and  a  French  army  under 
Coigni,  the  Austrians,  by  a  series  of  skilful  and  rapid  move- 
ments, which  won  the  admiration  of  Frederick  the  Great,  success- 
fully crossed  the  Rhine  on  the  30th  of  June,  overran  Alsace, 
threatened  Luneville,  and  were  only  prevented  from  seizing 
Lorraine  by  the  advance  of  Louis  xv.  himself,  who  had  left 
Maurice  de  Saxe  in  the  Netherlands  with  45,000  men.  At 
Metz,  on  August  4,  Louis  was  seized  with  a  dangerous  illness, 
Madame  de  Chateauroux  was  forced  to  fly,  and  the  king's  re- 
covery was  the  signal  for  the  wildest  rejoicing.  He  received 
the  name  of  Bie7i  aime,  and  in  spite  of  the  return  of  Madame 
de  Chateauroux  to  favour,  which,  however,  was  followed  imme- 
diately by  her  death,  enjoyed  for  a  short  time  the  greatest 
popularity.  But  before  the  French  armies  under  Noailles  and 
Coigni  had  effected  a  junction  to  oppose  Prince  Charles  of 
Lorraine,  the  Austiians  had  been  called  away  to  defend  Bohe- 
mia from  an  attack  by  Frederick  the  Great,  while  Noailles,  who 
had  in  an  attack  upon  the  Prince  shown  great  incompetence, 
was  temporarily  disgraced. 

A  number  of  circumstances  had  concurred  in  deciding  Fred- 
erick to  again  attack  Austria.  The  continued  successes  of 
Maria  Theresa  during  1743  had  made  him  anxious.  The 
Treaty  of  Worms  amounted  in  his  opinion  almost  to  a  men- 
ace.   While  guaranteeing  various  treaties,  it  omitted  all  mention 


1/2  Eiiropean  History,   171 5-1789 

of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  by  which  he  held  Silesia.  In  December 
of  the  same  year  the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  between  Saxony  and 
The  Causes  Austria,  increased  his  suspicions,  for  in  that  docu- 
of  the  Second   T^^^it  the  Austrian  territories  had  been  guaranteed 

Silesian  ^ 

War,  1744.  without  cxccption.  There  was  no  doubt  that  Maria 
Theresa's  ambitious  projects  were  developing  in  a  manner 
dangerous  to  Prussian  interests.  She  almost  alone  of  all  Euro- 
pean rulers  had  no  wish  for  peace,  and  thirsted  for  further 
triumphs  and  additional  compensations  for  her  losses.  Not 
satisfied  with  the  reconquest  of  Bohemia  and  the  occupa- 
tion of  Bavaria,  she  hoped  to  regain  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  to 
incorporate  Bavaria  in  the  Austrian  territories,  to  set  aside 
the  late  imperial  election,  and  to  depose  the  Emperor.  Fred- 
erick, moreover,  had  every  reason  to  believe,  from  information 
from  Vienna,  that  she  was  determined  to  reconquer  Silesia. 
Fears  for  the  safety  of  his  newly  acquired  possessions  undoubt- 
edly had  a  large  share  in  forcing  upon  Frederick  the  necessity 
of  making  preparations  for  a  fresh  struggle,  but  his  well-grounded 
uneasiness  at  the  Austrian  attitude  towards  the  imperial  consti- 
tution must  also  be  taken  into  account. 

As  a  supporter  of  the  Emperor  Charles  vii.,  Frederick  bit- 
terly resented  the  Austrian  occupation  of  Bavaria  and  Maria 
Theresa's  treatment  of  the  Empire  as  if  it  were  an  hereditary 
possession  of  the  Hapsburgs.  Nothing  would  have  suited  the 
Court  of  Vienna  better  than  the  inclusion  of  Bavaria  within  the 
Austrian  territories,  and  the  policy  of  Maria  Theresa  towards 
the  House  of  Wittelsbach  anticipated  that  of  Joseph  ir.  in  1778 
and  1785,  and  of  Francis  11.  in  1793  and  1794.  A  compact 
Austrian  state  in  South  Germany  would  have  enormously  in- 
creased the  Hapsburg  influence,  and  in  a  corresponding  degree 
diminished  that  of  the  Hohenzollerns.  To  Frederick,  however, 
the  permanent  occupation  of  Bavaria  would  have  constituted 
an  act  of  usurpation  upon  the  rights  of  the  princes,  a  deliberate 
attack  on  the  imperial  institutions,  and  a  serious  danger  to  his 
own  kingdom  of  Prussia. 

From  the  beginning  of  1744  Frederick  the  Great  contem- 


Austrian  War  after  the  Peace  of  Ercslaii      173 

plated  the  near  approach  of  war  with  Austria,  and  with  its  out- 
break the  possibility  of  gaining  new  acquisitions  of  territory  for 
Prussia.     On  May  22  he  formed,  with  the  co-oner-    ^^    „  . 

■'  '  '■  The  Union 

ation  of  Changny,  the  French  ambassador  at  Mu-  of  Frankfort, 
nich.  and  one  of  the  ablest  and  most  experienced  ^^^  ^'^' 
diplomatists  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  Union  of  Frankfort, 
which  was  joined  by  the  Emperor,  Charles  Philip  of  Sulzbach, 
the  Elector  Palatine,  the  Landgrave  of  Hesse-Cassel,  and  by 
France  in  a  secret  article.  The  nominal  objects  of  this  league 
were  the  pacification  of  Germany,  the  restoration  of  Bavaria, 
and  the  recognition  of  the  Emperor. 

Though  not  accepted  by  many  German  princes,  and  though 
its  terms  did  not  contain  Frederick's  real  objects,  the  Union  of 
Frankfort  is  a  clear  indication  of  the  attitude  henceforth  adopted 
by  Frederick  with  regard  to  German  affairs,  and  enabled  him  to 
take  up  a  strong  position,  and  to  gain  considerable  sympathy 
and  support  as  a  defender  of  the  rights  of  the  princes  and  ot 
the  imperial  constitution.  Earlier  in  the  year  Frederick  had 
sent  Count  Rothenburg  on  a  secret  mission  to  the  Court  of 
Versailles ;  his  object  was  to  induce  France  to  consent  to  a 
treaty  with  Prussia,  in  accordance  with  which  Frederick,  in  re- 
turn for  rescuing  and  restoring  Charles  vii.,  was  to  receive  all 
Silesia  that  remained  in  Austrian  hands,  and  in  addition  part  of 
Bohemia.  Rothenburg  gained  the  support  of  the  Duchess  of 
Chateauroux,  of  Tencin,  and  of  Richelieu,  and  in  June  assisted 
in  the  overthrow  of  Amelot,  who  was  hostile  to  this  scheme. 
After  the  fall  of  Amelot,  who  had  been  secretar}'  for  foreign  affairs 
since  the  dismissal  of  Chauvelin  in  1737,  foreign  affairs  were 
managed,  till  the  appointment  of  the  Marquis  d'Argenson  in 
November,  by  an  informal  committee,  which  included  the  Count 
of  Cha\'igny,  Marshal  Xoailles,  and  Du  Teil,  the  chief  clerk. 
The  declaration  of  war  against  England  and  Austria  by  France 
in  March  and  April  was  in  accordance  with  Frederick's  wishes, 
and  was  followed  by  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  between  Prussia, 
France,  and  the  Emperor,  for  the  division  of  the  conquests 
made    from    Austria.     France   was   to   receive    several   strons 


174  European  History,   171 5-1789 

places  in  the  Netherlands,  Charles  vii.     Upper  Austria  and  all 

Bohemia,  except  the  circles  of  Koniggratz,  Leitmeritz,  Pardu- 

bitz,  and  Bunzlau,  which,  with  that  portion  of  Si- 
Treaty  be-  .  ^ 
tween  Prus-     Icsia   which  was    not    yielded    to    Prussia    by   the 

sia,  France,     Treaty  of  BerHn,  were  to  be  handed  over  to  Fred- 

and  the  -^  ' 

Emperor,  erick.  The  arrangements  with  France  were  com- 
June  5.  pleted  by  a  m.ihtary  convention  concluded  at  Paris 

on  June  5.  The  French  king  agreed  to  invade  the  Netherlands 
and  Hanover,  and  to  follow  Prince  Charles  of  Lorraine  should 
he  return  to  Austria  to  resist  Frederick,  who  on  his  part  under- 
took, on  the  conclusion  of  treaties  by  France  with  Russia  and 
Sweden,  to  invade  Bohemia  in  August  with  an  immense  army. 
A  secret  treaty  with  the  Emperor  on  July  24  completed  Fred- 
erick's arrangements,  Charles  vii.  undertaking  to  assign  the  four 
Bohemian  counties  to  Prussia  as  soon  as  Bohemia  had  been 
conquered  and  handed  over  to  him.  The  failure  of  the  Union 
of  Frankfort  to  arouse  any  enthusiasm  in  Germany  for  the  Em- 
peror, or  to  attract  many  members,  and  its  subsequent  decline, 
more  than  justified  Frederick's  policy  in  turning  to  France, 
where  public  opinion  was  running  strongly  against  the  Austrian 
cause. 

Besides  securing  the  alliance  of  France,  the  King  of  Prussia 
had  found  means  to  strengthen  his  position  in  various  other 
ways.  The  death  of  Charles  Edward,  Prince  of  East  Friesland, 
on  May  25,  enabled  Frederick  to  rapidly  occupy  that  province 
in  right  of  claims  recognised  by  the  Emperor  in  1686.  Emden 
the  capital  was  taken,  the  administration  of  the  fief  was  reor- 
ganised on  a  Prussian  basis,  and  the  claims  of  Holland  and 
Hanover  were  ignored.  But  it  was  from  the  side  of  Russia 
Marriage  of  ^^at  Frederick  was  most  anxious  to  avert  the  pos- 
the  Russian     sibUity  of  attack.     His  continued  distrust  of  Russia, 

Grand  Duke  •' 

Peter  and  SO  Completely  justified  during  the  Seven  Years'  War, 
o^  Anhai"^^  had,  amoug  other  considerations,  led  him  to  aug- 
Zerbst.  meut  his  army  very  considerably,  and  to  increase 

his  war  fund  during  the  years  succeeding  the  Peace  of  Breslau. 
A  Russian  invasion  of  Prussia  in  1741  would  have  been  disas- 


Anstriafi   War  after  ihe  Peace  of  Brest  an      175 

trous  to  Frederick's  schemes,  and  was  only  prevented  by  the 
Swedish  war.  To  avert  the  possibiHty  of  such  an  invasion  in 
the  future  became  the  subject  of  the  king's  most  anxious 
thoughts.  The  Russian  Chancellor  Bestuzhev  headed  an  influ- 
ential party  opposed  to  Prussia,  and  it  was  not  till  the  end  of 
the  year  —  November  12,  1742  —  that  Russia  acceded  to  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin.  With  infinite  skill  Frederick'.!  diplomatic 
agents  succeeded  in  assuaging  the  Russian  hostility,  and  in 
bringing  about  better  relations  between  the  two  countries,  by 
securing  for  the  heir  to  the  Russian  throne,  the  Grand  Duke 
Peter  of  Holstein-Gottorp,  a  bride  in  the  person  of  Sophia, 
Princess  of  Anhalt-Zerbst,  who,  on  entering  the  Greek  Church, 
took  the  name  of  Catherine,  and  became  one  of  the  most 
famous  rulers  of  Russia.  The  betrothal  took  place  in  February 
1744;  the  anti-Prussian  influence  of  Bestuzhev  was  temporarily 
checked  :  and  Frederick  hoped  that  no  danger  was  to  be 
apprehended  from  Russia  during  the  ensuing  compaign  against 
Austria. 

With  Sweden  Frederick  had  long  been  desirous  of  estabhsh- 
ing  close  relations,  hoping,  if  occasion  required,  to  use  that 
countrv  as  a  restraint  upon  Russia.     Nesfotiations   ,,     . 

^  o  Marriage  of 

were  opened  with  the  Court  of  Stockholm  for  a  mar-    uinca  of 
riage  and  political  alliance,  and  met  with  success.   the^He1r-° 
In  June  1 744  Frederick's  sister  Ulrica  was  married   Apparent  of 

...  .  ,  11/-^  r    Sweden. 

to  the  heir-apparent  of  Sweden,  and  the  Court  of 
Stockholm  entered  cordially  into  friendly  relations  with  Prussia. 

A  friendly  understanding  with  Sweden  was  all  the  more 
important  since  Frederick  found,  by  the  summer  of  1744,  that 
he  could  not  hope  for  a  Russian  alliance.  The  French  envoy 
Cht^tardie,  who  had  lately  returned  to  Russia,  was  ordered  to 
leave  the  country  in  June,  and  Bestuzhev's  influence  was  re- 
stored. France  found  herself  unable  to  carry  out  the  terms 
of  the  treaty  of  June  5,  and  the  Prussian  king  had  the  techni- 
cal right  of  declining  to  fulfil  his  engagements. 

Realising,  however,  the  unappeasable  hostihty  of  Maria 
Theresa,  and  her  fixed  resolve  to  reconquer  Silesia,  sensible 


176  European  History ^   1715-1789 

of  the  latent  jealousy  of  George  11.  as  Elector  of  Hanover, 
and,  above  all,  profoundly  convinced  of  the  innmense  impor- 
Summary  of  tance  to  Prussia  and  to  Germany  of  recovering 
Frederick's  Bavaria  from  the  Hapsburg  grasp,  and  reinstating 
entering  the    Elcctor  to  his  position   among   the   indepen- 

Second  Si-  ^^"^  princcs  of  the  Empire,  Frederick  the  Great, 
lesian  War.  in  spite  of  the  possibility  of  Russian  opposition,  and 
■n  spite  of  the  inability  of  France  to  carry  out  the  terms  of  her 
ngagement,  decided  to  execute  the  treaty  of  June  5,  and  pre- 
pared to  invade  Bohemia  in  order  to  relieve  France  from  the 
Dresence  of  Charles  of  Lorraine  and  his  enormous  army.  He 
was  resolved,  while  curbing  the  ambitious  and  revolutionary 
policy  of  Maria  Theresa  within  the  Empire,  to  establish  his 
hold  firmly  upon  the  whole  of  Silesia,  and  to  win  a  portion  of 
Bohemia. 

Frederick's  plan  of  operations  was  very  simple.  One  French 
army  was  to  operate  in  the  Netherlands,  and  as  soon  as  his 
^^    „  attack  on  Bohemia  had  led  to  the  retirement  of 

The  Second 

Siiesian  Charlcs  of  Lorraine  from  Alsace,  a  second  French 

^'''  army  was  to  pun  ue  the  retreating  Austrians.     On 

August  7  the  Prussian  envoy  Dohna  declared  to  the  Chancellor 
at  Vienna  Frederick's  intention  of  supporting  the  Emperor  and 
the  constitution  of  the  Empire;  on  August  15  the  Prussian 
army  began  its  march  upon  Prague.  Avoiding  Dresden,  so  as 
not  to  rouse  open  hostility  from  that  quarter,  Frederick's  army, 
in  four  columns,  advanced  through  Saxony  into  Bohemia,  and, 
in  spite  of  numerous  difficulties,  besieged  and  took  Prague  on 
September  16.  By  the  advice  of  Belleisle,  who  had  recovered 
some  of  his  influence  and  was  in  the  Prussian  camp,  Frederick, 
against  his  own  judgment,  decided  to  advance  southwards,  con- 
quer the  whole  of  Bohemia,  and  threaten  Vienna.  This  deci- 
sion proved  disastrous.  Batthyani,  \\ith  his  irregulars,  cut  the 
Prussian  communications ;  Augustus  of  Saxony  carried  out  the 
Treaty  of  Vienna  of  December  1743,  and  sent  20,000  men  to 
Maria  Theresa's  assistance ;  while  the  return  of  the  Austrian 
forces,  under  Charles  of  Lorraine  and  Traun,  from  Alsace,  and 


Austrian   War  after  the  Peace  of  Bveslati      177 

their  junction  with  Batthyani  at  Mirotitz  on  October  2,  placed 
the  Prussian  army  in  great  peril.  The  Austrians  had  recrossed 
the  Rhine  on  August  13,  in  face  of  the  armies  of  Noailles  and 
Coigny,  and  on  September  10  had  reached  Donauwortb. 
The  French  had  made  no  serious  attempt,  in  accordance  with 
the  terms  of  their  treaty  with  Frederick,  to  follow  them  and  to 
harass  their  retreat.  Noailles  contented  himself  with  sending 
reinforcements  under  Segur  into  Bavaria,  and  in  besiegir'^ 
Freiburg ;  while  Seckendorf,  aided  by  S^gur  and  troops  froin 
Hesse  and  the  Palatinate,  busied  himself  with  reconquering 
Bavaria  and  in  restoring  Charles  vii.  to  his  dominions.  Fred- 
erick was  left  to  his  fate.  Traun,  placing  himself  between  the 
Prussian  king  and  Prague,  outmanoeuvred  the  Prussians,  and, 
with  admirable  strategy,  forced  Frederick  to  give  up  Prague, 
and,  discomfited  and  discredited,  to  evacuate  Bohemia,  and  to 
retire  into  Silesia.  Thither  the  Austrians  penetrated  in  the 
winter  of  1744-45,  after  Frederick  had  returned  to  Berlin,  but 
only  to  be  driven  out  in  January  by  Leopold  of  Dessau.  At 
the  close  of  1 744  Frederick  found  himself  attacked  by  the  full 
force  of  the  Hapsburg  monarchy,  and  had  learnt  too  late  how 
little  his  French  allies  could  be  depended  upon.  He  had 
deserted  them  in  1742  ;  they  deserted  him  in  1744. 

The  campaign  had  not  been  disastrous  to  Frederick  alone  : 
though  the  Austrians  had  regained  Bohemia,  they  had  lost 
all  Bavaria  except  Ingolstadt,  Scharding,  and  Braunau,  and 
on  the  23d  of  October  the  Emperor  had  returned  to  Munich. 
The  French  had  taken  Freiburg ;  Marshal  Saxe  kept  possession 
of  his  conquests  in  the  Netherlands  ;  the  ^Marquis  -.^^  j^ 
d'Argenson  had,  on  November  18,  become  min-  the  Emperor, 
ister  of  foreign  affairs.     Still,  at  the  beginning  of  ^°'  ^'''^^' 

1745  the  Austrian  fortunes  looked  brighter  than  did  those  of 
the  Prussian  king,  who  was  weary  of  the  war  and  ready  to 
accept  any  terms  which  would  leave  him  in  possession  of 
Silesia.  On  January  20,  1745,  two  months  after  the  capture 
and  imprisonment  of  his  supporter  Belleisle  by  the  English, 
the  Emperor  Charles  vii.  died  in  his  forty-eighth  year,  over- 

I'ERIOD    VI.  M 


178  European  History,   171 5-1789 

whelmed  with  anxiety,  disappointment,  and  disease.  His 
death  dealt  a  serious  blow  to  French  policy,  and  brought  to  an 
end  the  Union  of  Frankfort.  Frederick  the  Great  could  no 
longer  pose  as  the  defender  of  the  rights  of  the  Emperor ;  he 
was  more  exposed  than  ever  to  the  hostility  of  Austria;  while 
France,  like  Prussia,  having  lost  that  moral  basis  of  its  cause 
which  was  derived  from  the  support  given  to  Charles  vii.,  could 
only  see  in  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war  any  chance  of  an 
honourable  peace.  The  effects  of  the  death  of  the  Emperor 
seemed  likely  to  be  far-reaching.  In  France  pubUc  opinion  be- 
gan to  declare  against  entanglements  in  central  Europe,  since 
experience  had  shown  the  folly  of  engaging  in  the  quarrels  of 
Germany.  In  England  the  fall  of  Carteret,  one  of  the  most 
brilliant  foreign  ministers  of  the  eighteenth  century,  was  fol- 
lowed by  the  reunion  of  the  Whig  party  and  by  the  adoption 
and  extension  of  the  poHcy  advocated  by  the  fallen  minister. 
Though  the  Hanoverian  troops  were  dismissed,  the  system  of 
subsidising  the  German  states  was  largely  developed.  The 
Governments  of  England  and  France  found  themselves  unable 
to  shake  themselves  free  from  political  engagements,  and  the 
war  continued  on  its  former  lines.  The  IMarquis  d'Argenson, 
who  had  in  November  1744  become  minister  of  foreign  affairs 
in  France,  indulged  in  vast  schemes  of  foreign  poHcy,  and 
looked  forward  to  the  time  when  France  should  again  have  a 
commanding  influence  in  Europe.  He  put  forward  Augustus  - 
III.,  the  Saxon  King  of  Poland,  as  a  candidate  for  the  imperial 
throne,  and  at  the  same  time  an  attempt  was  made  to  preserve 
French  influence  in  Bavaria.  The  efforts  of  Chavigny,  who 
„,    _  was  still  the  French  ambassador  at  Munich,  were 

The  Treaty 

of  Fussen,  neutralised  by  d'Argenson's  refusal  to  supply  the 
April  22, 1745-  (iiestitute  young  Elector  with  money,  and  by  Maria 
Theresa's  insight  and  energy.  With  the  instinct  of  a  states- 
man she  at  once  recognised  the  advantages  of  her  position, 
showed  herself  as  determined  to  secure  her  husband's  election 
to  the  imperial  dignity  as  she  was  to  regain  Silesia,  and  resolved 
as  a  preliminary  step  to  these  ends  to  force  upon  the  young 


Austrian  War  after  the  Peace  of  Breslau      1 79 

Elector  a  reconciliation.  Maximilian  Joseph  was  only  eighteen 
years  old ;  his  mother  was  a  Hapsburg,  and,  with  Seckendorf^ 
was  in  favour  of  peace  with  Austria.  While  he  hesitated  to 
accept  the  terms  offered  by  Colleredo,  the  Austrian  representa- 
tive, which  amounted  to  a  status  quo  ante,  Maria  Theresa  poured 
her  troops,  under  Batthyani,  into  BaYaria.  On  March  24  they 
crossed  the  Inn,  droTe  the  French  contingent  out  of  Bavaria, 
and  threatened  Munich,  while  the  Elector  fled  to  Augsbuig. 
Deserted  by  the  French,  with  his  country  in  Austrian  hands, 
and  threatened  by  an  advance  on  the  part  of  Aremberg  south- 
wards, he  was  obliged  to  submit. 

On  the  2  2d  of  April  the  Treaty  of  Fussen  was  signed  be- 
tween the  young  Elector  and  Maria  Theresa.  By  it  Bavaria 
was  gained  to  the  Hapsburg  interest,  and  the  Bavarian  vote 
was  secured  for  Francis  Stephen  on  the  ensuing  imperial  elec- 
ron.  Maximilian,  while  recognising  the  Pragm:.::;  S3.r.:rion, 
was  not  compelled  to  ally  with  Austria  against  Piussia  and 
France,  though  by  a  secret  article  he  engaged,  in  return  for  a 
subsidy  equal  to  that  granted  formeriy  by  France  to  his  father, 
to  supply  12,000  troops  to  the  Maritime  Powers. 

The  e5r:ts  of  the  subjugation  of  Bavaria  ir.  1  :r.e  Treaty  of 
J-  _..  : -:e  at  once  seen.  The  German  sen:  :  er:  ■' vays 
5  :  r ;  lie  on  the  score  of  French  interference,  ex  : r  5 r :  : 5 e'f 
i::  :r  rings  in  Bavaria  at  the  expulsion  of  S^gu:  :  .  ^  ; 
tingent,  while  throughout  the  small  states  of  Gerr.  :  :.  _  :  : 
reaction  in  fevour  of  Austria  set  in.  At  the  Ha  ^7  :  e  enthu- 
siasm for  the  continuance  of  the  ^.-.r  ::  re  .-t  :  r  'r  the 
Elector  of  Saxony,  yielding  :o  :he  ;r:-.:i^:„zi  ^;  Ilaria 
Theresa's  minister,  allowed  his  ha::ri  ::  :r.e  King  of  Prussia 
fiill  play,  and  hastily  promised  to  ratify  the  Treaty  of  Warsaw, 
to  support  the  election  of  Francis  Stephen,  and  to  send 
troops  to  aid  Austria  in  the  ensuing  campaign.  In  con- 
sideration of  these  services  he  was  to  receive  Schwiebus  from 
Austria,  and  further  territorial  compensation  at  the  Prussian 
expense. 

On  the  iSth  of  May  the  Treaty  of  Warsaw,  which  had  been 


i8o  European  History ^   17 15-1789 

arranged  in  January,  was  ratified.  Austria  and  Saxony  were 
united  on  a  permanent  basis.  Both  Powers  agreed  to  partition 
^    ,  ^.       ,     Prussia  and  to  reduce  Frederick's  kinajdom  to  the 

Isolation  of  ° 

Frederick  Hmits  of  the  ancicnt  Margraviate  of  Brandenburg, 
t  e  reat.  Maria  Theresa  had  thus  succeeded  in  securing  the 
Bavarian  and  Saxon  votes,  and  in  isolating  Frederick.  The 
loss  of  the  Bavarian  alliance  had  been  a  serious  blow  to  the 
King  of  Prussia ;  the  policy  of  aggression  and  spoliation  agreed 
upon  by  Austria  and  Saxony  constituted  a  grave  danger. 
Though  d'Argenson  continued  his  hopeless  attempts  till  the 
eve  of  the  election  in  September  to  induce  Augustus  to 
become  a  candidate  for  the  imperial  dignity,  Frederick  the 
Great  saw  clearly  the  hopelessness  of  such  a  project,  and 
the  impossibility  of  gaining  the  adhesion  of  Augustus,  who  was 
himself  dependent  on  Austria,  while  his  ministers  were,  like 
the  Electors  of  Koln  and  Mainz,  in  the  pay  of  England.  He 
was  surprised  when  he  heard  of  the  French  determination 
to  continue  the  war ;  he  had  hoped  for  the  intervention  of 
England  in  favour  of  a  general  pacification.  No  assistance  or 
friendly  mediation  could  be  obtained  from  Russia,  for  the 
Tsarina  had  in  April  declared  she  would  no  longer  be  a  guar- 
antor of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin ;  while  England's  attempt  to  in- 
duce Austria  to  consider  the  question  of  peace  failed  utterly. 
Frederick  was  left  to  his  own  resources  and  to  the  valour  of 
his  soldiers.     The  fate  of  Silesia  hung  in  the  balance. 

Before  the  Austrian  attack  was  made,  France  had  won  the 
battle  of  Fontenoy  on  May  11,  and  had  to  some  extent  re- 
^,    „     ,     ,   stored  the  military  reputation  of  the  French  soldiers. 

The  Battle  of  . 

Fontenoy,  Maillcbois  had  been  sent  into  Italy  with  one  army  ; 
May  II,  1745.  (--Q^^^j  ys'i^^x  a  sccond  defended  Alsace ;  while 
Maurice  de  Saxe  with  a  third,  accompanied  by  Louis  xv.,  set 
forth  to  the  Netherlands.  In  making  his  principal  elTort  in 
Flanders,  Louis  and  his  ministry  were  acting  in  full  accord 
with  the  popular  wish.  In  abstaining  from  interference  in 
the  Empire,  and  in  profiting  by  the  quarrel  in  Germany  to 
extend  her  frontiers,  France  was  pursuing,  if  not  an  honour- 


Austrian  War  after  the  Peace  of  Breslau      i8l 

able,  at  least  an  intelligible,  policy.  In  spite  of  Frederick's 
sarcasm  that  the  capture  of  Tournay  would  be  as  useful  to 
him  as  the  siege  of  Babylon  by  Thamas-Chouli-Khan,  Saxe, 
on  April  30,  besieged  Tournay.  The  allied  forces  were  under 
Cumberland,  who  was  ably  seconded  by  the  Austrian  Konigs- 
tgg,  while  the  Dutch  troops  were  under  the  Prince  of 
Waldeck.  Cumberland  and  Konigsegg  made  a  desperate  at- 
tempt to  raise  the  siege  of  Tournay,  and  fought  on  May  11 
the  battle  of  Fontenoy,  which,  owing  to  the  inaction  of  the 
Dutch,  ended,  in  spite  of  the  heroism  of  the  English  and 
Hanoverians,  in  a  partial  victory  for  Marshal  Saxe.  Cum- 
berland was  compelled  shortly  afterwards  to  return  to  England 
on  account  of  the  Jacobite  ri.^ing,  and  the  French,  under 
Lowendahl,  fortunate  in  the  withdrawal  of  English  troops, 
found  httle  difficulty  in  capturing  Tournay,  Ghent,  Bruges, 
Oudenarde,  Dendermonde,  Ostend,  Nieuport,  and  Ath.^ 

Frederick  had  been  himself  opposed   to   campaigns  in  the 
Netherlands  which  could  not   be    of  any    senice    to    him   in 
Bohemia,    and    had    consistently   advocated    the    winning    of 
victories  in  Germany.     But  the  news  of  the  victor)-  of  Fonte- 
noy encouraged  him  to  hope  that  possibly  the  Enghsh  might 
now  be  induced    to    make    peace.     Fontenoy   had,  however, 
hardly  been  fought  before  the  combined  Austrian  and   Saxon 
armies,   75,000    strong    and    commanded    by    Prince    Charles, 
entered  Silesia.     \Vith    70.000    men    Frederick    defeated    the 
Prince  at  Hohenfriedberg  on  June  5,  and,  follow- 
ing the  enemy  into  Bohemia,  remained  encamped   veinion"of 
near  Koniggratz  for  three  months,  hoping  France   Hanover, 
would  declare  war  on  Saxony  and  send  Conti  into   the^Eiectlon 
Germany.     He  was  still  anxious  for  peace.     His   °^  Francis 

1  J        1  ij  J         Stephen  to 

resources  were  exhausted ;    he  could  get  no    ade-  the  imperial 
quate  monev  srrant  from  the  French  ;  while,  upon   J^^'o^^- 

^  -     ^  ?  '      r  Sept.  13, 1745. 

the  retirement  of  Conti  and  his  army  across  the 

Rhine  shortly  after  Fontenoy,  there  was  not  a  French  soldier 

1  For  much  of  the  later  portion  of  the  war  in  Germany  see  Due   de 
Broglie,  Marie  Thcresr,  Imperatrice.      2  vols. 


1 82  Etiropemt  History,   171 5-1 789 

left  in  Germany,  and  Saxony  had  no  longer  to  fear  the  pos- 
sibility of  French  intervention.  On  the  other  hand,  Maria 
Theresa's  forces  dominated  Frankfort,  where  the  election  of 
the  Emperor  was  to  be  held,  and  the  Austrian  Government 
was  well  supphed  with  English  subsidies. 

From  his  desperate  position  Frederick  was  partially  relieved 
by  George  11.  England  was  in  the  throes  of  the  Jacobite 
rebellion,  and  the  English  troops  in  Germany  were  required 
to  defeat  Charles  Edward,  who  had  landed  in  England  on 
August  4.  Fearing  to  leave  Hanover  exposed  to  the  attacks 
of  the  Prussian  king,  George  11.  on  August  26  signed  the 
Convention  of  Hanover,  guaranteeing  for  himself  and  his  alHes 
the  maintenance  of  Frederick  in  Silesia,  and  confirming  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin.  But  the  pacific  tendencies  of  the  English 
king  were  not  seconded  by  his  alhes.  The  attempted  media- 
tion on  the  part  of  England  in  favour  of  peace  by  Robinson, 
the  English  envoy  at  Vienna,  begun  a  month  previously,  met 
with  no  success  at  the  hands  of  Uhlfeld ;  and  on  September  13 
the  Grand  Duke  Francis  Stephen  was  elected  Emperor  as 
Francis  i. 

Maria  Theresa  had  secured  one  of  her  two  great  aims. 
It  remained  for  her  to  regain  Silesia.  The  Convention  of 
Hanover  had  infuriated  her  against  her  treacherous  friend 
England,  from  whose  alliance  she  felt  released,  and  while 
Briihl  suggested  to  the  Marquis  de  Vaulgrenant  the  establish- 
ment of  friendly  relations  between  Austria  and  France, 
Chavigny  was  writing  on  the  13th  of  September  from  Munich 
The  End  of  that  Chotek,  the  Austrian  minister  in  that  city, 
the  Second      ]^^^  g^j^  ^.q  ^^  Saxon    ambassador    that  *  it    was 

Silesian 

War,  and  the  the  first  time  the  Courts  of  Vienna  and  Ver- 
Dresden  sailles    should    draw    together.'      The    opposition 

Dec.  25, 1745.  of  Louis  XV.  and  d'Argenson,  however,  rendered 
the  Austrian  overtures  fruitless,  and  the  Franco-Prussian  alli- 
ance remained  intact. 

On  the  30th  of  September  Frederick,  while  retiring  from 
Koniggratz,  again  defeated  the  Austrians  at  Sohr,  and  con- 


Austrian    War  after  the  Peace  of  Breslaii      1S3 

tinued  his  retreat  into  Silesia.  The  Austrians,  however,  ignor- 
ing the  approach  of  winter,  to  the  surprise  of  Frederick,  who 
had  returned  to  Berhn,  where  he  received  a  declaration  that 
Russia  would  not  permit  any  attack  on  the  dominions  of 
Augustus  III.,  proposed,  in  conjunction  with  the  Saxons,  an 
invasion  of  Brandenburg.  Hearing,  through  the  indiscretion 
of  Count  Briihl,  of  this  daring  design  of  Maria  Theresa  against 
him,  Frederick  determined  to  brave  the  danger  of  a  Russian 
onslaught  and  to  attack  Saxony.  Suddenly  falling  on  Prince 
Charles'  army  in  Saxon  Lusatia,  he  overthrew  it  on  Novem- 
ber 23  in  the  battle  of  Gross  Hennersdorf,  and  drove  it  into 
Bohemia;  while,  on  December  15,  the  Prince  of  Dessau,  hav- 
ing taken  Leipsic,  defeated  a  combined  Austrian  and  Saxon 
army  under  Count  Rutowski,  a  half-brother  of  Marshal  Saxe,  at 
Kesselsdorf,  near  Dresden ;  and,  three  days  later,  Frederick 
entered  the  Saxon  capital,  where  he  charmed  all  by  his  moder- 
ation and  affability.  At  this  crisis  Harrach,  the  Austrian  min- 
ister in  Dresden,  who  hated  Frederick,  made  a  definite  offer  to 
Vaulgrenant  for  a  French  alliance.  But  neither  Louis  xv.  nor 
d'.\rgenson  was  as  yet  prepared  to  revolutionise  French  for- 
eign poHcy,  and  on  December  2-^,  i  745,  the  Treaty  of  Dresden 
ended  the  second  Silesian  War.  The  Convention  of  Hanover 
was  confirmed,  and  the  cession  of  Silesia  was  secured  to  Fred- 
crick,  who  agreed  to  recognise  the  new  Emperor. 

The  second  Silesian  War  is  of  enormous  importance  in  the 
history  of  Prussia,  which  was  only  saved  from  a  serious  disaster 
by  the  audacity  of  Frederick  himself.  At  its  close  he  was  again 
recognised  as  sovereign  of  Silesia,  and  the  influence  of  Prussia 
in  Germany  was  secured.  To  France  the  Treaty  of  Dresden 
was  an  unpleasant  surprise.  The  Prussian  king  had  again 
broken  with  France,  and  Louis  xv.'s  policy  had  suffered  a 
severe  blow,  more  severe  than  the  previous  disasters  of  the 
year  1745,  the  loss  of  Bavaria,  the  Convention  of  Hanover,  the 
election  of  Francis  i.  It  was  only  in  Flanders  and  in  Italy  that 
France  could  look  for  successes,  and  in  the  latter  country  a 
serious  calamity  was  awaiting  her  in  1 746. 


184  Etu'opcan  History y   171 5-1789 

Maria  Theresa's  acquiescence  in  the  Treaty  of  Dresden,  as 
unexpected  as  that  of  Louis  xiv.  in  the  Treaty  of  Ryswick,  had 
^,.  been  caused  by  the  arrival  of  the  news  of  the  loss 

D  Argen-  -' 

son's  Failure   of  Milan  and  the  threatened  loss  of  the  Italian  prov- 
^  ^'  inces  of  Austria.     The  year  1 745  was  disastrous  to 

the  Hapsburg  cause  in  Italy.  France,  closely  united  to  Spain 
by  the  Treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  had  sent  Maillebois  with  a 
French  army  to  co-operate  with  the  Spanish  forces  under  Don 
Philip.  Genoa,  anxious  to  save  Finale  f^om  Sardinia,  had  allied 
with  Spain,  and  Gages  iji  February  1745  forced  Lobkowitz  to 
retire  from  Papal  territory  to  Modena.  There  Lobkowitz  was 
superseded  by  Schulenberg,  while  Gages  was  ordered  to  march 
to  Genoa  to  join  the  combined  French  and  Spanish  armies 
under  Maillebois  and  Don  Philip.  Elizabeth  Farnese  was 
intent  on  the  conquest  of  the  Milanese,  but  though  nominally 
supported  by  the  French,  her  aims  met  with  no  sympathy  from 
the  Marquis  d'Argenson.  The  new  French  minister  of  foreign 
affairs  did  not  approve  of  the  Treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  and 
^u  o  ..,     r   wished  to  break  off  the  close  connection  between 

The  Battle  of 

Bassignano,  Francc  and  Spain.  But  the  impetuosity  of  Eliza- 
ept.  27, 1745.  ^^^^  carried  all  before  it.  In  August  Schulenberg 
and  Victor  Emanuel  stationed  themselves  at  Bassignano,  while 
the  Spaniards,  aided  by  a  strong  Genoese  force,  took  Tortona, 
Parma,  Piacenza,  and  Pavia  before  the  end  of  September,  and 
threatened  Milan.  Schulenberg,  alarmed  for  the  safety  of  the 
Milanese,  left  Victor  Emanuel,  who  cared  only  to  protect  his 
territories,  and  hurried  to  defend  the  capital  of  Lombardy. 
Gages  thereupon  attacked  the  King  of  Sardinia,  now  deprived 
of  Austrian  help,  won  the  battle  of  Bassignano  on  September 
2  7,  and  began  the  conquest  of  Lombardy,  in  opposition  to  the 
wish  of  the  French  commanders,  who  urged  the  reduction  of 
Piedmont.  While  Maillebois  and  Lasci  blockaded  Alessandria, 
Gages,  having  taken  Casale,  entered  Milan  on  December  16, 
though  the  citadel  still  held  out.  Prince  Lichtenstein,  who  had 
superseded  Schulenberg,  finding  it  necessary  to  remain  with 
Victor  Emanuel  in  Piedmont,  in  order  to  keep  him  true  to  the 


Austria  ft    War  after  the  Peace  of  Breslaii      185 

Austrian  alliance,  was  unable  to  oppose  the  Spanish  advance, 
and  the  campaign  proved  calamitous  to  the  Hapsburgs.  These 
disasters  to  the  Austrian  and  Sardinian  cause  had  a  twofold 
effect.  Maria  Theresa  recognised  the  necessity  of  making 
])eace  with  Prussia  in  order  to  strengthen  the  Austrian  forces 
i.i  Italy,  while  Victor  Emanuel,  not  altogether  without  reason, 
;;ttributed  his  losses  to  the  engrossing  interest  shown  by  Maria 
Theresa  in  her  contest  with  Prussia,  to  the  desire  of  the  Haps- 
burgs to  defend  the  Milanese,  and  to  the  insufficient  number  of 
Austrian  troops  in  Italy.  Feeling  that  Austria  had  treated  him 
unfairly,  he  began  to  listen  to  d'Argenson's  proposals,  and  con- 
sidered the  advisability  of  deserting  his  alliance  with  the  Haps- 
burgs and  making  peace  with  France.  As  long  as  Sardinia  was 
allied  with  Austria  and  subsidised  by  England,  she  remained 
the  great  barrier  to  Bourbon  extension  in  Italy.  The  defeat  at 
Bassignano,  and  the  fall  of  the  town  of  Alessandria  on  the  12  th 
of  October,  forced  upon  Charles  Emanuel  the  necessity  of 
reconsidering  his  position.  The  traditions  of  Piedmontese 
policy  demanded  the  maintenance  of  a  balance  between  the 
Hapsburgs  and  the  Bourbons.  In  the  autumn  of  1745  he 
could  no  longer  rely  on  effective  Austrian  assistance,  and  when 
d'Argenson  opened  negotiations  with  him  in  the  hope  of  de- 
stroying the  Austro-Sardinian  alliance,  Charles  Emanuel  felt 
bound  to  give  them  his  consideration. 

D'Argenson  had  already  carefully  drawn  up,  to  his  own  sat- 
isfaction, a  '  Project  for  forming  a  republic  and  a  lasting  associ- 
ation of  Italian  Powers  '  on  the  model  of  Germany,   D'Argen- 
Switzerland,  and  the  United  Provinces,  and  to  drive    project^and 
back  '  beyond  the  Alps  all  foreign  rule  in  order  to   its  Failure, 
estabhsh  a  federal  bond  among  the  sovereigns  of  Italian  nation- 
ality.'    This  scheme  for  the  regeneration  of  Italy  is  interesting 
in  the  history  of  Italian  independence ;  but  was  impracticable 
at  that  time,  and  was  recognised  as  such  by  Charles  Emanuel 
and  his  advisers.     Don  Carlos  could  not  be  expected  to  retire 
from  Naples,  nor  Don  Philip  to  resign  his  claims  on  Parma  and 
Piacenza.     There  was  no  demand  in  Italy  for  national  union. 


l86  EtiropeaJi  History,   1715-1789 

and  Charles  Emanuel  preferred  the  shadowy  imperial  suzerainty 
to  the  risk  of  being  exposed  to  French  dictation.  D'Argenson's 
earlier  proposals  in  September  that  France,  Spain,  and  Sardinia 
should  unite  to  expel  the  Austrians,  were  cordially  received  ; 
but  after  Bassignano,  the  fall  of  the  town  of  Alessandria,  and 
the  startling  progress  of  the  Bourbon  arms,  Charles  Emanuel 
allowed  the  negotiations  to  be  resumed.  On  December  26 
Gorzegno,  the  Sardinian  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  recognis- 
ing the  necessity  for  making  terms  with  the  victorious  Bourbons, 
signed  at  Turin  a  memorandum  which  set  out  the  conditions  to 
which  France  and  Sardinia  could  agree.  These  merely  touched 
upon  the  division  of  the  Austrian  possessions  in  Italy  between 
Sardinia,  Don  Philip,  Venice,  Modena,  and  Genoa.  Champeaux, 
the  French  agent,  who  had  been  sent  to  Turin  to  detach  Charles 
Emanuel  from  the  Austrian  alliance  and  offer  him  the  Milanese, 
returned  to  Paris  with  the  document.  Montgardino,  the  Sar- 
dinian ambassador  at  the  French  capital,  declined,  however,  to 
discuss  the  terms  of  peace,  and  Champeaux  was,  on  January  20, 
again  sent  to  Turin  to  obtain  a  final  settlement  and  to  convert 
the  preliminaries  of  peace  into  a  definite  treaty,  while  d'Argen- 
son  wrote  to  Maillebois,  telhng  him  that  secret  negotiations 
were  on  foot,  and  that  he  must  simply  stand  on  the  defensive. 
The  Spanish  Government  was  at  the  same  time  informed  of 
the  negotiations  which  were  proceeding.  In  Spain  the  utmost 
indignation  prevailed,  and  negotiations  were  opened  with  Aus- 
tria ;  while  in  France  the  policy  of  d'Argenson  was  subjected  to 
the  most  scathing  criticism.  At  Turin  the  Sardinian  ministers 
were  convinced  that  d'Argenson's  object  was  not  so  much  the 
freedom  of  Italy  as  the  aggrandisement  of  France,  and  that  in 
view  of  the  establishment  of  Don  Carlos  in  the  south,  and 
the  probable  establishment  of  Don  Philip  in  the  north  of 
Italy,  the  expulsion  of  the  Austrians  would  be  a  serious 
calamity  for  the  rulers  of  Piedmont.  In  these  views  they 
were  strengthened  by  events  in  England  and  Germany.  The 
reverses  of  Charles  Edward  freed  the  English  Government 
from  its  pressing  embarrassments ;  while,  on  the  very  day  that 


Atistrian  War  after  the  Peace  of  Breslan      187 

the  preliminaries  of  Turin  were  signed,  the  Treaty  of  Dresden 
was  being  concluded. 

On  January  4,  1 746,  news  of  the  close  of  the  second  Silesian 
War  reached  Turin;  on  January  13  the  Sardinian  Court  was 
informed  that  30,000  Austrian  troops  were  marching  to  Italy. 
The  best  policy  for  Charles  Emanuel  was  obviously  to  prolong 
the  negotiations  for  a  few  weeks.  He  had  insisted  on  a  sus- 
pension of  arms,  and  d'Argenson,  completely  overreached  by 
the  Court  of  Turin,  signed,  on  Febniary  17,  1746,  the  famous 
armistice,  *  without  making  a  single  condition  or  reservation, 
and  allowing  the  insertion  of  a  special  stipulation  for  the  imme- 
diate raising  of  the  siege  of  Alessandria.'  The  suspension  of 
arms  was  to  last  till  the  end  of  February. 

On  February  28  the  younger  Maillebois,  appointed  plenipo- 
tentiary at  Turin,  arrived  at  Briangon  with  orders  to  publish 
the  armistice  at  Turin.  But  the  Sardinian  king  was  by  this 
time  master  of  the  situation.  The  Austrian  troops  under 
Browne  were  approaching,  and  on  March  4  the  Count  de 
Maillebois,  then  at  Rivoli,  having  been  hoodwinked,  and  his 
father  the  ^Marshal  completely  bewildered,  the  Sardinian  troops, 
under  the  Baron  de  Leutrum,  captured  Asti  on  March  8,  and  a 
few  days  later  the  siege  of  Alessandria  was  raised,  and  the  Span- 
ish besieging  force,  under  Lasci,  retired  to  Tortona.  For  a 
second  time  since  the  opening  of  the  Polish  Succession  War, 
the  House  of  Savoy  had  declined  the  French  offer  to  make 
the  King  of  Sardinia  the  leading  Power  in  an  independent 
Italy. 

The  Spanish  Court,  which  with  difficulty  had  been  persuaded 
to  sign  the  armistice  on  the  8th  of  March,  was  furious,  and  the 
feeling  in  Paris  stirred  up  by  the  fall  of  Asti  ran   ^^    ^ 

°  .  .  The  Expul- 

strongly  against   d'Argenson.      Louis   xv.,  carried   sion  of  the 
away  by  the  general  feeling,  reversed  the  policy  of  Spaniards'* 
d'Argenson,  sent  Noailles  to  conciliate  the  Spanish   from  North 

It£llv* 

Court,  and  Maillebois  was  ordered  to  act  in  subor- 
dination to  the  Spanish  generals.     But  these  attempts  to  propi- 
tiate   Spain  failed.     The    ill-feehng  and  suspicions  roused  by 


1 88  Europe a7i  Histoiy^   171 5-1789 

d'Argenson's  policy  rendered  united  action  between  the  French 
and  Spanish  forces  impossible,  and  the  Sardinians  and  Austri- 
ans,  with  few  exceptions,  carried  all  before  them.  The  evacu- 
ation of  Milan  on  March  19,  and  of  Parma  and  other  places  by 
the  Spaniards,  was  followed  by  the  blockade  of  Don  PhiHp  and 
Gages  in  Piacenza  by  the  Austrians.  On  June  14  Maillebois 
came  to  Don  Philip's  assistance,  and  the  next  day  the  battle  of 
Piacenza  was  fought,  the  advantage  being  on  the  side  of  the 
Austrians,  who  were  only  prevented  by  dissensions  with  the 
Piedmontese  from  cutting  off  the  retreat  of  the  allied  army. 
The  Austrian  Court  gave  up  the  negotiations  with  Spain  into 
which  it  had  entered  secretly  the  previous  year ;  before  the  end 
of  1 746  the  French  and  Spaniards  were  driven  into  France ; 
and,  while  Charles  Emanuel  took  Finale  and  Savona,  the  Aus- 
trians entered  Genoa  in  September. 

These  disasters  to  the  Bourbon  cause  were  in  great  measure 
the  result  of  Philip  v.'s  death,  which  took  place  on  July  9.  His 
son,  by  his  first  marriage,  Ferdinand  vi.,  replaced  the  capable 
Gages  bv  the  incompetent  Las  Minas,  who  insisted  on  retreat- 
ing into  Savoy,  though  the  quarrels  between  Botta  —  who  had 
succeeded  Lichtenstein  in  the  command  of  the  Aus- 

Death  of 

Philip  V  ,  trian  army  —  and  Victor  Emanuel  offered  an  excel- 
juiy  9, 1746.  Yq^^i  opportunity  for  retrieving  the  late  disasters  to 
the  Bourbon  cause.  After  the  capture  of  Genoa  the  Austrians 
and  Sardinians  differed  as  to  the  future  course  of  the  campaign. 
The  Austrian  Court  wished  to  take  advantage  of  it?  splendid 
position  in  North  Italy  in  order  to  drive  the  Spaniards  out  of 
South  Italy,  and  to  recover  the  Two  Sicilies ;  Charles  Emanuel 
was  strongly  opposed  to  any  further  aggrandisement  of  the 
Hapsburgs.  The  weight  of  English  influence,  however,  in  view 
of  the  victories  of  Marshal  Saxe  in  the  Low  Countries,  which 
rendered  a  diversion  of  the  utmost  importance,  was  cast  in 
favour  of  an  invasion  of  Provence  and  the  capture  of  Toulon, 
the  great  French  naval  arsenal. 

The  skill  of  Belleisle,  who  commanded   the   French  army, 
the  rising  of  the  Genoese,  the  misconduct  of  the  Marquis  du 


Austrian   War  after  the  Peace  of  Breslau      189 

Botta,  the  Austrian  commander-in-chief,  and  the  recurrence  of 
dissensions  between  the  Austrians  and  Piedmontese,  ruined  the 
success  of  the  invasion  into  Provence,  which  took  place  in  No- 
vember, and  the  alhes  in  February  1747  were  forced  to  retreat. 
Though  the  French  had  failed  in  Germany  and  in  Italy  in  1746, 
they  could  congratulate  themselves  on  the  collapse  of  the  inva- 
sion of  Provence,  and  on  their  successes  in  Flanders. 

In  January  1 746  a  proposed  invasion  of  England  or  Scotland 
by  the  Due  de  Richelieu  and  11,000  men,  on  behalf  of  Charles 
Edward,  though  it  caused  a  certain  amount  of  anxiety  in  Eng- 
land, had  come  to  nothing ;  but  before  the  end  of  the  month 
Marshal  Saxe  had  invested  Brussels,  and  on  February  20  the 
Governor,  Count  Kaunitz,  surrendered,  and  Saxe  returned  in 
triumph  to  Paris.  The  political  importance  of  the  fall  of  Brus- 
sels was  great.  Holland  was  apparently  at  the  mercy  of  the 
French,  and  d'Argenson  had  it  in  his  power  to  force  the  States- 
General  either  to  remain  neutral  or  to  make  a  separate  peace 
with  France.  The  success  of  his  poUcy  depended  upon  imme- 
diate action  before  England  had  time  to  send  an  effective  force 
to  the  aid  of  Holland.  Instead  of  showing  any  energy,  d'Argen- 
son, occupied  in  his  complicated  negotiations  in  Italy,  contented 
himself  in  discussing  wdth  the  Dutch  envoy.  Was-  The  French 
senaer,  the  bases  of  a  sreneral  peace,  and  the  cam-    ^ampaign  m 

'  .  Flanders, 

paign  was  resumed  in  the  Netherlands.  The  siege  1746. 
of  Antwerp  was  witnessed  by  Louis  xv.,  and  after  the  capture 
of  the  town  the  citadel  surrendered  on  June  3,  while  Mons  and 
Charleroi  fell  shortly  afterwards.  The  serious  nature  of  the 
situation  was  now  appreciated  by  the  Austrian  Court ;  while 
the  victory  of  Culloden,  on  April  16,  enabled  the  Enghsh  to 
turn  their  attention  to  the  Netherlands,  and  in  view  of  the 
French  successes  in  the  Low  Countries,  to  send  an  expedition 
to  Brittany  in  September.  An  attempt  to  take  L'Orient  failed, 
and  Marshal  Saxe  continued  his  victorious  career.  Commanded 
by  the  incapable  Charles  of  Lorraine,  the  allied  army  suffered 
a  series  of  disasters.  Namur  was  lost ;  and  on  October  1 1 
Saxe  won  the  battle  of  Raucoux,  and  the  campaign  ended  with 


IQO  European  History,    171 5-1 789 

the  whole  of  the  Austrian  Netherlands,  except  Limburg  and 
Luxemburg,  in  the  hands  orAustnaT)  f^/^  i{  (jy     (  • 

Though  successful  in  theTCetKerlands,  the  French  policy  in 
Italy  had  failed ;  and  the  relations  between  France  and  Spain 
had  become,  since  the  death  of  Philip  v.  in  July  1746,  more 
strained  than  ever. 

Deprived  of  her  Bavarian  ally  by  the  Treaty  of  Fiissen, 
deserted  by  Prussia,  and  unable  to  hold  her  own  against  Eng- 
land on  the  sea  and  in  the  colonies,  France  might  well  recog- 
nise the  desirability  of  bringing  the  war  to  a  conclusion.  The 
fall  of  the  Marquis  d'Argenson,  on  the  nth  of  January  1747, 
removed  one  of  the  greatest  obstacles  to  peace. 

The  blame  of  the  Bourbon  failure  in  the  north  of  Italy  had 
been  universally  attributed  to  the  minister,  and  his  conduct  dur- 
ing the  negotiations  with  Charles  Emanuel  had  justified  the 
severest  criticisms  of  his  enemies.  His  Spanish  policy  had 
made  him  many  foes,  while  he  had  been  unfortunate  in  incur- 
ring the  dislike  of  Marshal  Saxe,  through  opposition  to  the  lat- 
The  Fall  of  ^^^'^  schemcs  in  the  Netherlands.  Saxe  wished  to 
d'Argenson.  carry  the  war  into  Dutch  territory,  and  to  force 
o  icy.  {j.Q^  ^j^g  Government  of  the  Hague  a  special  and 
separate  peace.  The  appointment  of  the  Prince  of  Conti  to  be 
generahssimo,  though  it  was  none  of  d'Argenson's  doing,  had 
still  further  alienated  the  Marshal,  who  united  with  ^ladame  de 
Pompadour  and  Conti  himself,  and  supported  by  the  influence 
of  Spain  and  Saxony,  and  the  council  of  ministers,  made  a  suc- 
cessful attempt  to  overthrow  the  unsuspecting  statesman.  It 
only  required  a  memoir,  drawn  up  by  Noailles  and  presented 
to  the  king  on  December  15,  1746,  to  put  the  finishing  touch 
to  the  long  series  of  intrigues  against  d'Argenson.  In  the  me- 
moir he  was  accused  of  having  thrown  himself  into  the  arms  of 
the  Dutch,  of  having  offended  Spain,  and  of  having  humiliated 
France.  He  was  charged  with  *  ignorance,  presumption,  in- 
discretion, and  gross  neglect,'  and  the  whole  blame  of  the 
political  situation  of  France  was  laid  upon  his  shoulders. 
Frederick  the  Great  regarded  him  with  contempt,  and  having 


Austrian   War  after  the  Peace  of  Brcslau       191 

made  many  foes  and  no  friends,  d'Argenson's  ministry  came  to 
an  end  on  January  11,  1747. 

The  basis  of  his  poHcy  was  the  Prussian  alHance.  '  The 
alliance  of  France  and  Prussia,'  he  said,  *  is  a  system  whose 
foundations  ought  to  be  immovable.'  This  conviction  caused 
the  failure  of  the  negotiations  with  Austria  in  1745,  which,  had 
they  been  successfully  carried  out,  would  have  anticipated, 
much  to  the  advantage  of  France,  the  revision  of  alliances  in 
I  756.  His  plan  for  the  regeneration  and  emancipation  of  Italy 
by  means  of  the  establishment  of  an  Italian  federation  —  admi- 
rable in  its  conception  —  would  have,  if  carried  out  at  that  time, 
simply  reduced  Italy  to  a  province  of  France.  But  while  to 
Chauvelin  the  independence  of  the  Italian  peninsula  was  simply 
a  means  for  the  expulsion  and  consequent  abasement  of  the 
Hapsburgs,  to  d'Argenson  it  was  an  end  desirable  in  itself 
The  failure  of  his  attempt,  which  itself  reflects  honour  on  his 
memory,  placed  a  weapon  in  the  hands  of  the  friends  of  Spain 
in  the  French  Court,  and  paved  the  way  for  his  downfall. 

In  his  relations  with  Spain  d'Argenson  represented  the  lack 
of  enthusiasm  felt  in  France  for  the  aims  of  Elizabeth  Farnese, 
while  that  absence  of  cordiality  in  the  relations  between  the 
two  countries,  which  he  had  inherited  from  Fleury,  was  con- 
tinued by  his  successor.  He  had  acted  with  reference  to  the 
Treaty  of  Fontainebleau  as  Fleury  had  acted  towards  the  Treaty 
of  the  Escurial,  and  like  his  predecessor  he  was  regarded  with 
detestation  by  the  Spanish  Court. 

Though  his  adherence  to  the  policy  of  antagonism  to  Austria 
and  England  was  intelligible,  d'Argenson's  general  views  were 
not  such  as  commended  themselves  to  men  like  Marshal  Saxe 
and  the  majority  of  Frenchmen.  He  held  that  increase  of 
territor}'  would  be  a  source  of  weakness  to  France,  and  desired 
to  see  Louis  xv.  in  the  position  of  'arbiter  and  paternal  pro- 
tector of  all  Europe.'  As  long  as  Prussia  was  confirmed  in  its 
possession  of  Silesia,  and  Austria  correspondingly  weakened, 
France  ought  in  his  opinion  to  be  satisfied.  On  these  grounds 
he  was  willing,  in  a  general  pacification,  to  restore  all  the  French 


192  European  History,   171 5-1789 

conquests  in  return  for  Cape  Breton  Island.  *  D'Argenson's  in- 
contestable superiority,'  writes  the  Due  de  Broglie,  '  lay  in  an 
intelligence  wide  enough  to  seize  on  grand  general  ideas ;  but, 
unfortunately,  it  was  of  little  use  in  politics  for  want  of  other, 
less  elevated  qualities  ;  practical  common-sense,  power  of  gaug- 
ing possibilities,  knowledge  of  men.' 

An  honest  minister,  he  was  no  statesman,  and  was,  moreover, 
unable  to  cope  with  the  diplomacy  and  intrigues  of  the  day. 
His  unmistakable  opposition  to  the  secret  efforts  of  Conti  to 
secure  the  Polish  throne  on  the  death  of  Augustus,  brought  on 
him  the  hostility  of  that  prince,  while  his  devotion  to  the  King 
of  Prussia  arrayed  against  him  the  powerful  influence  of  Bnihl, 
who  recognized  that  the  fall  of  d'Argenson  was  a  necessary 
preliminary  to  an  alliance  between  France  and  Saxony,  which 
should  lead  to  peace  with  Austria.  After  the  death  of  Philip 
V.  of  Spain  and  his  daughter,  the  Dauphiness  of  France,  Saxony 
had  occupied  a  large  place  in  French  diplomacy.  The  Spanish 
party  at  the  French  Court,  headed  by  Noailles  and  Maurepas, 
and  supported  by  Ferdinand  vi.  the  King  of  Spain,  desired  that 
the  sister  of  the  late  Dauphiness  should  marry  the  Dauphin. 
But  the  opposition  of  Louis  xv.  and  d'Argenson  to  this  scheme 
was  successful,  and  it  was  decided  that  negotiations  should  be 
entered  upon  for  the  marriage  of  the  Dauphin  to  the  daughter 
of  x\ugustus  III.  of  Saxony. 

On  January  11,  1747,  the  marriage  was  celebrated  at  Dres- 
den ;  and  on  that  day  d'Argenson  fell,  and  Saxony  remained 
the  ally  of  Austria.  During  the  marriage  negotiations  d'Argen- 
son had  aimed  at  replacing  the  connection  between  Saxony 
and  Austria  by  a  close  understanding  between  Saxony  and 
Prassia.  The  combined  influence  of  Prussia  and  France  were 
then  to  be  employed  in  making  the  crown  of  Poland  heredi- 
tary in  the  Saxon  house.  A  blow  would  thus  be  dealt  at  the 
power  of  Russia  and  Austria,  and  the  prestige  of  France  in- 
creased in  the  east  of  Europe. 

This  policy  was  opposed  by  Conti,  who  aimed  at  the  crown 
of  Poland  on  the  death  of  Augustus  in.,  and  by  Brlihl,  who  was 


Austrian   War  after  the  Peace  of  Brcslau       193 

decidedly  opposed  to  any  idea  of  a  Prussian  alliance.  The 
Marquis  des  Issarts  had  been  appointed  ambassador  at  Dres- 
den at  the  request  of  Conti,  in  whose  intrigues  at  this  period 
are  to  be  found  the  first  definite  beginnings  of  the  secret  diplo- 
macy of  the  reign  of  Louis  xv. 

D'Argenson,  ignorant  of  the  Court  intrigues,  ordered  his 
envoy  '  to  abstain  from  anything  which  might  give  the  least 
offence  to  the  Elector  of  Saxony ' ;  and  Conti,  finding  his  in- 
trigues checked  by  d'Argenson,  threw  himself  vigorously  into 
the  conspiracy  against  the  minister ;  while  Briihl  found  another 
powerful  supporter  in  Maurice  de  Saxe,  who,  though  chiefly 
interested  in  the  proposal  to  make  his  niece  Dauphiness,  was 
opposed  to  d'Argenson,  and  ready  to  support  the  Saxon  min- 
ister's pohcy.  Having  secured  the  assistance  of  Madame  de 
Pompadour  and  Xoailles,  Saxe  decided  the  duel  between  Briihl 
and  d'Argenson  in  favour  of  the  former.  D'Argenson's  bold 
and  not  unstatesmanlike  schemes  were  defeated.  Saxony  re- 
mained the  ally  of  Russia  and  Austria,  and  an  admirable  oppor- 
tunity was  lost  of  making  Poland  an  hereditary  monarchy,  and 
saving  it  from  its  impending  fate.-^ 

Thus  various  influences  united  in  the  same  direction,  and 
*  ministers,  mistress,  marshals,  princes,  courtiers,  foreign  ambas- 
sadors, all  were  unanimous  in  accusing  d'Argenson  of  being  the 
one  only  obstacle  to  peace,'  and  in  urging  his  downfall. 

His  famous  fiasco  in  Italy,  his  blunder  in  not  enforcing  on 
Holland  a  strict  neutrality  at  the  beginning  of  1 746,  his  blind 
belief  in  the  fidehty  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  his  want  of  tact 
in  his  deaUngs  with  Saxe  and  Conti,  justify,  and  to  a  great  ex- 
tent explain,  his  fall.  A  more  skilful  minister,  and  one  who 
was  less  an  idealist,  would  not  only  have  been  aware  of  the 
coalition  formed  against  him,  but  would  have  taken  steps  to 
defeat  it. 

He  was  succeeded  by  the  incompetent  Louis  Brulart  de 
Siller}',  Marquis  de  Puisieux ;  while  his  brother,  the  Comte 
d'Argenson,  was  confirmed  in  his  oflice  as  Minister  of  War,  and 

1  See  Due  de  Broglie,  Maurice  de  Saxe  et  Marquis  d^ Argenson,  vol.  ii. 
PERIOD  VI.  N 


194  Etiropean  History ^   171 5-1789 

for  a  time  the  military  operations  continued.  The  proposed 
conference  at  Breda,  in  the  autumn  of  1746,  had  proved  a  fail- 
TheWar  ^re  Owing  to  the  determination  of  Maria  Theresa 
in  1747-  to  Continue  the  war  till  she  gained  compensation 

for  the  loss  of  Silesia  and  for  the  territories  ceded  to  Charles 
Emanuel  by  the  Treaty  of  Worms.  In  Italy  the  Austrians 
under  Schulenberg  failed  in  June  to  take  Genoa,  after  a  siege 
of  two  months;  while  the  Sardinians,  on  July  19,  engaged  a 
French  force  under  the  Chevalier  Belleisle  at  Exilles,  on  the 
Col  d'Assietto,  with  the  result  that  the  Chevalier  was  killed, 
and  the  French  retreated  into  Dauphin^,  where  Marshal  Belle- 
isle  and  Las  Minas,  in  command  of  the  French  and  Spanish 
armies  respectively,  remained  inactive.  It  was  not  till  1796, 
the  year  of  Napoleon's  first  Italian  campaign,  that  French 
troops  again  invaded  Italy. 

In  the  Netherlands,  where  France  could  strike  at  the  Sea 
Powers  as  well  as  at  Austria,  Puisieux  attempted  to  carry  out 
the  poHcy  to  which  d'Argenson  had  been  opposed,  and  to 
compel  the  Dutch  to  make  peace.  Under  Saxe  and  Lowen- 
dahl  the  French  armies  met  with  a  series  of  successes.  On 
July  2,  the  Duke  of  Cumberland  was  defeated  by  Marshal  Saxe 
at  Laufeld,  and  though  Maestricht  did  not  fall,  Lowendahl  pro- 
ceeded with  his  capture  of  towns,  and  on  September  16  took 
the  great  fortress  of  Bergen-op-Zoom. 

Though  the  English  were  unsuccessful  in  the  Netherlands, 
at  sea  the  advantage  was  entirely  on  their  side.  Two  crushing 
defeats  completed  the  ruin  of  the  French  navy,  and  the  de- 
struction of  the  French  commerce.  The  maritime  supremacy 
of  England  at  the  beginning  of  1 748  was  unquestioned. 

The  invasion  of  the  Netherlands  in  1747  and  the  English  suc- 
,    .         cesses  at  sea  had  two  results.    A  popular  revolution 

Revolution  i     r 

in  Holland,  in  Holland  broke  out  against  the  republican  gov- 
^'^'*^'  ernment.     The  aristocratic  party  was  overthrown  ; 

WilHam  rv.  of  Orange,  a  son-in-law  of  George  11.  of  England, 
was  declared  Stadtholder  ;  and  after  an  interval  of  a  few  months 
the  office  was  made  hereditary  in  his  family  both  for  males  and 
females. 


Austrian    War  after  the  Peace  of  B.cslau       195 

A  second  result  was  that  fresh  attempts  were  made  to  bring 
about  a  general   pacification.     On   November   10,   close  of  the 
1747,  George  11.,  in  opening  Parliament,  had  an-   ^^'■• 
nounced  that  a  congress  would  shortly  meet  at  Aix-la-Chapelle 
to  consider  the  conditions  of  peace. 

Of  the  principal  combatants,  neither  England,  Spain,  Hol- 
land, nor  France  had  any  reasons  for  continuing  the  war. 
The  French  treasury  was  empty,  the  Pretender's  cause  was 
dead,  the  French  flag  had  practically  disappeared  from  the 
sea,  the  Government  had  asserted  that  it  desired  no  increase 
of  territory,  and  there  was  no  enthusiasm  in  France  for  the 
Spanish  demands.  In  Holland,  the  safety  of  which  was 
threatened  by  Marshal  Saxe  and  his  victorious  troops,  there 
was  no  serious  opposition  to  the  peace  proposals.  The  revo- 
lution had  not  been  followed  by  military  successes,  and  the 
finances  of  the  country  were  unable  to  stand  the  continued 
military  expenditure.  Spain,  under  Ferdinand  vi.,  had  already 
given  unmistakable  signs  that  Elizabeth  Farnese's  aggressive 
policy  was  no  longer  being  pursued,  and  that  peace  would  be 
welcome.  Between  England  and  Austria  relations  were  becom- 
ing more  and  more  strained.  As  in  the  Spanish  Succession 
War,  England  had  paid  large  subsidies  to  Austria,  and  Austria 
had  employed  that  money  in  the  maintenance  of  her  armies  in 
Italy. 

Since  17 15  it  had  been  recognised  at  Vienna  that  the 
defence  of  the  Netherlands  might  be  left  to  the  Maritime 
Powers,  England's  well-known  jealousy  of  French  supremacy 
in  that  quarter  being  considered  a  sufficient  guarantee  for 
their  security.  The  burden  of  the  war  had  as  usual  fallen 
mainly  upon  England,  and  the  English  Government  was  not 
prepared  to  make  further  sacrifices  on  behalf  of  a  lukewarm 
ally.  The  Pelhams,  no  longer  supporters  of  the  policy  initi- 
ated by  Carteret,  were  ready  to  adopt  the  more  pacific  views 
formerly  held  by  Walpole.  English  public  opinion  was  satisfied 
with  the  destruction  of  the  French  marine.  The  certainty  of 
the  fall  of  Maestricht,  the  refusal  of  the  Dutch  to  pay  a  share 


196  European  History,   171 5-1789 

of  the  expenses  connected  with  the  transport  of  30,000  Russian 
troops  which  the  Tsarina  had  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the 
allies,  and  the  non-arrival  of  the  troops  themselves  brought 
matters  to  a  crisis,  and  decided  the  Enghsh  Government  to 
hasten  the  signature  of  the  preliminaries  of  peace. 

Austria  had  no  real  desire  for  peace.  Maria  Theresa 
attributed  to  England,  in  no  small  part,  her  losses  at  the 
Treaties  of  Berlin,  Worms,  and  Dresden,  and  suspected  that 
Power  of  a  readiness  to  acquiesce  in  further  sacrifices  on  the 
part  of  Austria  to  the  Sardinian  king.  On  May  22,  1746,  the 
Treaty  of  1726  between  Austria  and  Russia  had  been  renewed. 
Opposition  with  the  addition  of  certain  secret  articles^  Early 
of  Maria         jj^  February   1748    the   Russians    entered    Poland, 

Theresa  to  y         /  t  7 

Peace.  and,  meeting  with  no  opposition  from  Augustus  iii., 

proceeded  on  their  march.  It  seemed  that  the  arrival  at  the 
seat  of  war  of  these  savage  auxiliaries  of  Maria  Theresa  and  her 
allies  would  counteract  the  efG^ct  of  the  successes  of  Marshal 
Saxe  in  the  Netherlands.  But,  in  spite  of  these  warlike  appear- 
ances, peace  was  near  at  hand.  England  had  made  overtures 
of  peace  to  the  French  Government,  while  Maria  Theresa,  sus- 
pecting treachery  on  the  part  of  Sardinia  and  England,  had 
already,  through  Count  Loos,  the  Saxon  Ambassador  at  Ver- 
sailles, approached  Puisieux  when  she  heard  of  the  pacific 
intentions  of  England  and  Holland.-^ 

Once,  after  the  Peace  of  Dresden,  and  a  second  time  on  the 
occasion  of  the  marriage  of  the  Saxon  princess  to  thcDauphin, 
Maria  ^^   attempt   had    been    made    to    bring   about  an 

Theresa  understanding  between  Austria  and  France,  which 

ally  w^th  °  had  failed  owing  to  the  firmness  of  d'Argenson 
France.  ^^(j  \]^q  iudecision  of  his  successor.     Undeterred 

by  the  failure  of  these  attempts,  the  Saxon  Minister,  Briihl,  now 
for  the  third  time  threw  himself  into  the  project  of  effecting  a 
diplomatic  revolution  which  should  checkmate  England  and 
Sardinia,  and  redound  to  the  advantage  of  Austria  and  France. 
But  his  efforts  were  again  doomed  to  failure.  While  Maurice 
1  See  Due  de  Broglie,  La  Paix  d\-\ix-la-Chapelle. 


Aj(stj'ia?i   War  after  the  Peace  of  B  re  si  an       197 

de  Saxe  besieged  jMaestricht,  on  which  the  safety  of  Holland 
entirely  depended,  the  Congress  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  met  in 
April  1 74S.  In  addition  to  the  representatives  of  Spain,  Sar- 
dinia, Holland,  IModena,  and  Genoa,  Austria  was  represented 
by  Kaunitz,  France  by  the  Comte  de  Saint-Severin  and  M.  de 
Laporte  du  Theil,  England  by  the  capable  and  industrious 
Earl  of  Sandwich  and  by  Sir  Thomas  Robinson.  Maria 
Theresa  desired  to  recover  the  territory  which  she  had  ceded 
to  Sardinia  by  the  Treaty  of  Worms ;  she  was  equally  anxious 
that  France  should  not  continue  to  guarantee  the  possession  of 
Silesia  to  Prussia.  Saint-Severin  at  first  appeared  to  agree  to 
her  wishes ;  but  he  suddenly  changed  his  attitude,  and  closed 
with  the  English  proposals.  Maria  Theresa  was  forced  to 
recognise  that  without  the  aid  of  the  Sardinians  in  Italy,  or  that 
of  the  Dutch  or  English  in  Flanders,  she  was  unable  to  con- 
tinue the  war.  The  weakness  of  her  position  rendered  her 
acceptance  of  the  terms  agreed  upon  by  France  and  England 
absolutely  necessary. 

Before  Austria  and  Spain  had  finally  given  in  their  adhesion 
to  the  proposals  for  a  general  pacification,  the  preliminaries  of 
peace  were  hastily  signed  by  the  plenipotentiaries  The  Peace 
of  England,  France,  and  Holland  on  April  30.  chapeUe" 
1748,  but  it  was  not  till  the  iSth  of  October  that  1748. 
these  prehminaries  were  converted  into  a  definite  peace.  The 
acquisition  of  Silesia  and  Glatz  by  Prussia  was  recognised  and 
guaranteed ;  Savoy  and  Nice  were  handed  over  to  Charles 
Emanuel,  who,  though  he  had  to  give  up  Finale,  was  confirmed 
in  the  possession  of  the  territory  in  Lombardy  which  he  had 
received  by  the  Treaty  of  Worms ;  Genoa  and  the  Duke  of 
Modena  recovered  their  lost  lands.  France  acknowledged 
Francis  as  Emperor,  and  George  il  as  King  of  England ;  she 
also  restored  the  Barrier  fortresses  to  Holland,  undertook  to 
destroy  the  walls  on  the  sea-side  of  Dunkirk,  retired  from  the 
Austrian  Netherlands,  and  promised  to  exclude  the  Pretender 
from  French  soil.  In  India,  Madras  was  restored  to  England, 
while  Louisburg  and  Cape  Breton  Island  were  handed  back  to 


iqS  European  History,   171 5-1789 

France.  Spain  acknowledged  the  Emperor,  and  confirmed  to 
England  the  Assiento  Treaty  and  the  right  of  sending  the  annual 
ship  to  South  America.  She,  however,  secured  for  Don  Philip 
Parma,  Piacenza,  and  Guastalla  as  an  hereditary  principality, 
which  was  to  revert  to  Austria  in  the  event  of  failure  of  heirs- 
male.  With  the  above  exceptions,  the  Pragmatic  Sanction  was 
formally  accepted,  the  election  of  the  Emperor  was  recognised, 
and  all  conquests  made  during  the  war  were  restored. 

With  the  exception  of  Prussia,  the  continental  Powers  saw 
little  reason  to  be  pleased  with  the  results  of  the  war.  Charles 
Emanuel  was  bitterly  disappointed  at  losing  the  Marquisate  of 
Finale,  and  with  it  a  direct  communication  between  his  Italian 
dominions  and  the  sea.  It  was  with  the  greatest  reluctance 
that  he  relinquished  Piacenza,  which  was  a  part  of  his  gains  at 
the  Treaty  of  Worms.  But  he  was  compelled  to  recognise  the 
necessity  for  submission,  for  Spain  still  held  Savoy  and  Nice, 
and  Austria  regarded  with  open  dissatisfaction  his  continued 
possession  of  a  portion  of  the  Milanese.  Declaring  that  he 
had  been  grossly  deceived  by  England,  he  accepted  the  terms 
offered  by  France  and  the  Maritime  Powers. 

Spain  had  similar  feehngs  of  resentment  towards  France. 
But  the  days  of  PhiHp  v.  and  Elizabeth  Farnese  were  over,  and 
Ferdinand  vi.,  though  furious  with  France,  agreed  to  give  up 
Savoy  and  Nice,  and  in  exchange  to  receive  the  principality 
of  Parma,  Piacenza,  and  Guastalla  for  his  half-brother,  Don 
PhiUp.  The  English  supremacy  of  the  sea  rendered  ^  resist- 
ance impossible,  and  Ferdinand  accepted  the  inevitable.  But 
while  Spain  and  Sardinia  had  good  ground  of  complaint,  the 
indignation  of  Maria  Theresa  was  still  more  justified.  The 
Treaties  of  Berlin,  Dresden,  and  Worms  had  been  concluded 
by  the  advice  of  England,  and  now  for  a  fourth  time  England 
proposed  to  impose  upon  her  fresh  sacrifices.  She  resented 
the  definite  loss  of  Silesia,  she  wished  to  recall  the  cessions 
made  to  Sardinia  at  the  Treaty  of  Worms,  she  was  opposed  to 
any  further  extension  of  the  power  of  Charles  Emanuel,  and 
to  the  establishment  of  Don  Philip  in  Parma.     Furthermore, 


Austrian  War  after  the  Peace  of  Breslati       199 

the  Austrian  Court  was  resolved  to  cancel  the  hateful  Barrier 
Treaty.  The  inabihty  of  the  Dutch  to  defend  themselves 
against  France,  and  the  uselessness  of  the  Barrier  towns  as 
an  obstacle  to  French  invasion,  had  been  so  forcibly  demon- 
strated in  the  late  war,  that  Austria,  so  Kaunitz  declared, 
found  herself  unable  to  acquiesce  in  the  restoration  of  the 
former  arrangement.  The  real  reason,  however,  for  this 
declaration  was  to  be  found  in  Maria  Theresa's  conviction 
that  Holland  was  a  mere  satellite  of  England,  and  in  her  fixed 
resolution  to  shake  herself  free  from  dependence  on  the  Court 
of  St.  James'.  With  infinite  skill  Kaunitz  endeavoured  to  break 
up  the  agreement  come  to  by  England,  France,  and  Holland, 
and  to  gain  over  Saint-Severin  to  his  views. 

But  England  and  Holland,  though  the  latter  Power  had  prac- 
tically disappeared  from  the  rank  of  great  nations,  presented  a 
united  front,  and  Puisieux  refused  to  give  the  Austrian  Court  any 
encouragement,  or  to  extend  the  guarantee  granted  to  Prussia 
for  Silesia  to  Maria  Theresa's  remaining  possessions.  With  the 
Russians  in  Germany,  delay  in  completing  the  pacification  be- 
came dangerous,  and  the  English  Government,  with  the  full  sup- 
port of  Madame  de  Pompadour,  insisted  with  vigour  upon  the 
conclusion  of  the  Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle.  After  farther  vain 
attempts  to  win  over  France,  Maria  Theresa,  without  allies,  and 
with  the  possibility  in  view  of  a  fresh  desertion  on  the  part  of 
Charles  Emanuel  to  the  side  of  France,  was  forced,  like  Charles 
VI.  in  I  714,  to  accept  the  terms  arranged  by  the  Courts  of  St. 
James',  Versailles,  and  the  Government  of  the  Hague.  No 
other  course  was  open  to  her.  England,  if  '■  abandoned  by 
Austria,  could  continue  the  war  with  her  fleets.  Austria,  de- 
prived of  the  Piedmontese  contingents  in  Italy,  of  the  Dutch 
and  English  in  Flanders,  could  not  carry  it  on  for  a  single  day.' 

On  the  1 6th  of  October  1748  the  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle 
was  signed  by  England,  France,  and  Holland.  Spain  agreed 
to  it  on  October  20,  Austria  on  the  8th  and  Sardinia  on  the 
20th  of  November.  . 

In   spite  of  her  territorial  losses,  Austria  was  in   1748   far 


2CXD  Europeaji  History,   171 5-1 789 

stronger  than  in  174 1,  In  the  latter  year  it  was  said  with 
some  appearance  of  truth  that  '  the  house  of  Austria  had 
ceased  to  exist';  in  1748  the  Hapsburgs  were  of  greater 
account  in  Europe  than  the  Bourbons.  Hungary  was  more 
closely  united  to  Austria  than  ever  before,  and  the  military 
resources  of  its  eastern  provinces  were  for  the  first  time  ap- 
preciated at  Vienna;  Bavaria  and  Saxony  were 
Position  of  mere  satellites  of  the  Hapsburg  monarchy ;  the 
the  Great        Russiau  alHance  of  1746  was  a  source  of  strength 

Powers  in  .  _      ° 

1748.  and  safety.     A  distinct  step  had  been  taken  in  the 

Austria.  direction  of  a  French  alliance,  and  the  question  of 

forming  a  league  -of  Catholic  as  opposed  to  Protestant  Powers 
began  to  find  favour  with  certain  politicians  both  in  Vienna 
and  Paris. 

While  the  gains  of  Austria  thus  outweighed  her  losses,  and 
while  the  war  left  her  not  only  strengthened  but  prepared  by  dras- 
Prussia  and  ^^^  reforms  to  Carry  out  the  work  of  centralisation  and 
Italy.  consolidation,  and  to  reconsider  her  system  of  for- 

eign policy,  the  new  states  of  Prussia,  Sardinia,  and  Russia  had 
made  a  distinct  step  forward.  Prussia  had  suddenly  developed 
into  a  first-rate  Power,  whose  army  was  the  best  fighting  ma- 
chine in  Europe,  whose  alliance  had  become  of  immense  value, 
and  whose  territorial  ambitions  had  roused  the  deep-seated 
hostility  of  Austria  and  Russia ;  Sardinia,  pursuing  by  different 
methods  a  similar  policy  of  centralisation  and  territorial  expan- 
sion, had  also  come  out  of  the  war  with  its  possessions^increased. 
Though  d'Argenson  had  failed,  the  efforts  of  Elizabeth  Farnese 
had  been  successful,  and  the  Polish  and  Austrian  Succession 
Wars  left  Italy  in  an  improved  position.  Two  Spanish  Bourbon 
dvnasties  had  been  introduced,  the  Sardinian  territories  ex- 
tended,  and  though  a  Hapsburg- Lorraine  prince  was  to  hold 
Tuscany,  the  decision  of  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  had  been 
reversed,  and  Italy  was  in  great  part  freed  from  the  German 
element.^ 

1  For  an  estimate  of  the  influence  of  Elizabeth  Farnese  upon  Italy  and 
Europe  see  Armstrong,  Elizabeth  Farnese,  p.  398. 


Austrian    War  after  the  Peace  of  B  res  I  an      201 

Under  the  Tsarina  Elizabeth,  Russia  was  ready  to  advance 
along  the  lines  laid  down  by  Peter  the  Great,  and  her  alliance 
was  courted  by  the  leading  European  Powers. 
French  statesmen  regarded  with  undisguised  hos- 
tility the  rising  influence  of  the  kingdom  of  the  Tsars.  The 
close  alhance  of  1746  between  the  Courts  of  Vienna  and  St. 


Russia. 


Petersburg  was  a  great  triumph  for  Maria  Theresa,  and  a 
corresponding  danger  for  Frederick  the  Great ;  and  the  whole 
of  Europe  was  affected  by  the  growing  importance  of  the 
Russian  state. 


202  European  History,   171 5-1789 

The  advance  of  a  Russian  army  in  1747  across  Germany, 
and  the  demand  of  Elizabeth  to  take  part  in  the  pacification 
of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  were  striking  symptoms  of  the  intention  of 
the  Tsarina  not  only  to  extend  the  influence  of  Russia  in  the 
East,  but  also  to  take  an  increasing  share  in  the  politics  of 
western  Europe.  The  rise  of  Russia  and  Prussia  coincided 
with  the  growing  weakness  of  France,  To  counteract  the 
plans  of  Russia,  always  a  difficult  task  for  French  statesmen, 
became  doubly  so  after  1748.  Though  France  emerged  from 
the  war  without  any  territorial  losses,  her  colonial 
ambitions  were,  owing  to  Fleury's  neglect,  threat- 
ened with  extinction,  her  commerce  had  suffered  severely,  and 
her  navy  had  been  practically  annihilated.  By  the  influence 
of  Madame  de  Pompadour  the  peace  had  been  hurried  on, 
and  its  conclusion  was  received  in  France  with  the  most  pro- 
found dissatisfaction.  It  was  felt  that,  after  the  conquest  of 
Belgium,  France  should  have  retained  some  territory,  and  it 
was  realised  that,  after  the  sacrifice  of  100,000  men,  the 
French  efforts  had  merely  resulted  in  an  enormous  increase  to 
her  debt,  in  the  acquisition  of  Silesia  by  Frederick  the  Great, 
of  a  principality  by  Don  Philip,  and  of  the  imperial  crown  by 
Charles  vii.  for  three  years. 

In  India,  however,  the  French  fortunes  flourished,  princi- 
pally owing  to  the  ability  of  Dupleix,  and  in  spite  of  the 
French  Fort-  ncglcct  of  the  Government  at  home.  The  spirit 
"ndiVduring  ^^  enterprise  had  received  a  considerable  impetus 
the  War.  from  Law's  operations,  and  the  French  Company, 
originally  founded  by  Colbert,  became  a  formidable  competitor 
with  England  for  the  trade  of  the  Indies.  Holland,  formerly 
the  rival  of  England,  had  become  so  weakened  by  the  long 
wars  in  which  she  had  played  a  part,  that  she  took  little  share 
in  the  competition  between  the  English  and  the  French. 
While  the  headquarters  of  English  trade  were  at  Bombay, 
Madras,  and  Calcutta,  or  Fort  William,  the  French  had  planted 
settlements  at  Surat,  Masulipatam,  Chandernagore,  and  Pondi- 
cherry ;  they  also  held  the  Isles  of  France  and  Bourbon  in  the 


Austrian    War  after  the  Peace  of  Breslau      203 

Indian  Ocean.^  Previous  to  the  appointment  of  DupleLx  —  who 
since  1730  had  been  Governor  of  Chandernagore  —  as  Gov- 
ernor of  Pondicherry  in  1741,  his  predecessors,  Francois  Martin 
and  Dumas,  had,  with  consummate  abihty,  developed  the  trade 
and  extended  the  influence  of  the  French  Company.  Dupleix 
was,  however,  not  content  with  being  the  head  of  a  schemes  of 
successful  trading  corporation ;  he  aimed  at  expel-  ^upieix. 
Hng  the  English  and  founding  a  great  continental  empire.  As 
a  means  to  this  end,  Dupleix,  aided  by  Bussy,  plunged  into  the 
vortex  of  native  intrigues,  and  began  to  organise  and  drill 
native  troops  in  the  European  fashion.  On  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  between  England  and  France  in  1744.  French  com- 
merce, owing  to  the  inadequacy  of  the  navy,  suffered  severely. 
But  Labourdonnais,  the  Governor  of  the  Mauritius,  whose  mili- 
tary skill  was  superior  to  that  of  Dupleix,  recognised  the  vital 
importance  of  the  possession  of  a  fleet.  Hastily  collecting  a 
number  of  ships,  he  sailed  to  the  assistance  of  Dupleix  on 
September  21,  1746,  and  captured  Madras  —  the  inhabitants 
surrendering  on  the  understanding  that  the  town  was  to  be 
repurchased  for  ;j^44o,ooo.  Between  Labourdonnais,  who,  it 
is  said,  was  bribed  by  the  members  of  the  Council  of  Madras, 
and  Dupleix,  who,  anxious  to  expel  the  English  from  India, 
refused  to  accept  the  terms  of  the  capitulation,  a  fierce  dis- 
pute arose.  Eventually,  Dupleix  having  promised  to  restore 
Madras,  Labourdonnais  returned  to  France  to  justify  himself. 
From  1748  to  1751  he  was  imprisoned  in  the  Bastille,  and, 
though  acquitted  of  the  charge  brought  against  him,  died  in 
1753  from  the  effects  of  the  treatment  which  he  had  received. 
In  the  meantime  Dupleix,  who  had  defeated  the  Xawab  of 
the  Carnatic,  raised  the  prestige  of  the  French  arms,  and 
retained  Madras,  proceeded  in  1747  to  attempt  the  capture  of 
Fort  St.  David.  Boscawen  and  the  English  fleet  saved  the 
fortress,  but  failed  in  an  attack  on  Pondicherry.  The  Peace 
of  Aix-la-Chapelle  led  to  a   mutual  restitution  of  conquests, 

1  These  islands,  known  as  the  Mauritius,  occupy  an  important  position 
between  India  and  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope. 


204  European  History,   171 5-1789 

but  the  prestige  of  France  remained  superior  tc  that  of  Eng- 
land in  India  till  the  recall  of  Dupleix  in  1754  put  an  end  to 
all  hope  of  a  French  empire  in  the  East. 

In  America  the  French  had  been  unable  to  prevent  the  loss 
of  Louisburg,  the  capital  of  Cape  Breton  Island  and  the  key 
to  their  possessions  in  Canada.  The  loss  of  Cape  Breton 
Island  laid  open  the  St.  Lawrence  and  Canada,  and  the  French 
»,.    „       u     disasters    at   sea   rendered   them   unable   to    help 

The  French  ^ 

in  North  the  colonists.  By  the  Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle 
merica.  Louisburg  was  exchanged  for  Madras,  and  it  was 
decided  that  commissioners  should  define  the  limits  of  the 
English  and  French  territories  in  North  America.  The 
course  of  the  struggles  both  in  India  and  America  had  ex- 
emphfied  the  disastrous  results  of  Fleury's  neglect  of  the 
navy,  and  had  given  many  proofs  of  the  mistaken  policy 
consistently  pursued  by  France  towards  her  distant  settle- 
ments and  their  governors  during  the  middle  portion  of  the 
eighteenth  century. 

The  maritime  supremacy  of  Great  Britain  was  now  assured ; 
and  though  France  had  been  successful  in  Flanders  and  held 
The  Peace  ^^^  ^^^'^  ^^  India,  her  growing  weakness  had  been 
of  Aix-ia-        conspicuously  exhibited  at  home  and  abroad.    The 

Chapelle  .  .     .  ,,..,,         ,  .  ,      . 

only  a  efforts  of  her  wisest  ministers  had  failed  to  hide  from 

Truce.  ^j^g  world  the  fact  that  good  government  and  able 

administration,  the  characteristics  of  the  reign  of  Irouis  xiv., 
no  longer  were  to  be  found  in  France.  The  Treaty  of  Aix-la- 
Chapelle,  resulting  as  it  did  from  the  exhaustion  of  the  various 
combatants,  was  no  satisfactory  pacification.  It  left  undecided 
the  disputes  between  the  French  and  Enghsh  colonists  in  North 
America;  it  postponed,  by  Article  18,  the  settlement  of  the 
claims  of  the  Elector  Palatine  against  the  ]Maritime  Powers  and 
Austria.  The  treaty,  concluded  with  such  regrettable  precipita- 
tion, merely  put  ofT  the  conflict  between  Austria  and  Prussia 
for  Silesia,  and  the  inevitable  struggle  between  England,  France, 
and  Spain  in  the  colonies  and  India,  for  eight  years,  during 
which  Europe  enjoyed  a  period  of  uneasy  rest. 


Austrian    War  after  the  Peace  of  Breslau     205 

Never   perhaps   did   any  war,  after  so  many  great   events 

^d  so  large  a  loss  of  blood  and  treasure,  end  in  replacing  the 

nations  engaged  in  it  so  nearly  in  the  same  situation  as  they 

held  at  first.'     The   Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  was  merely  a 

truce. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

THE  DIPLOMATIC   REVOLUTION 

1748-1756 

The  Years  1748-56  a  Period  of  Transition  —  Reforms  in  Austria  —  The  Aims 
of  Maria  Theresa  —  The  Policy  of  Kaunitz — Growing  Irritation  at  Vienna 
against  England  —  The  Question  of  the  Election  of  the  Archduke  Joseph  as 
King  of  the  Romans  —  The  Embassy  of  Kaunitz  to  France  —  Machaulfs 
Attempts  at  Reforms  —  Struggle  of  the  Parlenient  of  Paris  with  the  Court 
and  Clergy  —  Louis  XV.  —  Influence  of  Madame  de  Pompadour  —  Decline 
of  the  French  Monarchy  —  Diplomatic  Relations  between  France  and 
Austria  and  between  Austria  and  Russia  —  England's  Relations  with  Rus- 
sia and  Prussia — Likelihood  of  War  in  1753  —  England  and  France  in 
America  and  India  —  The  Franco-Prussian  Alliance — French  Policy  in 
Eastern  Europe — Position  of  Frederick  the  Great — His  Relations  with 
France  —  England  prepares  for  War — The  Convention  of  Westminster  — 
Negotiations  between  France  and  Austria,  1755-56  —  The  First  Treaty  of 
Versailles,  May  i,  1756  —  The  Diplomatic  Revolution,  1756. 

The  year  1756  saw  the  break-up  of  an  old  system  and  the 
substitution  of  a  new  one.  Austria  and  France  laid  aside  the 
enmity  of  200  years,  ceased  to  be  rivals,  and  formed 
Period  of  an  alliance  which  continued  till  the  French  Revolu- 
ransition.  ^|^^  .  ^^g|■J.j^  broke  off  her  long-standing  connec- 
tion with  the  Maritime  Powers,  while  England  found  an  ally  in 
Prussia. 

The  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  had  pleased  no  one.  France 
had  gained  nothing  from  the  war,  England  had  been  com- 
pelled to  restore  her  conquests,  Prussia  was  far  from  being 
satisfied  with  the  safety  of  Silesia,  and  Austria  was  furious  at 
its  loss  and  at  the  conduct  of  England  throughout  the  war.  In 
addition  to  Silesia,  Austria  had  suffered  losses  in  Italy,  while 

206 


The  Diplomatic  Revolution  207 

the  cost  of  the  struggle  had  been  enormous.  To  Maria  The- 
resa's complaints  the  English  minister  could  point  to  the  battles 
of  Dettingen  and  Fontenoy,  fought  on  behalf  of  Austria  with- 
out Austrian  troops ;  while,  to  the  French  complaints  of  Prus- 
sian desertion  at  the  Treaties  of  Berhn  and  Dresden,  Frederick 
could  reply  that  France  had  at  least  on  one  occasion  left  him 
to  the  mercy  of  his  foes. 

The  diplomatic  revolution  was  not  the  result  of  an  accident, 
or  of  the  injured  pride  of  Madame  de  Pompadour,  or  of  an 
intrigue.     It  was  due  to  general  causes  which  had  been  long 

at  work. 

The  transformation  in  the  relations  of  the  great  European 
Powers,  which  resulted  in  the  formation  of  a  new  balance  of 
forces, 'though  not   effected   till  1756,  was  working  itself  out 
during  the  eight    vears  succeeding  the  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Cha- 
pelle.°  When  completed,  it    constituted    a  diplomatic   revolu- 
tion more  far-reaching  in  its  effects  than  the  Triple  Alliance 
of  1 71 7.  and  was  in  the  main  caused  by  the  sudden  rise  of 
Prussia  and  the  implacable  hostility  which  existed,  after  Fred- 
erick  the    Great's    seizure    of  Silesia,  between  the    Courts  of 
Berlin  and  Vienna.     Maria  Theresa  was  not  inclined  to  accept 
as   final    the    terms    of  the  Treaty  of   Aix-la-Chapelle.     That 
treaty  had  left  unsettled  the  great  questions  at  issue  between 
England  and  France  in  America  and  in  India.     It  was  merely 
a  tr^'uce  in  the  rivalry  between  Austria  and  Prussia;  m  no  re- 
spect did  it  afford   anv   reasonable   hopes    of  inaugurating   a 
period    of  peace.     Europe,  till    the    actual    consummation  of 
the  diplomatic  revoludon  in  1 756,  ^vas  divided  into  two  groups  : 
EncTland,  Austria,    Russia,  and   Portugal   formed    roughly  one 
lea^e  ;  France.  Prussia,  Spain,  Denmark,  Poland,  Turkey,  and 
Sweden  formed   the  other.     Spain  was,   however,    dunng  the 
reicrn  of  Ferdinand  inclined  to  neutrahty,  and  to  the  cultiva- 
tion   of  peaceful   relations  with    England    and    Austria,   while 
England's  alliance  with  Russia  never  carried  with  it  adhesion 
to    the    secret    schemes    of   the  Courts  of  St.  Petersburg  and 
Vienna  with  regard  to  Pnissia.    With  Austria  and  Russia,  closely 


208  Ejiropcaji  History ^   171 5-1 789 

allied  since  1 746,  the  all-absorbing  question  was  the  reduction 
of  the  power  of  the  King  of  Prussia  and  the  partition  of  his 
dominions;  to  England  and  France  commercial  and  colonial 
rivalry  was  of  paramount  importance,  and  the  continued  dis- 
putes between  the  two  nations  in  America  and  India  might 
lead  to  open  hostilities  at  any  moment.  The  outbreak  of  war 
would  test  the  stabihty  and  reahty  of  the  existing  alliances. 

The  rise  of  Prussia  had  in  itself  revolutionised  the  European 
states-system,  and  had  impressed  upon  ministers  of  every 
Reforms  in  nationality  the  necessity  of  military  and  other  re- 
Austria,  forms  within  their  respective  dominions.  Though 
Austria  had  not  only  escaped  annihilation,  but  had  in  a  sense 
profited  by  the  late  war,  the  personal  enmity  between  Maria 
Theresa  and  Frederick  the  Great,  intensified  by  the  former's 
determination  to  regain  Silesia,  had  become  the  central  point  of 
European  politics,  and  led  to  a  complete  reorganisation  of  the 
Hapsburg  states.  The  Austrian  institutions  were  too  aristo- 
cratic, and  power  tended  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  a  few  great 
families.  The  weakness  of  the  central  executive  system,  the 
conflicting  interests  of  the  various  provinces,  the  selfishness 
of  the  nobles  and  their  excessive  influence  in  the  provincial 
estates,  had  clearly  demonstrated  the  necessity  of  greater 
centralisation,  together  with  the  better  organisation  of  the 
central  government  itself.  Financial,  judicial,  and  social  re- 
forms were  required.  Henceforward  each  province  paid  a 
lump  sum  for  the  maintenance  of  the  army,  and  a  tax  for  this 
purpose  was  levied  on  all  classes.  Similar  reforms  were  carried 
out  in  the  administration  of  justice.  During  the  late  war  the 
contrast  between  the  loosely  connected  Hapsburg  dominions 
and  the  centralised  Prussian  state  had  been  very  striking ;  and 
on  the  conclusion  of  peace.  Prince  George  of  Haugwitz,  the 
son  of  a  Saxon  general,  who  had  already  had  considerable  ex- 
perience as  governt)r  of  what  was  left  of  Silesia,  became  chan- 
cellor, and  introduced  reforms  which  were  warmly  supported 
by  Maria  Theresa  ;  while  Rudolf  Chotek,  the  new  chief  of  the 
finance  department,  inspired   by  a   feeling  of  rivalry  towards 


The  Diplomatic  Revohitioii  209 

Haugwitz,  entered  with  vigour  upon  his  new  duties.  Haug- 
witz  at  once  began  the  reorganisation  of  the  central  government, 
his  aim  being  to  introduce  greater  unity  into  the  administra- 
tion, to  check  corruption,  and  to  reduce  the  powers  enjoyed  by 
the  various  estates,  especially  those  which  touched  upon  finan- 
cial and  military  matters.  The  laws  required  codification  ;  the 
judicial  power  of  the  nobles  was  too  great ;  the  influence  of  the 
clergy  demanded  supervision;  and  primary  education  in  Aus- 
tria was  far  behind  that  of  Prussia  and  France. 

In  spite  of  opposition  from  most  of  the  older  ministers,  from 
the  nobles,  and  from  the  clergy,  Haugwitz  succeeded  in  canning 
out  valuable  reforms  which  led  the  way  for  those  of  Joseph  11. 
Hitherto  much  of  the  political  and  judicial  work  was  under  the 
chanceries  of  Austria,  Bohemia,  and  Hungary.  Each  chan- 
cery was  interested  in  escaping  from  the  burden  of  taxation, 
in  subordinating  the  interests  of  the  monarchy  to  those  of  its 
own  country,  and  in  checking  the  power  of  the  Exchequer 
(Hofkammer)  and  that  of  the  Emperor.  During  the  Austrian 
Succession  War,  Kinsky,  the  Chief  Chancellor  of  Bohemia,  had 
deliberately  starved  the  army  in  order  to  lessen  the  burdens  of 
Bohemia.  By  an  edict  of  May  14,  1749,  justice  was  separated 
from  administration,  and  the  Austrian  and  Bohemian  chanceries 
were  united,  and  called  at  first  Direcfoj'ium  i?i  internis,  later 
'  Kaiserliche  Konigliche  vereinigte  Hofkanzlei.'  It  was  simply 
a  ministry  of  the  interior  for  financial  and  executive  work,  and 
over  it  was  placed  Haugwitz  as  president.  Most  of  the  judi- 
cial work  was  transferred  to  a  High  Court  of  Justice  (Hofrath). 
Later  on  this  Directorium  was  divided  into  the  Exchequer 
(Hofkammer)  and  the  Chancery  (Hofkanzlei)  for  executive 
work.  Above  all  was  placed  in  1760  a  Council  of  State  (Staats- 
rath)  to  exercise  control  over  the  Chancery,  the  Exchequer, 
the  Aulic  Council  of  War,  and  the  High  Court  of  Justice.  It 
was  settled  that,  instead  of  annual  contributions  of  men  and 
money,  the  proWncial  estates  should  in  the  future  vote  a  fixed 
sum  for  ten  years,  and  that  the  administration  of  military  affairs 
should  be  taken  out  of  their  hands.     The  poHtical  powers  of 

PERIOD   VI.  o 


2IO  European  History ^  171 5-1 789 

the  estates  were  reduced  and  handed  over  to  representatives 
of  the  central  authority,  and  local  government,  no  longer  exclu- 
sively in  the  hands  of  the  nobles,  was  in  many  cases  practically 
destroyed.  Drastic  changes  were  made,  all  in  the  direction 
of  strengthening  the  power  of  the  central  government  through- 
out the  dominions  of  the  Hapsburgs,  of  lessening  the  influence 
of  the  nobles,  and  of  protecting  the  peasants  against  the  oppres- 
sions of  their  masters.^ 

Many  of  Maria  Theresa's  reforms  had  thus  for  their  object 
the  amelioration  of  the  lot  of  the  peasants,  and  the  diminution 
of  the  power  of  the  nobles  by  suppressing  the  right  to  exemp- 
tion from  taxation  which  many  of  their  lands  enjoyed,  and  by 
attracting  them  to  Vienna.  All  these  reforms  tended  to  the 
centralisation  of  the  Austrian  monarchy,  and  the  consolidation 
of  all  the  powers  of  the  state.  They  illustrated  the  ideas  of  hu- 
manity then  coming  into  favour ;  they  show  that  Maria  Theresa 
•was  bent  on  unifying  the  monarchy,  and  establishing  a' benevo- 
lent despotisQi ;  they  owed  their  introduction  to  the  conviction 
that  in  the  next  struggle  with  Prussia  greater  efficiency  in  all 
departments  of  the  state  produced  by  the  practical  reconstruc- 
tion of  all  branches  of  the  civil  administration  would  enormously 
increase  the  chances  of  success.  '  Haugwitz,'  wrote  Maria 
Theresa  after  the  Chancellor's  death,  '  brought  the  government 
from  confusion  into  order ' ;  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
central  authority  owed  a  debt  of  gratitude  to  the  determination 
with  which  the  reforms  were  carried  out. 

No  less  drastic  were  her  educational,  commercial,  industrial, 
and  financial  reforms,  carried  out  with  the  object  of  increasing 
the  revenue  and  reducing  expenditure.  In  February  1 746  the 
nomination  of  the  professors  of  the  University  of  Vienna  was 
placed  in  the  hands  of  the  Crown,  —  the  first  of  a  series  of 
measures  to  bring  all  education  under  the  control  of  the  state. 
Consulates  were  established  in  the  Mediterranean  and  Adriatic, 
merchant  ships  were  built,  the  development  of  Trieste  was  en- 
couraged.    Under  Chotek's  able  supervision  roads  and  canals 

1  See  Appendix  A. 


The  Diplomatic  Revolution  2 1 1 

were  vastly  improved,  internal  custom-houses  either  abolished,, 
or  carefully  restrained,  and  the  postal  system  reformed.  An 
income-tax  was  imposed,  and  a  graduated  poll-tax  decreed. 
By  these  methods  the  revenues  were  augmented,  and  Austrian 
credit  was  greatly  enhanced. 

In  view  of  Maria  Theresa's  determination  to  recover  Silesia, 
mihtary  reforms  were  imperatively  demanded.  Conscription 
after  the  Prussian  model  was  introduced  throughout  the  Aus- 
trian dominions,  except  in  Hungary,  the  Tyrol,  the  Milanese, 
and  the  Netherlands.  The  number  of  soldiers  was  increased, 
incompetent  officers  were  removed,  military  schools  were  created. 
Certain  reforms  in  drill  were  borrowed  from  the  Prussian  army, 
and  order  and  economy  carefully  enforced.  Efforts  were  taken 
to  improve  the  general'  morale  of  the  army,  and  to  increase  the 
comfort  of  the  men.  The  peace  establishment,  which  was  fixed 
at  100,000  Tnen,  could  be  in  time  of  war  so  largely  increased 
by  the  irregular  Hungarian  troops  and  the  reserves,  that  in  1753 
it  was  estimated  that  the  total  fighting  strength  of  Austria  was 
195,000.  When  the  Seven  Years'  War  broke  out  Maria  Theresa 
was  able  to  put  into  the  field  an  admirable  army,  and  to  say 
with  truth  that  the  Austrian  artillery  was  the  best  in  Europe. 

Dissatisfied  with  the  results  of  the  late  war,  Maria  Theresa 
was  bent  on  regaining   Silesia.     Being   one  of  the   principal 
German-speaking  provinces  of  the  Austrian  mon- 
archy,  its  loss,  while  a  serious  blow  to  the  prestige   of  Maria 
of  the  Hapsburgs,  tended  to  give  additional  weight       "esa. 
to  the  Slav  elements,  always  a  source  of  difficulty  to  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Vienna. 

Determined  to  try  again  the  chances  of  war,  the  choice  of 
foreign  allies  was  of  the  first  importance.  The  alliance  with 
the  Maritime  Powers  formed  the  basis  of  the  Austrian  system 
of  foreign  policy,  but  the  neutrality  of  England  during  the  Pol- 
ish Succession  War,  and  her  dictatorial  conduct  throughout  the 
Silesian  Wars,  had  roused  a  strong  feeling  of  resentment  in  Maria 
Theresa's  breast.  She  felt  that  the  late  loss  of  territor}^  was  due 
rather  to  the  pressure  of  a  selfish  and  insincere  ally  than  to 


212  European  History y   171 5-1789 

the  victories  of  the  French  or  the  Prussians.  On  the  7th  of 
March  1 749  she  directed  each  of  the  ministers  to  submit,  within 
a  fortnight,  a  written  opinion  on  the  system  of  foreign  policy 
which  Austria  ought  henceforward  to  pursue. 

She  found  opinions  were  divided.  The  Emperor  Francis, 
who  cared  principally  for  finance  and  chemistry,  agreed  with 
the  older  ministers  in  advising  adherence  to  the  ancient  sys- 
tem. Austria,  they  pointed  out,  had  three  enemies  —  France, 
Prussia,  and  Turkey,  and  in  a  less  degree  Sardinia  and  Parma. 
To  combat  these  she  needed  the  assistance  of  the  Maritime 
Powers  and  the  alliance  of  Russia  and  Saxony.  They  further 
advised  that  Prussia  should  be  given  no  excuse  for  renewing 
hostilities,  and  that  Austria  should  carefully  reorganise  her 
finances  and  the  army.  Their  views  were  combated  with  abihty 
and  boldness  by  Kaunitz,  the  youngest  member  of  the  Cabinet 
or  Conference. 

Anton  Wengel  von  Kaunitz  was  bom  in  1 7 1 1  in  Vienna,  and 
was  destined  for  the  Church.  The  death  of  his  four  elder 
The  Policy  brothers,  however,  changed  the  course  of  his  life, 
of  Kaunitz.  ^cciA  after  a  careful  education  for  a  diplomatic  career 
at  the  universities  of  Vienna,  Leipsic,  and  Leyden,  completed 
by  visits  to  England,  France,  Italy,  and  North  Germany,  he 
entered  the  service  of  Charles  vi.  as  Aulic  Councillor.  During 
the  Austrian  Succession  War  he  was  successively  ambassador  at 
Rome,  Turin,  and  Brussels,  and  represented  Austria  at  the  Con- 
gress of  Aix-la-Chapelle.  Though  accused  of  frivolity'and  fop- 
pishness, and  suffering  from  bad  health,  he  had  already  proved 
himself  a  successful  diplomatist.  He  was,  in  spite  of  appear- 
ances, a  sagacious  thinker  and  a  careful  observer  in  political 
matters,  and  he  proved  himself  to  be  one  of  the  most  acute 
statesmen  of  his  day.  His  ability  was  unquestioned ;  his  re- 
markable energy  never  developed  into  rashness  ;  surrounded  by 
jealous  critics,  he  showed  calmness,  foresight,  and  resource.  His 
dexterous  diplomacy  was  the  result  of  cool  and  calculating  rea- 
son, and  its  strength  lay  in  a  patriotic  regard  for  his  country, 
which  made  him  resent  the  position  in  which  Frederick's  seiz- 


The  Diplomatic  Revolution  213 

ure  of  Silesia  had  left  her.  It  was  this  patriotism  which  secured 
for  him  the  full  and  necessar}'  confidence  of  Maria  Theresa, 
and  forced  Frederick  to  reahse  that  in  him  he  had  found  his 
most  dangerous  opponent. 

Kaunitz  was  now  thirty-eight  years  old,  was  about  to  carry 
out  a  great  diplomatic  revolution,  and  to  take  upon  himself 
the  direction  of  Austria's  policy  for  upwards  of  forty  years. 
In  his  famous  State  Paper,  which  in  itself  was  twice  as  long 
as  the  united  '  notes '  of  the  other  ministers,  he  pointed  out 
that  Austria's  position  was  materially  affected  by  the  rise  of 
Prussia,  that  Prussia  was  the  chief  of  the  enemies  of  Austria, 
and  that  the  latter  Power  would  never  be  secure  till  she  had 
recovered  Silesia.  Though  France  and  the  Porte  could  also 
be  included  in  the  list  of  Austria's  enemies,  Prussia's  hostility 
was  undoubted,  and  might  declare  itself  any  day.  Austria 
must  therefore  regain  Silesia  without  delay ;  but  in  carrying 
out  this  policy  she  could  not  rely  for  support  upon  existing 
alliances.  Though  George  11.  and  Frederick  were  not  on 
good  terms,  the  King  of  Prussia  was  popular  in  England,  and 
moreover  the  increasing  interest  taken  in  colonial  and  com- 
mercial matters  rendered  the  English  people  more  than  ever 
indifferent  to  purely  German  questions.  Holland,  busy  with 
internal  troubles,  and  with  her  resources  each  year  becoming 
more  straitened,  would  follow  England's  lead ;  while  upon 
Russia,  whose  foreign  policy  depended  on  the  caprice  of  the 
reigning  despot,  no  reliance  could  be  placed.  The  conclusions 
arrived  at  by  the  audacious  minister  were  two.  In  the  task  of 
recovering  Silesia  no  help  could  be  expected  from  any  of 
Austria's  allies,  and  consequently  friendship  with  France 
should  be  assiduously  cultivated,  France  being  the  only  great 
Power  likely  to  aid  Austria  in  her  enterprise  against  Prussia. 
Kaunitz  pointed  out  that  the  relations  between  France  and 
Prussia  were  far  from  friendly,  and  he  anticipated  that  Louis 
XV.  could  be  easily  won  over  to  his  views.  Prussia  was  the 
only  foe  which  Austria  desired  to  attack,  and  the  reconquest 
of  Silesia  the  one  object  of  her  foreign  policy.     But  Prussia, 


214  Eii7'opea7i  History,   171 5-1 789 

while  possessing  a  formidable  army,  had  also  gained  consider- 
able prestige.  The  formation  of  a  European  confederacy  was 
required  to  crush  the  power  and  to  humble  the  pride  of 
Frederick  the  Great,  and  of  that  confederacy  France  should 
be  a  leading  member.  The  salient  points  in  the  policy  of 
Kaunitz  are  therefore  three  :  (i)  the  determination  to  recover 
Silesia;  (2)  the  conviction  that  the  English  alliance  was  useless 
against  Prussia  in  a  war  for  the  recovery  of  Silesia;  (3)  the 
absolute  necessity  of  a  French  alliance. 

The  views  of  Kaunitz  were  in  the  main  correct.  He  cared 
little  for  the  Austrian  Netherlands,  or  for  the  outlying  Italian 
provinces.  Unlike  Metternich,  he  was  bent  on  consolidating, 
at  the  expense,  if  necessary,  of  the  Milanese  and  of  the  Nether- 
lands, the  German  provinces  of  the  Hapsburgs.  In  pursuance 
of  these  views  he  and  Joseph  11.  in  1778  and  in  1785  attempted 
to  include  within  the  Austrian  monarchy  the  Electorate  of 
Bavaria,  and  to  form  a  strong,  compact  German  kingdom  in 
South  Germany.  He  wished,  in  a  word,  to  restore  that 
Austrian  preponderance  in  Germany  which  had  been  lost  at 
the  Peace  of  WestphaHa,  and  to  check  those  influences  which 
were  tending  to  make  her  an  Eastern  rather  than  a  Western 
Power.  The  plan  of  a  French  alliance  was  not  new.  In  1726 
one  of  Ripperda's  agents  had  suggested  that  France  should 
join  the  alliance  of  Vienna,  and  Fleury  himself  had  not  been 
unwilling  to  entertain  the  idea  of  cultivating  friendly  relations 
with  Austria.  During  the  later  phases  of  the  Austfian  Suc- 
cession War  Bartenstein  had  recognised  the  advisability  of 
iletaching  France  from  the  Prussian  alliance,  and  the  policy  of 
a  definite  rapprochement  between  the  Hapsburgs  and  the 
French  Bourbons  had  been  openly  discussed.  Briihl  in  Sep- 
tember 1 745  had  indicated  to  the  Marquis  de  Vaulgrenant  the 
advantages  of  an  alliance  between  France  and  Austria  for 
the  punishment  of  the  treacherous  King  of  Prussia,  and  about 
the  same  time  Chotek,  then  Austrian  minister  at  Munich,  was 
reported  to  have  said  to  the  same  ambassador,  that  *  it  was 
quite  time  that  the   Courts  of  Vienna  and   Versailles   should 


TJie  Diplomatic  Revolution  215 

draw  together.'  And  there  seems  Httle  doubt  that  Maria 
Theresa  was  at  that  time  wiUing  to  receive  overtures  from 
France.  The  French  Cabinet  decided  to  open  negotiations 
through  Vaulgrenant,  but  as  they  refused  to  entertain  the  idea 
of  wTesting  Silesia  from  Frederick,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
negotiation  proved  fruitless. 

The  views  of  Kaunitz  were  at  first  strongly  opposed  by  the 
Emperor,  by  Harrach,  and  by  Uhlfeld,  and  as  strongly  sup- 
ported by  Maria  Theresa,  who  at  once,  with  characteristic 
impetuosity,  accepted  a  scheme  which  seemed  to  afford  the 
best  means  for  canning  out  the  principal  object  of  her  thoughts 
—  the  recovery  of  Silesia. 

It  was  owing  to  her   influence,  coupled  ^vith   the   growing 
coolness  between  Austria  and  the  Maritime  Powers,  that  the 
opposition  to  the  policy  of  Kaunitz  gradually  disap-   Growing 
peared.     Ens^land  had.  in  Maria  Theresa's  opinion,   irritation  in 
played  her  false  with  regard  to  Silesia,  and  further,   against 
had    forced    her    to    make   the   Treaty    of  Aix-la-   England. 
Chapelle.     In  the  peculiarly  sensitive  state  of  feeling  at  Vienna 
towards   England,   it  required  little  to  increase    the   want  of 
cordiality  between  the  two  nations.   ^  Maria  Theresa  had  deeply 
resented  the  conduct  of  the  English  Cabinet  during  the  late 
war,  and  when,  on  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Cha- 
pelle,  the    Enghsh  Parliament   demurred    to  her   demand    of 
;!£^ioo,ooo  which  she  declared  was  due  to  her,  she  vented  her 
irritation  upon  Keith,  the  English  ambassador  at  Vienna.     She 
was  not  satisfied  with  the  general  adhesion  given  by  the  Eng- 
lish   Government    in   1 75o__lo--the  alliance  of  1746    between 
Austria  and  Russia,  nor  did  George  11. 's  attempt  to  concihate 
her  wound^d^elings,  by  proposing  to  support  at  ^j^^  Question 
the  Diet  the  election  of  the  Archduke  Joseph  as  of  the  Eiec- 
King  of  the  Romans,  meet  with  any  success.     For  Archduke 
two  years  the  negotiations  on  this  subject  contin-  Joseph  as 
ued,  absorbing  the  attention  of  the  Electors,  and  af-  Romans, 
fording  France  and  even  Russia  an  opportunity  of  ^750-52- 
asserting  their  interest  in  the  affairs  of  Germany.     In  July  and 


2i6  Etiropean  History,    171 5-1 789 

August  1750  conferences  were  held  in  Hanover,  by  the  authority 
of  George  11.,  to  consider  the  best  means  of  securing  the  election 
of  the  Archduke.  As  the  Electors  of  Mainz  and  Trier  were 
devoted  to  the  Austrian  interest,  and  those  of  Bavaria,  Koln, 
and  Saxony  were  supposed  to  be  influenced  by  England,  no  diffi- 
culty was  anticipated  in  securing  the  necessary  majority  in  the 
Electoral  College.  From  Vienna  itself  George  received  little 
support,  for  Maria  Theresa,  while  already  hoping  to  detach 
France  from  the  Prussian  alliance,  not  only  disliked  the  tone 
adopted  by  the  English  Court,  but  foresaw  that  the  Electors 
would  demand  from  Austria  sums  of  money  and  territorial 
concessions.  And  she  was  justified  in  her  apprehensions. 
While  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  demanded  a  large  annual  subsidy, 
and  the  Elector  of  Koln  the  remission  of  some  payments  known 
as  the  Alois  Romaifis,  levied  in  the  Middle  Ages  to  defray  the 
expenses  of  the  Emperor's  coronation  journey  to  Rome,  the 
Elector  Palatine  claimed  from  England  and  Holland  ^50,000 
due  since  the  Spanish  Succession  War,  and  from  Austria  consid- 
erable territorial  concessions  and  a  large  indemnity  for  his  losses 
in  the  late  war.  Charles  Theodore,  the  Elector  Palatine,  born 
on  the  nth  of  December  1724,  was  the  son  of  John  Christian, 
Prince  Palatine  of  Sulzbach,  and  in  1742  succeeded  Charles 
Philip,  the  last  Elector  of  the  branch  of  Neuburg,  in  his  titles 
anl  estates.  As  he  had  been  a  French  partisan  during  the 
••vir  of  the  Austrian  Succession,  his  claims  for  compensation 
from  the  Court  of  Vienna  naturally  were  received  "by  Maria 
Theresa  with  ill-concealed  contempt.  In  the  wearisome  com- 
plications and  negotiations  which  filled  the  years  1751  and 
1752,  Puisieux,  the  French  ^Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
Saint-Contest,  who  succeeded  him  in  September  1751,  con- 
tented themselves  with  sending  Vergennes  to  Coblentz  and 
Hanover  to  watch  French  interests,  with  advocating  the  execu- 
tion of  Article  18  of  the  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  on  which  the 
pretensions  of  the  Elector  Palatine  were  based,  and  with  pro- 
fessing a  readiness  to  support  whatever  pohcy  Frederick  the 
Great  decided  to  adopt.     After  lengthy  discussions  at  Hanover 


TJic  Diplomatic  Revolution  217 

among  the  ambassadors  of  the  various  Courts,  including  Gri- 
maldi,  the  Spanish  envoy  to  Sweden,  who  arrived  to  support 
Veigennes  and  the  French  poHcy,  the  attempt  of  George  11.  to 
increase  the  prestige  and  power  of  his  electorate  failed.  The 
King  of  England  had  found  himself  compelled  to  support  the 
pretensions  of  the  Elector  Palatine  in  the  face  of  the  outspoken 
indignation  of  Maria  Theresa,  and  an  acrimonious  correspond- 
ence took  place  between  the  Courts  of  Vienna  and  St.  James'. 
While  the  question  of  Joseph's  election  was  under  discussion, 
Frederick  the  Great  had  asserted  that  a  mere  majority  of 
Electors  was  insufficient  to  choose  a  king  of  the  Romans,  and 
the  English  Cabinet  had  taken  the  same  view.  Throughout 
the  negotiations  the  English  diplomatists  undoubtedly  showed 
a  want  of  tact,  the  irritation  felt  at  Vienna  towards  Austrian 
its  peremptory  ally  became  intense,  and  it  was  not  irritation, 
till  the  27th  of  March  1764  that  the  election  took  place.  Thus 
George  11. 's  well-meant  efforts  to  calm  the  irritation  of  the 
Empress  against  her  allies  only  resulted  in  infuriating  her  more 
than  ever  against  the  Enghsh  Government. 

The  question  of  the  Barrier  of  the  Netherlands  had  also  in- 
creased the  want  of  cordiality  between  the  two  Courts.  The 
Austrian  Netherlands  —  a  continental  colony  of  the  The  Barrier 
Hapsburgs  —  was  always  a  source  of  difficulty.  The  Fortresses. 
closing  of  the  Scheldt  to  commerce,  the  terms  of  the  Barrier 
Treaty,  and  the  interest  of  England  and  Holland  in  the  defence 
of  the  country  against  France  practically  destroyed  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  Emperor,  and  justified  the  Austrian  ministers  in 
regarding  the  strengthening  of  the  defences  of  the  province 
with  indifference.  To  ]Maria  Theresa  this  political  and  com- 
mercial bondage  to  England  and  Holland  was  peculiarly  exas- 
perating, and  she  only  accepted  in  1748  the  renewal  of  the 
arrangement  of  1713  with  intense  irritation  and  impatience. 
To  England  and  Holland  the  matter  was  one  of  vital  impor- 
tance, and  in  1753  Sir  Charles  Hanbury  Williams  arrived  at 
Vienna  as  special  envoy.  Unfortunately,  like  other  English 
diplomatists  of  the  time,  he  damaged  his  cause  by  his  want 


21 8  European  History,   17 15-1789 

of  tact  when  conferring  with  Maria  Theresa,  and  only  strength- 
ened the  Court  of  Vienna  in  its  determination  not  to  yield  to 
the  impatient  demands  of  the  English  ministers. 

In   1750  Kaunitz  went  as  Austrian  Ambassador  to  Versailles, 

determined  to  convert  the  hereditary  enmity  of   France  into 

active  friendship.     His   plan  was  to  bring  before 

basV  of"         the  French  ministers  the  possibihty  of  an  alliance 

Kaunitz  to       bctwccn  the  Courts  of  Vienna  and  Versailles,  and 

France,  1750.  . 

as  a  means  to  this  end  to  foment  their  suspicions 
of  the  King  of  Prussia.  But  though  he  remained  in  France  till 
1753,  his  embassy  was  not  marked  by  success.  On  arriving  at 
Paris  he  found  affairs  in  terrible  confusion.  Louis  xv.'s  popu- 
larity was  gone,  and  Madame  de  Pompadour  was  supreme. 
Foreign  envoys  paid  their  court  to  her,  and  the  French  min- 
isters looked  to  her  for  advancement.  The  extravagance  of 
'  the  court  was  unchecked,  and  the  heavy  and  unequal  taxation 
ruined  all  enterprise.  The  Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  remained 
intensely  unpopular,  and  it  seemed  as  though  discontent  in  Paris 
would  develop  into  a  revolution.  The  Parlemoit  of  Paris  had 
with  difficulty  been  persuaded  to  sanction  a  war- tax  of  a  *  tenth,' 
and  shortly  after  the  conclusion  of  the  war  it  found  itself  again 
the  champion  of  the  Jansenist  cause  against  the  Government, 
and  the  leader  of  the  opposition  to  an  attempt  of  Machault,  the 
Controller-General,  to  impose  a  permanent  tax  of  a  twentieth 
on  all  classes.  Machault  d'Ernouville,  the  rival  of  the  Comte 
d'Argenson,  had  succeeded  Orry  as  Controller-Generfil  in  De- 
cember 1745.     Formerly  an  intendant  in  Hainault,  he  owed 

his  position  not  a  little   to   Madame   de   Pompa- 

Machault  s  ^ 

Attempts  at  dour,  who  rccogniscd  the  merits  of  the  stern  and 
Reforms.  high-principlcd  magistrate.  By  strict  economy  Ma- 
chault made  an  honest  attempt  to  improve  the  condition  of  the 
finances  ;  but,  after  the  end  of  the  Austrian  Succession  War,  the 
edict  which  imposed  a  tax  of  a  '  twentieth '  was  received  with 
almost  universal  disapprobation.  Riots  broke  out  in  Brittany, 
the  provincial  Estates  offered  resistance,  the  Parlement  of  Paris 
refused  to  register  the  edict,  the  clergy  were  loud  in  their  com- 

\ 


The  Diplojuatic  Revolution  219 

plaints.  The  same  forces  which  successfully  resisted  the  later 
attempts  of  Turgot  to  cam'  out  reforms  were  able  to  offer  to 
the  edict  an  insurniountable  opposition.  Machault  also  attacked 
the  clerg}^  directly.  He  wished  to  close  many  of  the  convents, 
and  to  check  the  growth  of  new  religious  establishments ;  he 
hoped  to  pass  a  mortmain  law,  and  to  place  obstacles  in  the 
way  of  the  acquisition  by  the  Church  of  legacies  of  land  or 
money.  He  also  proposed  to  establish  free  trade  wnthin  the 
length  and  breadth  of  France,  in  order  to  improve  agricultijre. 
These  admirable  proposals  were  doomed  to  failure.  The  clergy 
accused  him  of  impiety,  the  speculators  in  grain  violently  attacked 
him.  Machault's  programme,  if  carried,  might  have  inaugurated 
a  series  of  reforms  which  would  have  averted  the  Revolution 
and  saved  the  French  throne  for  the  Bourbons.  But  Louis  xv. 
was  unable  to  withstand  the  outcn'  raised  against  the  minister, 
and  in  July  1754  Machault  was  transferred  to  the  Ministr}'  of 
Marine. 

The  Parlement  of  Paris,  unlike  the  king,  showed  no  weakness 
in  its  attitude  towards  the  clergy,  who  were  indeed  supported 
bv    Louis   himself.      De    Beaumont,    the   fanatical 

"  ,      ,  4       1  1  •   1  r  T-w      •      1       1    •  T  Struggle  of 

though  honest  Archbishop  of  Pans,  had  issued  an   the  Parie- 
order  that  no   one    should  receive   the  Sacrament   ™entofPans 

with  the 

without  showing  a  ticket  of  confession  to  prove  ciergy  and 
that  he  had  accepted  the  Bull  U7iigenitus,  and 
he  had  further  attempted  to  control  the  Paris  hospitals.  The 
Parle ?ne?it  of  Paris,  supported  by  the  provincial  Pjrkments, 
strenuously  opposed  the  Archbishop  ;  formally  condemned,  in 
1752,  the  tickets  of  confession,  and  took  severe  measures 
against  refractory  priests.  In  1753  the  Government  came  to 
the  rescue  of  the  Archbishop,  and  on  May  8  and  9  all  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Paris  Parleynent  were  exiled,  with  the  exception  of 
the  '  Grand  Chamber.'  which,  however,  was  sent  to  Pontoise, 
and  later  to  Soissons.  Supported  by  the  provincial  Parlements, 
by  the  L'niversity  of  Paris,  and  by  public  opinion  generally, 
the  Parlement  continued  the  strucrde. 

Its  members  protested  against  the  invasion  of  the  rights  of 


220  Europeaji  History,   171 5-1789 

the  civil  power  by  ecclesiastics  and  the  interference  by  the 
Court  in  the  affairs  of  the  Parlejtient.  The  Paris  streets  were 
patrolled  by  cavalry,  riots  broke  out  in  various  places,  seditious 
placards  were  posted  on  the  walls.  '  All  orders,'  wrote  d'Ar- 
genson, '  are  at  once  discontented.  Everything  is  combustible. 
A  riot  may  pass  into  a  revolt,  and  a  revolt  into  a  complete 
revolution.  It  was  expected  that  the  Parlement  would  de- 
mand the  meeting  of  the  States-General.  'Everything,'  wrote 
d'Argenson  in  March  1754,  'is  preparing  the  way  for  civil  war.' 
Louis  XV.,  however,  by  the  advice  of  Madame  de  Pompadour, 
checked  the  continuance  of  the  crisis  by  recalling  the  Parlement, 
releasing  the  imprisoned  magistrates,  and  exiling  the  Archbishops 
of  Paris  and  Aix  and  the  Bishops  of  Orleans  and  Troyes,  be- 
cause they  declined  to  reverse  their  policy  and  abandon  their 
attacks  on  Jansenism. 

In  1756  de  Beaumont  reopened  the  struggle,  which  increased 
daily  in  fury.  The  Parlement  refused  a  compromise  obtained 
at  the  suggestion  of  the  Government  from  Benedict  xiv.,  and, 
supported  by  the  public,  suppressed  the  Papal  brief.  Alarmed 
at  the  pretensions  of  the  Parlement,  and  furious  at  its  conduct 
with  regard  to  the  Bull,  the  king,  in  December  1756,  held  a 
bed  of  justice,  and  declared  he  would  enforce  the  acceptance 
of  the  Bull  and  would  curtail  the  judicial  powers  of  the  Parle- 
7nent  in  ecclesiastical  cases.  But  the  Parlement,  in  the  absence 
of  the  States-General,  was  looked  upon  as  the  only  ©heck  upon 
the  royal  despotism,  and  its  claim  that  no  edict  had  the  force 
of  law  unless  it  was  registered  by  the  magistrates  received  uni- 
versal acceptance.  The  weakness  of  its  position  lay  in  its  dis- 
like of  any  financial  reform,  and  its  conservative  attitude  with 
regard  to  the  preservation  of  antiquated  privileges.^ 

Nevertheless  the  Parlement,  in  attacking  a  monarchy  so 
unconscious  of  its  duties  and  responsibilities  as  was  that  over 
which  Louis  xv.  presided,  occupied  a  strong  position.     Till  the 

1  Rocquain,  L Esprit  Revolutiohnaire  avant  la  Revolution^  pp.  54-72; 
Aubertin,  L Esprit  Public  ait  XVIII^.  Siecie,  pp.  260-272;  Lecky,  History 
0/ England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  vol.  v.  pp.  325-333. 


TJie  Diplomatic  Revolution  221 

Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  Louis  was  popular.  He  had  undoubt- 
edly many  excellent  qualities,  and  he  could  on  occasion  show 
activity  and  energ}' ;  he  was  interested  in  questions  louIs  xv., 
of  foreign  policy ;  he  was  extremely  desirous  of  ^"^5-48- 
imitating  and  emulating  Louis  xiv.,  for  whose  memory  he 
had  the  deepest  veneration.  Though  he  was  considera- 
bly younger  than  his  wife,  whom  the  Duke  of  Bourbon  had 
made  Queen  of  France,  he  lived  happily  with  her  for  some 
ten  years,  and  had  one  son  and  six  daughters.  The  Dauphin, 
who  married  first  jMaria  Theresa  of  Spain,  and  on  her  death 
^Llria  Josepha  of  Saxony,  died  in  1765.  Of  the  daughters, 
Louise  Elizabeth  married  Don  Philip  in  1739,  and  from  1748 
to  1759  was  known  as  the  Duchess  of  Parma;  none  of  her 
sisters  were  married.  Unfortunately  Louis,  who  had  naturally 
an  easy-going,  indolent,  effeminate  nature,  was  brought  up 
either  by  men  like  Villeroy,  who  inculcated  the  most  extreme 
views  of  the  divine  and  absolute  power  of  kings,  or  like  Fleury, 
who  taught  the  narrowest  theological  dogmas.  As  soon  as  he 
had  escaped  from  the  domination  of  Bourbon,  he  encouraged 
Fleury  to  reproduce,  as  far  as  possible,  in  the  Court  the  spirit 
and  usages  of  the  age  of  Louis  xrv\  From  1735  he  began 
to  fall  under  the  influence  of  the  four  sisters  of  the  House  of 
Nesle,  of  whom  the  Duchess  de  Chateauroux  is  the  best 
known.  But  on  her  death,  shortly  after  Louis'  illness  at  Metz, 
when  his  popularity  reached  its  culminating  point,  the  star  of 
Jeanne  Poisson,  who  had  married  one  Lenormand  d'Etiolles,  a 
financier,  and  who    became  in   174;    Madame  de   ,  „ 

,  ^  Influence  of 

Pompadour,  began  to  rise.  With  her  appearance  Madame  de 
at  the  French  Court  all  hope  of  any  reformation  of  p°"^p^'^°"''- 
abuses,  of  any  thorough  reorganisation  of  the  army,  navy,  and 
finances,  or  of  any  statesmanlike  foreign  policy,  at  once  disap- 
peared. To  her  influence  was  mainly  due  the  precipitation  with 
which  the  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  was  signed,  and  after  the  end 
of  the  war  ministers  were  appointed  and  dismissed  in  accordance 
with  her  personal  wishes.  Between  1748  and  1756  the  French 
Government  should  have  come  to  a  clear  understanding  with 


222  European  History,   171 5-1789 

England  with  regard  to  the  colonial  disputes ;  a  school  of  gen- 
erals should  have  been  trained  to  take  the  place  of  Marshal 
Saxe,  who  died  in  1750,  and  of  Lowendahl,  who  died  in  1755  ; 
the  efforts  of  the  Comte  d'Argenson,  of  Rouille,  and  of  Machault 
to  reorganise  the  army  and  navy  and  to  reform  the  finances 
Decline  of       ought  to  have  bccu  energetically  supported.     But 

the  French      ^^  Government,  hampered  by  the  constant  inter- 
Monarchy,  '  •' 
1748-74.           ference    of  Madame    de    Pompadour,  was    unable 

to  carry  out  to  any  satisfactory  extent  this  most  essential  pol- 
icy. It  became  evident  that  the  king,  sunk  in  dissipation,  was 
unable  to  appreciate  the  responsibilities  of  his  position,  and 
the  prospects  of  the  Bourbon  monarchy  darkened  with  each 
succeeding  year. 

The  attack  of  Damiens  on  Louis  xv.  in  January  1757,  and 
the  opening  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  prevented  any  general 
outbreak ;  but  the  discontent  and  sedition  smouldered  on, 
religious  scepticism  grew,  discussions  about  the  fundamental 
laws  of  the  state  increased,  and  the  prestige  of  the  monarchy 
declined  rapidly.  *  With  no  firmness,  no  resolution,  no  de- 
cision of  any  kind,'  the  Government  might  well  deserve  the 
name  of  '  an  extravagant  weathercock.' 

But  though  its  internal  policy  was  vacillating  and  unstable,  the 
French  Government  showed  no  signs  of  wishing  to  change  the 
foreign  policy  pursued  by  France  for  well-nigh  250  years.  In 
October  1750  the  Marquis  d'Hautefort  was  sent  as  ambassador 
to  succeed  Blondel,  the  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Vienna,  and  in 
^.  ,        .        i7S^  he  was  succeeded  by  the  Sieur  d'Aubeterre. 

Diplomatic  '^^  .  ^ 

Relations  The  rcccptiou  accordcd  to  these  envoys  proved 
France  and  couclusively  the  dcsirc  of  the  Austrian  Govern- 
Austria,  mcut  to  sccurc   the  alliance  of  France,  and  Keith, 

the  English  representative,  at  once  realised  the 
drift  of  the  policy  of  the  Court  of  Vienna.  The  instructions  to 
these  ambassadors  show  that  the  French  Government  desired 
to  be  on  terms  of  friendship  with  Maria  Theresa,  but  that  as 
long  as  England,  '  the  natural  foe  '  of  France,  was  the  ally  of 
Austria,   France  was  compelled  to  find  in  Prussia  a  counter- 


The  Diplomatic  Revohition  '      223 

poise  to  Austria.  Though  Kaunitz  failed  to  detach  France 
from  Prussia,  he  cultivated  the  friendship  of  the  king  and  of 
Madame  de  Pompadour,  acquired  some  influence  over  the 
latter,  and  realised  that  France  had  no  special  feelings  of  hos- 
tility towards  Austria.  In  1753  he  returned  to  Vienna,  was 
made  Chancellor  of  State,  while  Bartenstein,  who  could  not 
work  with  him,  was  dismissed,  and  Uhlfeld  retired.  In  1752 
the  Treaty  of  Aranjuez,  a  faint  reproduction  of  the  famous 
Treaty  of  Vienna  of  1725,  had  been  made  between  Austria  and 
Spain,  the  latter  under  Ferdinand  vi.,  to  guarantee  each  other's 
European  possessions.  To  this  treaty,  Sardinia,  Naples,  and 
Parma  acceded,  so  far  as  the  Italian  provinces  of  Austria  were 
concerned.  But  the  coolness  between  Spain  and  France,  and 
the  continued  existence  of  the  Anglo-Austrian  connection, 
seemed  to  preclude  all  chance  of  a  close  alliance  between  Aus- 
tria, France,  and  Spain.  Circumstances,  however,  before  long 
aided  Kaunitz,  and  brought  about  not  only  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  between  Austria  and  France,  but  also  the  renewal  of 
the  Family  Compact  between  France  and  Spain.  The  mission 
of  Kaunitz,  though  devoid  at  the  moment  of  any  tangible  result, 
in  reality  paved  the  way  for  the  future  aUiance  between  France 
and  Austria.  Like  the  mission  of  Harcourt  to  Spain  at  the  close 
of  the  preceding  century,  it  proved  to  be  of  vast  international 
importance. 

In  1753  Austria's  principal  continental  ally  was  Russia.     Ar- 
ranged by  Charles  ^^.  in   1726,  the  alliance  between  the  two 
Courts  had  only  been  interrupted  for  a  few  years   Diplomatic 
on  the  death  of  that  Emperor.     In  1744  French   Relations 

•     n  •       o       T-.  1  •    1       •  1       -T-"  between 

influence  in  St.  Petersburg,  which  since  the  treaty  Austria  and 
of  Belgrade  had  become  of  some  importance,  dis-  ^"ssia. 
appeared  with  the  departure  of  La  Chetardie,  and  the  Tsarina 
Elizabeth,  realising  the  necessity  of  checking  the  ambition  of 
Frederick  the  Great,  \\'iningly  received  friendly  overtures  from 
Maria  Theresa.  On  the  30th  of  May  1745  Elizabeth  declared 
her  consent  to  the  renewal  of  the  alliance  of  1726,  and  on  the 
22d  of  May  1746  a  treaty  between  the  two  Powers  was  signed 


224  European  History y   171 5-1 789 

containing  secret  articles  for  the  recovery  of  Silesia  and  for  the 
partition  of  the  Prussian  kingdom.  From  the  date  of  the  sig- 
nature of  the  treaty  to  the  death  of  Ehzabeth,  in  spite  of  a 
dispute  over  a  religious  persecution  of  some  Servians  and  other 
Slavs  by  the  Hungarians,  Russia  and  Austria  remained  firm 
allies,  and  an  article  was  added  to  the  Treaty  of  1746  binding 
both  Powers,  in  view  of  French  influence  at  Constantinople,  to 
resist  any  Turkish  attack.  From  this  Russian  alliance  Maria 
Theresa  hoped  to  derive  ^o  small  benefit.  Her  hatred  of  the 
King  of  Prussia  was,  if  possible,  surpassed  by  that  of  Elizabeth, 
encouraged  by  her  Chancellor  Bestuzhev.  Russia  had  for 
some  time  past  aimed  at  changing  the  succession  in  Sweden, 
and  in  1749,  taking  advantage  of  the  illness  of  the  king,  a 
Russian  army  was  assembled  on  the  Finland  frontier.  The 
heir-apparent  of  Sweden  was  a  brother-in-law  of  Frederick,  who 
had  signed,  on  the  29th  of  May  1747,  a  defensive  alliance  with 
Sweden,  which,  in  1748,  had  been  joined  by  France.  Prepar- 
ing for  war,  he  issued  a  protest  in  May  1750  to  the  Russian 
Court.  Bestuzhev,  finding  that  England  was  unwilling  to  sup- 
port him,  withdrew  from  his  position ;  Ehzabeth  contented 
herself  with  breaking  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Prussia  ;  and 
in  1753,  at  a  Council  held  at  Moscow,  a  solemn  resolution  was 
come  to  that  Russian  policy  should  aim  at  the  prevention  of 
further  aggrandisement  on  the  part  of  Prussia,  and  at  co-op- 
eration with  Austria,  Saxony,  and  England  in  reducing  it  to 
its  original  limits.  England's  friendly  relations  with  Russia 
and  her  strained  relations  with  Prussia  seemed  still  further  to 
strengthen  the  position  of  Austria. 

A  Russian,  like  a  Swedish  alliance,  had  to  be  bought,  but 
English  statesmen,  partly  for  commercial  reasons,  partly  in 
England's  Order  to  sccurc  EHzabeth's  co-operation  in  over- 
Reiations        awiug  Frederick,  and   so    securins;  Hanover  from 

with  Russia  o  '  _  ^ 

and  Prussia,  all  danger  from  Prussia,  were  content  to  pay  con- 
siderable sums  for  the  continuance  of  friendly  relations  with 
Russia.  For  keeping  troops  in  readiness  in  time  of  peace 
Russia  demanded  at  least  ^200,000  a  year,  and  a  much  larger 


TJie  Diplomatic  Revolution  225 

sum  in  time  of  war.  So  unfriendly  were  the  relations  between 
England  and  Prussia  in  1750  and  the  years  immediately  follow- 
ing, that  there  seemed  little  chance  of  a  union  between  the 
two  Powers.  Frederick  distrusted  English  statesmen  before 
the  Seven  Years'  War  almost  as  much  as  he  did  after  it.  He 
opposed  George's  scheme  for  making  the  Archduke  Joseph 
King  of  the  Romans ;  he  quarrelled  with  England  about  cer- 
tain Prussian  ships  captured,  while  trading  with  France,  by 
English  men-of-war;  he  sent  a  Jacobite  envoy  to  Paris,  and 
for  a  time  no  English  ambassador  was  at  Berlin,  and  only  a 
Prussian  Secretary  of  Legation  in  London. 

In  1753  it  seemed  as  though  a  European  war  would  break 
out.  In  January,  a  Saxon  clerk,  Menzel,  whom  Frederick 
had  bribed,  sent  him  a  copy  of  the  secret  articles   , 

.  _  ^  •'  Likelihood 

of  the  Austro-Russian   Treaty  of   1 746,  and  con-   of  War  in 
tinned  to  send    copies  of  secret   documents   from   ^^^^' 
the  archives    at   Dresden.     In  Weingarten,  an  attach^  of  the 
Austrian  Embassy  at  Berlin,  Frederick  found  another  official 
who  for  gold  was  ready  to  supply  him  with  information.     The 
king  now  knew  the  worst.     Russia  and  Austria  had   planned 
his  destruction,  and  were  endeavouring  to  secure  the  adhesion 
of  Saxony.     Austria   was    collecting  forces    in    Bohemia,   and 
Russian   troops  were   moving  towards  Prussia.     But  the  Rus- 
sian   attack    on    Prussia  was  again   postponed.     England  was 
unwilling  to  pay  the  subsidies  demanded  by  the  Court  of  St. 
Petersburg,  Frederick  showed  his  usual  readiness  to  repel  inva- 
sion, and  France  intimated  to  England  that  if  Prussia  was  at- 
tacked she  would  send  troops  to  his  assistance.     The  fear  of 
an   invasion    of  Hanover   might    have    indefinitely  postponed 
the    inevitable    struggle   had  not   the  quarrels   be- 
tween England  and  France  in  India  and  in  Amer-    Prussian 
ica  led   to    the  outbreak  of , war    between  the  two        i^nce. 
countries.     In  1753  Duquesne,  Governor  of  Canada,  attempted 
to  seize  the  Ohio  Valley,  and  by  means  of  the  French  claims 
to  the  valleys  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  the  Mississippi,  to  unite 
the  provinces  of  Canada  and  Louisiana.     In  India  CHve  had 

PERIOD  VI,  p 


226  European  History,    17 1 5-1789 

foiled  the  schemes  of  Dupleix,  who  in  1754  was  recalled.  In 
America,  however,  the  quarrel  was  more  serious.  In  1754 
Washington  and  the  Virginian  militia,  after  winning  a  decided 
success,  were  defeated,  and  the  following  year  General  Brad- 
dock,  at  the  head  of  some  English  regular  troops,  was  defeated 
and  killed.  Though  war  was  not  formally  declared  between 
England  and  France,  it  was  obvious  in  1755  that  it  was  inevi- 
table. At  this  crisis  Frederick  the  Great  was  forced  to  con- 
sider carefully  his  relations  with  France,  while  the  Enghsh 
Cabinet  had  to  decide  upon  the  best  means  of  defending 
Hanover,  which  lay  exposed  to  the  hostility  of  France  and 
Prussia. 

Frederick  was  closely  connected  with  France.  The  Treaty 
of  1 741  bound  him  to  aid  Louis  xv.  if  attacked,  whilejn  1753 
Position  of  France  had  come  to  his  support  with  a  aistinct 
Frederick        declaration  that  she  would  assist   him  if   Ensfland 

the  Great  in  " 

1754-55-  declared  war.     Though   neither  Power   had  much 

confidence  in  the  sincerity  of  the  other,  though  Frederick 
despised  French  statesmen,  and  though  Madame  de  Pompa- 
dour and  the  Court  of  Versailles  disliked  and  distrusted  Fred- 
erick, common  interests  seemed  to  render  the  close  alHance  of 
France  and  Prussia  absolutely  necessary.  And  for  a  Power 
situated  as  was  Prussia  both  geographically  and  financially, 
alHance  with  France  seemed  to  be  of  incalculable  value. 

France  occupied  an  influential  position  in  Europe.  Her 
relations  with  Poland,  Turkey,  Sweden,  and  the  sn^aller  Ger- 
French  man   princes   rendered    her   a   valuable    ally,    and 

Policy  in  though  Louis  xv.'s  secret  diplomacy,  combined 
Europe.  with  frcqucnt  changes  in  the  department  of  foreign 

affairs,  made  a  firm  and  consistent  policy  impossible,  the  mili- 
tary and  political  position  of  the  French  nation  was  incontesta- 
bly  strong.  /On  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle 
it  was  clear  that  in  Russia  a  strong  and  successful  Power  had 
risen,  while  the  violation  of  PoHsh  territory  by  Russian  troops 
in  1747-48  not  only  rendered  apparent  the  weakness  of  Poland 
itself,  but  demonstrated  the  fixed  determination  of  the  Tsarina 


TJie  Diplomatic  Revolution  227 

to  make  that  countn'  subsement  to  herself. y  Any  idea  that 
Louis  or  his  ministers  might  have  of  allying  with  Russia  was 
prevented  by  the  union  of  the  Imperial  Courts  in  the  Treaty 
of  1746,  by  Louis'  distaste  of  Russian  aggressiveness,  and  his 
personal  dislike  of  Elizabeth.  In  his  own  feeble  way  he  was 
inclined  to  draw  closer  his  relations  with  Poland,  Turkey,  and 
Sweden,  realising  the  truth  of  the  saying  that  the  road  from 
Moscow  to  Constantinople  passed  through  Stockholm  and  War- 
saw. Like  Bonneval,  he  dimly  appreciated  the  advantage  to 
France  of  a  union  of  Poland,  Turkey,  and  Sweden  under  the 
direction  of  France.  But  French  credit  had  sensibly  dimin- 
ished in  the  north  and  east,  and  the  three  countries  in  question 
were  each  in  various  degrees  of  decadence.  It  would  have  re- 
quired a  statesman  of  superhuman  energy  to  rouse  them  from 
their  torpor,  to  induce  them  to  carry  out  the  required  reforms, 
and  to  make  them  appreciate  the  imminence  of  the  danger 
from  Russia.  Louis  was  not  a  statesman ;  he  was  timid,  he 
loved  secrecy  and  circuitous  courses,  his  health  was  entirely 
broken.  He  resolved  to  carr}-  out  his  schemes  by  means  of 
secret  agents.  He  decided  to  use  the  senices  of  the  Prince 
of  Conti,  the  great  nephew  of  the  famous  Conde,  and  a  cousin 
of  his  own.  A  popular  man,  Conti  was  active  and  energetic, 
but  he  was  the  prey  to  an  overmastering  ambition,  and  over- 
fond  of  building  castles  in  the  air.  Numerous  schemes  had 
floated  through  his  brain.  He  had  hoped  at  one  time  to 
marr}'  Elizabeth  of  Russia,  at  another  to  be  the  generalissimo 
of  the  troops  of  some  great  European  Power,  at  another 
to  be  a  Cardinal.  A  field  for  his  ambition  was  now  found  in 
Poland,  where  Augustus  m.,  the  king,  was  not  expected  to  live 
long. 

As  Poland  was  in  size  as  large  as  France,  and  barred  the 
advance  of  Russia  into  western  Europe,  it  was  obvious  that 
she  would  become  the  centre  of  diplomatic  activities  directly 
a  fresh  European  war  came  within  sight.  Austria  and  Russia, 
aided  by  England,  were  busy  trying  to  secure  the  adhesion  of 
Augustus  to  the  Treaty  of   1746,  while   France,  realising  the 


228  European  History,   171 5-1789 

importance  of  the  position,  endeavoured  at  any  rate  to  secure 
the  neutrality  of  Poland.^ 

Louis  determined,  therefore,  to  put  forward  the  claim  of 
Conti  to  the  Polish  succession,  hoping  thereby  to  advance  his 
own  design  with  regard  to  a  general  opposition  to  Russia.  In 
Poland  two  parties  henceforward  struggled  for  pre-eminence. 
The  Saxon  party  was  anxious  for  the  Russian  alliance ;  and  the 
Russian  policy,  which  had  the  support  of  England,  was  to  sup- 
port the  Czartoryskis,  to  keep  the  Poles  and  Saxons  in  due  sub- 
mission, to  eventually  raise  a  Czartoryski  to  the  throne,  using 
him  as  a  Russian  tool,  and  thus  to  secure  the  right  of  passage 
through  Poland.  The  national  party,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
opposed  to  the  establishment  of  Russian  influence  in  Poland. 
To  compass  the  triumph  of  the  national  party  was  the  object 
of  the  French  ministers,  while  Louis  xv.  went  still  further,  and 
hoped  and  intrigued  to  secure  the  election  of  the  Prince  of 
Conti.  As  the  Dauphiness  was  the  daughter  of  Augustus,  and 
as  Maurice  de  Saxe  was  still  alive,  Louis  found  it  necessary  to 
keep  secret  the  objects  of  his  pohcy  in  Poland.  He  therefore 
set  to  work  with  great  mystery,  intending  to  secure  Conti's 
election,  and  thus  to  give  the  coalition  of  Poland,  Turkey,  and 
Sweden  a  natural  leader.  To  Turkey  the  Comte  des  Alleurs, 
one  of  Conti's  partisans,  had  been  sent  with  two  sets  of  instruc- 
tions—  one  official,  one  secret.  With  great  difficulty  he  restored 
French  influence  in  Constantinople,  and  by  1750  the  Turks  will- 
ingly entered  into  the  French  plan  of  checking  Russian  influence 
in  Poland  and  Sweden.  To  the  latter  country  d'Havrencourt, 
another  of  Conti's  agents,  had  been  sent  in  1 749,  and  there  he 
remained  till  1753.  In  1748  France  had  joined  Prussia  in 
guaranteeing  the  defence  of  Sweden  in  case  of  attack,  and  in 
1750  it  seemed  likely  that  Russia,  then  in  occupation  of  Fin- 
land, would  march  on  Stockholm.  But  the  protests  and  prepa- 
rations of  Frederick,  combined  with  the  interests  of  France  in 
Sweden,  checked  Russia,  while  the  accession  of  Adolphus  Fred- 
erick at  the  end  of  1750  to  the  Swedish  throne,  and  his  decla- 
1  See  Due  de  Broglie,  The  King's  Secret. 


TJie  Diplomatic  Revolution  229 

ration  that  he  would  not  attempt  any  constitutional  reforms, 
gave  Russia  an  excuse  for  evacuating  Finland. 

From  1752  to  1756  the  chief  theatres  of  French  diplomacy 
were  Constantinople  and  Warsaw.  In  1752  the  Comte  de 
Broglie,  the  second  son  of  the  Marshal,  who  had  taken  a 
considerable  part  in  the  early  stages  of  the  Austrian  Suc- 
cession War,  was,  through  Conti's  influence,  appointed  envoy 
to  Poland.  He  carried  with  him,  like  des  Alleurs,  two  sets 
of  instructions.  Saint-Contest,  the  Foreign  Minister,  ordered 
him  simply  to  bring  about  a  close  union  between  Poland  and 
Saxony,  to  oppose  their  alliance  with  Russia  and  Austria,  and  to 
support  the  national  party  in  Poland  ;  Louis,  on  the  other  hand, 
instructed  him,  while  re-establishing  French  influence,  to  for- 
ward Conti's  candidature,  and  to  correspond  \vith  Conti  himself. 
De  Broglie  had  a  difficult  task  to  perform,  and,  in  spite  of  his 
total  want  of  experience  in  diplomacy,  seems  to  have  shown 
considerable  tact  and  skill.  Like  Hertzberg,  de  Broglie 
evolved  a  policy  which,  if  not  practicable,  was  at  any  rate 
ingenious.  He  aimed  at  making  Poland  and  Saxony  an  im- 
passable barrier  to  Russia,  and  at  inducing  Turkey,  when  occa- 
sion required,  to  attack  Russia  by  land,  while  Sweden  and 
Denmark  were  to  attack  her  by  sea.  He  further  looked 
forward  to  the  occupation  of  Holland  by  Prussia.  In  the 
event  of  a  continental  war,  France  would  thus  only  have 
Austria  to  deal  with.  Though  his  principal  efforts  were  de- 
voted to  securing  the  alHance  of  Poland  and  Saxony,  and  to 
prevent  armed  interference  in  the  affairs  of  Poland,  de  Broglie 
made  some  attempts,  with,  however,  little  success,  to  further 
the  candidature  of  Conti. 

By  the  beginning  of  1755  a  certain  measure  of  success  re- 
warded de  Broglie's  energy  and  diplomacy.  A  strong  party 
hostile  to  the  Czartoryskis  had  been  formed  among  the  Polish 
noblesse,  and  Augustus  iii.  was  ready  to  promise  to  oppose  the 
entrance  of  Russian  troops  into  Poland,  and  give  France  armed 
assistance.  He  was  further  ready  to  authorise  his  subjects  to 
rise  en  masse  should   the    Russians   invade    Poland.     France, 


230  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

supported  by  Prussia,  Poland,  Sweden,  and  Turkey,  seemed 
prepared,  by  dint  of  the  vigorous  action  of  de  Broglie,  des 
Alleurs,  and,  on  his  death  in  1754,  of  Vergennes,  not 
only  to  completely  detach  Saxony  from  an  alliance  with  the 
two  Imperial  Courts,  but  also  defend  herself  and  her  allies 
successfully  against  the  hostiUty  of  Russia,  Austria,  and 
England. 

With  the  shadow  of  an  inevitable  conflict  hanging  over  his 

country,  and  with  full  knowledge  of  the  schemes  of  Austrian 

diplomacy   of    which    Dresden    was    the    centre, 

Position  of 

Frederick  Frederick  might  well  hesitate  before  he  sacrificed 
the  Great.  ^^  alliance  with  a  Power  which  was  as  equally 
interested  as  he  was  in  checking  the  growth  of  the  Hapsburg 
supremacy  in  the  Empire.  The  influence  and  prestige  of 
the  Court  of  Vienna  were  increasing,  and  the  undoubted 
tendency  of  Austrian  policy  was  to  transform  the  princes  of 
the  Empire  into  subservient  instruments  of  its  own.  It  was 
then  of  the  utmost  importance  to  prevent  the  union  of  France 
and  Austria  against  the  House  of  Brandenburg.  The  action  of 
England  only  tended  to  confirm  his  anxieties,  and  to  force  him 
to  a  decision  with  regard  to  his  alliance  with  France. 

From  1 749  he  had  consistently  endeavoured  to  counteract 
the  diplomacy  of  Maria  Theresa  in  the  French  capital,  and 
had  urged  upon  his  representatives  constant  watchfulness  and 
caution.  Against  his  numerous  foes  a  continuance  of  his  close 
aUiance  with  France  seemed  his  best  chance  of  safety.  But 
in  France  opinion  was  divided.  Though  ofificialdom,  as  repre- 
sented by  Louis'  ministers,  continued  to  regard  the  continuance 
of  the  Prussian  alliance  as  necessary,  and  had  no  wish  to  desert 
the  ancient  system  of  hostility  to  the  Hapsburgs,  a  different 
spirit  was  apparent  among  many  members  of  the  Court,  among 
financiers,  diplomatists,  and  others.  It  was  asserted  openly  that 
the  King  of  Prussia  had  proved  an  unfaithful  ally  in  the  late 
war,  that  his  policy  was  selfish,  that  he  desired  a  fresh  outbreak 
of  hostiUties,  that  his  alliance  was  dangerous  to  the  interests  of 
France. 


The  Diplomatic  Revolution  231 

The  appearance  of  Kaunitz  in  Paris  gave  force  to  the  argu- 
ments of  the  enemies  of  Frederick,  who  found  that  none  of  his 
successive  representatives  at  the  French  capital  —   , 

^  .  ^  His  Rela- 

Chambrier,  Lord  Keith,  and  Knyphausen  —  could  tions  with 
weaken  the  favourable  impression  which  the  Aus-  ^'■*"*^®- 
trian  ambassador  had  made  at  the  French  Court.  Kaunitz 
reigned  supreme  in  the  good  graces  of  Madame  de  Pompa- 
dour, but  though  Louis  xv.  was  gratified  at  the  friendship  of 
Maria  Theresa,  the  ancient  system  of  alliance  was  not  over- 
thrown. That  Louis  chafed  at  the  dictatorial  tone  of  Fred- 
erick, just  as  Maria  Theresa  resented  the  blunt  advice  of  the 
English  diplomatists,  is  undoubted.  From  Berlin  emanated  at- 
tacks by  French  refugees  upon  religion  and  the  monarchy.  In 
France  and  in  Prussia  were  a  number  of  literary  men,  pension- 
ers of  Frederick.  But  Louis'  character,  and  his  love  of  secret 
diplomacy,  rendered  a  decision  which  involved  a  complete 
change  of  French  policy  pecuharly  difficult  to  make,  and  when 
in  1753  Kaunitz  returned  to  Vienna,  and  Hautefort  was  replaced 
by  Aubeterre,  there  was  nothing  in  the  political  situation  to  lead 
Europe  to  expect  a  reshuffling  of  the  alliances  of  the  great 
Powers. 

But  the  increasing  hostility  between  England  and  France 
rendered  Frederick's  position  one  of  extreme  anxiety.  France 
^'as  unprepared  for  war,  and  her  government  was  conducted 
upon  no  intelligible  principle.  A  popular  outcry  against  the 
Controller-General,  Machault.  had  resulted  in  his  appointment 
to  the  Ministry  of  Marine,  while  Rouille,  an  intendant  seventy 
years  old,  was  made  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  on  the  death 
of  Saint-Contest.  The  French  na\T  was  far  inferior  to  that  of 
England,  and  the  inability  of  France  to  cope  with  Great  Britain 
on  the  sea  rendered  it  absolutely  certain  that  she  would  endeav- 
our to  attack  England  on  the  continent.  In  presence  of  this 
crisis  French  foreign  policy  wavered.  If  the  war  was  confined 
to  a  struggle  between  England  and  France,  and  Austria  and 
Holland  remained  neutral,  England  could  only  be  attacked  in 
Hanover,  and  only  there   if  the  Franco-Prussian  alliance   re- 


232  European  History^   171 5-1789 

mained  intact.  The  French  Government  would  certainly  de- 
mand Frederick's  co-operation  in  an  invasion  of  Hanover,  and 
his  entry  into  the  war  would,  he  saw,  be  at  once  followed  by 
a  combined  Austro-Russian  attack  on  his  dominions.  With  his 
usual  clear-sightedness  the  Prussian  king  perceived  that  if  France 
was  beaten  at  sea  he  could  not  hope  to  oppose  successfully  the 
attacks  of  England,  Hanover,  Austria,  Russia,  and  Saxony.  His 
perplexity  during  the  year  1755,  as  shown  in  his  instructions  to 
his  ambassadors  and  in  his  conversations  with  the  French  envoy. 
La  Touche,  was  only  natural.  In  April  d'Argenson,  the  Minis- 
ter of  War,  suggested  that  the  Prussians  should  occupy  Han- 
over. But  Frederick,  aware  of  the  designs  of  his  enemies  at 
St.  Petersburg,  Vienna,  and  Dresden,  dared  not  weaken  him- 
self by  attacking  the  Electorate.  Hoping  to  preserve  neutrality 
in  the  coming  war  between  England  and  France,  he  in  July 
urged  the  French  to  occupy  the  Austrian  Netherlands.  In 
France  the  news  of  the  capture  of  the  Alcide  and  the  Lys  had 
caused  intense  excitement.  The  Council  was  itself  divided, 
and  the  prey  to  irresolution  and  weakness.  Questions  of 
foreign  policy  were  discussed  in  the  streets,  and  while  the 
majority  of  the  ministers  agreed  with  the  majority  of  the  nation 
in  demanding  immediate  war,  a  small  number  urged  that  repa- 
ration should  first  be  demanded  from  England. 

Though  Frederick,  through  Knyphausen,  continued  to  urg^ 
upon  the  distracted  French  ministers  an  immediate  and  over- 
whelming attack  upon  the  Austrian  Netherlands,  he  Tvas  careful 
not  to  make  any  offer  of  an  active  alliance.  His  treaty  made 
with  France  in  1741  would  expire  in  June  1756,  and  he  de- 
clared that  on  its  expiry  he  would  be  ready  to  consider  the 
whole  question  of  a  new  alliance.  The  French  Government, 
though  involved  in  negotiations  with  Austria,  was  desirous,  if 
possible,  of  obtaining  some  more  definite  declarations  of  policy 
from  Frederick,  and  decided  to  send  the  Due  de  Nivernais  to 
Berlin.  But  though  every  moment  was  of  importance,  a  long 
and  disastrous  delay  took  place  between  the  appointment  of 
Nivernais  and  his  arrival  at  Berlin.     During  that  interval  events 


The  Diplomatic  Revolution  233 

had  occurred  which  enabled  Frederick  to  see  that  his  safest 
poHcy  was  to  ally  with  England. 

It  had  been  recognised  early  in  1755  by  English  statesmen 
that  war  with  France  was  inevitable,  and  that  the  French 
would  attack  the  Austrian  Netherlands  and  invade   ^    ,     , 

England 

Hanover.  A  treaty  with  Hesse  for  a  supply  of  prepares  for 
12,000  troops  was  concluded,  and  Austria  was 
invited  to  renew  her  alliance  with  England.  Early  in  1755 
the  English  Government  had  made  a  definite  offer  respecting 
the  defence  of  the  Austrian  Netherlands.  England  would  em- 
ploy Hessians,  and  would  conclude  an  alliance  with  Russia, 
if  Austria  on  her  part  would  send  an  army  of  some  25,000  men 
to  strengthen  the  garrisons  in  the  Barrier  towns.  Kaunitz  met 
this  proposal  in  May  with  a  poHte  refusal.  There  was  no 
danger,  he  asserted,  of  hostilities  breaking  out ;  such  prepara- 
tions as  the  British  Government  suggested  might  lead  to  the 
invasion  which  it  dreaded,  and  should  war  be  declared  by 
France,  the  reinforcements  demanded  would  arrive  too  late. 
Holderness,  the  English  Secretary  of  State,  at  once  recognised 
the  meaning  of  Kaunitz'  attitude,  and  the  fact  that  the  Anglo- 
Austrian  alliance  had  come  to  an  end.  Austria,  with  no 
colonies  and  no  navy,  had  ostensibly  as  little  interest  in  the 
war  between  England  and  France  as  had  Prussia.  Maria 
Theresa's  object  being  to  reconquer  Silesia,  all  her  preparations 
were  directed  to  that  end,  and  of  this  Frederick  was  well  aware. 
The  Austrian  Government  was  resolved  to  recover  Silesia.  It 
was  willing  on  certain  terms  to  ally  with  England  against 
Prussia  as  well  as  against  France,  but  the  English  ministers  had 
no  intention  of  attacking  Prussia  or  of  supporting  the  Austrian 
schemes  in  Silesia.  The  evasive  and  unsatisfactory  reply  of 
Austria  to  Holderness'  ultimatum  showed  that  Kaunitz  was 
not  anxious  for  the  English  alliance  on  the  EngHsh  terms,  and 
Hanbury  Williams  was  sent  to  St.  Petersburg.  There  he  was 
cordially  received  by  the  Chancellor,  Bestuzhev,  who  hated 
Prussia,  and  was  convinced  that  the  true  allies  of  Russia  were 
England,  Austria,  Sweden,  and  Saxony.     On  the  30th  of  Sep- 


234  Eiiropean  History,   171 5-1789 

tember  a  subsidy  treaty  was  concluded,  and  England  took  into 
her  pay  55,000  Russian  troops,  who,  if  Hanover  was  attacked, 
should  at  once  march  to  its  assistance. 

Meanwhile  the  Austrian  Cabinet  had  taken  a  decisive  step, 
and  negotiations  had  been  opened  by  England  with  Prussia. 
^^    ^  In  August  the  Austrian  ministers  had  decided  to 

The  Conven-  ° 

tionofWest-  leave  the  Netherlands  to  their  fate  —  a  decision 
minster.  which  implied  that  the  English  alliance,  which  had 

existed  since  the  revolution  of  1688,  was  at  an  end.  Almost 
simultaneously  overtures  had  been  made  by  England  to  Fred- 
erick, who  declared  that  he  was  anxious  for  peace,  and  hoped 
to  see  the  differences  between  France  and  England  amicably 
arranged.  But  war  was  inevitable ;  the  news  of  Boscawen's 
capture  of  the  Alcide  and  the  Lys  reached  France  in  July,  and 
by  the  end  of  1755  some  300  French  merchant  ships  had  been 
seized.  Frederick  was  unwiUing  to  guarantee  the  French 
colonies ;  he  held  that  the  dispute  between  England  and 
France  was  essentially  a  colonial  one,  and  that  his  engage- 
ments with  France  applied  only  to  Europe.  He  distrusted 
the  French  ministers  and  Madame  de  Pompadour,  and  he 
resented  the  tone  of'the  Court  of  Versailles.  He  had,  early  in 
1755,  urged  upon  France  vigorous  measures,  but  could  not  get 
any  satisfactory  assurances.  In  supporting  France  he  would 
be  increasing  her  influence  in  Germany ;  he  would  also  run  the 
risk  of  being  deserted  by  her  in  revenge  for  his  double  desertion 
of  the  French  cause  during  the  Austrian  Succession  IVar ;  he 
was  exposing  himself  to  an  attacl^Mrom  England,  Russia,  and 
Austria.  In  December  he  saw  a  copy  of  the  treaty  between 
Russia  and  England.  He  at  once  came  to  a  decision.  He 
would  have  none  of  French  half-measures  and  French  hesi- 
tation. On  the  1 6th  of  January  1756  the  Convention  of 
Westminster  w^s  signed,  by  which  England  and  Prussia  agreed 
not  to  allow  foreign  troops  of  any  nation  to  enter  or  pass 
through  Germany.  England  no  longer  wished  to  use  Russian 
troops  in  Germany  ;  Frederick  agreed,  to  the  great  satisfaction 
of  George  11.,  to  defend  Hanover  if  attacked  by  French  troops. 


The  Diplomatic  Revolution  235 

Both  Powers  'guaranteed  the  neiitrahty  of  Germany,'  but  by 
a  secret  article  expressly  excluded  the  Austrian  Netherlands. 
Hitherto  though  English  statesmen  had  felt  no  special  animos- 
ity to  Prussia,  George  11.,  as  Elector  of  Hanover,  had  always 
regarded  Frederick  William  and  Frederick  the  Great  as  his 
rivals  in  Germany.  In  the  face,  however,  of  a  great  struggle, 
the  petty  jealousy  between  the  two  Electors  was  swept  away, 
and  Prussia  was  recognised  as  England's  strongest  ally  on  the 
continent.  By  this  treaty  Frederick  had  converted  one  enemy, 
England,  into  an  ally,  had  rid  himself  of  another,  Russia,  had 
preserved  the  neutrality  of  Germany,  and  kept  out  of  Germany 
Russian  and  French  troops.  The  first  step  in  the  great  diplo- 
matic revolution  had  been  taken. 

The  effect  of  the  news  of  the  Treaty  of  Westminster  was 
immediate  and  stupendous.  Broglie's  diplomatic  edifice,  so 
carefully  reared,  fell  to  the  ground  like  a  pack  of  cards.  All 
his  plans  were  upset,  the  anti-Russian  party  became  powerless, 
and  Poland  was  used  as  a  basis  of  operations  throughout  the 
ensuing  war.  In  Turkey  the  skill  of  Vergennes  had  so  arranged 
matters  that  as  soon  as  the  Russians  had  begun  their  march 
westwards,  the  Turkish  army  would  have  attacked  Russia  on 
her  flank.  He  had  roused  the  Tartars  and  sown  disaffection 
among  the  Cossacks.  All  was  ready,  and  Vergennes  was  wait- 
ing for  the  signal.  But  the  signal  never  came  ;  and  instead  of 
France  and  Turkey  acting  together  against  Austria  and  Russia, 
France  was  found  a  year  later  in  close  alliance  with  the  two 
Imperial  Courts. 

At  Vienna  great,  indignation  was  expressed  at  a  treaty,  which, 
without  consultation  with  the  Emperor,  provided  for  the  neu- 
trality of  Germany,  while  at  St.  Petersburg  Elizabeth  was  furious. 
She  hated  Frederick  the  Great,  and  in  October  1755  the  Rus- 
sian Council  had  solemnly  declared  that  Russia  would  aid  any 
Power  which  should  attack  Prussia.  She  had  regarded  the  sub- 
sidy treaty  of  St.  Petersburg,  made  with  England  in  September 
1755,  as  directed  against  Prussia,  and  she  now  felt  that  by  the 
Convention  of  Westminster  she  had  been  balked  of  her  prey. 


236  Europea7i  History,   171 5-1789 

In  France  the  news  of  Frederick's  desertion  aroused  a  feeling 
of  irritation  which  furthered  the  schemes  of  Kaunitz.  In  Au- 
Negotiations  S^^t  1 755  when  the  EngUsh  negotiations  with  the 
between  Court  of  Vienna  had  fallen  to  the  ground,  the  Aus- 

Austria,  triau  Chancellor  had  again  brought  forward  his  old 

1755-56.  plan  of  1749,  and  secured   for  it  the   support  of 

Maria  Theresa.  He  aimed  definitely  at  the  partition  of  the 
greater  part  of  the  Prussian  state  between  Saxony,  the  Palati- 
nate, Sweden,  and  Austria.  But  first  of  all  France  was  to  be 
won  over  by  the  cession  of  Mons  to  herself,  and  by  the  creation 
of  a  principality  in  the  Netherlands  for  Don  PhiUp,  Louis'  son- 
in-law;  the  Polish  throne  was  to  be  given  to  Conti,  and  an 
alliance  to  be  made  with  Russia.  By  means  of  the  French 
assistance,  Austria  would  be  enabled  to  reduce  Prussia  to  the 
condition  of  a  fourth-rate  Power,  and  to  recover  Silesia. 

The  scheme  imphed  a  complete  change  in  French  foreign 
policy.  All  the  traditions  of  France  were  opposed  to  the  plan 
of  Kaunitz.  For  generations  France  had  aimed  at  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  power  of  Austria,  and  in  the  contests  of  the  last  250 
years  she  had  gained  important  territorial  acquisitions  on  the 
side  of  Germany.  But  though  the  War  of  the  Austrian  Succes- 
sion had  been  fought  in  accordance  with  the  traditions  of  the 
foreign  policy  of  Louis  xiv.,  the  results  of  that  war,  so  far  as 
they  had  affected  France,  were  distinctly  unsatisfactory,  and  a 
widespread  feeling  of  discontent  at  the  failure  of  Louis  xv.'s 
foreign  policy  pervaded  all  classes.  Kaunitz  was  himself  well 
aware  of  the  difficulties  attendant  on  the  realisation  of  his  aims. 
*  A  great  Power  was  to  be  convinced  that  the  whole  political 
system  which  it  had  hitherto  pursued  was  in  direct  opposition 
to  its  true  interests.  It  was  to  be  persuaded  that  what  it 
regarded  as  the  only  means  for  overcoming  the  difficulties  with 
England  were  really  unsuited  for  the  purpose,  and  that  it  was 
pursuing  a  radically  false  policy  when  it  made  the  support  of 
Prussia  the  central  object  of  all  its  alHances.'  To  Stahremberg, 
then  Austrian  Ambassador  in  Paris,  was  intrusted,  in  the  latter 
days  of  August  1755,  the  task  of  bringing  about  this  revolution 


The  Diplo7natic  Revolution  237 

in  the  classical  system  of  French  foreign  policy,  and  of  end- 
ing the  old  rivalry  with  Austria.  On  September  3  he  opened 
negotiations  with  Bemis. 

France  had  much  to  gain  by  a  change  in  her  policy.  In 
a  war  with  England  the  Austrian  alliance  or  neutrahty  would 
be  valuable,  while  Prussia  had  hitherto  proved  but  a  treacher- 
ous ally.  In  the  late  contest  she  had  risked  the  loss  of  Canada 
in  order  to  assist  Frederick  to  conquer  Silesia.  Her  efforts 
against  Austria,  her  expenditure  of  men  and  money,  and  her 
exhaustion  and  impoverishment  at  the  end  of  the  war,  had 
only  resulted  in  the  aggrandisement  of  a  treacherous  Power, 
which  had  grown  into  a  formidable  military  state.  For  centu- 
ries, too,  France  had  coveted  the  Austrian  Netherlands.  An 
alliance  with  Austria  would  make  her  supreme  in  that  quarter, 
might  lead  to  an  entire  or  partial  annexation  of  the  Low  Coun- 
tries, and  enable  her  to  deal  a  serious  blow  at  the  Maritime 
Powers.  In  reality,  the  interests  of  Austria  and  France  were 
very  dissimilar.  France  wished  to  attack  England,  Austria  to 
attack  Prussia.  For  France  peace  on  the  continent  would  be 
of  enormous  advantage;  Austria,  on  the  other  hand,  desired 
to  begin  a  European  war.  The  negotiations  proceeded  slowly, 
for  Louis  refused  to  believe  without  full  and  adequate  proof 
that  Frederick  had  a  secret  understanding  with  England  or  was 
plotting  against  the  Cathohc  religion.  Austria,  while  matters 
were  in  this  state  of  uncertainty,  definitely  proposed  to  unite 
with  Spain  and  France  for  the  support  of  the  Treaty  of  Aix- 
la-Chapelle  against  any  state  that  should  begin  war.  Stahrem- 
berg  on  these  terms  renewed  secret  negotiations  mth  RouilM, 
Machault,  Sechelles,  and  St.  Florentin,  as  well  as  with  Bemis. 
But  the  French  ministers  were  suspicious  of  Austrian  sincerity ; 
in  a  naval  war  with  England  the  Austrian  alliance  would  be  of 
little  use ;  and  it  was  practically  impossible  for  an  Austrian 
force  to  operate  in  Hanover.  In  the  meantime,  while  the 
negotiations  hung  fire,  Nivernais,  who,  in  consequence  of 
Bernis'  suspicions  of  Frederick's  conduct,  had  been  appointed 
to  succeed  La  Touche,  at  last  arrived  at  Berlin  on  January  1 2, 


238  Europea7i  History,   171 5-1789 

1756.  He  was  instructed  to  find  out  what  the  king  was  think 
ing  about,  and  to  endeavour  to  bribe  him  to  join  an  anti-Enghsh 
alUance.  He  arrived  in  time  to  receive  a  copy  of  the  treaty 
between  England  and  Prussia.  Frederick's  poUcy  was  un- 
veiled, and  Kaunitz  at  once  saw  that  his  efforts  would  be 
crowned  with  success.  Negotiations  were  resumed  on  the  old 
basis  between  Bernis  and  Stahremberg.  But  France,  though 
vvilHng  to  abandon  her  old  alliance  with  Prussia,  was  not  pre- 
pared to  throw  herself  unconditionally  into  the  arms  of  Austria. 
The  negotiations  advanced  slowly,  for  France  demanded  that 
the  engagements  between  the  two  countries  should  be  recipro- 
cal, and  that  Austria  should  do  as  much  against  England  as 
France  would  do  against  Prussia.  Moreover,  France,  though 
prepared  to  recognise  the  recovery  of  Silesia  by  Austria,  would 
not  consent  to  the  practical  extinction  of  Prussia  as  proposed  by 
Kaunitz. 

Maria  Theresa  on  her  part  was  unwilling  to  take  any 
decided  action  against  England  until  she  knew  what  course 
Russia  intended  to  adopt  in  consequence  of  the  Convention 
of  Westminster.  Early  in  April  1756,  however,  Elizabeth  de- 
clared to  Esterhazy  that  she  was  prepared  to  attack  Fred- 
erick that  year  with  80,000  men ;  that  she  would  not  make 
peace  till  Maria  Theresa  had  recovered  Silesia ;  and  that  she 
would  agree  to  the  proposed  alliance  between  France  and 
Austria. 

This  report  was  indeed,  as  Kaunitz  asserted,  'a  message  of 
comfort  and  encouragement '  for  the  anxious  Austrian  Court. 
^^   ^  Kaunitz   saw   that    delay   would    be    ruinous.     On 

The  Treaty  ^ 

of  Versailles,  the  19th  of  April  a  meeting  of  the  French  minis- 
ay  I,  175  •  |-gj.g  |.Q  consider  the  Austrian  proposals  took  place. 
Louis  XV.  had  been  in  favour  of  an  x\ustrian  alliance  during  a 
great  part  of  his  life  ;  Madame  de  Pompadour  now  strongly 
supported  it.  The  ministers,  with  the  exception  of  Machault 
and  the  Comte  d'Argenson,  declared  their  approval ;  and  as 
Kaunitz  only  asked  for  the  conclusion  of  a  general  alHance, 
the  details  to  be  settled  later,  the  ist  of  May  saw  the  Treaty 


TJic  Diplomatic  Revolution  239 

of  Versailles  signed.  The  treaty  really  consisted  of  three 
treaties  —  two  public  and  one  secret.  By  the  first,  which 
was  an  act  of  neutrality,  Austria  agreed  to  take  no  part  in 
the  hostilities  between  England  and  France,  and  France  en- 
gaged not  to  attack  the  Netherlands  or  any  Austrian  posses- 
sion. The  second  was  a  defensive  aUiance  and  treaty  of 
friendship.  Each  Power  agreed  to  defend  the  possessions  of 
the  other  if  attacked  —  the  existing  war  between  England  and 
France  being  expressly  excepted.  By  the  third  treaty,  which 
included  five  secret  articles,  it  was  settled  that  Austria  would 
aid  France  if  attacked  by  any  ally  of  England ;  that  the  Kings 
of  Spain  and  Naples,  Philip  of  Parma,  and  other  princes  as 
might  be  agreed  upon  subsequently,  should  be  invited  to  join 
the  defensive  alliance,  and  that  neither  Power  should  make  any 
new  aUiance  without  mutual  agreement.  The  Treaties  of  West- 
phaha  formed  the  basis  of  the  new  system  which  was  now 
adopted. 

In  January  of  the  following  year,  Russia,  by  the  Convention 
of  St.  Petersburg,  accepted  the  defensive  alliance  between 
Austria  and  France,  and  on  May  i,  1757,  a  second  Treaty 
of  Versailles,  in  which  France  agreed  upon  the  partition  of 
Prussia,  and  undertook  to  pay  Austria  an  annual  subsidy,  to 
place  a  large  army  in  the  field,  and  to  receive  in  return  a  por- 
tion of  the  Netherlands,  completed  the  diplomatic  revolution. 

All  traditional  French  policy  was    thus    reversed.     Sweden 
and  Poland  were  practically  given  up  to  Russia,  Turkey  was 
neglected.      The   system   of  supporting  a   clientele'  The  Dipio- 
of    small    states    for    the    purpose   of  restrainins:  f"^.*'"^  Revo- 

^      ^  o     lution, 

Austria  and  Russia  was  abandoned.  The  French  1756. 
alliance  ^^•ith  the  German  Protestants  came  to  an  end.  His- 
torians take  very  different  views  with  regard  to  the  wisdom 
of  French  policy  during  these  years.  *  France,'  says  Henri 
Martin,  '  committed  an  act  of  madness,  of  imbecile  treason 
against  herself,  the  like  of  which  hardly  exists  in  history.' 
The  Due  de  Broglie  takes  the  opposite  view.  '  The  Austrian 
alliance,'  he  says,  ^  was  a  condition  of  safety  if  not  of  existence 


240  Europeaji  History,   171 5-1 789 

to  France.'  In  1756  France  had  probably  no  intention  of 
carr}'ing  out  a  complete  revolution  in  her  traditional  policy, 
but  simply  to  adapt  herself  to  the  new  conditions  of  Europe, 
which  had  itself  been  revolutionised  by  the  rise  of  Prussia 
and  Russia.  But  the  feeble  Government  of  Louis  xv.  failed 
to  see  that  France  ought  to  have  concentrated  her  strength 
upon  the  struggle  in  India  and  America  and  on  the  sea,  and 
that  in  plunging  into  a  continental  war  for  the  recovery  of  Si- 
lesia and  the  partition  of  Prussia,  she  was  playing  the  game 
of  England  and  Austria. 

The  Austrian  alliance  proved  to  be  disastrous  to  France, 
because  that  countr)'  was  governed  by  a  king  sunk  in  sloth, 
and  contemptible  for  his  vices ;  and  French  poHcy,  during  the 
early  stages  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  was  guided  by  incom- 
petent ministers.  Through  their  incapacity  and  mismanage- 
ment, France  became  the  cat'spaw  of  Russia  and  Austria,  and 
her  influence  in  Europe  was  ruined.  The  Treaty  of  West- 
minster and  the  Treaties  of  Versailles  introduced  a  new  system 
into  Europe  ;  England  and  Prussia,  the  two  vigorous  advancing 
Powers,  alUed  together  against  France  and  Austria,  aided  by 
the  young  pushing  Russian  nation.  This  revolution,  due  in 
great  measure  to  the  rise  of  the  Hohenzollern  kingdom,  owes 
no  small  measure  of  its  success  to  the  foresight,  skill,  and  de- 
termination of  Kaunitz.  He  had  brought  into  being  a  powerful 
coalition  against  the  small  military  state  of  Prussia,  which,  hav- 
ing restored  Silesia  to  Austria,  was  to  be  itself  partitioned.  It 
remained  to  be  seen  how  far  his  policy  would  prove  successful. 
On  the  29th  of  August  1756  Frederick  the  Great,  unable  to 
obtain  satisfactory  assurances  from  x\ustria,  invaded  Saxony, 
and  thus  began  the  Seven  Years'  War. 


CHAPTER    IX 

THE  SEVEN  YEARS'  WAR 
1756-1763 

The  Invasion  of  Saxony  —  The  Saxon  Resistance  and  the  Battle  of  Lobositz— 
The  Convention  of  St.  Petersburg  and  the  Second  Treat}'  of  Versailles  — 
Failure  of  France  to  secure  the  Co-operation  of  Spain  —  French  Policy  in 
Poland  —  The  Battles  of  Prague,  Kolin,  and  Gross-Jagersdorf — The  Bat- 
tles of  Rossbach  and  Leuthen  —  Pitt  and  Frederick  the  Great  —  The 
Siege  of  Olmiitz  —  Loudon  raises  the  Siege  of  Olmiitz  —  The  Battle 
of  Zomdorf — The  Defeat  of  Frederick  at  Hochkirchen  —  Ferdinand  of 
Brunswick  in  Western  Germany  —  Frederick  the  Great  at  the  Close  of 
1758  —  Fall  of  Bernis  and  Rise  of  Choiseul  —  Choiseul's  Vigorous  Policy  — 
The  Disasters  of  France  in  1759  —  The  Battles  of  Minden  and  Kunersdorf 

—  Finck's  Capitulation  at  Maxen  —  Louis  XV. 's  Secret  Diplomacy  —  The 
War  in  1760  and  1761 — The  Accession  of  Charles  III.  of  Spain  —  The 
Family  Compact  of  1761  —  Fall  of  Pitt,  and  War  between  England  and 
Spain —  Death  of  Ehzabeth  of  Russia  and  its  Results  —  The  Peace  of  Paris 

—  The  Treat)-  of  Hubertsburg —  Results  of  the  War. 

The  wisdom  of  the  step  taken  by  Frederick  the  Great  in 
opening  the  war  is  not  Hkely  to  be  questioned.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  Austria  and  Russia,  probably  in  con-  The  invasion 
junction  with  Saxony,  intended  to  attack  him  the  °^  Saxony. 
following  year  after  full  preparations  had  been  made.  In 
anticipating  the  onslaught  of  his  enemies  lay  Frederick's  one 
chance  of  safety.  While  this  invasion  of  Saxony  would  bring 
upon  his  country  all  the  horrors  of  war,  delay  meant  absolute 
destruction.  The  justification  of  Frederick's  attack  will  be 
found  in  the  Russian  and  Austrian,  no  less  than  in  the  Saxon, 
archives.  In  selecting  Saxony  as  the  object  of  his  invasion 
the  Prussian  king's  motives  were  militar}^  and  political.  While 
desirous  of  crushing  Austria  in  a  single  campaign,  he  recog- 
PERioD  VI.  241  Q 


242  Etn'0pea7i  History,   171 5-1789 

nised  the  impossibility  of  having  a  hostile  Saxony  in  his  rear. 
And  at  the  same  time  he  hoped  to  find  and  publish  the  Menzel 
documents  which  lay  in  Dresden,  and  so  to  give  Europe  an 
adequate  justification  of  his  conduct. 

As  events  turned  out,  Frederick  would  probably  have  acted 
more  wisely  in  limiting  his  attack  to  Austria.  For  "to  his  own 
surprise,  his  intention  of  marching  through  Saxony  into  Bohemia 
and  falling  upon  the  unprepared  Austrians,  was  frustrated  by 
the  Saxons  themselves.  r^ 

Though  Augustus  in.  only  possessed  an  army  of  1 7,000, 
as  compared  with  the  65,000  Prussians  who  were  marching 
The  Saxon  southwards,  he  acted  with  decision  and  success, 
Resistance      ^ccidi  entrenched  himself  and  his  army  on  the  hills 

and  the  i  •  i 

Battle  of  —  the  Misnian  Highlands  —  a  few  miles  above 
Lobositz.  Dresden,  his  right  and  left  ^\^ngs  resting  respec- 
tively upon  the  impregnable  mountain  fortresses  of  Pima  and 
Konigstein.  For  upwards  of  a  month  the  Saxons  held  the  hilly 
country,  and,  by  checking  the  Prussian  advance  into  the  Austrian 
dominions,  rendered  an  invaluable  service  to  the  Emperor.  The 
importance  of  the  Saxon  resistance  can  be  fully  appreciated 
when  it  is  remembered  that  the  Austrian  army  was  far  from 
being  ready  for  the  struggle  which  had  so  suddenly  been  forced 
upon  its  rulers,  and  that  the  inter\'al  afforded  by  the  Saxon 
resistance  was  utilised  by  the  Austrian  general,  Browne,  in 
remedying  the  many  deficiencies  in  the  army  and  in  ^organising 
every  branch  of  the  ser\ice.  Though  the  Court  of  Vienna 
disapproved  of  the  defence  of  Saxon  Switzerland,  and  suspected 
the  fidelity  of  Augustus,  it  was  compelled  to  take  measures  to 
relieve  the  Saxon  army,  then  in  great  danger  of  being  starved 
into  surrender.  Marshal  Browne  was  ordered  to  march  to  the 
relief  of  the  Saxons  without  delay.  His  carefully  conceived 
plans,  however,  received  a  rude  check.  Frederick,  leaving  half 
his  army  to  watch  the  Saxons,  advanced  into  Bohemia  with 
the  other  half,  met  Browne,  and  fought  the  indecisive  battle  of 
Lobositz.  The  Prussians  remained  in  possession  of  the  battle- 
field, and  Browne  had  for  the  moment  to  renounce  the  idea 


The  Seven    Years'    War  243 

of  relieving  the  Saxons.  When  on  the  nth  of  October  he 
managed  to  advance  within  a  few  miles  of  Schandau  he  found 
that  the  Saxons,  outmanoeuvred  by  the  Prussians,  half-starved, 
and  badly  led,  were  in  no  condition  to  form  a  junction  with  his 
troops  and  to  fight  the  Pmssians.  He  was  compelled  to  retreat ; 
and  on  the  i6th  of  October  the  capitulation  of  Pirna  took  place. 
Saxony  was  conquered  ;  her  king  had  to  retire  to  Warsaw  ;  her 
soldiers  were  forced  to  join  the  Prussian  army  ;  and  the  papers 
in  the  Dresden  archives  furnishing  a  justification  of  Frederick's 
invasion  were  published.  But  the  Saxon  resistance  had  saved 
Austria,  and  though  the  possession  of  Saxony  was  important 
from  a  mihtary  point  of  view,  Frederick  gained  little  from  the 
publication  of  his  memoire  raisoune,  which  he  sent  to  all  the 
European  Courts.  During  the  winter  and  spring  his  enemies 
left  no    stone  unturned  to  compass   his   ruin.     In  September 

1756  he  had  been  condemned  by  the  Emperor  Francis  as  a 
disturber  of  the  peace,  and  the  Diet  on  the   17th  of  January 

1757  declared  war  against  Prussia,  and  put  her  king  to  the  ban 
of  the  Empire.  But  the  hostility  of  the  Empire  was  no  great 
danger  to  Frederick,  nor  any  source  of  strength  to  the  Emperor 
Francis.  The  Protestant  states  were  opposed  to  the  action  of 
the  Diet,  and  the  imperial  army  was  of  little  practical  use.  ^^^-^ 
her  struggle  against  Prussia  Austria  had  mainly  to  rely  upon  J? 
the  assistance  and  co-operation  of  the  Tsarina  of  Russia  ana 
the  King  of  France.  Of  these  Powers  the  Tsarina  Elizabeth 
had,  for  upwards  of  ten  years,  been  bitterly  hostile  to  Frederick, 
partly,  it  is  said,  on  account  of  some  sarcastic  remarks  ;  while 
Bestuzhev.  the  Russian  Chancellor,  consistently  opposed  Prussia, 
affecting  to  see  in  it  a  dangerous  neighbour  to  Russia. 

Supported  by  Woronzov  and  all  the  ministers  with  the  ex- 
ception of  Bestuzhev,  Elizabeth,  on  the  21st  of  January  1757, 
by  the  Convention  of  St.  Petersburg,  accepted  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  concluded  the  previous  May  between  Austria  and 
France,  and  in  February  made  a  new  treaty  with  Austria,  the 
latter  Power  agreeing  to  pay  Russia  about  ^100,000  a  year 
during   the   war,   and   both    Powers   undertaking   not   to   end 


BURG    '•^"^^-..  ^  '■■''         '•— -       11   ^P'-llSsi^  '772) 


•JO  burg    JC-vDrpsden. 


"••...••■         /  V   /      *»T^  A  <3  O  V>; 


Czaslau  ^ 

'BOHEMIA..-.,     ■■ 


K 


Cracow      ^^     . 

G  AL I  C I  A 
(Austrian  1772J 


HUNGARY 


_Salzbups 


A  U  S  T  R  /  A    /^' 


/ 


15 


^■o«TH&i-AST  GEEJiAxy  iroe-irer"""" 


i'l^-  Co.Sc, 


The  Seven    Years     War  245 

the  war  till  Frederick  had  yielded  Silesia  and  Glatz,  and  the 
Prussian  state  was  reduced  to  the  position  of  Bavaria  or  Hesse- 
Cassel.     Sweden,  Denmark,  and  Saxony  were  to  be    ^^    ^ 

'  '  •'  The  Conven- 

induced  to  join  the  alliance  by  the  offer  of  territo-   tion  of  st. 

■    1  ,•  Petersburg:, 

rial  compensation.  j^^,  21,  and 

Secure  of  the  aid  of  Russia,  it  only  remained  for  the  second 
Austria  to  clinch  her  alliance  with  France.  On  the  Versailles, 
I  St  of  May  1757  the  second  Treaty  of  Versailles  May  i,  1757. 
was  signed  by  Austria  and  France  for  the  partition  of  Prussia. 
As  soon  as  Silesia  was  in  Austrian  hands,  France  was  to  obtain 
a  portion  of  the  Netherlands,  including  the  ports  and  towns 
of  iMons,  Ostend,  Nieuport,  Ypres,  Furnes,  the  sovereignty 
of  Beaumont  and  Chimay,  and  the  fortress  of  Knocque, 
while  the  remainder  was  to  be  given  to  Don  Philip  of 
Parma,  Louis'  son-in-law,  in  exchange  for  Parma,  Piacenza, 
and  Guastalla,  which  were  to  go  to  Austria ;  Prussia  was  to  be 
conquered,  and  partitioned  between  Austria,  Saxony,  Sweden, 
the  Elector  Palatine,  and  Holland,  Frederick  being  permitted 
to  retain  the  lahds  which  were  included  in  the  Hohenzol- 
lern  territory  at  the  time  of  the  Great  Elector's  accession. 
France  agreed  to  pay  an  annual  subsidy  of  about  a  million 
sterling  so  long  as  the  war  should  last,  and  to  set  on  foot  an 
army  of  100,000  men.  She  further  contracted  treaties  with 
Bavaria,  the  Elector  Palatine,  and  the  Duke  of  Wlirtemberg, 
agreeing  to  pay  large  subsidies  in  return  for  the  employment 
of  troops  against  Frederick  the  Great.  In  ]\larch  and  Sep- 
tember 1757  conventions  were  signed  between  France  and 
Sweden,  in  which  Austria  was  included.  By  these  treaties 
Sweden,  still  ruled  by  the  aristocratic  faction  of  the  Hats,  in 
spite  of  the  efforts  of  Ulrica  in  1756  to  restore  the  royal  power, 
engaged,  in  consideration  for  subsidies,  to  employ  an  army  of 
20,000  men  in  Pomerania  against  the  King  of  Prussia.  Her 
rival  Denmark,  governed  by  Frederick  v.  and  his  minister 
Count  Bernsdorf,  refused  to  join  the  league. 

The  first  Treaty  of  Versailles,  signed  in  1756,  was  conceived 
in  a  statesmanlike  spirit ;  the  second  Treaty,  from  the  French 


246  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

point  of  view,  was  a  serious  blunder.  As  Austria  was  unable  to 
strike  a  blow  at  England,  France  should  have  concentrated  all 
her  energies  upon  the  maritime  and  colonial  war,  and  refused 
to  take  an  activ^e  part  in  the  European  struggle.  The  French, 
under  the  Due  de  Richelieu,  had  captured  Minorca  in  May 
1756,  and  their  success  in  the  Mediterranean  should  have  been 
followed  by  a  determined  attack  upon  the  naval  power  of  Eng- 
land, whose  conduct  in  laying  a  nominal  blockade  on  all  the 
French  ports  had  excited  the  indignation  of  Europe.  Machault, 
since  he  became  Minister  of  Marine,  had  taken  up  the  policy 
of  Rouille,  his  predecessor  from  1 749  to  1 754,  and  made  strenu- 
ous endeavours  to  remedy  the  neglect  of  Maurepas,  Minister 
of  Marine  from  1723  to  1749,  and  of  Fleury ;  and  the  seizure 
of  Minorca  bears  witness  to  the  success  of  his  efforts.  Neglect- 
ing, unfortunately  for  France,  the  advice  of  old  Marshal  Noailles 
and  that  of  men  like  Machault  and  Comte  d'Argenson,  Louis 
XV.  from  the  conclusion  of  the  second  Treaty  of  Versailles,  the 
terms  of  which  were  unduly  favourable  to  the  Emperor,  adopted 
a  fatal  line  of  pohcy.  Satisfied  with  the  hope  of  uniting  to 
France  a  portion  of  the  Austrian  Netherlands,  and  of  hamper- 
ing the  EngHsh  by  the  occupation  of  Hanover,  the  French  king 
allowed  himself  to  be  dragged  into  a  struggle  for  the  annihilation 
of  Prussia  for  the  benefit  of  Austria,  and  plunged  into  the  con- 
tinental war  without  receiving  any  quid  pro  quo  from  the  astute 
Hapsburg  Government.  Apart  from  the  enormous  blunder  of 
neglecting  the  struggle  in  America,  Louis  xv.,  before  signing 
the  treaty  of  1757,  should  have  entered  into  possession  of  the 
Austrian  Netherlands.  France  would  then  have  been  in  a  posi- 
tion to  secure  compensation  for  her  losses  in  the  colonies,  and,  if 
necessary,  to  dictate  terms  to  Austria  and  Prussia.  In  spite  of 
the  efforts  of  Bernis,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  from  June  1757 
to  November  1758,  the  interests  of  France  were  subordinated  to 
those  of  Austria,  and  French  armies  fought  to  regain  Silesia  for 
Maria  Theresa.  Louis  xv.  was  not  destined  to  add  any  portion 
of  the  Netherlands  to  his  kingdom,  and  when  at  the  end  of  the 
war  Frederick  the  Great  still  held  Silesia,  and  France  was  forced 


The  Seveji    Year's     War  247 

to  acquiesce  in  her  losses  in  North  America  and  the  West 
Indies  and  the  overthrow  of  her  influence  in  India,  the  real 
significance  of  the  fatal  policy  adopted  in  1757  was  fully 
realised.^ 

In  spite,  however,  of  the  unfortunate  decision  of  the  French 
Government  to  aid  in  the  defence  and  extension  of  the  Haps- 
burg  provinces  in  Germany  instead  of  making  vigorous  efforts 
to  preserve  the  colonies  of  France,  the  treaty  of  1757  need  not 
necessarily  have  led  to  such  overwhelmingly  disastrous  results 
had  a  close  union  between  the  Courts  of  Versailles  and  Madrid 
been  effected,  and  had  France,  Austria,  and  Russia  acted  ener- 
geticallv  and  harmoniouslv  in  Germanv.     The  in- 

ro-  IT-'  ii'  Failure  of 

terests  of  Spam  and  France  were  closely  connected   France  to 
and  were  opposed  to  those  of  England.     In  March    ^^^"^"^^  ^h^. 

^ '^  °  Co-operation 

1755  Knyphausen,  Frederick  the  Great's  repre-  of  Spain, 
sentative  at  Paris,  in  answer  to  his  master's  letter  ^'^^"^  ' 
expressing  surprise  that  no  close  alliance  subsisted  between 
Ferdinand  vi.  and  Louis  xv.,  declared  that  the  languid  interest 
taken  by  the  French  Government  with  regard  to  Spain  was  in- 
conceivable. With  the  near  approach  of  the  Seven  Years'  War 
even  the  pacific  Rouille,  who  was  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
in  France  from  July  1754  to  June  1757,  saw  the  necessity  of 
endeavouring  to  secure  the  Spanish  alliance.  Ferdinand  vi. 
of  Spain  had  in  1729  married  Barbara,  daughter  of  John  v.  of 
Portugal,  a  princess  who  exercised  considerable  influence  over 
her  husband,  and  who,  accustomed  to  regard  England  as  the 
ally  of  Portugal,  was  opposed  to  the  outbreak  of  hostihties 
between  the  Courts  of  London  and  Madrid.  Ferdinand  him- 
self, a  weak  prince,  influenced  by  his  confessor  Ravergo,  the 
singer  Farinelli,  and  the  queen,  was  inclined  to  maintain  peace, 
and,  since  the  hasty  conclusion  of  the  prehminaries  of  the  Peace 
of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  had  been  opposed  to  any  French  alliance. 
In  April  1754  Caravajal,  who  had  been  the  first  minister  of 
Spain  for  twenty  years,  died,  and  though  French  influence  was 

1  For  the  history  of  the  Diplomatic  Revolution  see  Due  de  Broglie, 
V Alliance  Autrichienne. 


248  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

used  to  secure  for  the  Marquis  de  la  Ensenada  the  highest  post 
in  the  Government,  the  efforts  of  Keene,  the  English  ambassa- 
dor, succeeded  in  securing  the  appointment  of  General  Wall, 
an  Irishman  by  extraction  and  a  friend  of  England,  as  Foreign 
—  and  practically  first  —  Minister.  Ensenada,  who  had  en- 
deavoured to  plunge  Spain  into  a  war  with  Great  Britain,  was 
exiled,  and  the  French  envoy,  Duras,  was  replaced  by  Bernis, 
who  shortly  afterwards  returned  to  France.  All  efforts  on  the 
part  of  Austria  as  well  as  of  France  failed  to  shake  the  deter- 
mination of  the  Spanish  Court  to  observe  a  policy  of  neutrality 
during  the  Seven  Years'  War.  The  value  of  a  Spanish  alliance 
was  appreciated  by  all  the  leading  Powers.  While  Pitt  seri- 
ously considered  the  advisability  of  offering  the  Spaniards 
Gibraltar  and  other  concessions  in  return  for  their  assistance 
in  retaking  Minorca,  Maria  Theresa  appealed  to  the  religious 
sentiments  of  Ferdinand  and  to  the  necessity  of  defending  the 
orthodox  faith  against  the  attacks  of  heretics.  Early  in  1758 
the  Marquis  d'Aubeterre,  a  diplomatist  of  some  experience,  was 
sent  by  Bernis,  now  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  second  the 
appeal  of  Maria  Theresa,  to  point  out  the  dangers  to  the  Cath- 
olic religion  which  would  result  from  the  supremacy  of  the  King 
of  Prussia,  to  play  upon  Wall's  well-known  attachment  to  the 
Stuarts,  and  finally  to  demand  a  close  offensive  and  defensive 
aUiance,  considerable  subsidies,  and  the  adhesion  of  Spain  to 
a  maritime  league,  including  France,  Sweden,  and  Denmark. 
In  return  for  the  accession  of  Spain  to  the  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
France  offered  the  Isle  of  Minorca.  These  efforts  of  Bernis 
throughout  the  year  1758  were  not,  however,  crowned  with  suc- 
cess. The  English  sympathies  of  the  queen  and  her  influence 
over  Ferdinand  proved  strong  enough  to  maintain  the  neutrality 
of  Spain,  though  the  successes  of  the  EngUsh  in  America  roused 
the  fears  of  the  Spanish  Government.  Though  during  Ferdi- 
nand's reign  the  agriculture,  manufactures,  and  commerce  of 
Spain  had  improved.  Wall  declared  to  d'Aubeterre  that  Spain 
was  not  in  a  position  to  advance  the  millions  demanded,  that 
a  maritime  union  with  Sweden  and  Denmark  had  little  to  recom- 


TJie  Seven    Years'    War  249 

mend  it,  and  that  Spain  would  confine  herself  to  endeavouring 
to  mediate  a  peace  between  France  and  England. 

Unable  to  secure  an  alliance  with  Spain,  the  success  of  Louis 
XV. 's  pohcy  in  Europe,  and  that  of  Austria  and  Russia,  de- 
pended upon  the  hearty  union  and  mutual  good  faith  of  the 
allies.  Louis  xv.,  however,  was  unable  to  appreciate  the  vital 
necessity  of  eliminating  all  cause  of  suspicion  and  jealousy  from 
the  minds  of  Maria  Theresa  and  Elizabeth  of  Russia,  and  his 
intrigues  in  Poland  proved  fatal  to  the  successful  p^.^^^^^ 
prosecution  of  the  war  in  Europe.  The  objects  of  Policy  in 
Austria,  Russia,  and  France  in  the  contest  with 
Frederick  the  Great  could  only  be  carried  out  by  the  loyal 
co-operation  of  each  of  these  Powers.  IMutual  confidence  and 
united  action  were  absolutely  necessary  for  success.  It  was 
necessary  that  France  should  renounce  her  policy  of  inten-en- 
tion  in  Poland,  that  her  agents  should  cease  to  intrigue  at 
Warsaw  against  Russian  influence,  and  that,  in  view  of  the 
wide  issues  at  stake,  every  means  should  be  taken  to  secure 
the  confidence  of  the  Tsarina  Elizabeth.  L'nfortunately,  Louis 
XV.  never  reaUsed  the^real  import  of  the  struggle  in  which 
France  was  engaged  with  England.  The  Treaty  of  Westmin- 
ster, followed  by  the  disgrace  of  Conti,  had  for  a  time  over- 
thro\\Ti  his  carefully  prepared  plans  in  Poland.  But  with  the 
opening  of  the  Seven  Years'  War  Louis'  interest  in  Poland 
revived,  and  he  again  began  a  series  of  attempts,  by  means  of 
his  secret  diplomacy,  to  support  the  anti-Russian  party  at  War- 
saw, and  by  so  doing  sacrificed  the  real  interests  of  France  to 
a  futile  attempt  to  maintain  French  influence  in  Poland.  Ber- 
nis,  bent  on  loyally  supporting  Russia  and  Austria  in  the  attack 
on  Prussia,  struggled  in  vain  to  compel  Broglie,  who  was  still 
the  French  representative  at  Warsaw,  to  offer  no  opposition  to 
Russia ;  but,  in  consequence  of  a  secret  intimation  from  Louis, 
BrogUe  ignored  the  official  instructions,  his  house  became  the 
rendezvous  of  the  Polish  malcontents,  and  his  opposition  to  the 
march  of  the  Russian  troops  through  Poland  grew  so  violent  that 
the  Russian  general,  fearing  an  insurrection,  advanced  very  cau- 


250  European  History,   171 5-1789 

tiously,  and  thus  enabled  Frederick  the  Great  to  gain  time  for 
organising  the  defence  of  his  kingdom. 

The  year  1757,  the  most  briUiant  of  Frederick  the  Great's 
Ufe  was  not  only  an  epoch  in  the  history  of  the  relations  be- 
The  Battles  tween  France  and  Austria,  it  had  momentous  con- 
of  Prague,  scquences  for  the  kingdom  of  Prussia.  Preparations 
Gross'.  were  made  by  Frederick's  enemies  for  a  concerted 

jagersdorf.  attack  upon  his  dominions  by  Austrian,  French, 
Russian,  Swedish,  and  imperial  armies.  But  the  King  of 
Prussia,  imitating  his  tactics  of  the  previous  year,  determined 
to  adopt  the  offensive,  and  invade  Bohemia.  Browne  and  his 
troops  retired  before  the  advancing  Prussians ;  and  at  Prague 
accepted  battle.  , After  a  fierce  engagement,  in  which  Schwerin 
was  killed,  the  main  portion  of  the  Austrian  army  was  be- 
sieged in  Prague.  As  at  Pirna,  Frederick's  plans  were  again 
foiled  by  the  stubborn  resistance  of  the  besieged  arm.y.  The 
approach  of  Daun  with  reinforcements  decided  Frederick  to 
meet  his  new  foe  before  he  could  approach  Prague.  With 
ordinary  prudence  on  his  own  part  and  that  of  his  generals, 
he  might  have  defeated  Daun  and  forced  his  enemies  to 
submission. 

On  the  1 8th  of  June  Frederick  was  defeated  at  Kolin,  prin- 
cipally owing  to  mistakes  on  the  part  of  the  Prussian  generals 
which  might  easily  have  been  prevented.  Nearly  1.^,000  out  of 
32,000  Prussians  were  killed,  the  siege  of  Prague  was  raised, 
and  Frederick  was  forced  to  retire  from  Bohemia.  His  plans 
were  all  shattered,  and  he  learnt  that  he  was  not  invincible. 
Before  the  end  of  the  year,  however,  he  had  broken  up  the 
hostile  combination  formed  against  him,  and  had  avenged 
Kolin.  The  immediate  consequences  of  his  defeat  had  been 
serious  for  Prussia.  The  imperial  army  hastened  to  make 
arrangements  for  a  combined  movement  in  North  Germany 
with  a  French  force,  which,  under  d'Estr^es,  marched  against 
the  Duke  of  Cumberland,  won  the  battle  of  Hastenbeck,  and, 
under  the  Due  de  Richeheu,  the  successor  of  d'Estrees,  ex- 
tracted   from    the    Duke    of  Cumberland    the    Convention    of 


TJie  Seven    Years     War  251 

Klosterseven.  On  the  30th  of  June  the  Russians,  under 
Apraksin,  crossed  the  border,  took  Memel,  and  on  the  30th  of 
August  defeated  Lewald  at  Gross-Jagersdorf,  while  the  Swedes 
declared  war,  and,  using  Stralsund  as  a  base  of  operations, 
invaded  Pomerania.  Had  it  not  been  for  Apraksin's  connec- 
tion with  the  party  of  the  Russian  heir  Peter,  and  his  wife 
Catherine,  who  were  opposed  to  the  overthrow  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  and  had  it  not  been  for  the  extreme  caution  of  the 
victorious  Daun,  the  battles  of  Gross-Jagersdorf  and  Kolin 
would  have  proved  fatal  to  the  Prussian  cause.  Apraksin  re- 
mained on  the  defensive  in  his  camp,  and  in  spite  of  the  ad- 
vice of  Loudon,  the  excessive  prudence  and  over-confidence  of 
Daun  and  Prince  Charles,  threw  away  an  opportunity  of  strik- 
ing a  decisive  blow  at  the  weakened  Prussian  army.  Though 
on  the  1 6th  of  October  an  Austrian  force  entered  Berlin,  and 
though  Austrian  troops  occupied  Silesia,  no  combined  move- 
ment was  arranged  by  the  allies.  Apraksin,  hearing  that  the 
Tsarina  was  seriously  ill,  and  being,  moreover,  with  Bestuzhev, 
the  Russian  Chancellor,  a  member  of  the  party  of  which  the 
Grand  Duchess  was  a  leading  spirit,  retired  into  winter  quar- 
ters in  Courland  with  his  Cossacks ;  the  Enghsh  Government 
repudiated  the  Convention  of  Klosterseven,  and  requested 
Frederick  to  make  Ferdinand  of  Brunswick  general  of  an  army 
which  Pitt  was  prepared  to  place  in  the  field.  Encouraged  by 
these  favourable  circumstances  Frederick  advanced  to  meet 
the  united  French  and  imperial  forces  which,  under  Soubise 
and  the  Prince  of  Hildburghausen,  were  threatening  Saxony. 
Early  in  1757  two  of  Louis'  ablest  ministers,  the  Comte 
d'Argenson  and  ]\Iachault,  had  been  dismissed.  Both  had 
opposed  French  inten-ention  in  Germany,  and  were  desirous 
of  saving  the  colonies.  The  former's  experience  and  admin- 
istrative capacity  would  have  proved  valuable  during  the  Seven 
Years'  War.  His  fall  was  due  to  an  attempt  to  bring  about  the 
dismissal  of  Madame  de  Pompadour,  and  thus  France  was 
served  during  these  eventful  years  by  a  succession  of  incapable 
ministers  of  war  and  marine. 


252  European  History,   171 5-1789 

On  the  5  th  of  November  Frederick  the  Great  won  a  decisive 
victory  at  Rossbach,  inflicting  heavy  loss  on  the  enemy,  break- 
^^   „.  insf  up  the  imperial  army,  and  forcing  the  French 

The  Victory  =>       r  V  J  J  Q 

of  Rossbach,   to  rccross  the  Rhine 

Nov.  5, 1757.  rpj^^  victory  of  Rossbach  had  far-reaching  effects. 
While  in  England  the  enthusiasm  for  the  Prussian  cause  showed 
itself  in  bonfires  and  the  despatch  of  reinforcements,  in  Germany 
the  battle  was  regarded  as  a  national  triumph  over  the  French. 
The  German  people  henceforward  looked  upon  Frederick  the 
Great  as  a  national  hero.  Rossbach,  like  Mollwitz,  revealed 
to  Europe  the  strength  and  vigour  of  the  young  Prussian  king- 
dom. It  was,  in  Napoleon's  opinion, the  cause  of  the  overthrow 
of  the  French  Bourbons  in  1792.  To  Frederick  Rossbach  was 
important  simply  as  enabling  him  to  attempt  to  drive  the  Aus- 
trians  out  of  Silesia.  Schweidnitz  had  fallen,  and  Charles  of 
Lorraine,  having  defeated  Bevern,  had  captured  Breslau  and 
Liegnitz.  Without  a  decisive  victory  Silesia  was  as  good  as 
lost.  With  characteristic  appreciation  of  the  position  of  affairs 
Frederick  resolved  to  stake  all  upon  a  battle.  On  the  5th  of 
^^   „     ,    ,   December,  iust  a  month  after  Rossbach,  the  mem- 

The  Battle  of  '  -'  .  . 

Leuthen,  orable  battle  of  Leuthen  was  fought,  which  was  in 
Dec.  5, 1757.  j|.gg|f  sufficient  to  place  Frederick  in  the  rank  of  the 
greatest  generals.  The  Prussian  movements  had  been  entirely 
misunderstood  by  Prince  Charles  and  Daun,  and  the  battle 
proved  to  be  an  admirable  illustration  of  Frederick's  '  oblique 
order '  of  attack.  In  three  hours  the  Prussian  army  of  some 
30,000  had  totally  defeated  So, 000  Austrians.  Silesia  was  re- 
covered with  the  exception  of  Schweidnitz,  and  the  year  1 75  7 
closed  with  a  remarkable  page  of  militar)^  history  added  to  the 
annals  of  Germany. 

The  opening  of  1758,  a  year  which  affords  excellent  illus- 
trations of  Frederick's  skill  in  marches  and  manoeuvres,  saw 
Pitt  and  several  important  modifications  in  the    plans    and 

thecYeat  attitudes  of  the  various  combatants.  Rossbach  and 
1758-  Leuthen  had  indeed  saved  Frederick  from  destruc- 

tion, but  his  position  was  still  very  precarious.     He  could  at 


The  Seven    Years     War  253 

anv  rate  count  on  Ensflish  assistance.  With  unhesitating:  de- 
cision  Pitt  expressed  the  enthusiasm  of  his  countrymen  when 
in  April  he  made  a  new  subsidy  treaty  with  Prussia  by  which 
the  Hanoverian  army  was  taken  into  EngHsh  pay  and  a  treaty 
of  alHance  signed  which  provided  for  the  payment  of  ^670,000 
a  year  to  the  Prussian  king.  Though  recognising  the  errors 
made  by  the  French  in  not  directing  all  their  energies  to  the 
colonial  and  maritime  war  with  England,  Pitt  thus  resolved, 
while  concentrating  his  principal  efforts  on  the  extension  of 
England's  colonial  empire,  to  subsidise  foreign  troops  for  the 
defence  of  Hanover  and  the  support  of  Frederick.  America 
was  to  be  won  for  England  in  Germany.  Maria  Theresa's  hope 
of  a  neutral  Hanover  was  destroyed,  and  the  French  hopes  of 
wringing  concessions  from  George  11.  in  the  colonies  in  exchange 
for  the  security  of  Hanover  were  doomed  to  disappointment. 
By  the  end  of  March  Ferdinand  of  Brunswick  had  cleared 
Germany  of  the  French,  and  Hanover  was  safe. 

Ferdinand  of  Brunswick,  who  had  already  proved  himself  a 
capable  general  in  the  Austrian  Succession  War,  was  the  brother 
of  Charles,  Duke  of  Brunswick-Wolfenblittel  from   _ 

,  ...  Ferdinand  of 

1735  to  1780,  who  had  married  Philippa  Charlotte,  Brunswick 
sister  of  Frederick  the  Great ;  while  of  his  own  ^"'^  ^""'°'- 
sisters,  one,  Elizabeth  Christine,  had  married  the  Prussian  king  ; 
another,  the  latter's  brother  Augustus  WiUiam ;  and  a  third, 
Frederick  v.,  King  of  Denmark.  Charles  fought  for  Prussia  dur- 
ing the  Seven  Years'  War,  and  on  his  death  was  succeeded  by 
his  son,  Charles  William  Ferdjnand,  who  was  defeated  at  Jena. 
Though  England  remained  at  peace  with  Russia  and  sent 
no  fleet  to  the  Baltic,  there  is  little  doubt  that  the  English 
alliance,  following  the  failure  of  the  French  at  Rossbach,  proved 
of  incalculable  value  to  the  Prussian  king.  He  had  not  only 
broken  through  the  ring  of  his  foes,  but  had  destroyed  all 
danger  for  the  time  from  France  and  from  the  imperial  army. 
Though  Belleisle  became,  in  July  1758,  war  minister  in  France, 
and  remained  in  office  till  his  death  in  January  1761,  suc- 
cessful military  operations  were   impossible   owing  to  the  in- 


254  European  History,   1 71 5-1 789 

capacity  of  the  French  generals  and  the  disorganisation  of  the 
armies. 

During  1758  Frederick  had  only  two  enemies  to  deal  with, 
Austria  and  Russia.  Elizabeth,  as  hostile  as  ever,  was  roused 
by  the  battles  of  Rossbach  and  Leuthen,  superseded  Apraksin 
in  favour  of  Fermor,  a  Russian  general  of  English  origin,  who 
had  distinguished  himself  in  the  Turkish  war  of  1736-39,  and 
the  Chancellor  Bestuzhev  in  favour  of  Woronzov,  an  Austrian 
partisan,  and  the  Russian  army  was  set  in  motion  in  the  depth 
of  the  winter.  In  January  East  Prussia  was  occupied  by  31,000 
men.  Konigsberg,  Thorn,  and  Elbing  having  been  captured 
and  Kiistrin  besieged,  no  attack  on  Frederick's  forces  could 
take  place  before  the  summer,  when  the  main  Russian  army 
was  expected.  Though  the  French  and  Austrian  arms  had 
failed,  their  diplomacy  at  St.  Petersburg  had  succeeded ;  the 
Grand  Duke  Peter  and  his  wife,  Catherine,  ceased  for  a 
time  to  exercise  any  influence  in  Russian  politics,  a  close 
correspondence  between  Louis  xv.  and  Elizabeth  was  opened, 
and  a  direct  alliance  between  France  and  Russia  was  dis- 
cussed. 

In  the  spring  of  1758,  Frederick,  in  opposition  to  the  opin- 
ion of  several  of  his  advisers,  determined  again  to  take  the  of- 
The  Siege  fcusivc  and  attack  Austria  before  the  Russians 
of  oimiitz.  arrived.  Leaving  in  Bohem.ia  Daun,  who.  Prince 
Charles  having  retired,  was  now  supreme,  he  retoolT  Schweid- 
nitz  and  boldly  advanced  into  Moravia,  intending  to  take  Oi- 
miitz and  threaten  Vienna.  The  capture  of  Oimiitz  would  at 
once  be  followed  by  the  withdrawal  of  Austrian  troops  from 
Bohemia.  The  siege  began  on  the  27th  of  May,  and  was  con- 
ducted with  great  vigour.  As  time  went  on  the  situation  de- 
veloped many  points  of  similarity  with  the  situation  before 
Prague  in  1757.  On  each  occasion  a  powerful  army  was  hard 
by  threatening  Frederick's  communications.  In  1758,  however, 
Loudon,  by  his  military  qualities,  had  acquired  a  certain  amount 
of  influence;  on  July  26,  1757,  ^e  had  been  promoted  to  the 
rank  of  major-general,  and  was  in  a  position  to  interfere  seriously 


The  Seven    Yeai's'  War  255 

with  Frederick's  plans.  Belonging  to  an  old  Scottish  family, 
Loudon  had  seen  service  in  Russia  wqth  Munich.  Having  been 
refused  a  commission  by  Frederick  the  Great,  he  entered  the 
Austrian  service,  and  proved  to  be,  in  all  the  qualities  neces- 
sary for  a  successful  general,  only  second  to  Eugene. 

Had  he,  and  not  Prince  Charles  or  Daun  commanded,  the 
fortunes  of  Austria  in  the  Seven  Years'  War  might  have  had 
very  different  results.     As  it  was,  he  remained  the  most  for- 
midable enemy  Frederick  had  ever  met,  and  the  failure  of  the 
siege  of  Olmiitz  was  due  to  his  energy  and  resource.     Seven 
weeks  after  the  opening  of  the  siege  he  captured,  in  spite  of 
the  bravery  of  the  Prussian  troops,  an  important   Loudon 
convoy  of  3000  w^agons,  and  compelled  Frederick   ^^'^^^  *J^^ 
on  the   ist  of  July  to  raise  the  siege.     With    the   oimiitz. 
Prussian  king's  failure  Loudon's  reputation  was  made,  and  he 
was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  field-marshal-lieutenant. 

The  rest  of  the  year  was  no  less  remarkable  in  the  history 
of  the  militar}'  operations  of  the  war.  Frederick's  retreat 
from  Olmiitz  through  Bohemia  into  Silesia  was  a   ^,    „ 

^  The  Battle  of 

masterpiece  ;  his  defence  of  Brandenburg  from  a  Zomdorf, 
Russian  invasion  illustrated  his  energy  and  resolu-  "^'  ^^'  ^^^ 
tion.  The  Russians  had  occupied  East  Prussia  and  Poland, 
and,  ravaging  and  murdering  as  they  went,  were  threatening 
northern  Germany.  Frederick  advanced  to  Frankfort-on-the- 
Oder,  formed  a  junction  with  Count  Dohna,  and  fought  the 
battle  of  Zorndorf  on  the  25th  of  August.  Never  had  so 
bloody  a  battle  been  seen  between  Teuton  and  Slav.  No 
quarter  was  given,  and  with  savage  fury  and  stubborn  deter- 
mination the  struggle  raged  for  some  ten  hours.  The 
brilHant  conduct  of  the  Prussian  cavalry  under  Zeidlitz,  and 
the  dogged  courage  of  the  Russians,  are  the  only  interesting 
features  of  :i  battle  which,  as  the  day  wore  on,  resolved 
itself  into  a  hand-to-hand  encounter  between  opposing  forces 
in  utter  and  hopeless  confusion. 

Though  in  itself  indecisive.  Zorndorf  proved  to  be  a  victory 
for   the    Prussians.      While   11,500  Prussians  were  killed,  the 


256  European  History,   171 5-1789 

Russian  losses  amounted  to  21,000  men,  100  cinnons,  and  30 
flags,  and  after  a  few  days  Fermor  retired  in  good  order  into 
Poland,  and  gave  up  all  idea  of  co-operating  with  the  Swedes. 
Though  Brandenburg  was  safe,  a  fresh  attack  had  been  ar- 
ranged at  Vienna.  Daun,  assisted  by  the  army  of  the  Empire 
under  the  Duke  of  Zweibriicken,  was  to  crush  Prince  Henry 
and  retake  Dresden,  while  another  Austrian  army  under  De- 
ville  and  Harsch  was  to  enter  Silesia  and  besiege  Neisse. 
The  chief  efforts  of  the  Austrians  were  directed  against 
Saxony,  and  on  the  5  th  of  September  General  Maguire  seized 
Sonnenstein,  overlooking  Pirna.  With  extraordinary  rapidity 
the  Prussian  king  returned  to  Dresden,  in  time  to  disconcert 
Daun's  combination  and  to  force  the  Austrians  to  adopt  defen- 
sive tactics.  Frederick's  position  was  a  strong  one ;  but  he 
threw  away  his  advantage  by  advancing  against  Daun,  who  com- 
manded an  army  of  twice  his  strength,  and,  with  headstrong 
obstinacy  and  overweening  confidence,  by  encamping  in  a 
position  inferior  to  the  Austrian  position,  and  completely 
commanded  by  the  Austrian  army. 

On  the  14th  of  October  Daun,  reahsing  his  opportunity, 
attacked  and  defeated  the  Prussians  at  Hochkirchen,  but, 
The  Defeat  owing  to  his  extraordinary  cautiousness,  gained  no 
of  Frederick  advantages  from  his  victory.  With  surprising 
kirchen,  boMucss  Frederick,  by  forced  marches,  compelled 

Oct.  14, 1758.  Harsch  to  raise  the  sieges  of  Neisse  and  Kosel  and 
to  retire  into  Bohemia,  and  then  returning  with  equal  rapidity 
into  Saxony,  saved  Dresden  from  all  danger  from  Daun,  and 
forced  him  to  cross  the  frontier.  Elsewhere  fortune  favoured 
the  Prussian  cause.  Though  Cleves  and  Hesse  remained  in 
the  hands  of  the  French,  and  East  Prussia  was  within  the 
Russian  grasp,  England  had  gained  colonial  successes  against 
the  French.  Fermor's  invasion  of  Brandenburg  had  been  pre- 
vented, Daun  had  retired  into  Bohemia,  leaving  Saxony  and 
Silesia  in  Frederick's  hands,  and  a  Swedish  attack  on  Pom- 
erania  had  been  repulsed. 

In  western  Germany  Ferdinand  of  Brunswick  had  cleared 


The  Seven    Years'    Wcir  257 

Hanover,  and  at  Krefeld,  on  the  23d  of  June,  had  defeated  and 
driven  across  the  Rhine  one  French  army  under  the  command 
of  the  Comte  de  Clermont,  who  had  superseded   Ferdinand  of 
the  Due  de  RicheUeu.     Ruremonde  and  Dender-   Brunswick 
monde  were  lost,  Ferdinand  held  the  Westphalian   Germany^" 
bishoprics,  and  Clermont,  whose  defeat,  in  spite  of  '"  ^758- 
his  own  incapacity,  had  been  mainly  due  to  the  undisciplined 
and  miserable  condition  in  which  Richelieu  had  left  his  forces, 
was  replaced  by  the  ]Marquis  de  Contades. 

The  efforts  of  Madame  de  Pompadour  were  forthwith  di- 
rected to  strengthening  the  army  of  the  Maine,  which  under 
her  friend  Soubise  took  Cassel,  while  the  advanced  guard 
under  de  BrogHe  defeated  a  German  contingent  at  Sonders- 
hausen  on  the  23d  of  July.  To  check  this  advance  of  the 
French,  Ferdinand  of  Brunswick,  reinforced  by  12,000  English 
troops,  abandoned  his  pursuit  of  Contades,  and  met  the  army 
of  Soubise  at  Lutterberg,  near  Cassel.  There  on  the  7th  of 
October,  owing  to  the  vigour  of  Chevert,  who  had  in  the  pre- 
vious war  distinguished  himself  at  Prague,  Soubise  won  a  small 
success,  which,  however,  proved  of  little  benefit  to  the  French. 

In  spite  of  the  French  occupation  of  Cassel,  of  the  failure 
of  the  English  expedition  to  St.  Malo  and  Cherbourg,  and  not- 
withstanding  the    Russian    occupation   of    eastern   Prussia  and 
Prussia,  Frederick  the  Great  had  so  far    success-   JL^f "f ^  ^*  , 

^  the  close  of 

fully  resisted  the  attacks  of  his  numerous  foes.  1758. 
It  was  obvious  at  the  close  of  1758  that  only  by  a  close  and 
harmonious  union  between  Russia,  Austria,  and  France  could 
the  overthrow  of  the  King  of  Prussia  be  effected.  In  1758 
such  a  close  union  seemed  impossible  ;  for  France,  defeated  on 
the  continent  and  at  sea,  with  her  coasts  blockaded,  and  her 
communications  with  her  colonies  destroyed,  and  having,  more- 
over, lost  Louisburg  and  Fort  Duquesne  —  the  line  of  junction 
between  Canada  and  the  Mississippi  being  effectually  cut  — 
was  powerless  to  give  any  effective  aid  to  the  Courts  of  St. 
Petersburg  and  Vienna.  The  disorganisation  of  her  admin- 
istration, the   incapacity    of   her    Government,  and    her   utter 

PERIOD  VI.  R 


55 


WEST  GEEMA>(Y 
1756-1763. 


^JUTLAND      T'^^^^^    Copenhagen 
JCHLESVV 


HOL  STEIN 
tiibeeko' 

IfambuVg -...  DUCHY 

MECKLEN 

ELT  or  ' 

itANovER  •: 

■•.  Altmark 


NCONl 

SX         ...,,...•.    ;••.;••••■.  I  UPPER  \     TV 


■•-.     Jl       ;  vi^      I  5>,>„<V  d-J%  ':  .     ..••  ••..:.;....  :     PAL 

'xo-viner-     ^„-r-        /r^  ■%.    I      s    ••; ..•    : 


I      PALATINATi 
'■■OJVurtmberg    ' 


.R'atfshfl 


TJu  s/Mded  portions  represent  Prussian  territory. 


zo 


The  Seven  Years'    War  259 

feebleness  were  displayed  before  Europe,  and  Bernis,  recog- 
nising her  inability  to  continue  the  struggle  with  any  hope 
of  success,  had  already  attempted  to  bring  about  peace  on  the 
continent.  Frederick  had  nothing  to  fear  on  the  side  of 
France,  and  for  the  moment  it  seemed  as  though  his  three 
principal  foes  would  be  compelled  to  confess  their  power- 
lessness  to  conquer  his   kingdom. 

A  general  pacification  in  the  autumn  of  1758  seemed  a  far 
from  improbable  event.  Such  a  pacification  was  the  desire  of 
Bernis,  who  fully  realised  the  weakness  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment, the  general  confusion  in  the  administration,  and  .the 
difficulties  attendant  on  a  continuance  of  the  war.  Powerless 
before  the  British  fleet,  France  was  compelled  to  see  her  mer- 
chant marine  destroyed,  and  her  communications  with  Indin, 
Canada,  and  the  Antilles  cut  off. 

Dupleix  in  1754,  in  response  to  the  complaints  of  England, 
had  been  recalled  from  India,  and  his  successor,  Godeheu,  at 
once  made  a  treaty  with  the  English  in  which  Dupleix'  con- 
quests were  sacrificed.  In  America  hostilities  between  the 
English  and  French  colonists  had  never  ceased,  and  though 
Montcalm  made  brilliant  efforts  to  defend  the  French  position, 
he  was  unable  to  receive  adequate  assistance  from  France. 
The  overthrow  of  Braddock's  force  had  been  followed  by 
Montcalm's  capture  of  Oswego  in  Lake  Ontario  and  by  his 
repulse  of  the  English  at  Ticonderoga,  though  he  was  unable  to 
save  Louisburg  or  Fort  Duquesne.  To  Montcalm's  demand  for 
assistance,  Bernis,  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  replied  that  when 
one's  house  was  on  fire  one  could  not  think  of  the  stables ; 
and  Belleisle.  the  minister  of  war,  wrote  that  he  could  see  no 
prospect  of  being  able  to  send  reinforcements. 

Though  clever  and  clear-sighted,  the  astute  Bernis  was  no 
match  for  Frederick  the  Great  or  Pitt ;  he  lacked  the  strength 
required  to  bear  up  against  misfortunes  or  to  carry    Fail  of 
through  anv  definite  Hne  of  policv.     In  the  face  of  bernis  and 

°  '  ^         ^  Rise  of 

defeat  he  became   discouraged,  and    incapable  of  Choiseui. 
devising  fresh  plans  of  resistance.     In  his  eyes  peace  was  the 


26o  Eii7'opea7t  History y   1715-1789 

only  remedy  for  the  plight  in  which  France,  tied  by  unequal 
and  onerous  conditions  to  Austria,  found  herself.  He  suc- 
ceeded in  obtaining  the  assent  of  Maria  Theresa  to  the  opening 
of  negotiations,  but  before  Elizabeth  of  Russia  had  been  con- 
sulted he  had  fallen  the  victim  of  a  ministerial  revolution,  itself 
the  work  of  Madame  de  Pompadour,  who  blamed  his  concilia- 
tory tendencies,  insisted  on  a  continuance  of  the  war,  and  still 
hoped  to  gain  some  advantage  over  Prussia.  On  the  13th 
of  December  Bernis,  who  had  received  the  cardinal's  hat  on 
November  30,  was  exiled,  and  his  fall  marks  the  beginning  of 
a  period  of  activity  in  French  policy  under  the  direction 
of  Choiseul.^  Before  Bernis'  disgrace  the  Count  of  Choiseul- 
Stainville  had  been  recalled  from  Vienna,  created  Due  de 
Choiseul,  and  appointed  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.^  He  now 
became  the  leading  minister,  and  for  some  years  held  the  chief 
authority  in  the  French  Court.  By  birth  a  Lorrainer,  Choiseul 
had  in  his  early  days  served  in  the  army ;  he  had  then  entered 
upon  a  diplomatic  career,  and  was  popular  at  the  Court  of 
Vienna.  He  had  secured  the  favour  of  Madame  de  Pompa- 
dour, and  by  his  marriage  with  Mile.  Crozat  du  Chatel  had 
acquired  an  immense  fortune.  There  is  no  doubt  that  during 
the  later  phases  of  the  Seven  Years'  War  his  influence  was 
highly  beneficial  to  his  country,  that  he  gave  decision  to  her 
policy  and  that  his  failure  to  save  her  from  further  losses  was 
due  to  the  mistakes  of  his  predecessors  and  to  the  interference 
of  Louis  XV.  with  his  plans. 

Choiseul  was  not  a  great  statesman,  but  he  was  a  man  of 
considerable  ability,  and  was  vastly  superior  in  political  sagac- 
Choiseui's  ity,  in  energy,  and  in  determination,  to  any  of  his 
Vigorous         fellow-ministers.     He  worked  eiarht  or  ten  hours  a 

Policy  in  ^  *-" 

1759-  day,  and  on  his  accession  to  power  effected  a  revo- 

lution in  the  French   Foreign  Office.     A  clever   courtier,  he 

1  See  Memoires  de  Bernis^  edited  by  Frederic  Masson, 

2  Choiseul  was  from  1758-1761,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs;  from 
1 761-1766,  Minister  of  War  and  Marine;  from  1 766-1 770,  Minister  of 
War  and  Foreign  Affairs. 


The  Seven    Years     War  261 

could  hold  his  own  among  the  literary  and  scientific  spirits  of 
the  day.  A  man  of  many  interests,  the  final  judgment  on  his 
career  has  yet  to  be  passed.  He  hoped  at  first  to  ally  with 
Spain,  and  to  use  the  mediation  of  that  Power  to  bring  about 
peace  with  England,  so  as  to  leave  France  free  to  devote  her 
energies  to  the  war  on  the  continent.  Finding  the  execution 
of  this  policy  impossible,  he  determined  to  carry  on  the  war 
with  vigour,  both  against  England  and  against  Prussia,  and  at 
the  same  time  resolved  to  revise  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  of 
1757,  in  a  sense  more  favourable  to  France.  Accordingly, 
while  declaring  for  a  continuance  of  the  war,  he  concluded 
on  the  30th  of  December  1758  two  new  treaties  —  ratified 
in  March  1759  —  with  Austria,  one  public  and  the  other  se- 
cret.^ Family  alliances  were  arranged ;  the  Archduke  Joseph 
was  to  marry  Isabella,  Princess  of  Parma  and  granddaughter  of 
Louis  XV.,  and  his  brother  Leopold  was  to  marry  a  Princess 
of  Naples.-  Neither  country  could  conclude  a  separate  peace 
without  the  other,  and  France  was  to  do  all  in  her  power  to 
aid  Austria  in  the  conquest  of  Silesia  and  Glatz.  Though 
France  was  no  longer  bound  to  continue  the  war  till  Silesia  and 
Glatz  were  recovered,  and  though  no  further  partition  of 
Prussia  was  suggested,  Austria  had  still  the  advantage  over 
France  in  these  treaties.  France  bound  herself  to  increase  the 
number  of  her  troops  in  Germany,  and  was  compelled  to  con- 
tinue a  ruinous  and  exhausting  war  in  order  that  Austria  should 
gain  territorial  concessions.  It  was  no  wonder  that  the  French 
people  hated  the  war,  detested  the  Austrian  connection,  and 
suspected  Choiseul  of  being  favourable  to  its  continuance. 

Though  unable  to  free  France  to  any  great  extent  from  her 
Austrian  alliance,  Choiseul  made  a  determined  and  ambitious 
effort  to  restore  French  credit  on  the  continent  and  on  the 
sea.     French  troops  were  to  conquer  Hanover,  and  the  colonies 

1  This  arrangement  between  France  and  Austria  is  sometimes  called  the 
Third  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

-  See  i'ne  Fille  de  France  et  sa  correspondance  inedite^  par  L.  de 
Beauriez. 


262  European  History,   i/i 5-1789 

were  to  be  recovered  by  means  of  an  invasion  of  England. 
The  task  of  overthrowing  Frederick  was  to  be  left  mainly  to  the 
Russians  and  Austrians,  and  the  largest  portion  of  the  French 
troops  were  to  be  used  to  strike  a  telling  blow  at  England. 
Canada  and  Pondicherry  were  to  be  regained  by  an  armed 
occupation  of  London.  Fleets  were  prepared  at  Toulon  and 
Brest,  and  Choiseul  proposed  to  Woronzov  that  a  portion  of 
the  Russian  army  should  embark  at  Stettin  in  Swedish  ships, 
and,  after  having  received  at  Gothenburg  an  additional  force 
of  12,000  Swedes,  should  land  in  Scotland. 

The  army  for  the  invasion  of  England  was  intrusted  to 
The  Disas-  Soubise,  that  for  the  invasion  of  Scotland  to  the 
ters  of  equallv  incapable  d'Aisfuillon,  the  fleet  to  the  in- 

France  in  ^         '  ^  o  ? 

1759-  competent  de  la  Clue,  Conflans,  and  Thurot. 

These  ambitious  projects  ended  in  failure,  and  the  year  1759 
proved  signally  disastrous  to  France. 

In  Januar}',  news  of  the  capture  of  the  island  of  Gor^e,  on 
the  west  coast  of  Africa,  arrived  in  England,  and  in  June  the 
capture  of  Guadaloupe  was  announced.  An  attempt  of  the 
French  to  unite  the  three  squadrons  of  de  la  Clue,  Conflans, 
and  Thurot,  which  lay  respectively  at  Toulon,  Brest,  and  Dun- 
kirk, watched  by  Enghsh  ships,  led  to  a  series  of  overwhelming 
tlefeats.  Boscawen  won  a  great  victory  over  de  la  Clue  on  the 
17th  of  August  at  Lagos;  and,  on  the  20th  of  November, 
Hawke  gained  a  brilliant  success  in  Quiberon  Bay  over  Conflans 
and  the  Brest  fleet,  while  Rodney  bombarded  Havre.  Thurot 
was  equally  unsuccessful,  and  his  squadron,  which  had  sailed  to 
Ireland,  was  completely  destroyed.  The  French  fleet  was 
practically  annihilated,  and  the  scheme  of  an  invasion  of  Eng- 
land was  ruined.  To  add  to  these  disasters,  Wolfe,  on  the  i8th 
of  September,  had  captured  Quebec,  and  the  fate  of  Canada 
was  sealed.  Equally  successful  were  the  English  arms  in  India, 
where  the  battle  of  Plassey,  won  by  Clive  on  the  27th  of  June 
1757,  had  re-established  the  English  position  in  Calcutta,  and 
was  followed  by  the  steady  decline'  of  French  influence  in 
India,  till  it  received  its  death-blow  in  December  1760  at  the 
battle  of  Wandewash. 


The  Seven    Year's     War  263 

On  the  continent  failure  also  attended  all  Choiseul's  schemes, 
in  spite  of  the  strong  reinforcements  sent  to  the  armies  in 
Germany.  De  BrogHe,  the  commander  of  the  The  Battle  of 
southern  French  army,  had  indeed  defeated  Fer-  Minden, 
dinand  of  Brunswick,  who  had  attempted  to  regain  Pefce '  ^^^^ 
Frankfort,  at  Bergen  on  the  13th  of  April,  had  Projects, 
effected  a  junction  with  the  northern  French  army  under  Mar- 
shal Contades,  and  had  taken  Cassel  and  Minden.  Hanover, 
however,  was  saved  by  the  generalship  of  Ferdinand,  who,  on 
the  I  St  of  August,  won  the  decisive  battle  of  Minden,  which  re- 
sulted in  the  expulsion  of  the  French  from  Hesse,  and  the  dis- 
grace of  Contades,  and  the  appointment  of  de  Broglie  to  the 
supreme' command  of  the  army.  Nor  was  Choiseul  more  suc- 
cessful in  securing  the  active  co-operation  of  Peter  Saltikov^,  the 
incapable  Russian  commander,  who  had  succeeded  Fermor. 
Saltikov  had  no  wish  to  enter  upon  the  siege  of  Stettin,  which 
might  prove  a  lengthy  business.  Moreover,  the  Russian  Court 
had  no  intention  of  breaking  with  England.  No  war  existed 
between  the  Courts  of  St.  James  and  St.  Petersburg,  and  though 
Russia  remained  the  ally  of  France,  she  was  never  the  enemy 
OR  England.  Instead  of  co-operating  with  France  in  an  attack 
upon  the  throne  of  George  11.,  Elizabeth  contented  herself  with 
making  a  convention  with  Sweden  on  the  8th  of  March,  to 
which  France  and  Denmark  were  invited  to  join,  to  exclude 
from  the  Baltic  all  foreign  ships.  Asserting  principles  which 
in  1780  were  accepted  by  the  Northern  League,  the  Russian 
and  Swedish  Governments  united  to  preser\'e  peace  in  the 
Baltic.  Before  the  year  had  run  its  course,  Choiseul  had 
forced  upon  him  the  desirabihty  of  a  return  to  Bernis'  poHcy, 
and  he  began  to  think  of  using  the  mediation  of  Russia  in 
order  to  bring  about  peace.  He  had  already  made  a  deter- 
mined effort  to  counteract  Louis  xv.'s  secret  correspondence 
with  the  ambassadors  at  foreign  Courts,  and  had,  in  ^Tarch 
1759.  procured  the  dismissal  of  Tercier,  who  acted  as  Louis' 
confidential  secretary.  Durand,  another  of  Louis'  creatures, 
was  superseded  in   1760  by  Paulmy,  who  was  sent  to  Warsaw 


264  European  History y   17 15-1789 

with  orders  to  support  the  Russian  Government  and  to  give  no 
encouragement  to  the  national  party.  Choiseul,  however,  soon 
reaUsed  that  some  occult  influence  interfered  with  the  execution 
of -his  orders  to  Paulmy,  and  when  he  began  to  take  measures 
to  secure  the  Russian  mediation,  he  was  confronted  by  fresh 
difficulties.  He  instructed  I'Hopital,  the  French  representa- 
tive at  St.  Petersburg,  in  a  despatch  dated  July  8th,  1759,  to 
indicate  to  the  Russian  Chancellor  the  advisability  of  employ- 
ing Russian  mediation  in  order  to  bring  about  peace  between 
Austria  and  Prussia,  Choiseul  hoping  that  Russian  mediation 
would  be  extended  later  in  favour  of  negotiations  for  a  settle- 
ment between  France  and  England.  Had  his  statesmanHke 
recognition  of  the  necessity  of  peace  been  accepted  in  1759, 
Choiseul  might  have  saved  France  from  a  portion  of  the  losses 
and  humiHation  which  she  had  to  undergo  in  1763.  But  he 
again  found  his  policy  hampered  by  the  secret  diplomacy  of 
Louis  XV.  L'Hopital,  prompted  by  his  secretary,  d'Eon,  who 
was  acquainted  with  the  views  of  the  French  king,  found  it 
advisable  to  pay  no  attention  to  his  official  instructions,  and 
Choiseul's  well-meant  efforts  fell  to  the  ground. 

Louis  XV.,  who  preferred  to  treat  directly  \vith  England, 
disapproved  of  the  idea  of  Russian  mediation,  and  secretly 
threw  all  the  weight  of  his  influence  against  Choiseul.  Pitt 
had  declined  to  consider  the  question  of  a  separate  peace 
with  France  ;  while  the  Russian  Court,  jubilant  over'  Saltikov's 
victory  at  Kunersdorf  on  the  13th  of  August  1759,  ^^as 
resolved  to  continue  the  war,  to  definitely  annex  eastern 
Prussia,  and  to  obtain  the  acquiescence  of  France  and  Austria 
to  this  increase  of  her  territory. 

The  battle  of  Kunersdorf  seemed  for  the  moment  Hkely  to 
put  the  final  touch  to  the  overthrow  of  Prussia.  Though 
The  Battle  of  Frederick  had  held  his  own  in  1758,  his  country 
Kunersdorf,  ^^^  exhausted,  his  expenses  largely  exceeded  his 
1759-  means,  the  English  subsidies  were  far  from  being 

sufficient  to  outweigh  the  drain  on  the  Prussian  resources. 
While  the  Austrian  armies  were  improving  in  experience,  and 


The  Seven    Years'    War         '  265 

the  Austrian  generals  in  knowledge  of  the  art  of  war,  Fred- 
erick's position  was  somewhat  similar  to  that  of  Napoleon 
after  the  Wagram  campaign.  His  opponents  were  learning 
from  him ;  and  while  their  armies  were  drawn  from  a  wide 
area,  his  own  recruits,  raised  from  the  small  population  of 
Prussia,  were  poor  substitutes  for  the  veterans  who  had  com- 
posed the  magnificent  army  with  which  he  had  begun  the  war. 
Opposed  to  him  were  the  improved  Austrian  forces  and  the 
Russian  troops,  whose  fighting  qualities  had  come  upon  him 
as  a  sudden  revelation,  while  the  hostile  cordon  was  completed 
by  the  imperial  army  under  the  Duke  of  Zweibriicken,  which 
had  occupied  Leipsic,  Wittenberg,  and  Torgau,  and  the  French 
army  under  de  Broglie.  Offensive  operations  on  a  large  scale 
were  impossible,  though  Prince  Henry  successfully  destroyed 
the  Austrian  magazines  in  Bohemia,  and  drove  back  the 
imperial  army  to  Bamberg  and  Wiirzburg.  During  the  early 
part  of  the  year  1759,  Frederick  had  no  aggressive  action  on 
the  part  of  his  foes  to  ward  off,  for  the  cautiousness  of  Daun 
kept  the  Austrians  inactive  till  the  Russians  had  advanced  as 
far  as  the  Oder,  and,  after  defeating  a  Prussian  corps  under 
GeneralWedel  atZlillichau  on  the  23d  of  July,  taken  Frankfort. 

Loudon  and  18,000  Austrians  then  joined  Saltikov,  and 
Frederick  with  50,000  men  found  himself  confronted  by  at 
least  So,ooo  Austrian  and  Russian  troops.  In  the  battle  which 
was  fought  on  the  13th  of  August  the  Prussians  were  at  first 
brilliantly  successful,  but  the  advance  of  Loudon  at  a  critical 
moment,  coupled  with  Frederick's  over-confidence  and  obsti- 
nacy, altered  the  fate  of  the  day,  and  the  conflict  ended  in  his 
complete  overthrow.  A  Russian  advance  upon  Berlin  would 
have  been  followed  by  the  annihilation  of  the  Prussian  monarchy, 
and  Kunersdorf  would  have  ranked  among  the  decisive  battles 
of  the  world's  history. 

But  the  inactivity  of  the  Austrians  and  Russians  saved 
Frederick.  Though  the  former,  with  the  aid  of  the  Imperialist 
army  which  had  taken  Leipsic  and  Torgau,  captured  Dresden 
on  the  14th  September,  Daun's  habitual  sluggishness  and  lack 


266  European  History^   171 5-1789 

of  military  genius  rendered  him  a  poor  match  in  the  face  ot 
the  active  operations  of  Prince  Henry.  The  Russians  showed 
Capitulation  no  anxiety  to  march  into  Brandenburg  ;  their  losses 
ofFinck   The   had  been  considerable,  and  Saltikov,  either  angry 

Treaty  cf  '  . 

schuwaiov.  at  the  supineness  of  Daun  or  anxious  about  the 
state  of  politics  in  St.  Petersburg,  refused  to  follow  up  the 
victory.  None  the  less,  after  three  years  of  conflict  which 
had  exhausted  Austria,  France,  and  Prussia,  the  Tsarina  held 
in  her  hands  the  fate  of  Poland  and  that  of  the  continent.  The 
life  of  Elizabeth,  however,  was  not  likely  to  be  of  long  duration ; 
the  party  of  the  heir  Peter,  and  his  wife  Catherine,  was  increas- 
ing in  importance ;  and  the  accession  of  Peter  would,  it  was 
well  known,  be  followed  by  a  change  of  poKcy.  After  marching 
into  Silesia^^'the  Russians  retired  into  Poland,  and  the  Austrians 
were  left  to^-continu%*the  campaign.  The  obstinacy  of  Fred- 
erick agam^  brc^ught  disaster  on  the  Prussian  cause.  Anxious 
to  hasten  the  retreat  of  Daun  into  Bohemia  before  the  masterly 
manceuvres  of  Prince  Henry,  Frederick  ordered  General  Finck 
to  circle  round  in  rear  of  Daun,  so  as  to  bring  about  the 
destruction  of  the  Austrian  army.  On  the  23d  of  November 
Finck  was  forced  to  capitulate  at  Maxen  with  some  12,000 
Prussian  soldiers,  and  Dresden  remained  in  Austrian  hands. 
The  year  1759  closed  gloomily  for  Prussia  no  less  than  for 
France.  But  the  personality  and  iron  will  of  Frederick  upheld 
his  country  through  its  period  of  misfortunes,  while  in  France 
the  weakness  and  incapacity  of  Louis  xv.  gave  no  hope  to  his 
subjects  of  a  satisfactory  escape  from  their  calamities. 

The  chances  of  peace  at  the  opening  of  1760  seemed  indeed 
small.  The  note  of  England  and  Prussia  on  the  25th  of 
November  1759,  suggesting  that  a  European  congress  should 
be  held,  had  been  rejected  by  Russia  and  Austria,  and  the 
accession  of  Charles  of  Naples  —  the  famous  Don  Carlos  —  to 
the  Spanish  throne  in  August  1759  rendered  it  probable  that, 
in  spite  of  the  new  king's  dislike  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
Spanish  aid  would  be  given  to  France.  But  though  the  war 
might  continue,  various  circumstances   tended  to  destroy  still 


The  Scvcji    Years'    War  267 

more  all  chance  of  united  action  on  the  part  of  the  alHes.  In 
March  1760  the  Tsarina  Elizabeth  forced  from  Maria  Theresa 
the  Treaty  of  Schuwalov,  guaranteeing  to  Russia  the  possession 
of  eastern  Prussia  and  Danzig.  Whilst  being  extremely  dis- 
tasteful to  the  Austrian  Court,  the  treaty  roused  the  utmost 
irritation  in  France.  The  efforts  of  Peter  the  Great,  of  Cathe- 
rine I.,  and  Elizabeth  to  secure  a  French  alliance  had  so  far 
proved  unavailing,  and  France  still  adhered  to  her  traditional 
policy  with  regard  to  Poland,  Sweden,  and  Turkey.  To  pre- 
ser\'e  a  balance  of  power  in  the  Baltic  was  one  of  the  aims  of 
French  diplomacy,  and  the  Treaty  of  Schuwalov  was  a  direct 
menace  to  such  a  balance  of  power,  endangering  as  it  did 
the  independence  and  prosperity  of  Sweden  and  Denmark. 
Though  the  ties  that  bound  France  to  her  aUies  were  becoming 
sensibly  weakened,  Choiseul  made,  in  March  1760,  an  attempt 
to  induce  Russia  and  Austria  to  agree  to  the  conclusion  of  a 
treaty,  and  the  Baron  de  Breteuil  was  sent  to  St.  Petersburg 
with  that  object.  L'Hopital  had  demonstrated  his  untrust- 
worthiness,  and  Choiseul  hoped  that  the  new  am-   , 

Louis  XV. 's 

bassador  would  carry  out  his  wishes.  But  before  Secret 
he  set  out,  Louis  xv.  himself  intimated  to  him  that  ^^pi°"^acy. 
he  was  to  obey  the  royal  orders  in  preference  to  those  of  the 
minister.  While  Choiseul's  instructions  related  to  the  necessity 
of  inducing  Russia  to  act  as  mediator  of  a  general  peace, 
Breteuil  also  received  another  set  of  instructions  from  the 
king,  which  are  valuable  as  showing  that  the  principal  object 
of  the  secret  diplomacy  of  Louis  xv.  was  the  preser\'ation  of 
the  anarchical  independence  of  Poland  and  the  establishment 
of  French  influence  over  the  fortunes  of  the  republic.  The 
document  proves  incontestably  that  Louis  was  prepared  to 
sacrifice  the  most  important  interests  of  his  kingdom  to  the 
one  object  of  saving  Poland  from  the  Russian  occupation.  At 
this  time  he  hoped  to  procure  for  Xavier  de  Saxe,  third  son  of 
Augustus  III.  and  the  favourite  brother  of  the  Dauphiness,  the 
crown  of  Poland  on  the  king's  death.  He  was  averse  to  any 
territorial  or  other  increase  of  the  power  of  Russia,  and  ordered 


268  European  History,   17 15-1789 

Breteuil  to  do  all  in  his  power  to  retard  the  movements  ot 
the  Russian  troops  against  Frederick,  fearing  that  some  signal 
success  would  increase  the  influence  of  the  Tsarina  and  cause 
her  to  adopt  a  high  tone.  Thus  Louis  xv.'s  secret  poUcy  was 
at  variance  with  his  engagements  made  in  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  in  1757;  it  was  fraught  with  pernicious  results  for 
France ;  it  was  dishonourable  to  his  alhes ;  it  paralysed  the 
efforts  of  men  like  Choiseul,  who  were  working  for  the  real 
interests  of  France.  Louis  was  no  doubt  correct  in  his  view 
that  a  peace  such  as  Choiseul  desired  would  inevitably  involve 
the  increase  of  Russian  influence  in  Poland.  But,  disregarding 
the  whole  tendency  of  events,  he  decided,  when  Russia  in  1760 
demanded  the  Ukraine,  to  continue  the  hopeless  task  of  pre- 
serving the  integrity  of  Poland,  though  his  misguided  policy 
involved  the  loss  of  the  French  colonies,  and  in  the  end  failed 
to  benefit  Poland.  Breteuil's  mission  to  St.  Petersburg  failed 
to  bring  about  the  object  desired  by  Choiseul.^ 

Peace  was  not  made,  and  the  year  1 760  proved  to  be  a 
year  of  battles.  Finck's  capitulation  at  Maxen  had  enabled 
the  Austrians  to  establish  themselves  firmly  in  Saxony,  and 
General  Maguire  defeated  Frederick's  determined  attempts  to 
dislodge  them. 

On  the    23d    of  June    1760    Fouquet,    one   of   Frederick's 

generals,  was  overwhelmed  at  Landshut  by  Loudon,  who  took 

several    thousand   Prussian  soldiers  prisoners,  and 

Scenes  of  the   01^  J^^^Y  26  capturcd  Glatz.     A  Russian  army  under 

War  in  Czernitcheff  crossed  the  Oder,  and  Silesia  became 

Germ  Sin  v> 

the  chief  theatre  of  the  war.  Followed  by  two 
Austrian  armies  under  Daun  and  Lacy,  Frederick,  who  on 
hearing  of  Fouquet's  danger  had  immediately  bestirred  himself, 
threw  himself  into  the  province,  but  after  hearing  of  his  general's 
surrender  he  turned  and  attempted  to  take  Dresden.  Baffled, 
he  rushed  again  into  Silesia,  and  before  the  Austrian  armies 
could  unite  he  defeated  Loudon  at  the  battle  of  Liegnitz  on 
the  15th  of  August.  The  slowness,  caution,  and  incapacity  of 
1  Albert  Vandal,  Louis  XV.  et  Elizabeth  de  Rusiie. 


TJie  Seven   Years     War  269 

Daun  and  Lacy  had  saved  Frederick  from  destruction.  But 
in  spite  of  the  unwiUingness  of  Maria  Theresa  and  the  Aulic 
Council  to  recognise  the  futihty  of  directing  mihtary  opera- 
tions from  Vienna,  and  the  necessity  of  placing  Loudon  in  the 
chief  command,  the  Austrian  armies,  if  well  led,  were  still 
capable  of  winning  victories.  Though  Czernitcheff  recrossed 
the  Oder,  and  the  Austrians  in  Silesia  were  checked,  Frederick 
remained  in  a  very  precarious  position.  A  corps  of  Austrians 
and  Russians  under  Lacy  and  Totleben  raided  Berhn,  while 
the  Austrian  troops  occupied  Saxony.  Frederick's  return  from 
Silesia  was  followed  by  his  attack  on  Daun  at  Torgau  on  the 
3d  of  November.  After  a  fierce  struggle,  in  which  Daun  was 
wounded,  the  Austrians  were  defeated,  and  having,  it  is  said, 
lost  20,000  men,  retired  upon  Dresden ;  while  Frederick,  hav- 
ing regained  the  greater  part  of  Saxony,  though  at  the  cost 
of  14,000  men,  wintered  at  Leipsic.  The  last  pitched  battle 
of  the  war  had  been  fought ;  Saxony,  with  the  exception  of 
Dresden,  which  was  still  held  by  ]NLiguire,  was  left  in  the 
possession  of  the  Prussians ;  the  Austrians  had,  owing  to  the 
genius  of  Frederick  and  the  caution  of  Daun,  merely  con- 
quered Landshut  and  the  country  of  Glatz ;  and  the  remaining 
military  operations  were,  in  Carlyle's  words,  Mike  a  race  be- 
tween spent  horses.'  In  western  Germany  and  in  the  colonies 
the  French  had  gained  no  signal  advantage.  The  Due  de 
Broglie,  who,  aided  by  the  Comte  de  Saint-Germain,  had 
introduced  reforms  into  the  army,  had  indeed  won  a  success 
at  Corbach,  and  had  reoccupied  Hesse-Cassel,  while  the 
hereditary  Prince  of  Brunswick  had  been  defeated  at  Kloster- 
Campen  by  the  Marquis  de  Castries ;  but  Ferdinand  of  Bruns- 
wick's strategy  proved  sufficient  for  the  defence  of  Westphalia 
and  Hanover,  and  by  the  battle  of  Warburg,  which  was  won 
mainly  by  the  English  cavalry,  he  checked  the  French  advance. 
In  America,  after  some  small  successes,  the  capitulation  of  Mon- 
treal on  the  8th  of  September  completed  the  loss  of  Canada, 
and  Louisiana  alone  remained  to  France  of  all  her  American 
possessions.     In  India  Eyre  Coote  had  defeated  the  French  at 


270  European  History^   17 15-1789 

the  battle  of  Wandewash  on  the  22d  of  January  1760,  and,  aftei 
capturing  the  smaller  French  forts,  besieged  Pondicherry  in 
September.  On  the  26th  of  January  1761  Pondicherry  fell, 
and  the  French  dominion  in  India  came  to  an  end. 

The  year  1761  was  marked  by  the  failure  of  renewed  efforts 
to  bring  about  peace,  by  the  exhaustion  of  the  combatants  in 
Germany,  by  the  fall  of  Pitt,  and  by  a  last  attempt  of  Choiseul 
to  restore  the  French  fortunes.  Finding  that  his  efforts  to 
bring  about  peace  were  not  successful,  he  had  resigned  the 
direction  of  foreign  affairs  early  in  1761,  and  became  ^Minister 
of  War  and  Marine.  In  this  capacity  he  made  strenuous  efforts 
to  improve  the  condition  of  the  French  fleet.  All  classes  united 
to  aid  Choiseul  in  his  attempts  to  defend  the  country,  and  new 
ships  were  ordered  to  be  built,  these  efforts  being  an  earnest 
of  the  minister's  work  of  reorganisation  from  1763  onwards. 
Choiseul  had  indeed  induced  Austria  and  Russia  to  consent  to 
negotiations  at  Augsburg,  but  his  wishes  met  with  Httle  support 
from  the  former  Power ;  the  congress  led  to  no  result,  and  the 
war  continued  in  a  desultory  manner.  Loudon  and  Buturlin 
respectively  commanded  the  Austrian  and  Russian  forces  in 
Silesia,  but  their  quarrels  enabled  Frederick  to  hold  his  own 
till  the  I  St  of  October,  when  Loudon,  by  a  sudden  and  unex- 
pected movement,  captured  Schweidnitz,  and  Silesia  and  Glatz 
were  occupied  by  Austrian  and  Russian  armies.  In  eastern 
Pomerania  Russian  troops,  under  Rumiantsov,  reduced  Kolberg 
on  the  ist  of  December,  and  though  they  failed  to  take  Stettin, 
they  remained  in  occupation  of  the  surrounding  country.  Only 
in  western  Europe  was  the  Prussian  cause  successful.  There 
Ferdinand  of  Brunswick  successfully  repulsed  at  Villingshausen 
an  attempt  of  the  incapable  Soubise  and  the  jealous  de  Broglie, 
at  the  head  of  16,000,  to  advance  into  Westphalia  and  Hanover. 
D'Estr^es  replaced  de  Broglie,  while  Conti  succeeded  Soubise, 
with  little  advantage  to  the  French  cause.  The  capture  of 
Dominica,  Belleisle,  and  Pondicherry  were  further  blows  to  the 
French  cause,  and  Choiseul  realised  that  the  complete  annihila- 
tion of  the  French  naval  power  could  alone  satisfy  Pitt. 


The  Seven    Years    War  271 

Conscious  that  the  Austrian  aUiance  was  of  httle  use  to 
France,  and  finding  that  the  separate  negotiations  which  had 
been  opened  between  England  and  France  in  June  were 
opposed  by  Pitt,  he  naturally  turned  to  Spain,  whose  king, 
Charles  in.,  inspired  by  a  deep  resentment  of  long  standing 
against  England,  was  burning  with  indignation  at  certain  high- 
handed acts  of  the  English. 

On  the  27th  of  August  1758  Queen  Barbara  died;  her  in- 
consolable husband  shut  himself  up,  became  seriously  ill,  and  a 
period  of  governmental  anarchy  super\'ened.  during  which  the 
possibility  of  making  Elizabeth  Famese  regent  was  at  one  time 
discussed.  The  death  of  Ferdinand  vi..  on  tlie  24th  of  August 
1759,  put  an  end  to  the  confusion  in  Spain,  and  his  half-brother, 
the  famous  Don  Carlos,  king  of  the  Two  Sicihes,  ascended  the 
Spanish  throne  as  Charles  in.  The  new  king,  the  ^^^^  Acces- 
eldest  son  of  Elizabeth  Farnese  and  Philip  v.,  was  sion  of 
born  in  1716,  and  in  1739  had  married  Maria  of  Spain, 
Amelia,  sister  of  Maria  Josepha,  the  Dauphiness,  ^759- 
and  daughter  of  Augustus  in..  King  of  Poland  and  Saxony. 
Endowed  with  natural  advantages  both  of  mind  and  body, 
Charles  in.,  after  receiving  an  excellent  education,  had  developed 
the  qualities  most  necessary  for  a  king.  Imbued  with  the  love 
of  justice  and  with  a  sense  of  his  royal  responsibihties,  he  had 
during  his  reign  in  the  kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies  devoted 
himself  with  assiduitv  to  the  amelioration  of  the  lot  of  his  sub- 
jects.  Aided  by  his  able  minister  Tanucci,  brigandage  was 
severely  repressed,  the  privileges  of  the  barons  were  curtailed, 
many  ecclesiastical  rights  were  abolished  and  others  were  care- 
fully restrained,  industry  and  manufactures  were  encouraged. 
By  the  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  it  had  been  provided  that  if 
Don  Carlos  became  King  of  Spain,  and  Don  Philip  King  of 
Naples,  Parma  and  Guastalla  should  revert  to  Austria,  and  the 
greater  part  of  the  Duchy  of  Piacenza  to  the  King  of  Sardinia. 
After  much  negotiation,  it  was  settled  that  Charles  iii.  should 
be  allowed  to  leave  his  kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies  to  his  son 
Ferdinand  rv.,  and  that  Don  Philip  should  remain  in  his  duchy, 


2/2  European  History,   171 5-1789 

and  that  the  claims  of  the  King  of  Sardinia  should  be  compen- 
sated for  by  a  sum  of  money.  The  Austrian  Court,  still  bent 
on  strengthening  its  friendship  with  the  Bourbons,  consolidated 
the  Austro-Spanish  alliance  by  the  marriages  of  the  Archdukes 
Joseph  and  Leopold  to  the  daughters  of  Don  Phihp  and 
Charles  iii.  respectively. 

After  leaving  his  son  Ferdinand  rv.  in  possession  of  the 
Two  Sicilies,  Charles  had,  on  his  arrival  in  Spain,  found  that 
kingdom  in  a  state  of  disorganisation,  and  completely  unpre- 
pared to  take  part  in  any  warlike  operations.  The  realisation 
of  the  true  position  of  Spain,  together  with  the  representations 
of  Wall,  then  as  ever  opposed  to  war,  and  the  influence  of 
the  Queen,  checked  the  anti-English  tendencies  of  Charles. 
^^   ^     .,       But  on  the  death  of  Maria  Amelia  Charles  chanejed 

The  Family  ° 

Compact  of  his  attitude,  determined  to  exclude  the  English 
ug- 15. 17  I-  fj-om  the  commerce  of  central  America,  and  to 
recover  Gibraltar.  He  accordingly  listened  to  the  French 
proposals  for  united  action  against  the  House  of  Braganza,  in 
order  to  withdraw  the  attention  of  the  English  from  Germany, 
and  to  strike  a  blow  at  England's  commerce  with  Portugal. 
The  Marquis  of  Grimaldi,  a  Genoese  by  birth,  and  whose  rise 
had  been  due  to  the  influence  of  Ensenada,  was  sent  to  Paris, 
and  on  August  15,  1761,  a  Family  Compact  between  Spain  and 
France  was  signed,  Choiseul  hoping,  with  some  plausibility,  to 
form  within  the  Franco- Austrian  alliance  a  union  'of  all  the 
Bourbon  Powers  which  should  be  capable  of  holding  its  own 
against  England. 

This  agreement,  to  which  the  Bourbon  Princes  of  Parma 
and  Naples  were  to  be  admitted,  consisted  (i)  of  a  Family 
Compact  which  established  in  a  general  manner  and  on  a  per- 
manent basis  the  relations  of  the  two  monarchies  ;  and  (2)  of 
a  special  convention  relating  to  the  Seven  Years'  War,  in  ac- 
cordance with  which  Charles  iii.  engaged  to  declare  war  upon 
England  on  May  i,  1762,  if  at  that  date  peace  was  not  already 
concluded,  and  France  promised  to  hand  over  Minorca  to  the 
Spaniards  on  the  day  that  Spain  declared  war. 


The  Seven    Years'    War  273 

Choiseul's  name  will  ever  be  connected  with  the  Family 
Compact.  The  necessity  of  united  action  on  the  part  of  the 
Bourbons  of  France  and  Spain  against  the  predominance  of 
England  in  America  and  her  naval  supremacy  had  been  realised 
by  Louis  xiv.  The  dynastic  exigencies  of  the  Regent  Orleans, 
followed  by  the  timorous  and  short-sighted  policy  of  Fleur)' 
and  his  successors,  had  relegated  commercial  and  colonial 
matters  to  the  background,  with  the  result  that  the  navy  was 
neglected  and  star\'ed,  and  the  ruin  of  the  French  commerce 
and  colonies  rendered  certain  in  the  event  of  a  war  with  Eng- 
land. Choiseul  recognised  clearly  the  defects  of  the  poHcy  of 
his  predecessors,  and  the  value  of  the  Spanish  alliance  was 
strikingly  evidenced  during  the  war  between  England  and  her 
American  colonies. 

At  first,  however,  no  beneficial  results  attended  the  states- 
manlike action  of  Choiseul.  The  union  of  France  and  Spain, 
coming  as  it  did  when  France  was  exhausted  and  Spain  un- 
prepared, ended  in  fresh  disasters  to  the  former  and  serious 
losses  to  the  latter  Power.^ 

Pitt,  suspecting  with  reason  the  existence  of  this  treaty,  was 
anxious  for  an  immediate  declaration  of  war  against  Spain. 
But  a  change  had  come  over  the  aspect  of  affairs  in  England. 
George  11.  had  died  on  the  25th  of  October  1760,  and  his 
successor  George  iii.  made  Bute  one  of  the  Secretaries  of 
State. 

Bute  headed  a  party  desirous  of  making  peace,  mainly  in 
order  to  get  rid  of  Pitt  and  to  break  up  the  Whig  party.     Find- 
ing his  policy  was  not  approved  of  by  the  Cabinet,   y&w  of  Pitt 
Pitt  resigned  on  the  5th  of  October,  and  thus  ended   '^^^  ^ar 
the  splendid  administration  which  raised  England   England 
to  a  position  of  first-rate  importance  in    Europe,   ^^^  Spain, 
and  firmly  established  her   colonial    empire.     Under   the   in- 
fluence of  Bute,  who  named  himself  Prime    Minister   on  the 
retirement  of  Newcastle,  Parhament  did  not  renew  the  annual 

1  See  La  Diplomatie  de  Louis  XV.  et  Le  Facte  de  Famille,  par  Andre 
Soulange-Boden. 

PERIOD   VI.  S 


2/4  Europea^i  History,   171 5-1789 

subsidy  to  Prussia,  and  though  Bute  found  himself  compelled 
to  declare  war  on  Spain  in  January  1762,  and  to  repel  the 
invasion  of  Portugal,  he  continued  to  endeavour  to  abandon  all 
continental  connections,  and  to  procure  peace  at  any  price. 

The  fall  of  Pitt  had  dealt  what  seemed  to  be  a  very  serious 
blow  to  the  fortunes  of  Frederick  the  Great,  who  found  him- 
self at  the  end  of  176 1  in  a  weakened  and  exhausted  condition, 
exposed  to  the  fierce  hostility  of  the  Tsarina,  and  deprived  of 
the  support  of  England.  Though  the  efforts  of  the  alhes  to 
crush  Frederick  had  so  far  failed  in  their  object,  Prussia  at 
the  close  of  1761  seemed  to  all  but  her  king  in  a  well-nigh 
hopeless  position. 

But  if  Frederick  had  only  60,000  men  left,  his  enemies  were 
also  in  an  exhausted  condition.  The  Tsarina's  end  was  fast 
Death  of  approaching.  Each  day  the  situation  in  France 
Russi^rjan!  became  more  serious.  At  Vienna  the  want  of 
5, 1762.  money  necessitated  the  discharge  of  some  20,000 

soldiers ;  while  the  absence  of  harmony  among  the  generals, 
the  quarrels  of  the  ministers,  the  weak  health  of  the  Emperor, 
and  the  feeling  of  general  discouragement  at  the  failure  of  the 
last  campaign,  rendered  Maria  Theresa  wilhng  to  consider 
peace  proposals.  It  is  doubtful,  even  if  the  war  had  dragged 
on  its  course  for  another  year,  if  the  exhausted  coalition,  in 
face  of  his  extraordinary  exertions,  could  have  crushed  the 
Prussian  king.  The  death  of  the  Tsarina  on  the  5th  of  January 
1762,  however,  at  once  turned  the  scale  in  favour  of  Prussia, 
and  Peter  iii.,  whose  admiration  of  Frederick  was  of  long 
standing,  not  only  on  the  5th  of  May  made  peace  with  Fred- 
erick and  restored  all  the  conquered  territories,  but  a  month 
later  made,  on  the  8th  of  June,  an  offensive  and  defensive 
alHance  with  Prussia,  and  ordered  Czernitcheff  to  lead  his 
troops  against  the  Austrians  in  Silesia.  Some  justification  for 
the  violent  change  of  poHcy  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that, 
though  Russia  seemed  to  be  renouncing  the  fruits  of  her 
endurance  and  victories,  the  war  from  which  she  was  gaining 
little  was  a  constant  drain  to  her  in  men  and  money. 


The  Seven    Years'    War  275 

The  Swedes  followed  suit,  and  on  the  2 2d  of  May  made  the 
Peace  of  Hamburg  and  withdrew  from  the  war.  Frederick's 
hinds  were  freed  to  attack  the  Austrians  in  Silesia,  and  the 
imperial  army  which  was  united  to  an  Austrian  contingent 
under  Serbelloni  and  Stollberg  in  Saxony.  In  Silesia  Daun, 
who  resumed  the  command  in  May,  attempted  to  defend 
Schweidnitz,  and  a  lengthy  series  of  manceuvres  began.  Before 
any  engagement  took  place,  a  revolution  took  place  at  St. 
Petersburg.  Peter's  first  measures  on  attaining  the  throne  had 
been  calculated  to  increase  his  popularity.  The  state  prisons 
were  opened,  and  Munich,  Biren,  Lestocq,  and  many  others 
returned  from  Siberia.  The  Secret  Chancery  of  the  late 
Tsarina  was  abolished,  and  the  law  of  Peter  the 

Revolution 

Great,  compelling  all  members  of  the  aristocracy  to  in  Russia. 
take  some  civil  employment,  was  repealed.  But  the  pefe^i°i 
Tsar's  attempt  to  interfere  with  the  property  of  the  Accession  of 
Church  by  a  measure  of  confiscation  was  premature, 
and  his  endeavour  to  introduce  into  the  army,  and  especially 
among  the  guards,  a  severe  system  of  discipline,  roused  the 
discontent  of  the  soldiers.  His  German  propensities  did  not 
commend  themselves  to  the  Russian  people,  and  a  proposed 
expedition  against  Denmark  for  the  conquest  of  Schleswig  met 
with  general  disapproval.  His  wife  Catherine  headed  a  party 
which  included  the  Orlovs  and  Potemkin,  and  a  plot  was 
formed  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Tsar.  On  the  8th  of  July  the 
revolution,  which  was  bloodless  and  over  in  two  hours,  took 
place.  Peter  iii.,  who  abdicated  on  the  9th  of  July,  died  on 
July  19,  and  his  successor,  his  wife  Catherine,  though  confirm- 
ing the  peace  with  Frederick,  withdrew  Czernitcheff  and  his 
forces.  Before,  however,  the  Russians  actually  retired,  Fred- 
erick defeated  the  Austrian's  at  Burkersdorf  on  the  21st  of  July, 
but  it  was  not  till  the  9th  of  October  that  he  succeeded  in 
taking  Schweidnitz.  He  then  returned  to  Saxony,  where 
Prince  Henry,  whom  Frederick  declared  was  the  only  general 
who  made  no  mistake  in  the  war,  had  defeated  the  combined 
imperial  and  Austrian  army  at  Freiburg  —  the  last  engagement 


276  Eicropean  History,    171 5-1 789 

of  the  Seven  Years'  War  —  had  taken  Bamberg  and  Nuremberg, 
and  forced  the  Diet  of  Ratisbon  to  declare  its  neutrality.  The 
siege  of  Dresden  was  not  attempted,  and  the  last  campaign  of 
the  Seven  Years'  War  ended  in  truces  with  Daun  and  Serbelloni. 
English  Meanwhile  England  was  throughout   1762  winning 

Successes.  signal  succcsses  against  France  and  Spain.  Mar- 
tinique was  taken  in  February  1762,  followed  by  the  submission 
of  the  lesser  French  islands,  Grenada,  St.  Vincent,  St.  Lucia, 
and  the  abandonment  of  Louisiana;  on  the  13th  of  August, 
Havannah,  the  key  of  the  Spanish  West  Indian  possessions, 
capitulated  after  a  gallant  defence,  while  in  the  East  Indies, 
Manilla,  the  capital  of  the  Philippines,  was  seized.  In  the 
west  of  Germany  English  interests  were  no  less  secure ;  for 
Ferdinand  of  Brunswick,  showing  as  usual  his  high  qualities  as 
a  general,  took  the  aggressive  against  d'Estr^es  and  Soubise, 
and  regained  Cassel.  Equally  successful  was  the  English 
defence  of  its  old  ally  Portugal  against  the  attack  of  the  Spanish 
Bourbons,  who  hoped  to  force  it  into  hostiUties  with  Great 
Britain.  Though  the  Portuguese  lost  their  colony  of  Sacra- 
mento, the  invasion  of  Portugal  by  the  Franco-Spanish  army 
was  checked  by  the  despatch  in  1762  of  8000  English  troops 
to  Lisbon. 

As  in  1 7 13,  the  exigencies  of  the  party  in  power  interfered 
with  the  general  interests  of  England.  Bute  determined  to 
The  Peace  ^ud  the  war,  hastened  on  the  negotiations,  took 
of  Paris.  \\\.\\q  account  of  the  late  successes,  and  on  Novem- 
ber 3,  1 762,  the  preHminaries  of  peace  were  signed  at  Fontaine- 
bleau.  North  America  passed  into  the  hands  of  England  ;  the 
French  retaining  fishing  rights  round  Newfoundland  and  in  the 
Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  at  a  distance  of  three  leagues  from 
the  shore,  as  well  as  the  two  small  islands  of  St.  Pierre  and 
Miquelon  off  Newfoundland.  England  restored  the  islands  of 
Guadaloupe,  Marie- Galante,  de  la  Desirade,  Martinique,  and 
St.  Lucia ;  but  kept  St.  Vincent,  Tobago,  Dominica,  and 
Grenada.  Goree  was  restored  to  France  (the  English  keeping 
Senegal) ,    and  Minorca   and    Belleisle  were    exchanged ;    the 


TJie  Seven    Years     War  277 

French  evacuated  their  conquests  in  Germany,  and  the  Enghsh 
army  was  withdrawn  from  the  continent,  both  Powers  agreeing 
to  retire  from  the  continental  war.  In  India  the  French 
received  back  their  factories,  but  they  were  not  allowed  to 
have  any  military  establishments.  They  also  undertook  to 
restore  Dunkirk  to  its  condition  before  the  Treaty  of  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  in  1748.  Spain  was  forced  to  make  considerable 
concessions.  She  acknowledged  the  right  of  the  English  to 
cut  logwood  in  Honduras  Bay,  provided  the  Enghsh  destroyed 
their  fortifications  erected  there.  All  claim  to  the  Newfound- 
land fishing  was  renounced,  and  Florida  was  ceded  to  England. 
In  return  for  these  losses,  and  for  the  inabiUty  of  the  French 
to  restore  Minorca,  she  received  from  France  New  Orleans 
and  all  Louisiana  west  of  the  Mississippi,  and  from  England 
Havannah  and  the  ports  of  Cuba,  which  had  been  conquered. 
After  the  preliminaries  had  been  signed,  the  Philippines  and 
Manilla,  captured  during  the  peace  negotiations,  were  restored, 
the  latter  on  the  understanding  that  a  ransom  of  half  a  million 
sterling,  arranged  by  the  inhabitants  of  Manilla  to  save  their 
property  from  plunder,  should  be  paid  by  the  Spanish  Govern- 
ment. With  regard  to  Portugal,  all  conquests  in  the  Portuguese 
colonies  were  to  be  restored  by  Spain,  and  the  Spanish  and 
French  troops  withdrawn  from  Portuguese  territories. 

Though  England  came  triumphantly  out  of  the  war,  Bute's 
anxiety  to  hurry  on  the  peace,  and  his  carelessness  when  draw- 
ing up  its  provisions,  proved  detrimental  to  English  interests, 
and  deprived  England  of  many  advantages  due  to  her  briUiant 
and  successful  efforts.  Though,  in  view  of  the  accession  of 
Peter  in.,  and  of  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish  war,  Bute  may 
have  been  justified  in  withdrawing  the  English  subsidies  from 
Frederick  the  Great,  there  is  no  room  for  doubt  that  during 
the  negotiations  he  attempted  to  favour  Austria  at  the  expense 
of  the  Prussian  king.  Bute's  foreign  policy  was  very  unpopular 
at  home,  roused  a  deep  hatred  on  the  part  of  Frederick  towards 
the  Court  of  St.  James,  and  left  England  without  allies  and 
isolated  in  Europe. 


2/8  Europeafi  History,   171 5-1 789 

On  the  loth  of  February  1763  the  definitive  treaty  between 
England,  France,  Spain,  and  Portugal,  was  signed  at    Paris ; 
The  Treat       ^^^  ^^  Peace  of  Hubcrtsburg,  between   Austria, 
of  Huberts-     Prussia,  and    Saxony,   on   the    15th    of  the    same 
'^^^'  month.     By  this  treaty  matters  were    restored    to 

their  position  before  the  war.  Maria  Theresa  renounced  her 
pretensions  to  the  territory  ceded  to  Prussia  after  the  first 
Silesian  war ;  she  agreed  to  restore  the  county  and  town  oi 
Glatz,  and  the  fortresses  of  Wesel  and  Gelders,  which  had 
been  held  by  France.  By  two  secret  articles  Frederick 
promised  to  give  his  vote  for  the  election  of  the  x'\rchduke 
Joseph  as  King  of  the  Romans,  and  undertook  to  forward 
the  marriage  of  one  of  the  Archdukes  to  a  Princess  of  Modena. 
To  Augustus  III.  Frederick  promised  to  evacuate  the  Electorate, 
to  restore  the  archives,  and  to  renev/  the  Treaty  of  Dresden. 

The  political  results  of  the  Seven  Years'  War  were  consider- 
able. The  territorial  increase  of  the  possessions  and  the  mari- 
Resuits  of  time  preponderance  of  England  placed  her  in  the 
the  War.  front  rank  of  European  nations,  and  at  the  head  of 
colonising  Powers.  Prussia  and  Russia  had  established  their 
claims  to  be  considered  as  the  equals  of  France,  Austria,  and 
Spain :  and  Germany  was  destined  to  be,  till  the  present  day, 
the  field  of  a  struggle  between  the  Courts  of  Berlin  and  Vienna 
for  the  leadership  in  Germany.  Austria,  though  exhausted  by 
the  war,  had  proved  herself  a  worthy  antagonist  of -Frederick. 
Had  Austrian  generals  not  been  hampered  by  the  necessity 
of  consulting  the  Council  of  War  at  Vienna  before  undertaking 
any  serious  enterprise,  and  had  Loudon  and  not  the  incapable 
Charles  of  Lorraine  or  Daun  commanded,  the  struggle  between 
Frederick  and  Maria  Theresa  might  have  resulted  in  the  res- 
toration of  Silesia  to  Austria.  For  France  and  Spain  the  war 
had  brought  disasters.  The  alliance  between  France  and 
Austria  remained  hateful  to  the  French  nation,  till  the  Giron- 
dists, backed  by  pubhc  opinion,  overthrew  it  in  1792.  To  the 
fatal  policy  of  which  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  of  1757  is  '  an 
illustration,  and  to  the  influence  of  Madame  de  Pompadoui 


The  Seven    Years'    War  279 

and  the  secret  diplomacy  of  Louis  xv.,  was  due  the  humilia- 
tion of  France  which  the  efforts  of  Choiseul  had  been  unable 
to  avert.  While  Frederick  the  Great,  Loudon,  Wolfe,  Hawke, 
and  Montcalm  had  among  others  distinguished  themselves  by 
their  achievements  by  land  or  by  sea,  William  Pitt,  and  in  a  lesser 
degree  Choiseul,  had  exhibited  statesmanHke  qualities  for  the 
benefit  of  their  respective  countries.  To  Pitt's  energy,  foresight, 
and  determination,  and  skill  in  the  selection  of  subordinates,  Eng- 
land owed  much  of  her  success ;  while  owing  to  Choiseul's  ap- 
preciation of  the  disastrous  nature  of  the  Treaty  of  1757,  and  to 
his  conclusion  of  the  Family  Compact,  France  was  given,  after 
1763,  a  last  opportunity  of  setting  her  house  in  order,  and,  by 
salutary  reforms,  of  averting  a  revolutionary  crisis.  After  the 
close  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  the  union:  of  the  Bourbon 
Powers  was  confirmed  and  strengthened  by  the  necessity  not 
only  of  opposing  England,  but  also  of  offering  a  united  resist- 
ance to  the  pretensions  of  the  Jesuit  Order. 


CHAPTER   X 

THE   FALL   OF    THE  JESUITS 
1759-1773 

Europe  in  the  Middle  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  —  Catherine  II.  —  Frederick 
the  Great  —  Other  Enlightened  Princes  —  France  and  Spain  —  Charles  III. 
and  his  Ministers  —  Enlightened  Statesmen  —  Struensee  in  Denmark  — 
Pombal  in  Portugal  —  Italian  Reformers — Many  of  the  Reforms  Epheme- 
ral— The  Jesuit  Order  —  Attacks  on  the  Jesuits  in  Portugal  —  The  Expul- 
sion of  the  Jesuits  from  France  —  Charles  III.  and  the  Jesuits  —  The 
Papal  Resistance  —  The  Conclave  of  1769.  Election  of  Clement  XIV.  — 
The  Suppression  of  the  Jesuit  Order. 

The  Seven  Years'  War  was  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  Austria 
and  Russia  to  destroy  Prussia ;  it  was  the  turning-point  in  the 
Europe  in  great  colonial  struggle  between  England  and  France, 
the  Middle  The  policy  of  Russia  and  Austria  was  characteristic 
teenth  '  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  closely  resembled 
Century.  ^-j^g^j-  ^f  Prussia  and  France  at  the  opening  of  the 
Austrian  Succession  War,  and  that  of  Russia,  Prussia,  and 
Austria  in  the  partition  of  Poland.  Solemn  treaties  carried 
no  weight ;  national  boundaries  and  race  limits  were  held  to 
be  of  no  importance ;  the  condition  of  the  labouring  classes 
was  little  considered.  Jealousy  and  suspicion  marked  the 
deaUngs  of  states  with  each  other ;  corruption  and  venality 
characterised  the  official  relations  of  countries ;  secret  di- 
plomacy was  widespread.  Adventurers  were  found  in  every 
Court;  spies  inundated  each  European  capital.  Atheism 
was  rampant,  the  financial  condition  of  every  country  was 
rotten,  and  self-interest  was  the  only  guiding  motive. 

280 


The  Fall  of  the  Jesuits  281 

Europe  in  1763  seemed  to  be  in  a  state  of  decadence,  with 
no  fixed  religious  beliefs,  no  sound  principles.  But  though 
the  idea  of  nationality  was  absent  from  the  councils  of  Europe, 
and  though  the  hope  of  sharing  in  a  partition  of  a  country 
was  the  only  incentive  potent  enough  to  bring  countries  into 
alliance,  there  were'  in  the  middle  of  the  century  some  signs 
of  better  things.  Europe  was  governed  by  a  number  of  benevo- 
lent despots,  who,  either  in  person  or  by  means  of  their  minis- 
ters, worked  for  the  benefit  of  the  people  over  whom  they  ruled. 
While  with  them  the  omnipotence  of  the  state  was  ever}'thing, 
it  was  recognised  that  government  existed  for  the  good  of 
the  people.  Reforms  were  good  in  themselves,  but  all 
reforms  were  to  come  from  the  king,  and  no  interference 
with  his  power  was  allowed.  Many  of  the  rulers  of  European 
countries  between  1740  and  1789  were  actuated  by  benevolent 
ideas,  and  many  of  their  ministers  proved  unselfish  adminis- 
trators.     Catherine   11.    and  Frederick    the    Great 

1     r  1  /-         ■  1  r  X  1  1         Catherine  II. 

were,  before  the  reformmg  days  of  Joseph  11.,  the 
most  prominent  of  the  enlightened  despots.  Both  were  tyran- 
nical, both  prided  themselves  on  their  Hberal  tendencies.  In 
the  early  years  of  her  reign  Catherine  posed  as  a  reformer. 
She  called  an  assembly  in  1767,  in  order  to  secure  its  assist- 
ance in  dealing  with  national  grievances,  and  with  the  codifica- 
tion of  the  Russian  law.  Affected  by  the  French  liberal 
doctrines  professed  by  Montesquieu  and  Voltaire,  she  at- 
tempted to  combine  despotism  with  a  care  for  her  subjects. 
She  checked  torture,  she  studied  sympathetically  the  condi- 
tion of  the  peasants.  The  Church  became  entirely  subordi- 
nate to  the  state,  and  the  poHcy  of  Peter  the  Great  and  Peter 
III.  was  thus  carried  out.  But  though  undoubtedly  full  of  grand 
aspirations,  and  in  the  earlier  years  of  her  reign  anxious  to 
carry  out  beneficial  reforms,  she  was  unable  to  effect  much. 
In  the  first  place,  like  Joseph  11.,  she  interfered  in  every 
department  of  national  life,  and  persistently  attempted  to  force 
modern  civilisation  upon  a  country  backward,  half  Asiatic,  and 
corrupt.     It  was  sought,  says  S(^gur,  '  to   create  at  the  same 


282  European  History,   1 71 5-1 789 

time  a  third  estate,  to  attract  foreign  commerce,  to  establish 
all  kinds  of  manufactures,  to  extend  agriculture,  to  increase 
paper  money,  to  raise  the  exchanges,  to  reduce  the  rate  of 
interest,  to  found  cities,  to  people  deserts,  to  cover  the  Black 
Sea  with  a  new  navy,  to  conquer  one  neighbour  and  circum- 
vent another,  and  finally  to  extend  Russian  influence  all  over 
Europe.'  And  a  further  cause  of  her  failure  as  a  reformer  is 
to  be  found  in  her  autocratic  instincts,  which  made  her  impa- 
tient of  opposition  and  rapidly  converted  her  government 
into  a  cruel  tyranny.  She  found  that  on  the  corrupt  Rus- 
sian soil  her  schools,  her  system  of  justice,  and  her  press 
could  not  flourish.  The  partition  of  Poland,  and  the  rising  of 
the  serfs  under  Pougatchef,  had  the  efl'ect  of  encouraging  her 
absolutist  ideas  and  checking  her  hberal  tendencies.  Though 
it  has  been  said  that  '■  before  the  death  of  Catherine,  the  great 
mass  of  the  monuments  of  her  reign  were  mere  ruins,'  it  re- 
mains true  that  Russia  under  her  rule  was  established  as  a 
great  European  Power,  and  that  the  material  and  intellectual 
progress  of  the  country  made  rapid  strides. 

With  Frederick  the  Great,  similarly,  his  benevolent  inten- 
tions were  outweighed  by  his  despotic  tendencies.  Like  Cathe- 
Frederick  ^iue  he  afl'ccted  to  be  influenced  by  French  ideas, 
the  Great.  ^cci^  \^q  Catherine  he  admitted  the  Jesuits  when 
they  were  suppressed  by  Clement  xrv.  But  his  ruling  motive 
was  expediency,  and  he  had  little  regard  for  international  law 
or  for  the  maxims  of  justice.  While  anxious  for  the  welfare 
of  his  people,  who  were  for  the  greater  part  as  backward 
in  civilisation  as  the  Russian  lower  orders,  he  maintained  the 
authority  of  the  nobles  at  the  expense  of  the  peasants  and 
the  citizens.  The  administration  of  justice  was  carefully  re- 
formed, and  corruption  was  not  allowed  to  invade  the  civil 
service.  Equality  of  all,  whether  noble  or  workman,  before 
the  law,  was  insisted  upon,  and  in  all  departments  he  at  any 
rate  secured  unity  of  purpose  and  outward  harmony  of  action. 
But  as  he  was  compelled  to  make  the  army  his  first  care, 
the   people  were   practically  helpless,    and  the   governmental 


The  Fall  of  the  Jesuits  283 

machine  derived  all  its  power  from  him  alone.  '  The  basis  of 
his  Prussian  majesty's  conduct,'  wrote  Sir  James  Harris,  '  from 
the  time  he  mounted  the  throne  to  this  day,  seems  to  have 
been  the  considering  mankind  in  general,  and  particularly  those 
(/ver  whom  he  was  destined  to  reign,  as  beings  created  merely 
to  be  subservient  to  his  will.  .  .  .  Proceeding  on  these  grounds, 
he  has  all  along  been- guided  by  his  own  judgment  alone,  with- 
out ever  consulting  any  of  his  ministers  or  superior  officers ; 
not  so  much  from  the  low  opinion  he  entertains  of  their  abihties, 
as  from  a  conviction  from  his  own  feelings  that,  if  he  employed 
them  otherwise  than  as  simple  instruments,  they  would  in  time 
assume  a  wall  of  their  own.'  ^  Though  his  government  may 
have  been  the  most  efficient  in  Europe,  it  lacked  organic  vital- 
ity, and  his  system  was  certain  to  decline,  if  not  to     ^  , 

^  ">  J  '  Other  En- 

collapse,  as  soon  as  his  hand  was  withdrawn.  Other  lightened 
princes  eciaifes  could  be  found  during  this  period  winces, 
in  Germany  and  Italy,  such  as  Maria  Theresa,  whose  reforms 
are  described  elsewhere  ;  Leopold,  Duke  of  Tuscany,  the  ablest 
of  the  benevolent  despots,  whose  duchy  was  the  best-governed 
state  in  Italy,  and  whose  reforms  were  distinguished  by  the 
wisdom  in  which  they  were  conceived,  and  the  thoroughness 
with  which  they  were  carried  out ;  Ferdinand,  Duke  of  Bruns- 
wick, Charles  Augustus,  Duke  of  Saxe-Weimar,  and  Charles 
Frederick  of  Baden ;  while  the  careers  of  Joseph  Emmanuel, 
Archbishop-Elector  of  Mainz,  and  of  Clement  Wenceslaus, 
Archbishop-Elector  of  Trier,  showed  the  existence,  even  in 
the  ecclesiastical  states,  of  a  tendency  to  promote  the  pros- 
perity of  the  people. 

The  Bourbon  states  of  France  and  Spain  followed  in  like 
manner  the  movement  of  the  century.  Though  France  and 
Louis  XV.  cannot  be  numbered  among  the  en-  Spain. 
Hghtened  despots,  France  was  the  centre  of  a  philosophical 
and  literary  movement  which  influenced  all  civilised  Europe  ; 
and  Choiseul,  and  after  him  Turgot,  distinctly  belonged  to  the 
band  of  ministers  who  represented  the  tendencies  of  the  age  in 

1  Diaries  and  Correspondence  of  the  Earl  of  Malmcsbiiry,  vol.  i.  p.  142. 


284  European  History,   171 5-1789 

which  they  Uved.  In  Spain,  Charles  iii.,  who  bad  already  as 
Don  Carlos  supported  Tanucci  in  bringing  about  many  admira- 
Charies  III  ^^^  changes  in  Naples,  continued  with  vigour  the 
and  his  work  of  reform  begun  under  Philip  v.  and  Ferdi- 

nand VI.  Fully  alive  to  the  duties  of  monarchy,  he 
carried  out  a  number  of  beneficent  measures  which  conferred 
great  benefits  on  Spain,  and  entitled  Charles  to  be  numbered 
among  the  greatest  of  the  Spanish  rulers.  In  spite  of  his 
strong  religious  instincts,  many  admirable  ecclesiastical  re- 
forms were  initiated.  The  amount  of  land  to  be  held  in 
mortmain  was  restricted,  the  number  of  monasteries  was 
diminished,  the  power  of  the  Inquisition  was  regulated,  and, 
in  place  of  the  papal  jurisdiction,  a  national  court  was  set  up 
in  Madrid.^  Wise  measures  were  also  taken  for  the  develop- 
ment of  commerce.  Colonial  trade  was  freed  from  vexatious 
restrictions,  national  manufactures  were  encouraged,  and,  by 
the  ordinance  of  1773,  it  was  declared  that  engaging  in  trade 
was  no  longer  to  be  considered  as  derogatory  to  a  noble,  and 
should  not  involve  loss  of  rank  or  its  privileges.  The  construc- 
tion of  canals  was  entered  upon,  and  agriculture  was  still  further 
encouraged  by  the  removal  of  the  fatuous  prohibition  of  en- 
closures, and  by  the  planting  of  trees  in  the  hitherto  arid 
deserts  of  central  Spain.  In  this  meritorious  work  for  the 
regeneration  of  Spain  Charles  m.  was  aided  successively 
by  Squillacci,  d'Aranda,  Campomanes,  and  Florida  Blanca. 
D'Aranda,  who  succeeded  Squillacci  in  1766  as  Finance 
Minister,  was  an  Arragonese  noble  who,  like  Choiseul,  had 
imbibed  the  philosophic  and  secular  spirit  of  the  times.  His 
liberal  and  anti-clerical  tendencies  were  not  congenial  to 
Charles  in.,  and  after  the  expulsion  of  the  Jesuits  he  was  sent 
as  ambassador  to  Paris  —  his  post  in  the  Government  being 
taken  by  Campomanes,  one  of  the  most  enlightened  Spanish 
statesmen  of  the  century.  Like  the  younger  Pitt  he  was  a 
student   of   political   economy,  and    moreover  was    a   leading 

^  VideCoxe,  TAe  Bourdons  in  Spain;  smd  the  JSncyc/o/xzdia  Br iiannica, 
Art.  '  Spain.' 


The  Fall  of  the  Jesuits  285 

representative  of  Spanish  literature.  Without  the  sceptical 
tendencies  of  d'Aranda,  he  bent  his  attention  to  measures  for 
the  relief  of  trade,  and,  \vith  a  liberalism  in  advance  of  the 
times,  and  altogether  foreign  to  the  opinions  of  the  king, 
aimed  at  educating  the  people  for  a  share  in  political  life.  He 
gave  valuable  assistance  to  Florida  Blanca,  who,  in  1774,  had 
succeeded  Grimaldi  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  who, 
while  promoting  the  well-being  of  the  Spanish  people,  was 
always  careful  not  to  wound  the  king's  monarchical  or  religious 
susceptibilities.  The  subordination  of  the  Church  to  the  state 
being  secured,  the  relations  between  the  Government  and  the 
clergy  became  again  harmonious.  The  economic  reforms  of 
Campomanes  were  continued  after  the  latter's  fall ;  but  the 
progress  of  Spain  was  checked  by  the  decision  of  Charles  iii. 
to  support  the  American  colonists  against  England.  Spain 
required  peace  and  good  administration;  the  outbreak  of  war 
interrupted  the  work  of  reform  ;  and  the  death  of  Charles  in., 
a  few  years  after  the  conclusion  of  peace,  still  further  checked 
the  growth  of  prosperity. 

A  great  advance  was  undoubtedly  made  during  the  reign  of 
Charles  in.;  but  the  Spanish  population  was  sunk  in  sloth  and 
superstition,  the  lower  officials  were  corrupt  and  ignorant,  no 
efficient  machinen,^  existed  to  carry  out  the  reforms,  and  the 
state  took  too  much  upon  itself. 

In  spite,  however,  of  Charles  iii.'s  death  in  1788  and  the 
accession  of  the  incapable  Charles  iv.,  many  of  the  reforms 
proved  permanent,  and  Florida  Blanca  remained  in  power  till 
1792. 

In  other  parts  of  Europe  the  same  tendency  was  visible.  In 
some  cases',  as  in  that  of  Sweden  after  the  revolution  of  1772, 
the  king  himself  took  the  lead  in  devising  measures   „^ 

...  The 

for  the  welfare  of  his  subjects;  in  other  cases,  en-    Enlightened 
lightened  ministers  either  ably  seconded  the  efforts   ^****""^°- 
of  their  masters,  or  actually  initiated  reforms  themselves.    Mont- 
gelas  in  Bavaria,  Stadion  at  Mainz,  Abel  at  Stuttgart,  Struensee 
in    Denmark,   Pombal   in    Portugal,   Tanucci,   du   Tillot,    and 


286  European  History^   171 5-1789 

others  in  Italy  and  Germany,  all  devoted  themselves  in  vari- 
ous degrees  to  increasing  the  prosperity  of  the  states  which 
they  administered. 

In  Denmark  Struensee  developed  the  work  of  Frederick  v., 
who  patronised  literature  and  science  till  his  death  on  the 
Struensee  in  1 4th  of  January  1766,  when  he  was  succeeded  by 
Denmark.  j^jg  gon,  Christian  VII.,  whose  wife,  Caroline  Matilda, 
was  a  sister  of  George  iii.  Weak  in  body  and  mind,  Christian 
speedily  fell  under  the  influence  of  Struensee,  who,  originally  a 
physician  at  Altona  in  Holstein,  became  the  favourite  of  the 
young  queen.  Count  Bernsdorf  and  the  former  ministers 
having  been  removed,  Struensee,  in  aUiance  with  the  com- 
mander-in-chief, ruled  Denmark  from  1770  to  1772.  Though 
ambitious,  unprincipled,  avaricious,  insolent,  and  vain,  Struen- 
see's  ability  was  undoubted,  and  his  attempts  to  modernise 
Denmark  stamp  him  as  one  of  the  boldest  of  the  autocratic 
reformers  of  the  age.  Honorary  titles,  monopolies,  and  the 
censorship  of  the  press  were  abolished,  and  the  universities, 
the  law  courts,  and  the  municipal  corporations  were  reformed. 
The  lot  of  the  peasants  was  hghtened,  and  the  nobles  were 
brought  under  the  law.  Reforms  in  the  Church  were  attempted, 
and  economies  in  the  military  service  were  effected.  These 
reforms  were,  however,  carried  out  hastily  and  without  due 
precaution,  and  before  long  Struensee  found  himself  ci^nfronted 
by  the  opposition  of  the  entire  Danish  nation.  The  introduc- 
tion of  foreign  teachers,  and  his  interference  with  the  Church, 
roused  general  discontent,  while  his  influence  over  the  young 
queen  and  his  attempt  to  arrogate  to  himself  royal  powers, 
alienated  men  of  all  classes.  A  '  Danish  '  party  was  formed, 
and  a  conspiracy  was  organised  by  Guldberg,  the  former  tutor 
of  the  young  Prince  Frederick,  and  by  Juliana,  the  Queen- 
Dowager,  which,  owing  to  the  minister's  cowardice,  was  com- 
pletely successful.  On  April  18,  1772,  Struensee  was  executed, 
and  shortly  afterwards  Caroline  Matilda  was  divorced.  For 
twelve  years  Guldberg  and  Queen  Juliana  ruled  Denmark, 
reversing  the  policy  of  Struensee  and  restoring  all  the  former 


The  Fall  of  the  Jesuits  287 

abuses.  In  1784,  taking  advantage  of  the  unpopularity  of 
Guldberg,  the  Crown  Prince  overthrew  him  and  Queen  Juhana, 
obtained  possession  of  Christian  vii.,  and  appointed  Peter 
Andrew  von  Bernsdorf,  nephew  of  the  former  minister,  and  a 
man  of  abihty  and  integrity,  to  the  post  of  first  minister.  The 
Danish  people  had  learnt  before  Guldberg's  fall  to  regret 
Struensee,  who,  though  autocratic  like  Pombal,  had  at  any 
rate  attempted  to  reform  the  relations  between  the  peasants 
and  the  nobles,  and  to  enforce  equality  before  the  law. 
"  In  Portugal,  which,  under  John  v.  (1706-50),  the  slave  of 
the  Jesuits,  had  sunk  into  insignificance,  Pombal,  the  chief 
minister  of  Joseph  i.  from  1750  to  1777,  carried  Pombai  in 
out  in  a  very  remarkable  manner  a  series  of  admira-  Portugal, 
ble  reforms,  all  of  which  illustrated  the  liberal  tendencies  of 
the  times.  But  here,  as  in  Spain,  the  movement  of  reform 
made  little  progress  among  the  mass  of  the  people.  Sebastian 
Joseph  de  Carvalho  e  Mello,  Marquis  of  Pombal,  was  the  son 
of  a  country  gentleman,  who  from  1739  to  1750  served  in  the 
Portuguese  diplomatic  service.  From  1739  to  1745  he  was 
in  England,  where  he  studied  EngUsh,  history,  law,  and  finance. 
From  1745  to  1750  he  was  at  Vienna,  where  he  married,  as 
his  second  wife,  the  daughter  of  Marshal  Daun,  and  by  his 
abilities  attracted  the  attention  of  Maria  Theresa  and  Joseph. 
With  no  army  worthy  of  the  name ;  with  pirates  infesting  her 
shores,  and  brigands  her  roads ;  with  her  commerce  for  the 
most  part  in  the  hands  of  England,  and  her  trade  in  the  East 
well-nigh  destroyed ;  with  an  idle  and  licentious  nobility,  and 
a  corrupt  and  vicious  civil  service,  Portugal  had  never  re- 
covered from  the  days  of  her  dependence  on  Spain.  Pombal's 
reforms  in  Portugal  were  interrupted  by  the  earthquake  of 
1755,  which;  however,  only  served  to  illustrate  his  energy  and 
determination.  '  The  genius  of  Pombal  rose  out  of  the  ashes 
of  Lisbon,'  and  the  very  prostration  of  Portugal  enabled  him 
to  regenerate  his  country.  His  commercial  policy,  though 
protectionist,  was  patriotic.  He  wished  to  relieve  Portugal 
from   its    dependence    upon    England,    and,  by  fostering   her 


288  European  History,   17 15-1789 

industries  and  trade,  to  make  her  self-supporting.  Like  Sully 
he  believed  that  agriculture  was  the  only  foundation  of  com- 
merce, and  in  various  ways  he  attempted  to  improve  the 
condition  of  agriculture  in  Portugal.  To  further  private  enter- 
prise he  founded  several  trading  companies,  made  a  commercial 
treaty  with  Morocco,  and  allowed  the  nobles  to  take  part  in  trade. 
In  1775  he  reformed  the  Government  of  Goa  and  the  other 
East  Indian  islands,  and  he  introduced  various  important 
changes  in  the  army  and  navy.  Economies  were  effected  in 
the  Court  and  in  all  departments,  and  peculation  was  checked 
in  the  collection  of  taxes.  His  educational  and  social  reforms 
were  equally  drastic.  A  Royal  College  for  the  better  education 
of  the  nobility  was  established ;  the  University  of  Coimbra, 
which  hitherto  had  been  in  the  hands  of  the  Jesuits,  was  re- 
modelled, and,  in  fact,  refounded ;  professors,  who  received 
the  privileges  of  nobility,  were  established  in  Lisbon  and  in  the 
provinces  to  teach  Latin,  Greek,  rhetoric,  and  logic  gratuitously, 
and  a  commercial  school  —  the  first  technical  school  in  Europe 
—  was  opened  at  Lisbon.  His  social  reforms  were  no  less 
interesting.  All  slaves  landing  in  Portugal  were  declared  free, 
and  many  privileges  attached  to  nobility  were  wisely  abolished. 
He  endeavoured  with  success  to  preserve  harmony  between 
the  nobility  and  the  middle  classes,  and  between  both  and  the 
lower  orders.  Throughout  his  pubhc  career,  which  lasted  till 
the  death  of  Joseph  i.  in  1777,  Pombal  showed  refnarkable 
courage,  activity,  and  energy.  Always  busy  with  numberless 
plans  and  reforms,  his  period  of  office  may  be  regarded  as  the 
golden  age  of  Portuguese  industry  in  every  branch  of  commerce. 
He  possessed  the  entire  confidence  of  his  sovereign,  the  effect 
of  a  strong  will  upon  a  feeble  character,  and  under  Pombal 
Portugal  enjoyed  a  strong,  though  despotic.  Government. 

In  Italy  similar  reforms  were  effected  by  Tanucci  in 
Naples,  and  du  Tillot  in  Parma.  Tanucci  till  1759  had  served 
Italian  with  Squillacci  under  Don  Carlos,  who,  though  a 

Reformers,  devotcd  adherent  of  the  Church,  was  firmly 
imbued   with    monarchical   sentiments  and  fully   alive  to  the 


The  Fall  of  the  Jesuits  289 

responsibilities  of  kingship.  Under  him  and  his  successor, 
Ferdinand  iv.,  valuable  educational,  financial,  and  judicial 
reforms  were  carried  out  in  Naples.  The  judicial  powers  of 
the  nobles  were  abolished,  the  pretentions  of  the  clergy  were 
checked,  and  the  rights  of  the  Pope  were  reduced.  Many  con- 
vents were  suppressed,  titles  were  abolished,  and  the  introduc- 
tion of  Papal  Bulls  was  regulated.  He  thus  increased  the  in- 
fluence of  the  crown  and  advanced  the  well-being  of  the  people. 
In  1776,  eight  years  after  the  marriage  of  Ferdinand  to  Maria 
Caroline,  daughter  of  Maria  Theresa,  the  great  Neapolitan  min- 
ister fell,  and  the  queen  attempted,  with  the  aid  of  incompetent 
advisers,  to  govern  the  kingdom.  In  Parma  Ferdinand,  the  son 
of  Don  Philip,  succeeded  his  father  in  1765,  and  du  Tillot, 
Marquis  of  Felino,  and  a  Frenchman,  was  continued  in  office. 
Like  Pombal  and  Tanucci,  he  encouraged  education,  and  did 
much  to  aid  the  advancement  of  the  University  of  Parma.  In 
1 7  71,  two  years  after  the  marriage  of  Ferdinand  to  the  Austrian 
Archduchess,  Maria  Amelia,  du  Tillot  was  dismissed.  Llanos, 
a  Spaniard,  and  his  successor  Mauprat,  a  Frenchman,  though  not 
continuing  the  work  of  reform,  administered  Parma  well,  and  it 
continued  to  rank  among  the  well-governed  Italian  states. 

In  the  Sardinian  kingdom  Charles  Emmanuel  vied  with  his 
contemporaries  in  his  eagerness  to  benefit  his  subjects.  Like 
Joseph  II.,  he  had  a  passion  for  equality,  concentration,  and 
uniformity  in  the  administration.  After  the  Treaty  of  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  the  army  was  placed  on  a  peace  footing,  and  the  lot 
of  the  soldiers  improved.  Fortresses  were  rebuilt  and  strength- 
ened, public  works  were  undertaken,  and  the  provinces  were 
brought  under  one  regime.  Pere  Beccaria  was  recalled  from 
Rome  to  assist  in  the  foundation  of  a  society  for  the  study 
of  natural  science ;  and  the  Abb^  Nollet,  a  distinguished  phy- 
sician, lectured  on  medicine  in  Piedmont.  In  1771  feudal 
rights  and  many  ancient  privileges  were  reclaimed.^  Similar 
reforms  were    carried    out    in    Lombardy    during   Joseph   11. 's 

^Hisioire  de  la  Maison  de  Savoie,  par  Madame  la  Princesse  Christine 
Trivulce. 

PERIOD  VI.  T 


290  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

reign  under  the  direction  of  Count  Firmian,  who  supported 
the  Universities  of  Milan  and  Pavia,  and  generally  patronised 
literature  and  art. 

In  spite  of  the  admirable  motives  which,  as  a  rule,  prompted 
these  efforts  for  the  welfare  of  mankind,  it  has  to  be  confessed 
Many  of  that  the  benefits  conferred  on  the  people  had 
ReTo^rms  ^^^^^^  permanent  effect.     In  the  majority  of  those 

Ephemeral,  countries  in  which  the  liberal  tendencies  of  the 
rulers  showed  themselves  in  measures  of*  reform,  the  same 
causes  of  failure  existed.  The  state  took  too  much  upon  itself, 
and  left  little  or  nothing  to  local  enterprise  ;  and,  moreover,  the 
reforming  impulse  was,  as  a  rule,  confined  to  the  educated 
classes  and  hardly  touched  the  mass  of  the  people,  where 
corruption  and  ignorance  reigned  supreme.  The  methods 
employed,  too,  were  often  faulty,  and  the  most  enlightened 
measures  remained  inoperative  for  want  of  proper  machinery 
to  carry  them  out.  In  Russia,  in  Spain,  and  elsewhere,  the 
most  promising  reforms  in  many  cases  remained  mere  paper 
schemes,  and  the  inevitable  reaction  was  found  to  be  easier 
than  progress. 

There  was  one  reform  upon  which  all  the  Bourbon  Powers 
were  united  —  a  reform,  too,  which  secured  the  sympathy  and 
The  Jesuit  support  of  Maria  Theresa  and  Joseph  11.  Many 
Order.  Qf  these  bcuevoleut  despots  had  found^that  their 

work  was  retarded,  and  their  reforms  checked,  by  the  in- 
fluence of  the  Jesuits.  Within  a  period  of  fifteen  years,  con- 
sequently, many  of  the  leading  European  Powers  agreed  to 
unite  in  destroying  the  power  of  the  Society  to  interfere  with 
their  policy.  In  most  European  states  the  nobles  had  been 
to  a  great  extent  deprived  of  their  political  privileges,  while 
popular  assemblies  either  did  not  exist,  or  had  been  reduced 
to  harmlessness.  It  was  not  likely  that  the  sovereigns  of 
Europe  would  allow  unquestioned  the  existence  in  their 
countries  of  a  rich,  powerful,  disciplined  body  looking  to  the 
Pope  as  their  chief,  who  himself  considered  that  he,  the  spiritual 
head  of  Christendom,  was  all-powerful  over  temporal  monarchs. 


The  Fall  of  the  Jesuits  291 

Louis  XIV.  had  not  revoked  the  Edict  of  Nantes  in  order  to 
hand  France  over  to  the  Ultramontanes.  His  poUcy  was  '  no 
parties,  no  dissidents,  no  masters.'  In  Spain,  similarly,  from 
the  accession  of  Philip  v.,  attempts  had  been  made  to  regulate 
and  lessen  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Church.  A  strong  feeling 
existed  in  many  parts  of  Europe  about  the  beginning  of  the 
eighteenth  century  that  ecclesiastical  institutions  should  be 
subject  to  the  civil  power.  The  attacks  on  the  Jesuits,  which 
culminated  in  1773  with  their  suppression,  were  due  partly  to 
this  feeling,  partly  to  the  growth  of  enlightenment,  partly  to 
special  causes.  There  is  no  doubt  that  before  the  Order  was  a 
hundred  years  old  it  had  begun  to  decline.  A  succession  of 
incapable  generals  after  the  death  of  Acquaviva  had  caused  the 
development  of  a  secular  tendency  among  the  priests  ;  recruits 
of  rank  and  wealth  were  admitted,  strict  discipHne  was  relaxed, 
the  system  of  free  education  was  abandoned,  and  by  becoming 
attached  to  courts  and  the  nobility,  the  Jesuits  lost  their  popu- 
larity among  the  middle  and  lower  orders.  Moreover,  the 
conviction  was  growing  that  their  presence  was  not  conducive 
to  public  order  or  to  domestic  peace.  It  was  quite  evident 
that  to  the  corporate  interests  of  the  Society  were  subordinated 
all  other  feelings,  and  hence,  when  these  interests  ceased  to  be 
purely  rehgious  and  spiritual,  the  Jesuits  found  themselves  the 
objects  of  hatred  in  most  of  the  capitals  of  Europe.  This 
lack  of  spirituality  in  no  small  way  contributed  to  the  views 
adopted  by  the  Encyclopedists,  and  received  a  striking  illus- 
tration in  their  devotion  during  the  eighteenth  century  to 
commercial  pursuits.  The  Jesuits  had,  by  the  middle  of  the 
century,  developed  into  a  rich,  active,  and  important  trading 
firm,  with  branch  houses  in  many  parts  of  the  world.  Possessed 
of  enormous  wealth,  the  Order  had  become  the  object  of  gen- 
eral envy,  when,  by  a  succession  of  mistakes,  and  by  the  adop- 
tion of  a  shortsighted  policy,  it  provoked  a  series  of  attacks 
against  which  it  could  not  prevail. 

The  Society  had  been  too  successful.     As  confessors  of  kings, 
as  instructors  of  the  young,  as  the  conquerors  of  empires,  and 


292  European  History y   171 5-1789 

the  founders  of  colonies,  the  Jesuits  thought  the  world  belonged 
to  them,  and  that  their  supremacy  would  last  for  ever.  Victo- 
rious over  the  Jansenists,  they  had  failed  to  adapt  themselves 
to  the  new  ideas  of  the  eighteenth  century.  They  believed  that 
they  were  necessary  to  the  Papacy,  for  were  they  not  more 
papal  than  the  Pope  himself?  One  Pope,  however,  the  wise 
and  capable  Benedict  xiv.  (1740-58),  recognised  the  signs  of 
his  time,  and  attempted  to  reform  the  Papal  Court  as  well  as 
the  Jesuits.  In  1741  he  issued  a  Bull  in  which  he  disowned 
the  Order,  as  consisting  of  '  disobedient,  contumacious,  captious, 
and  reprobate  persons,'  and  enacted  stringent  regulations  for 
their  better  government.  In  1742  and  1744  Bulls  were  pub- 
lished with  the  object  of  checking  their  insubordination  and 
bringing  about  reforms.  Unfortunately  on  the  death  of  Bene- 
dict in  1758  Clement  xiii.  was  elected,  a  Pope  who  reversed 
the  far-seeing  policy  of  his  predecessor ;  and  consequently  the 
determination  of  the  European  Courts  '  to  bring  all  ecclesias- 
tical institutions  under  the  control  of  the  civil  power,'  found 
expression  in  a  number  of  violent  attacks  on  the  Jesuit  Order. 
The  first  blow  was  dealt  by  Pombal,  and  was  caused  by  the 
Jesuit  opposition  to  his  policy  in  South  America,  and  to  his 
domestic  reforms,  together  with  their  connection 

^^xcmCks  on 

the  Jesuits,  with  a  plot  for  the  assassination  of  the  king.  In 
ortuga  .  1 75 1  a  long  dispute  between  Spain  and  Portugal 
was  ended  by  a  treaty  arranging  the  exchange  of  the  town  and 
district  of  Tuy,  in  Galicia,  and  Paraguay,  for  San  Sacramento, 
a  colony  on  the  river  Plate  assigned  to  Portugal  by  the  Treaty 
of  Utrecht.  The  Jesuits,  who  had  estabhshed  in  Paraguay  a 
sort  of  independent  republic,  incited  the  natives  to  resist,  and 
it  was  not  till  1756  that  Pombal  overcame  their  opposition. 
Finding  that  his  domestic  reforms  were  similarly  resisted  by 
the  Order,  and  being  attacked  from  the  pulpits  at  the  time  of 
the  earthquake,  Pombal  dismissed  Moreira,  Joseph's  confessor, 
on  September  19,  1757,  forbade  any  Jesuit  to  approach  the 
Court  without  the  king's  permission,  and  published  a  mani- 
festo against  the  Society.     Complaints  were  also  sent  to  the 


The  Fall  of  the  Jesuits  293 

Pope,  and  Benedict  appointed  Cardinal  Saldanha,  a  friend  of 
Pombal,  to  examine  into  the  malpractices  of  the  Order,  and 
on  the  15th  of  May  1758  pubhshed  a  decree  forbidding  the 
Portuguese  Jesuits  to  carry  on  illegal  trade  —  i.e.  the  purchase 
or  sale  of  converted  Indians  —  and  suspending  them  '  from  the 
power  of  confessing  or  preaching.' 

In  September  of  the  same  year  Joseph  was  attacked  and 
wounded.  After  an  inquiry  of  three  months,  all  members  of 
the  families  of  Tavaro  and  Aviero  were  seized.  It  was  asserted, 
though  no  proof  was  ever  produced,  that  their  papers  proved 
the  complicity  of  the  Jesuits  in  a  plot  for  the  assassination  of 
the  king.  The  nobles  were  executed,  and  as  Clement  xiii.  re- 
fused to  allow  Pombal  to  try  the  accused  ecclesiastics,  that 
minister,  having  with  difficulty  obtained  the  consent  of  the  weak 
and  superstitious  Joseph,  who  only  consented  through  terror 
of  his  life,  on  September  i,  1759,  ordered  the  immediate  depor- 
tation of  the  Jesuits  from  Portugal  and  its  dependencies,  and 
their  supersession  by  the  bishops  in  the  schools  and  universi- 
ties. Those  in  Portugal,  to  the  number  of  6000,  were  shipped 
to  Civita  Vecchia  in  September  1759,  and  those  in  the  colonies 
were  expelled.  The  Pope  having  ordered  all  Portuguese  to 
leave  the  Papal  estates,  Pombal  replied,  in  February  1761,  by 
confiscating  the  property  of  the  Jesuits  in  Portugal,  and  appeal- 
ing to  other  European  Courts  to  suppress  the  Society  within 
their  dominions. 

At  first  Pombal's  high-handed  and  cruel  measures  were  not 
received  by  Europe  with  enthusiasm,  but  before  long  other 
countries,  sharins;  in  the  general  dissatisfaction  at   _. 

'  °  °  Expulsion  of 

the  conduct  of  the  Jesuits,  adopted  similar  meas-  the  Jesuits 
ures.  In  France  the  growth  of  rehgious  scepti-  ^^^ 
cism,  and  the  general  hatred  of  the  Jesuits,  had  by  1756  made 
considerable  progress,  and  in  attacking  the  Order  the  French 
Government  was  making  a  distinct  concession  to  public  opinion. 
Madame  de  Pompadour  disliked  them  on  account  of  their 
close  relations  with  Louis,  and  because  they  refused  her  abso- 
lution.    In  this  matter  she  and  the  Farlements  were  agreed  iu 


294  European  History,  171 5-1 789 

desiring  their  destruction.  An  opportunity  was  given  the  Par- 
lement  of  Paris  of  interfering  with  them  by  the  bankruptcy  of 
Lavalette,  the  Jesuit  administrator  of  Martinique,  a  speculator 
who  had  become  involved  in  mercantile  undertakings,  and  had 
failed  for  2,400,000  francs,  involving  in  his  own  ruin  several 
French  commercial  houses.  Ricci,  the  General  of  the  Jesuits, 
repudiated  the  debt,  and  was  sued  by  the  creditors.  Having 
lost  his  case,  he  unwisely  appealed  to  the  Parlement  of  Paris. 
That  body,  having  required  the  constitutions  of  the  Jesuits  to 
be  laid  before  it,  affirmed  the  judgment  of  the  lower  court. 

Great  indignation  being  aroused  at  the  character  of  the 
Jesuit  constitutions,  Choiseul  appointed  a  commission  to  re- 
vise them.  It  was  resolved  that  the  unlimited  authority  of 
the  General  of  the  Jesuits  was  incompatible  with  the  laws  of 
France,  and  that  a  resident  Vicar  should  be  appointed.  Ricci, 
however,  refused  to  entertain  the  idea  of  the  Society  being 
regulated  by  the  civil  power.  *  Si7it  ut  sunt,  aut  non  sint,^  was 
his  famous  reply.  In  spite  of  the  support  given  to  the  Order 
by  the  Queen  and  Dauphin,  Choiseul  and  Madame  de  Pompa- 
dour triumphed,  with  the  aid  of  the  judicial  bodies.  After 
various  decrees  had  been  published  against  them  by  the  Parle- 
ment of  Paris  and  the  provincial  Parle77ie7its ,  the  Society  was 
suppressed  in  France  in  November  1764  by  royal  authority. 
For  three  years  they  were  allowed  to  remain  as  secular  priests, 
but  in  May  1767  they  were  expelled,  Clement,  wlio  had,  in 
1765,  pubHshed  a  Bull  containing  a  formal  apology  for  the 
Order,  declaring  that  their  expulsion  was  a  grievous  injury 
inflicted  at  once  upon  the  Church  and  the  Holy 
and  the  See.     In  Spain,  now  almost  the  sole  refuge  of  the 

Jesuits.  Jesuits,  Charles  iii.  was  at  first   unwilling  to  pro- 

ceed to  great  lengths.  Like  Joseph  of  Portugal,  he  was  super- 
stitious, and  a  devoted  adherent  of  the  Church.  But  while 
not  imbued  with  the  new  philosophical  ideas,  he  was  deter- 
mined to  advance  the  royal  power  and  to  overcome  all  oppo- 
sition to  his  authority,  whether  from  nobles  or  from  the  Church. 
But  in  1766  the  Jesuits  united  in  a  revolt  against  a  tax  imposed 


The  Fall  of  the  Jesuits  295 

by  the  Italian  Squillacci,  whom  Charles  felt  compelled  to  dis- 
miss. Enraged  at  this  affront  to  his  prerogative,  and  convinced 
that  they  were  plotting  against  his  authority,  if  not  against  his 
life,  Charles,  with  the  full  concurrence  of  his  liberal-minded 
minister  d'Aranda,  drew  up  a  decree  for  the  suppression  of 
the  Order  in  Spain,  Sealed  despatches  were  sent  to  all  the  Span- 
ish colonies,  to  be  opened  the  same  day  on  which  the  decree  was 
to  take  effect  in  Spain.  On  the  2d  of  April  1767  nearly  6000 
Jesuits  were  deported  to  the  Itahan  coast ;  but,  repulsed  by 
the  Pope  and  Ricci,  they  eventually  found  an  asylum  in 
Corsica. 

Encouraged  by  the  news  from  Spain,  the  opponents  of  the 
Jesuits  in  France  had  secured  their  expulsion  in  May,  and 
now  Choiseul  and  Pombal  urged  Charles  in.  to  unite  with  them 
in  demanding  from  the  Pope  the  entire  suppression  of  the 
Society. 

Naples  and  Parma  had  imitated  France  and  Spain,  and  the 
Jesuits  were  expelled  from  their  dominions.  But  Charles  ni. 
was,  as  has  been  said,  no  philosophic  reformer,  and  Papai  Re- 
he  hesitated.  The  Pope's  action,  however,  decided  sistance. 
him  to  throw  in  his  lot  with  the  other  Bourbon  countries.  In 
an  unwise  moment  Clement  decided  to  attack  the  Duke  of 
Parma,  who  was  the  nephew  of  Charles  iii.,  the  grandson  of 
Louis  XV.,  and  the  cousin  of  Ferdinand  of  Naples.  By  a  de- 
cree, in  January  1768,  he  pronounced  the  duke's  rank  and 
title  forfeit,  re-established  in  Parma  the  ecclesiastical  jurisdic- 
tion, and  declared  war  against  the  duke.  The  reply  of  the 
Bourbons  was  decisive.  Lx)uis  xv.  took  possession  of  Avignon 
and  the  county  of  Venaissin,  the  King  of  the  Two  Sicilies 
seized  Beneventum  and  Ponte  Corvo,  Charles  iii.  resolved 
upon  the  abolition  of  the  Order,  and  all  the  Bourbon  Powers 
threatened  the  Pope  with  war.  On  the  loth  of  December 
1768  a  joint  note,  demanding  the  abolition  of  the  Jesuits,  was 
presented  to  Clement.  The  feeling  against  the  Order  had  now 
spread.  Its  members  were  expelled  from  Venice,  Modena, 
and  even  from  Bavaria,  while  in  the  Austrian  dominions,  still 


296  European  History ^   171 5-1789 

under  the  influence  of  the  pious,  though  'igorous,  Maria 
Theresa,  they  were  removed  from  the  chairs  of  theology  and 
philosophy. 

The  Pope,  now  eighty-two  years  old,  was  unequal  to  the 
crisis.  An  attack  of  apoplexy,  brought  on  by  the  late  events, 
The  Conclave  proved  fatal  on  February  3,  1769.  On  his  death 
of  1769  arose  the  serious  question  of  the  election  of  his 

Election  of  r     i  •  /■      i 

Clement  succcssor.     In  cousequeuce  01  the  gravity  of  the 

^^^"  situation,  the    conclave   of    1769    had   an   unusual 

importance :  the  election  of  a  Pope  able  to  recognise  the 
signs  of  the  times,  and  wilhng  to  conciliate  public  opinion, 
might  appease  the  storm,  while  no  one  could  foresee  the 
results  of  the  election  of  a  Pope  who  had  Jesuit  sympathies. 
During  the  conclave  the  cardinals  fell  into  two  clearly  defined 
parties.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Zelanti  or  the  Zeles,  who  had 
been  all-powerful  during  Clement  xiii.'s  pontificate,  aimed  at 
securing  a  Pope  of  like  opinions,  one  who  would  defend  the 
Order  against  Bourbon  interference  and  the  atheistical  tenden- 
cies of  the  day.  To  them  the  Papacy  stood  at  the  head  of  a 
movement  opposed  to  the  rising  flood  of  sceptical  philosophy. 
Each  day,  attacked  by  writers  like  Voltaire  and  the  Encyclo- 
pedists, or  by  sovereigns  like  Frederick  the  Great  and  Cathe- 
rine II.,  the  Papacy,  uncertain  of  the  fidelity  of  its  own  disciples, 
required,  in  the  eyes  of  this  party,  a  strong  Pope  who  would 
support  the  Jesuits.  Opposed  to  the  Zelanti  were'the  Rega- 
listi,  or  supporters  of  the  crowned  heads  —  les  cardinaux  des 
couromies  —  whose  aim  was  to  secure  the  suppression  of  an 
arrogant  and  pestilent  society.  After  lengthy  negotiations 
among  the  cardinals,  the  influence  of  Bernis  was  successful  in 
securing,  on  the  i8th  of  May,  the  election  of  Cardinal  Lorenzo 
Garganelli,  a  Franciscan  of  considerable  abilities,  and,  like 
_^   ^  Benedict  xiv.,  enhsfhtened  and  tolerant.     At  first 

The  Suppres-  . 

sion  of  the  he  showed  some  hesitation,  and  tried  to  avoid 
Jesuit  r  er.  j^-^^jj^g  ^  dccisiou,  while  the  Jesuit  hopes  were 
raised  by  the  fall  of  their  enemy  Choiseul.  But  before  the 
determination  of  Grimaldi,  backed  by  France    and  Portugal, 


The  Fall  of  the  Jesuits  297 

and  even  by  Maria  Theresa,  Clement  was  forced  to  yield. 
On  the  1 6th  of  August  1773  ^^  issued  the  Bull  Dominus  et 
Redernptor,  abolishing  the  Society  of  Jesuits.  After  this  de- 
cisive act,  which  was  not  revoked  until  August  7,  18 14,  when 
Pius  VII.  published  the  Bull  SoHcitiido  oi7miu77i  ecclesiarium^ 
Clement  appointed  a  number  of  cardinals  to  take  possession 
of  the  temporalities  of  the  Society,  and  imprisoned  Ricci  in  the 
castle  of  St.  Angelo,  where  he  died  in  1775.  At  the  time  of 
its  suppression  the  Order  had  41  provinces  and  22,589  mem- 
bers, of  whom  11,295  were  priests.  Avignon  was  restored  to 
the  Papacy,  and  the  Jesuits  found  refuge  in  the  dominions  of 
Catherine  11.  and  Frederick  the  Great.  The  proscribed  Order 
had  not  to  wait  long  for  revenge.  In  the  Holy  Week  of  1774 
Clement  xrv.  was  taken  ill;  on  the  22d  of  September  he 
died. 


CHAPTER    XI 

THE  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 
AND  THE  TREATY  OF  KUTCHUK-KAINARDJI 

Europe  after  the  Seven  Years'  War  —  Austria  —  Italy — Prussia,  the  Empire 
and  Russia — Alliance  between  Prussia  and  Russia,  1764  —  Poland  —  The 
Policy  of  Frederick  the  Great  and  Catherine  II.  —  Polish  Politics —  Russian 
Intervention  in  Poland  —  France  and  Turkey  —  The  Outbreak  of  War  be- 
tween Russia  and  Turkey,  1768 — The  Views  of  Frederick  the  Great  and 
Kaunitz  —  War  and  Diplomacy.  The  Interview  at  Neisse  —  Proposals  for 
a  Partition  of  Poland  —  The  Partition  of  Poland  — The  Causes  of  the  Fall 
of  Poland — The  Non-intervention  of  England  —  The  Policy  of  France  — 
The  Russo-Turkish  War — The  Treaty  of  Kainardji — Choiseul's  Foreign 
Policy  —  The  Affair  of  the  Falkland  Islands — War  between  England  and 
the  Bourbon  Powers  averted  —  The  Suppression  of  the  Parlement  of  Paris 
and  the  Provincial  Parlements  —  The  Fall  of  Choiseul  —  The  Triumvirate 
—  Gustavus  III.  and  the  Swedish  Revolution  —  Its  Effects  —  Attitude  of 
France. 

From  1763  to  1792  western  and  centra]  Europe  were  at 
peace.  It  is  true  that  France,  Spain,  and  Holland  combated 
Europe  after  England  at  sea  or  in  America  during  the  War  of 
the  Seven  American  Independence,  and  that  the  Russo- 
Years  ar.  -p^j-j^jg}^  ^^j-  Qf  ly^s.y^  ^yas,  in  1 787,  followed  by 
the  Russo-Austrian  attack  on  the  Porte.  But  during  these 
years  the  greater  part  of  Europe  enjoyed  an  unaccustomed 
period  of  repose.  These  thirty  years  constitute  a  very  compli- 
cated period  of  European  history.  They  include  the  last 
years  of  the  eighteenth  century ;  they  form  an  introduction 
to  the  new  period  ushered  in  by  the  French  Revolution. 
With  the  widespread  desire  of  aggrandisement,  and  the  uni- 
versal longing  for  compactn-ess  of  territory,  the  idea  of  the 
balance  of  power  continues  to  be  a  living  force,  though  in  a 

298 


The  Partition  of  Poland  299 

pen-erted  form.     The  greed  of  acquisition  becomes  strong,  and 
the  smaller  are  threatened  by  the  greater  Powers  with  extinction. 

The  fall  of  the  Jesuit  Order,  affecting  as  it  did  the  general 
history  of  Europe,  was  the  one  circumstance  which,  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  united  the  Bourbon  states  of  France.  Spain, 
Naples,  and  Parma  in  a  close  alliance.  The  hope  of  partition- 
ing the  two  ancient  kingdoms  of  Poland  and  Sweden  proved  "^ 
strong  enough  to  bind  closely  together  in  a  powerful  league  the 
northern  states  of  Prussia  and  Russia,  and  with  this  alliance 
Austria  and  Denmark  connected  themselves,  in  order  to  share 
in  the  spoil. 

During  these  years  Austria  and  Prussia  occupy  a  leading 
position  in  Europe,  while  the  Slav  Power  of  Russia  advances, 
and  is  universally  recognised  as  an  integral  portion  of  the 
European  states-system.  The  influence,  however,  of  the  Latin 
nations  of  Spain,  France,  and  indeed  of  the  Papacy,  in  central 
Europe  and  Italy  declines,  and,  \nth  the  temporar}^  retirement 
of  France,  important  developments  take  place  in  the  north  and 
e^st  of  Europe.  In  1 763  many  of  these  changes  were  already 
presaged.  England's  maritime  power  had  definitely  triumphed 
during  the  Seven  Years'  War.  The  Teutonic,  and  not  the 
Latin,  element  was  henceforward  to  control  the  destinies  of  the 
New  World ;  while  in  India,  the  English  and  not  the  French, 
were  to  become  the  dominating  influence.  France  had  not 
only  suffered  defeat  in  America,  in  India,  and  on  the  seas,  but 
her  prestige  in  Europe  had  sensibly  declined,  and  she  resigned 
to  Prussia  the  mihtary  leadership  in  Europe.  Her  ally  Spain 
had  also  suffered,  and,  like  France,  was  bent  on  securing 
revenge  on  the  first  opportunity.  In  spite  of  the  failure  of 
Maria  Theresa  to  recover  Silesia,  and  to  ruin 
Prussia,  Austria,  with  its  mar\-ellous  elasticity  and 
inexhaustible  resources,  remained  one  of  the  most  powerful^ 
states  in  Europe.  Reforms  in  every  department  were  pressed 
on,  and  with  the  impetus  given  to  commerce  and  improved 
military  and  ci\-il  organisation,  the  Court  of  Vienna  hoped  to 
reduce  the  power  and  territories  of  Frederick  the  Great     In 


300  European  History^   171 5-1789 

1765,  Joseph  11, ,  who  the  pre\dous  year  had  been  elected  king 
of  the  Romans,  became  Emperor,  and  inherited  from  his  father, 
who  had  never  forgiven  the  French  seizure  of  Lorraine,  a 
hatred  of  France.  His  succession  thus  gave  a  new  bias  to 
Austrian  poHtics,  which  was  in  harmony  with  the  dishke  felt  in 
Vienna  by  the  educated  classes,  as  well  as  by  the  mihtary 
authorities,  for  the  French  alKance.  Kaunitz,  however,  who 
still  remained  in  power,  clung  to  France  from  hatred  to 
Prussia,  and  continued  his  efforts  to  unite  Austria  still  more 
closely  with  the  Bourbons.  The  marriages  of  the  Archdukes 
Joseph  and  Leopold  to  the  daughters  of  Don  Philip  and  Don 
Carlos  respectively  had  indicated  the  line  of  poHcy  which 
Kaunitz  continued  after  the  Peace  of  Paris  in  the  case  of  the 
Austrian  Archduchesses.  In  1768,  Maria  Caroline  married 
Ferdinand  r'.  of  Naples  ;  in  1769,  ]\Iaria  Amelia  married  Ferdi- 
nand of  Prussia ;  and  the  following  year  Marie  Antoinette  mar- 
ried the  Dauphin.^ 

Bella  gerant  alii,  tufelix  Austria  nube. 

Till  the  fall  of  Choiseul,  the  Franco-Austrian  alliance  showed 
no  outward  signs  of  weakness,  and  the  decision  of  Maria 
Theresa  to  support  the  action  of  the  Bourbons  in  the  suppres- 
sion of  the  Jesuits  still  further  strengthened  the  union  of  the 
Courts  of  Vienna  and  Versailles. 

One  result  of  the  diplomatic  revolution  of  1756  was  to  check 
French  interference  in  Italy.     The  new  Italian  dynasties,  the 
outcome  of  the  Polish   and   x^ustrian   Succession 
^*  ^'  Wars,  unable  to  secure  independent  support  from 

France,  fell  under  Austrian  influence,  and  the  Hapsburg  rule, 
through  the  skill  of  Kaunitz,  again  became  paramount  in  Italy. 
The  Franco-Austrian  alliance  conferred  undoubted  benefits 
upon  that  country.  The  Seven  Years'  War  had  left  Italy  undis- 
turbed, and  the  tranquillity  of  the  Peninsula,  assured  by  the 
alliance  between  the  Hapsburgs  and  the  Bourbons,  continued 
till  the  wars  of  the  French  Revolution. 

^  Von  Arneth,  Geschichte  von  Maria  Theresia,  iv.  p.  336,  v.  p.  449. 


The  Partition  of  Poland  301 

The  Bourbon  states  in  the  west  and  south  of  Europe,  bound 
together  in  one  great  league,  and  connected  with  Austria  by 
marriage  aUiances,  were,  shortly  after  the  close  of  p^ussia,  the 
the  Seven  Years'  War,  confronted  by  a  league  in  Empire,  and 
the  north  of  Europe  consisting  of  Russia,  Prussia, 
and  Denmark,  supported  by  England.  Frederick  the  Great 
had  brought  his  country  out  of  the  war  without  loss  of  territory, 
but  terribly  exhausted.  Prussia,  however,  possessed  great 
vitality  :  she  had  established  her  military  reputation ;  she  was 
regarded  as  the  defender  of  German  Protestantism,  and  the 
protector  of  the  ancient  constitution  of  the  Empire.  The  Ger- 
manic body  had  indeed  cause  to  rejoice  at  the  success  of  Prus- 
sia. After  the  Peace  of  Hubertsburg  it '  entered  upon  the  hap- 
piest days  of  its  existence.'  For  some  thirty  years,  owing  to  the 
Franco-Austrian  system,  Germany  escaped  the  horrors  of  a 
French  invasion,  while  all  attempts  on  the  part  of  Joseph  11.  to 
interfere  with  the  ancient  constitution  of  the  Empire,  or  the 
rights  of  any  of  its  members,  were  sternly  and  successfully  re- 
pressed by  the  Prussian  king.  Though  the  Empire  continued 
its  course  of  gradual  and  unobserved  decay,  the  Germans  began 
to  reaUse  that  they  possessed  a  language  and  a  literature. 

Of  the  other  Powers  engaged  in  the  Seven  Years'  War,  Rus- 
sia had  given  unmistakable  proof  of  the  possession  of  enor- 
mous strength.  Henceforward  she  became  an  important  factor 
in  European  politics.  No  sooner  was  the  Treaty  of  Paris  signed, 
than  Europe  found  in  the  close  union  of  Russia  and  Prussia  a 
menace  to  the  peace  of  eastern  Europe.  The  defection  of 
Peter  in.  from  the  coalition  had  saved  Frederick,  and  his  alli- 
ance with  Prussia  laid  the  foundations  of  a  friendship  between 
the  two  countries  which  has  lasted  till  our  own  day. 

The  death  of  Peter  in  the  summer  of  1762,  and  the  accession 
of  Catherine  11.,  did  not  interfere  with  this  friendship,  which 
ripened  into  an  alliance  formally  concluded  on  April  11,  1764, 
and  which  was  a  necessary  condition  of  success  for  the  realisa- 
tion of  the  great  designs  then  being  prepared  at  St.  Peters- 
burg and  Berlin.     Catherine  11.,  one  of  the  chief  founders  of 


302  Eiiropea7i  History,   171 5-1 789 

the  Russian  empire,  had,  like  Maria  Theresa,  many  of  the  char- 
acteristics of  a  true  statesman.     Though  often  capricious  and 
j  Alliance  reckless,  though  at  times  influenced  by  unworthy 

/  between  favourites,  thou2;h  vice  had  great  charms  for  her, 

1    Russia  and  i  i=>  ^  > 

_\Prussia,  1764.  and  terrible  crimes  were  imputed  to  her  fierce  wrath, 
the  Semiramis  of  the  North  was  a  capable  and  strong-willed 
ruler.  She  believed  in  the  national  destinies  of  the  Muscovite 
race  ;  she  was  alive  to  the  advantages  of  her  j3osition  as  head 
of  the  Slavonic  race  ;  she  possessed  to  an  extraordinary  degree 
the  genius  of  government ;  she  could  choose  able  subordinates  ; 
she  was  prepared  to  advance  along  the  lines  laid  down  by  Peter 
the  Great.  Like  Frederick  the  Great  Catherine  was  infected 
by  the  liberahsm  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  under  her  in- 
fluence the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  imitated  the  habits  of  west- 
ern civilisation,  though  the  nation  at  large  was  little,  if  at  all, 
affected  by  her  real  desire  to  introduce  reforms.  She  and 
Frederick  the  Great  are  the  most  conspicuous  figures  among  the 
sovereigns  of  the  age,  and  the  success  of  their  vast  designs  de- 
manded a  close  union.  An  inevitable  antipathy  existed  between 
France  and  Prussia ;  Austria  was  still  bent  on  reconquering 
Silesia ;  England,  under  Bute,  had  completely  broken  -with 
Frederick.  The  Prussian  king,  isolated  in  Europe,  saw  in  a 
Russian  alHance  the  best,  if  not  the  sole,  means  of  placing  his 
kingdom  in  a  safe  position.  Neither  France  nor  Austria  was 
well  disposed  towards  Russia.  Austria  was  the  natural  foe  of 
Russia,  and  her  true  policy  was  to  support  and  strengthen  the 
Polish  kingdom.  France  had  always  regarded  herself  as  the 
defender  of  Poland,  and,  according  to  Choiseul,  distance  alone 
prevented  the  outbreak  of  hostiHties  between  Russia  and 
France.  From  the  Seven  Years'  War  Russia  had  emerged 
triumphant,  and  the  European  states,  which  hitherto  had 
treated  her  successes  with  indifference,  now  reaHsed  the  signifi- 
cance of  the  rise  of  the  powerful  Slavonic  nation.  But  the 
selfishness  of  England,  the  exhaustion  of  France,  the  blindness 
of  Austria,  and  the  isolation  of  Prussia  were  facts  of  which 
Catherine  was   prepared    to    take    full   advantage.      She    thus 


The  Partition  of  Poland  303 

found  herself  on  her  accession  in  a  strong  position,  and  able  to 
choose  the  methods  and  allies  best  suited  for  carrjang  out  her- 
clearly  defined  plans.  With  England,  Catherine's  relations 
varied.  English  ships  had  for  ages  been  the  carriers  of  Russian 
commerce  ;  during  the  Seven  Years'  War  the  peace  between  the 
two  countries  had  been  unbroken ;  the  friendship  of  England 
and  Russia,  Chatham  declared,  was  the  comer-stone  of  his  for- 
eign pohcy,  and  in  1766  he  endeavoured,  though  without  suc- 
cess, to  form  a  close  alhance  with  Russia  and  Prussia,  England, 
however,  continued  to  give  admirals  and  captains  to  Russian 
fleets,  and  the  victory  of  Tchesme  was  due  to  the  skill  of  an 
Englishman.  After  that  battle  the  Russians  received  no  open 
support  from  the  English  Government,  which,  though  it  closed 
its  eyes  to  the  Partition  of  Poland,  resolutely  refused  to  aid 
Russia  in  1772  against  Sweden.  It  was  not,  however,  till  the 
time  of  the  younger  Pitt  that  England  became  an  obstacle  to 
Russian  aggrandisement  in  Turkey.  France,  as  the  ally  of  Po- 
land and  Turkey,  Catherine  disliked,  and  showed  no  hesitation 
in  expressing  her  views  with  regard  to  Louis  xv.  and  his  minis- 
ters. Austria  showed  as  yet  no  desire  that  Poland  should  be- 
come a  vassal  state  of  Russia,  and  viewed  with  hostility  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  mouths  of  the  Danube  coming  under  the  control 
of  Catherine.  But  she  took  no  steps  to  oppose  the  schemes 
of  the  Russian  Court,  and  gradually  drifted  into  the  position  of 
a  partner  in  the  Partition  of  Poland.  The  Tsarina  thus  natu- 
rally turned  to  Prussia  as  the  one  continental  Power  with  which 
she  could  form  a  satisfactory  alliance.  Frederick  had  no  objec- 
tion to  Russian  extension  in  the  East,  while  he  was  as  anxious 
as  Catherine  to  destroy  Austrian  influence  in  Poland,  and  he 
was  equally  ready  to  join  in  the  dismemberment  of  Sweden. 
The  continued  anarchy  in  Poland,  and  the  inability  0I 
Poles,  by  means  of  drastic  reforms,  to  lead  their  country  along 
the  path  of  national  progress,  gave  Catherine  and 
Frederick  some  apparent  justification  for  inter- 
vention. An  elective  kingship,  a  senate,  and  a  diet  composed 
of  delegates  from  the  provincial  assembUes  of  nobles,  in  which 


304  European  History,   1715-1789 

any  member  might,  by  the  liherum  veto,  or  by  simply  with- 
drawing altogether,  or  by  obstructing  progress  for  six  weeks, 
impede  all  business,  formed  a  constitution  which  was  not  only 
an  anachronism,  but  rendered  Poland  a  centre  of  turmoil  in 
the  centre  of  Europe. 

*  Poland  had  no  ambassadors  at  foreign  courts,  the  land  had 
no  fortresses,  no  navy,  no  roads,  no  arsenals,  no  treasury,  no 
fixed  revenue.  The  army  was  small,  undisciplined,  often  un- 
paid, so  that  the  troops  were  forced  to  unite  and  to  encamp 
before  the  place  of  assembly  of  the  Diet,  and  to  add  an  unlaw- 
ful weight  to  their  lawful  demands.'^ 

To  keep  Poland  in  a  state  of  anarchy  had  been  the  object 
of  Russian  rulers  from  the  days  of  Peter  the  Great,  so  as  to 
The  Policy  of  obtain  a  decisive  voice  over  her  destinies.  The 
Frederick        eveuts  of  the  PoHsh  Succession  War  and  the  Seven 

the  Great  and 

Catherine  II.  Years*  War  had  practically  secured  the  predom- 
inance of  Russia  in  Poland,  and  shortly  after  her  accession, 
Catherine,  overruling  the  decision  of  the  Pohsh  Senate  (who 
had  given  Courland  to  Charles,  son  of  Augustus  iii.),  and  the 
wishes  of  Augustus  himself,  replaced  Biren  in  the  government 
of  that  province.  To  overawe  the  Poles,  Russian  troops  were 
moved  towards  Poland,  and  Augustus,  alarmed,  forced  his  son 
Charles  to  resign,  and  took  refuge  in  Saxony,  where  he  died  on 
the  5th  of  October  1763.  Though  during  the  early  years  of 
her  reign  Catherine  was  guided  by  the  Orlovs,  the  real  influence 
in  foreign  affairs  was  wielded  by  Nikolai  Ivanovich  Panin,  the 
Russian  Chancellor,  the  basis  of  whose  policy  was  the  Prussian 
alliance,  and  the  complete  subordination  of  Poland  to  Russian 
influence." 

The  death  of  Augustus  in.  of  Poland  was  followed  by  a 
treaty  signed  on  April  11,  1764,  between  Russia  and  Prussia. 
Besides  promising  mutual  assistance  in  case  of  war,  the  con- 
tracting Powers  agreed  to  place  Stanislas  Augustus  Poniatowski 

'^Poland,  by  Field-Marshal  Count  von  Moltke  (translated),  p.  74. 

-The  leading  members  of  the  Orlov  family  were  —  Gregory,  the  chief 
of  the  artillery  ;  Alexis,  the  admiral;  Theodore,  the  procurenr-general  of 
the  Senate;   and  Vladimir,  director  of  the  Academy  of  Science. 


The  Partitio7i  of  Poland  305 

on  the  Polish  throne,  and  not  to  permit  the  abohtion  of  the 
liberum  veto,  nor  the  transformation  of  the  elective  into  an 
hereditary  monarchy. 

They  were  both  determined  to  ward  off  all  foreign  inter-t^ 
ference  in  the  affairs  of  Poland,  and  the  Tsarina  in  placing 
her  vassal  Poniatowski  on  the  throne,  indicated  her  resolution 
to  govern  the  Poles  through  him.  Catherine  had  set  out  in 
1763  with  the  intention  of  conquering  Poland,  of  extending 
Muscovite  influence  over  Sweden,  if  not  of  actually  dismember- 
ing that  country,  and  of  gradually  advancing  to  Constantinople. 
To  carry  out  this  policy  was  in  her  eyes  the  mission  of  the 
Russian  rulers.  By  the  treaty  of  1764  the  way  was  prepared 
for  the  establishment  of  Russian  influence  in  Poland  :  in  1 769, 
Russia,  Prussia,  and  Denmark'  guaranteed  the  integrity  of  the 
existing  Swedish  Constitution.  The  ground  seemed  quite  clear 
for  the  successful  attainment  of  her  aims  in  Poland  and  Turkey 
no  less  than  in  Sweden.  All  these  countries  were  distracted  by 
internal  troubles  and  weakened  by  a  long  period  of  disorder. 
In  Sweden  the  dominion  of  the  Hats  was  shaken,  and  the  Caps, 
encouraged  by  Russia,  were  ready  to  betray  their  country. 
Turkey  was  decaying  rapidly,  and  the  designs  of  Russia  upon 
the  Ottoman  Empire  seemed  likely  to  bfe  realised.  In  Poland 
the  election  of  Poniatowski  had  been  effected  by  intimidation 
on  the  part  of  Russia  and  Prussia.  That  kingdom  was  hope- 
lessly divided ;  the  Government,  while  ignoring  the  rise  of 
Russia  and  Prussia,  had  taken  no  advantage  of  the  improve- 
ments in  warfare.  The  Constitution  ensured  the  continuance 
of  anarchy,  and  the  relations  between  the  upper  and  lower 
orders  proved  fatal  to  any  consistent  policy. 

The  nobles  upheld  the  feudal  system,  and  the  Polish  peasantry, 
who  were  mere  slaves,  felt  a  most  implacable  hatred  towards 
their  masters.  The  family  of  Czartoriski,  however,  Poiish 
aimed  at  thorough  reforms,  which  should  change  Politics, 
completely  the  system  of  government  and  bring  Poland  into 
line  with  other  countries.  They  wished  to  abolish  the  liberum 
veto,  to  make  the  crown  hereditary,  and  to  increase  its  powers.^' 

PERIOD    VI.  U 


3o6  European  History ^   171 5-1789 

Unable  to  hope  for  assistance  from  France  or  even  fronr 
Austria,  the  Czartoriskis  boldly  determined  to  use  the  forces  o 
Russia  for  the  regeneration  of  Poland,  and  having  reformed  anc 
reorganised  their  country,  to  shake  off  their  semi-barbarous  ally 
But  the  task  was  beyond  their  strength.  If  they  had  not  aimec 
at  the  crown  for  their  own  family,  and  applied  to  Russia  for  aid 
their  influence  might  possibly  have  benefited  their  unhappy 
country.  Opposed  to  them  were  the  Potockis,  who  aimed  a 
limiting  the  power  of  the  crown  by  the  establishment  of  a  per 
manent  council  of  nobles.  Before  the  election  of  Foniatowski 
the  Czartoriskis,  with  Russian  support,  had  overthrown  the  op 
position  of  their  enemies,  and  had  carried  their  reforms  in  ar 
Interregnum  Diet.  After  the  election  of  the  king,  who  wa; 
the  nephew  of  the  Czartoriskis,  the  Confederation,  or  Irregulai 
Diet,  remained  sitting,  the  reforms  were  ratified,  and  Polanc 
seemed  at  last  to  have  a  chance  of  securing  some  real  improve 
ments.  But  neither  Catherine  nor  Frederick  really  cared  foi 
reforms,  and  the  former  opened  negotiations  with  the  nationa 
party,  which  under  Potocki  had  sworn  allegiance  to  the  king 
Repnin,  the  Russian  representative  in  Poland,  opposed  Michae 
Czartoriski,  and  supported  by  Frederick,  found  a  further  oppor 
tunity  of  interference  in  the  matter  of  the  Dissidents.  These 
were  chiefly  Greek  and  Protestant,  whose  religious  rights  hac 
been  guaranteed  since  1562  by  every  Polish  king.  During 
the  eighteenth  century,  these  rights  had  been  in  various  ways 
attacked.  Repnin  now  proposed  that  the  Dissidents  shoulc 
be  made  ehgible  for  all  offices  in  the  Diet  and  in  the  Senate 
They  were  to  take  part  in  the  making  and  administration  o 
the  laws. 

The  Diet  was  strongly  Catholic;  and  in  1766,  when  th( 
question  of  the  Dissidents  was  brought  before  it,  stirred  up  b^ 
the  Bishop  of  Cracow,  and  suspecting  Poniatowsk 
Intervention  and  the  Czartoriskis  of  a  tendency  to  toleration,  i 
in  Poland.  refused  the  claims  of  the  Dissidents,  and  united  witl 
Russia  to  demand  the  abolition  of  reforms.  Henceforth  Cathe^ 
Vrine  and  Frederick  intervened  in  the  affairs  of  Poland  in  th( 


The  Partition  of  Poland  307 

name  of  religious  toleration.  When  the  Diet  refused  to  grant 
religious  liberty  and  political  equality  to  the  Dissidents,  the 
latter,  supported  by  many  of  the  patriot  party  who  wished  to 
leave  things  as  they  were,  formed  Confederations  which  finally 
combined  in  the  Confederation  of  Radom,  in  June  1767,  and 
received  the  support  of  Russian  troops.  The  question  whether 
Poland  should  continue  free  under  a  reformed  government,  or 
become  entirely  dependent  on  Russia,  was  to  be  decided  with- 
out further  delay.  In  October  1767  the  king  called  a  Diet; 
Warsaw  was  surrounded  by  Russian  troops ;  and  while  Cathe- 
rine demanded  equal  rights  for  the  Dissidents,  and  the  privilege 
of  keeping  troops  in  Poland,  a  proposal  was  made  at  Russia's 
instigation  to  delegate  the  powers  of  the  Diet  to  certain  Com- 
missioners. The  prospect  of  being  ruled  by  Commissioners 
under  Russian  influence  provoked  great  indignation ;  but 
Catherine  seized  and  sent  to  Siberia  the  chief  leaders  of  the 
opposition;  the  Diet,  terrorised,  yielded  on  the  19th  of  No- 
vember 1767;  and  on  the  24th  of  February  1768  a  treaty 
between  Poland  and  Russia  completed  the  subjection  of  the 
RepubHc.  The  constitution  agreed  to  by  Catherine  provided 
that  the  monarchy  should  remain  elective  and  that  the  libgriim 
veto  should  be  continued,  except  in  such  matters  as  voting  of 
supplies.  The  Dissidents  were  to  be  assured  in  their  rights, 
and  a  mixed  tribunal  was  to  decide  religious  questions.  In 
February  1768  Russia  compelled  the  Diet  to  ratify  the  consti- 
tution. Poland,  however,  was  not  to  enjoy  tranquiUity  for  long. 
The  nobles  who  were  Catholic  in  religion  were  attached  to  in- 
dependence, and  detested  the  laws  of  1767  and  the  treaty  of 
1 768.  In  southern  Poland  the  nobles  formed  the  Confederation 
of  Bar  for  the  maintenance  of  their  independence  and  religion, 
and  this  was  the  signal  for  the  outbreak  of  serious  disturbances. 
The  peasants  rose  and  perpetrated  terrible  atrocities ;  the 
Catholics  appealed  to  France,  the  Dissidents  to  Russia  and 
Prussia.  While  the  Poles  massacred  in  the  name  of  the  Cath- 
olic religion,  the  Russians  massacred  in  the  name  of  tolerance. 
The  increase  of  Russian  influence  in   Poland    had   roused 


3o8  Eiiropean  History,   17 15-1789 

Choiseul  to  the  significance  of  the  crisis.  Not  only  were  officers 
and  money  sent  to  support  the  Confederation,  but  diplomacy 
France  and  was  employed  to  Stir  up  the  enemies  of  Catherine. 
Turkey.  Qf  these,  Turkey  was  the  only  one  whose  inter- 

ference was  likely  to  be  of  much  service.  The  Porte  had 
always  in  theory  opposed  the  introduction  of  a  Russian  army 
into  Poland.  Up  to  1767,  however,  the  Turks,  perhaps  owing 
to  the  bribery  of  influential  members  of  the  Divan  by  Cathe- 
rine, had  appeared  indifferent  to  the  fate  of  Poland.  But*  by 
the  beginning  of  1768  various  circumstances  tended  towards 
a  rupture  of  the  long-continued  peace  between  Russia  and 
Turkey.  jNIustapha  iii.,  an  accomphshed,  energetic  prince,  de- 
voted to  his  own  religion,  was  anxious  for  war,  and  with  many 
of  his  subjects  had  viewed  the  progress  of  the  Russian  arms  in 
Poland  with  jealousy  and  alarm.  Moreover,  ever  since  1765, 
Russian  agents  had  been  stirring  up  the  Greeks,  Montenegrins, 
and  Bosnians  against  the  Turkish  rule.  In  July  176S  Russian 
troops,  pursuing  fugitive  PoUsh  Confederates  into  Turkish  ter- 
ritory, had  burnt  Balta,  a  town  belonging  to  the  Tartar  Khan. 
The  Sultan's  position,  however,  remained  technically  weak, 
especially  as  Catherine  offered  a  full  explanation  of  the  con- 
duct of  the  troops,  and  probably  war  would  not  have  broken 
out  but  for  the  intervention  of  Vergennes,  the  French  ambas- 
sador at  Constantinople.  Taking  advantage  of  the  irritation 
The  Out-  ^^^^  ^^  Turkey  at  the  Russian  intrigues  in  Monte-  ^ 
break ofWar  negro,  he  incited  the  Turks  to  demand  the  evacua- 
Russia  and  ^ion  of  Poland  by  Russian  troops,  and  sent  the 
Turkey,  1768.  Baron  de  Tott  to  stir  up  the  Khan  of  the  Crimea 
to  support  the  Sultan.  The  violation  of  the  Turkish  frontier 
and  the  seizure  of  Cracow  added  force  to  Vergennes'  argu- 
ments, and  on  the  6th  of  October  the  Porte  declared  war  upon 
Russia,  declaring  that  it  was  simply  on  behalf  of  the  liberties 
of  the  Poles  that  the  Turks  took  up  arms.  If  Russia,  in  her 
dealings  with  Poland,  had  flattered  herself  that  she  was  acting 
as  the  defender  of  religious  liberty,  Turkey  could  at  any  rate 
assert  that  slie  was  fighting  in  defence  of  political  liberty. 


The  Partition  of  Poland  309 

The  declaration  of  war  by  Turkey  took  Europe  by  surprise, 
and  the  Austrian  envoy  at  Constantinople,  Brognard,  used 
all   possible    means    to    preserve    peace.     Neither   ^^  „. 

^  .  .  The  Views  of 

Frederick  nor  Kaunitz  looked  with  favour  upon  Frederick 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  Both  were  resolved  ^"'^^^""i*^- 
not  to  allow  their  respective  allies,  Russia  and  France,  to 
involve  them  in  a  fresh  war ;  both  desired  to  maintain  the 
tranquillity  of  Germany ;  both  felt  that  the  peace  of  Europe 
depended  on  the  good  understanding  between  Prussia  and 
Austria.  '  We  are  Germans,'  said  Frederick ;  '  what  does  it 
matter  to  us  if  the  English  and  French  fight  for  Canada  and 
the  American  islands,  or  if  PaoH  gives  the  French  plenty  to 
do  in  Corsica,  or  if  Turks  and  Russians  seize  one  another  by 
the  hair?'  Had  these  admirable  sentiments  been  acted  upon 
throughout  the  reigns  of  Frederick  and  Joseph,  Germany 
would  have  been  the  gainer.  Notwithstanding  his  alHance 
with  Russia,  Frederick  was  resolved  not  to  allow  himself^o 
be  drawn  into  a  war  in  which  Prussia  had  no  conceri^r  In 
spite,  however,  of  his  protestations,  Frederick  was  as  anxious 
to  secure  Prussian  Poland  as  Kaunitz  was  to  recover  Silesia 
or  to  obtain  an  equivalent.  Already  before  his  eyes  floated 
the  prospect  of  a  partition  of  Poland.  It  was  arranged  at 
Vienna  in  January  1769  that  an  inter\qew  between  Frederick 
and  Joseph  should  take  place  the  following  August,  and  the 
same  month  Frederick,  in  consideration  of  the  succession  to 
Anspach  and  Bayreuth  being  guaranteed  him  by  Catherine, 
agreed  to  make  common  cause  with  Russia  against  Sweden 
and  Turkey.  The  Prussian  king  was  fully  alive  to  the  steady 
development  of  the  terrible  Russian  state  ;  he  was  equally  con- 
scious that  the  war  between  Russia  and  Turkey  might  enable 
him  to  secure  a  valuable  accession  to  his  kingdom ;  he  was 
deeply  anxious  to  prevent  the  war  from  spreading  and  involv- 
ing the  German  Powers.  The  preservation  of  the  peace  of 
Europe  could  not,  however,  be  hoped  for  without  the  co-opera- 
tion of  Austria.  If  Austria  adhered  loyally  to  the  French  alli- 
ance, she  could  aid  the  Turks  and  the  Poles ;  and  Frederick, 


310  European  History,   1715-1789 

allied  with  Russia,  would  find  himself  again  at  war  with  France 
and  Austria.  If  the  latter  Power,  however,  agreed  to  join  with 
Russia  in  a  partial  partition  of  Turkish  territories,  Frederick 
would  find  himself  in  a  dangerous  isolation. 

Already  Frederick  had  determined  to  prevent  a  great  Euro- 
pean war  by  indemnifying  Austria  and  Russia  and  Prussia  in 
Poland.  If  his  plan  could  be  carried  out,  he  would  receive 
Polish  Prussia  without  firing  a  shot ;  Russia  would  be  satisfied, 
and  the  Franco-Austrian  alliance  would  be  sensibly  .weakened. 
In  February  1769  he  had  written  to  Count  Solms,  the  Prussian 
minister  at  St.  Petersburg,  a  description  of  a  project  of  Count 
Lynar  for  the  Partition  of  Poland,  with  the  expectation  that 
Solms  would  use  it  for  eliciting  from  Count  Panin  the  views  of 
the  Russian  Court.  Panin,  in  the  course  of  a  conversation 
with  the  Prussian  ambassador,  declared  that  Austria  should  in- 
demnify herself  for  the  loss  of  Silesia  by  acquisitions  in  the  East, 
that  Prussia  should  take  Polish  Prussia,  while  Russia  would  be 
satisfied  with  the  overthrow  of  the  Turkish  empire  and  the  for- 
mation of  a  Turkish  republic  with  Constantinople  as  the  capital.^ 

While  the  Prussian  and  Russian  diplomatists  were  discuss- 
ing projects  of  aggrandisement,  and  before  diplomacy  could 
produce  any  decided  results,  Kaunitz  had  showed  a  readiness 
to  profit  from  the  outbreak  of  the  Turkish  War  which  might 
have  provoked  the  envy  of  Frederick.  In  February  1769  an 
Austrian  force,  under  pretence  of  asserting  ancient  IH^ungarian 
rights,  occupied  the  county  of  Zips  at  the  very  time  that 
Frederick  was  planning  that  system  of  compensations  which 
led  to  the  Partition  of  Poland. 

In  July  hostihties  broke  out  seriously  between  the  Russians 
and  Turks  on  the  Dniester.  In  September  1769  the  Turks 
War  and  Were  defeated  and  the  Russians  occupied  Moldavia 
Diplomacy,  and  Wallachia,  took  possession  of  the  three  for- 
intervi'ew  at*  trcsses  of  Khotin,  Azov,  and  Taganrog,  and  seized 
Neisse.  Bucharest    in    November.      While    the    campaign 

was  proceeding,  Joseph  and  Frederick  had  met  at  Neisse  in 
1  See  Sorel,  La  Question  d' Orient  au  XVIII'^^Siecle. 


The  Partition  of  Poland  311 

Silesia  in  August.  It  was  most  important  to  dfscover  the 
views  of  the  '  Ogre  of  Potsdam,'  but  at  this  famous  meeting 
neifher  potentate  seems  to  have  committed  himself  to  any 
declaration  of  policy.  The  news  of  this  interview  disquieted 
Catherine,  and  she  agreed  to  all  Fre.derick's  demands.  In 
October  the  alliance  between  Russia  and  Prussia  was  extended 
till  1780,  Catherine  guaranteed  the  succession  of  Anspach  and 
Bayreuth  to  Frederick,  while  he  agreed  to  invade  Pomerania 
if  the  Swedish  Constitution  was  modified.  Choiseul  had  also 
felt  alarm  at  the  possible  results  of  the  interview,  and  feared  a 
Prusso- Austrian  understanding  to  the  detriment  of  the  Franco- 
Austrian  alliance.  Choiseul  .declared  that  a  long  war  between 
Russia  and  Turkey  would  best  suit  French  interests ;  Kaunitz, 
on  the  other  hand,  wished  for  peace,  and  was  ready  to 
mediate  between  the  belligerents,  in  order  that  Austria  should 
gain  some  territorial  advantages.  The  war  in  1770  proved 
disastrous  to  the  Turks.  A  Russian  fleet,  under  the  direction 
of  English  officers,  sailed  from  the  Baltic  to  the  ^-Egean  Sea, 
and  though  Alexis  Orlov  failed  to  bring  about  a  revolution  in 
Greece,  the  Russian  admiral,  aided  by  Elphinstone,  defeated 
and  destroyed  the  Turkish  fleet  at  Tchesme  on  Julv  5, 
1770;  whfle  on  August  i,  Rumiantzov,  with  a  small  Russian 
force,  overthrew  the  Turkish  forces  at  Kagoul.  It  seemed 
as  if  the  last  hour  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  had  come,  that  its 
territories  were  about  to  be  partitioned,  and  that  the  Russians 
would  be  firmly  established  on  the  Danube.  The  Sultan  in 
alarm  appealed  to  France  for  help,  but  Choiseul  was  only 
able  to  send  money,  1500  men,  and  a  few  officers,  among 
whom  was  Dumouriez,  to  aid  the  Confederation  of  Bar. 
England,  alarmed  to  some  extent  at  the  Russian  successes, 
recalled  the  officers  who  were  serving  in  the  Russian  fleet, 
while  her  envoy,  Murray,  at  Constantinople,  suggested  English 
mediation  to  the  Porte.  While  Frederick  the  Great  renewed 
with  vigour  his  attempts  to  bring  about  peace  between  the 
belligerents,  Austria,  not  content  with  Zips,  occupied  a  larger 
extent   of    Polish   territor}'.     In    August   Turkey    decided    to 


312  European  History ,   171 5-1789 

appeal  to  Prussia  and  Austria  to  use  their  mediation  to  brine 
the  war  to  a  conclusion. 

The  second  interview  between  Frederick  and  Joseph,  whicl 
was  held  at  Neustadt  on  September  3,  1770,  took  place  undei 
circumstances  of  extreme  gravity.  On  this  occasion  Kaunitz 
accompanied  Joseph  and  took  a  prominent  part  in  the  pro- 
ceedings. Frederick  saw  clearly  that  Austria  was  the  pivot  o 
all  negotiations.  If  the  Muscovite  troops  crossed  the  Danube, 
Austria  would  attack  Russia,  and  a  European  war  would  be 
the  result.  Kaunitz  stated  that  if  Catherine  insisted  on  making 
Poland  a  Russian  province,  or  on  dismembering  Turkey  to  an) 
large  extent,  Austria  would  go  to  war. 

On  the  1 2th  of  October  Prince  Henry  arriv^ed  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, and  his  mission  proved  to  be  an  event  of  European  im- 
,   ,      portance.     By  the  end  of  the  year  Russia  had  taker 

Proposals  for    ^  ■'  ■' 

a  Partition  Bender,  Akermann,  and  Braila.  The  Turks  onl) 
of  Poland.  \^q\^  Giurgevo,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube 
Catherine,  triumphant,  declared  her  readiness  to  entertain  the 
idea  of  peace.  Prince  Henry  declares  that  in  an  interview  with 
Catherine  in  January  1771  he  proposed  the  Partition  of  Poland, 
At  that  moment  the  situation  in  the  east  of  Europe  was  pecu- 
liarly threatening.  The  Russians  had  completed  their  con- 
quests of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia ;  Austria  had  occupied  Zips 
and  Sandecz,  including  in  her  grasp  some  500  Polish  villages  ; 
and  while  the  King  of  Prussia  had  sent  troops'into  Polish 
Prussia,  the  Polish  Confederates  had  no  money  and  small  hopes 
of  success.  The  Confederation  relied  entirely  on  cavalry, 
which  numbered  about  17,000,  divided  into  five  or  six  squad- 
rons, under  the  command  of  as  many  independent  chiefs.  In 
1 771  Dumouriez  was  defeated  at  Landskron,  and  though  Vio- 
mesnil,  Dussaillans,  and  Choisy  seized  the  castle  of  Cracow  the 
following  year,  they  were  unable  to  hold  it  against  Suvor6v,  and 
Poland  lay  at  the  mercy  of  the  three  allies. 

On  the  24th  of  December  1770,  Choiseul  had  fallen,  and 
France  had  become  for  the  moment  a  cipher  in  European 
politics.     It  was  at   that   very  time,   when  Van  Swieten,  the 


The  Partitio7i  of  Poland  313 

Austrian  envoy,  was  negotiating  with  Frederick  at  Beriin,  and 
Prince  Henry  was  negotiating  with  Catherine  in  St.  Peters- 
burg, that  a  x)eaceful  solution  of  the  Turkish  question  was  found 
in  the  suggestion  of  a  partition  of  Poland. 

The  idea  of  a  partition  was  no  new  one.  Maximilian  11.  had 
suggested  it  in  1573,  Charles  x.  of  Sweden  nearly  a  century 
later  returned  to  it,  and  his  successor  proposed  that  xhe  Partition 
the  Emperor,  Brandenburg,  and  Sweden  should  °^  Poland, 
divide  the  Polish  territories  between  them.  In  the  eighteenth 
century,  the  question  of  a  partition  was  often  discussed.  Peter 
the  Great  seriously  considered  it,  and  Augustus  11.  thought  of 
making  the  crown  hereditary  in  his  own  House.  Prussia  had 
long  desired  the  possession  of  Polish  Prussia,  and  Frederick  the 
Great  had  himself  demonstrated  to  his  father  the  necessity  of 
uniting  Brandenburg  and  the  Prussian  Duchy.  The  advantage 
which  Prussia  would  derive  from  such  a  seizure  was  so  obvious 
that  in  1764  it  was  firmly  beheved,  in  spite  of  the  Tsarina's 
denial  that  a  partition  had  been  agreed  upon  between  Freder- 
ick and  Catherine.  From  the  time  of  Prince  Henry's  visit 
(October  1770-January  1771),  the  Tsarina  began  seriously 
to  entertain  the  idea  of  taking  PoHsh  territor}'  in  heu  of  her 
Turkish  conquests,  and  of  pacifying  Austria  and  Prussia  by 
consenting  to  their  seizure  of  portions  of  the  doomed  country. 
Meanwhile,  Kaunitz  was  busily  engaged  in  opposing  the  Russian 
designs  on  Turkey.  The  Turks  themselves  had  hoped  to  secure, 
if  not  the  alHance,  at  any  rate  the  assistance  of  France.  Such 
a  project  was  distasteful  to  Austria.  A  united  Franco- Austrian 
inter\'ention  on  behalf  of  Turkey  implied  a  complete  breach 
with  Russia,  and  rendered  impossible  any  indemnification  for 
Austria  at  the  expense  of  either  Turkey  or  Poland.  Events 
aided  Austrian  diplomacy.  The  fall  of  Choiseul  removed  all 
danger  of  French  inter\^ention,  and  the  continued  successes  of 
the  Russians  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube  and  against  the 
Tartars  of  the  Crimea  compelled  the  Turks  to  turn  to  Austria. 
On  July  6,  1771,  a  secret  treaty  was  signed  by  the  Porte  with 
Austria,  in  which  the  latter,  in  consideration  of  a  large  sum  of 


314  Eicropean  History y   171 5-1 789 

money,  agreed  to  take  up  arms  against  Russia,  and  to  aid  Tur- 
key to  recover  her  lost  possessions.  Adopting  a  strong  attitude, 
Kaunitz  sent  a  declaration  to  St.  Petersburg  and  Berlin  that 
Austria  would  assume  the  offensive  if  the  Russians  crossed  the 
Danube,  and  that  she  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  Parti- 
tion of  Poland.  For  a  few  months  a  general  European  war 
seemed  inevitable.  The  Russians  were  unable  to  suppress  the 
Confederates  in  Poland  without  Prussian  aid,  and  at  the  same 
time  were  not  desirous  to  hasten  a  partition  which  would  enor- 
mously strengthen  their  powerful  neighbour.  Frederick's  plans 
were  for  the  moment  completely  upset.  He  had  resolved  on  the 
Partition  as  a  means  of  ensuring  peace.  If  the  dismemberment 
was  to  be  followed  by  a  war  he  would  prefer  to  defer  the  Parti- 
tion. From  this  diplomatic  tangle  he  suddenly  found  a  means 
of  extricating  himself,  when  he  learnt  that  MariaTheresa,  opposed 
to  war,  was  simply  determined  not  to  permit  the  occupation  of 
Moldavia  and  Wallachia  by  the  Russians.  Armed  with  this  infor- 
mation, Frederick  resumed  his  intrigues.  Though  Maria  Theresa 
abhorred  the  policy  of  plunder,  Joseph  11.  and  Kaunitz  listened 
to  Frederick's  advice  ;  and  Austria,  Russia,  and  Prussia  agreed 
to  the  principle  of  partition  on  February  19,  February  28,  and 
March  5,  1772,  respectively.  The  Partition  was  the  result  of 
a  compromise,  by  which  Catherine  11.  relinquished  her  con- 
quests on  the  Danube,  Austria  averted  a  serious  perii  to  herself, 
and  Frederick  gained  his  long-coveted  territory.  Suvor6v  had 
defeated  the  Confederation;  Dumouriez  had  retired,  and  his 
successor,  Viomesnil,  though  he  effected  the  capture  of  Cracow 
by  French  volunteers,  was  unable  to  carry  out  any  operation 
of  importance.  On  the  25th  of  July  the  definitive  Treaty  of 
Partition  was  finally  signed,  and,  under  threats  of  the  con- 
quest of  the  whole  country,  the  Diet  agreed  to  the  de- 
mands of  the  alHes.  Poland  accepted  a  constitution  which 
perpetuated  many  of  the  old  evils,  and  she  remained  for  some 
twenty  years  in  an  anarchic  condition,  weakened,  and  awaiting 
her  final  dismemberment.     By  the  Treaty  of  Partition  Russia 


The  Partition  of  Poland  315 

secured  White  Russia,  with  all  that  part  of  Poland  which  lay 
between  the  Dwina,  the  Dnieper,  and  theDrusch;  Austria  took 
almost  all  Red  Russia  and  GaUcia,  with  part  of  Podolia,  San- 
domir,  and  Cracow ;  and  Prussia  received  PoKsh  Prussia,  except 
Danzig  and  Thorn,  and  part  of  Great  Poland. 

By  this  partition  Poland  lost  one-third  of  its  territory  and 
about  one-half  of  its  inhabitants.  Of  the  three  Powers,  Prussia 
was  the  greatest  gainer.  Her  portion,  though  the  smallest,  was 
the  most  populous,  and  proved  of  great  value  as  a  connecting 
link  between  the  outlying  parts  of  the  Prussian  monarchy. 

Weakened  by  her  internal  divisions  and  jealousies,  Poland 
could  offer  but  a  feeble  resistance  to  the  Russian  national 
movement  in  favour  of  the  annexation  of  \Miite,   ^^   „ 

'    The  Causes 

Black,  and  Little  Russia,^  or  to  the  fixed  determina-   of  the  Fail 
tion  of  Frederick  the  Great  to  secure  Polish  Prussia.   °^  P°iand. 
Whatever  chance  she  might  have  had  of  maintaining  her  in- 
dependence by  the  aid  of  France  had  been  lost   during   the 
Seven  Years'  War,  when  Poland  became  the  base  of  operations 
for  the  Russian  armies. 

Poland  had  fallen,  but  her  fall  was  not  entirely  due  to  the 
political  exigencies  of  the  moment,  or  to  the  rapacity  of  her 
three  neighbours.  Her  fall  was  in  no  small  measure  brought 
about  by  her  own  shortcomings.  It  is  true  that  the  incessant 
feuds  of  the  Polish  noblesse  made  Poland  an  intolerable  neisrh- 

O 

bour  for  the  three  countries  on  which  she  bordered,  and  as 
long  as  that  noblesse  continued  to  perpetuate  the  medieval 
relations  between  their  own  order  and  the  peasants,  Poland 
was  doomed.  The  Polish  peasantry  were  still  slaves.  By  each 
partition  an  additional  number  of  this  peasantry  gained  by  a 
change  of  masters.  '■  To  the  peasant,  who  had  nothing  to  lose, 
it  was  a  matter  of  indifference  whether  he  was  subject  to  his 
territorial  lord  or  to  a  foreign  foe.'-  The  key  of  the  so-called 
misfortunes  of  Poland,  and  the  explanation  of  the  failure  of  the 
Poles  to  save  their  country,  is  to  be  found  in  the  implacable 

1  Rambaud,  Histoire  de  la  Russie,  p.  460. 

"^Poland,  by  Field-Marshal  Count  von  Moltke  (translated),  p.  75. 


3i6  European  History y   17 15-1789 

hatred  felt  towards  the  noblesse  by  the  great  body  of  the 
people.  None  the  less,  the  First  Partition  of  Poland  remains 
*a  vast  national  crime,'  and  a  striking  illustration  of  the 
political  temper  of  the  times.  It  constitutes  a  great  revolution 
in  the  history  of  Europe,  and  is  a  remarkable  proof  of  the 
desire  of  aggrandisement,  and  of  that  tendency  to  round  off 
territories,  without  any  consideration  of  nationality,  which  is  so 
characteristic  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

It  is  very  doubtful  if  Russia  did  wisely  in  agreeing  to  the 
Partition.  Poland,  like  Russia,  was  a  Slav  Power.  In  the 
Seven  Years'  War,  Poland  lay  under  the  influence  of  Russia ; 
and,  with  Poniatowski  on  the  throne,  Catherine  could  have 
ruled  the  Poles  through  him,  and  have  gradually  absorbed 
Poland.  The  Partition  strengthened  both  Prussia  and  Austria 
against  Russia ;  it  turned  the  Poles  into  deadly  enemies  of  the 
Muscovite  state ;  it  has  checked  the  advance  of  the  Russians 
westwards ;  it  has  put  serious  obstacles  in  the  road  from  St. 
Petersburg  to  Constantinople.  By  agreeing  with  Prussia  and 
Austria  to  divide  Poland,  Catherine  gave  away  that  supremacy 
over  the  Poles  which  was  nearly  equivalent  to  annexation. 
In  doing  so  she  acted  contrary  to  the  advice  of  her  astute 
minister  Panin,  who  opposed  the  idea  of  partition  on  the 
ground  that  it  would  be  to  Russia's  advantage  to  make  Poland 
a  vassal  state.  But,  supported  by  her  favourites,  the  Tsarina 
overruled  Panin's  counsel,  and  the  pohcy  of  partition  was 
entered  upon. 

The  reforms  instituted  by  Frederick  the  Great  in  his  new 
territory  go  far  to  justify  the  Partition  in  the  eyes  of  some 
German  historians.  He  connected  the  Oder  and  the  Vistula 
by  a  canal ;  he  encouraged  the  growth  of  cities ;  he  reclaimed 
land  which  has  become  one  of  the  richest  agricultural  districts 
in  Germany.  Throughout  the  newly  acquired  territory  the  lot 
of  the  peasantry  was  ameliorated,  and  trade  was  improved. 
Nevertheless,  the  verdict  of  history  must  be  given  against  the 
three  Powers,  who  by  their  action  definitely  introduced  into 
European  politics  a  principle  which  Napoleon  in  later  years 


TJie  Partition  of  Poland  31/ 

put  into  practice,  with  results  so  serious  to  both  Austria  and 
Prussia.  The  policy  which  led  to  this  dismemberment  of 
Poland  developed  naturally  into  a  system  of  universal  con- 
quest, and  thus  the  First  Partition  marks  the  beginning  of  the 
European  revolution. 

Neither  England  nor  France  interfered  to  save  the  unhappy 
country.  England  was  fully  occupied  with  the  American  diffi- 
culty, and    moreover   her   statesmen   looked  with   ^. 

•"  .  .  The  Non- 

favour  upon  the  policy  of  establishing  a  close  con-   intervention 

nection  ^^ith  Russia.  Her  commercial  interests,  °  "s^*"'^- 
threatened  by  the  Bourbons,  would,  it  was  felt,  be  furthered  by 
a  good  understanding  between  the  Courts  of  London  and  St. 
Petersburg.  English  policy  in  India  and  in  the  colonies  was 
not  interfered  with  by  Russia ;  there  was  no  danger  of  Rus- 
sian domination  in  the  Mediterranean,  or  indeed  in  the  Black 
Sea.  France  was  still  to  be  reckoned  with  in  India,  and 
Russia,  like  England,  was  not  on  friendly  terms  with  the 
French  Bourbons.  Moreover,  while  English  and  French  in- 
terests clashed  in  the  Levant,  England,  in  agreement  with 
Russia,  held  an  uncontested  commercial  supremacy  in  the' 
Baltic.  Enghsh  ministers  might  not  approve  the  principle  of 
partition,  but  they  had  neither  the  wish  nor  the  power  to 
intervene.  Lord  Suffolk,  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
alluded  to  the  Partition  as  a  *  curious  transaction,'  and  con- 
tented himself  with  prophesying  that  the  three  Powers  were 
'  sowing  the  seeds  of  future  disturbances,  instead  of  rest  and 
tranquillity,  to  that  part  of  Europe.'  The  continental  mon- 
archs  regarded  the  possible  interference  of  England  with  their 
schemes  with  indifference.  It  was  thought  that  England,  owing 
to  the  parliamentary  struggles  and  to  the  colonial  troubles, 
was  in  a  state  of  decadence.  At  Neisse,  Frederick  spoke  of 
England  with  contempt,  and  said  he  would  prefer  to  be  a 
small  German  prince  to  being  king  of  England.  Catherine 
was  herself  convinced  that  a  war  alone  would  bring  about 
internal  unity  in  England.  Kaunitz,  indeed,  seems  to  have 
recognised  that  England  differed  from  the  continental  Powers, 


3i8  Europea7i  History^   17 15-1789 

that  '  one  must  not  be  deceived  by  appearances,'  and  that  it 
was  necessary  to  be  circumspect  in  deaUng  with  such  a  curious 
and  singular  government. 

Nor  did  France  give  any  effective  assistance  to  Poland. 
As  long  as  Choiseul  was  in  power  Austria  hesitated  to  join 
The  Policy  Prussia  and  Russia  in  the  policy  of  partition, 
of  France.  Beyond  sending,  in  reply  to  the  appeal  of  the 
members  of  the  Confederation  of  Bar,  whose  success  would 
have  resulted  in  the  postponement  of  all  attempts  to  alter  the 
Polish  Constitution,  arms,  m.oney,  and  1500  men  under  Choisy 
de  Taules  and  Dumouriez,  Choiseul  trusted  to  the  inter- 
vention of  the  Turks,  to  the  resistance  of  the  Poles,  and  to  the 
neutrality  of  Austria,  to  defeat  the  aims  of  Russia.  Though 
willing  to  use  diplomatic  means  to  hamper  Russia,  Prussia, 
and  Austria,  he  had  no  intention  of  involving  Europe  in  a 
war  for  the  preservation  of  Poland,  and  never  seems  to  have 
realised  the  possibility  of  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria  acting 
in  union.  The  marriage  of  Marie  Antoinette  to  the  Dauphin, 
in  1770,  seemed  to  justify  his  expectations.  His  sudden  fall, 
however,  in  December  1770,  destroyed  all  possibiHty  of  active 
French  intervention,  and  removed  a  stumbling-block  in  the 
way  of  Joseph  11.  and  Kaunitz. 

The   Partition   of  Poland   and   the    revolution   in   Sweden^ 

accomplished,    the    main    interest    of    the    three    PoAvers   was 

concentrated  on  the  Turkish  war.     Attempts  had 

The  Russo-  ^ 

Turkish  already  been  made  to  bring  about  peace,  but  the 

War.  Porte,  recognising  that  the  aim  of  the  Russians  was 

the  occupation  of  Constantinople,  refused  the  terms  offered  at 
a  congress  held  at  Bucharest  in  the  spring  of  1773,  and  the 
war  continued.  Meanwhile  the  Austrian  Court  was  bent  upon 
rectifying  the  terms  of  the  Partition  Treaty,  and  securing  the 
line  of  the  Sbrucz  and,  if  possible,  Bukovina.  Catherine  at 
first  refused  to  entertain  the  idea  of  any  Austrian  extension, 
but  events  in  the  autumn  of  the  year  rendered  her  more  ame- 
nable.    Not  only  had  the  Russian  troops  suffered  reverses,  but 

1  See  page  328. 


The  Treaty  of  KiUc/mk-Kamardji  319 

a  formidable  insurrection  had  broken  out  among  the  Cossacks 
of  the  Don,  headed  by  Pugachev.  The  movement  was  in  part 
national  and  in  part  social.  The  introduction  of  foreign  in- 
fluences in  the  seventeenth  century,  affecting  even  the  hturgy, 
had  been  very  unpopular,  and  Peter  the  Great  had  been  com- 
pelled to  sternly  repress  the  discontent.  The  old  Muscovite 
traditions  lived  on  in  the  reign  of  Catherine  11.,  and  Pugachev 
belonged  to  the  party  that  upheld  them.  His  real  strength, 
however,  lay  with  the  peasants.  Originally  the  peasant  was 
free,  but  gradually  he  had  become  a  serf  attached  to  the  soil, 
and  by  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century  could  even  be  sold 
apart  from  the  land,  though  by  law  he  was  distinguished  from 
a  mere  slave.  When  Peter  in.,  in  1762,  excused  the  noble 
class  from  enforced  service,  the  peasants,  remembering  their 
ancient  freedom,  expected  the  extension  of  the  same  principle 
to  themselves,  declared  that  the  upper  orders  had  kept  back 
the  edict,  and  attributed  Peter's  death  to  their  enemies  the 
nobles.  Many  believed  that  Peter  was  still  alive,  and  that 
Pugachev,  a  Cossack,  was  the  Tsar.  The  Cossacks,  Slavs  by 
birth,  attached  to  the  orthodox  religion,  and  dishking  the  Turk- 
ish war,  which  disturbed  their  ordinary  avocations,  were  joined 
by  numbers  of  fugitive  serfs,  and  by  Calmuck  and  Khirgis 
Tartars.  At  first  Pugachev  met  with  some  successes  in  the 
Ural,  and  divided  the  property  of  all  the  nobles  who  fell  into 
his  hands  among  the  serfs.  Eventually  the  insurgents  were 
defeated,  Pugachev  was  captured  and  executed,  and  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Cossacks  considerably  curtailed.^ 
^  Hampered  by  this  rising,  Catherine  could  not  prevent  Kau- 
nitz  from  placing  troops  along  the  Sbrucz,  nor  Frederick  from 
rounding  off  his  new  possessions  in  Poland  by  the 
acquisition  of  fresh  territory.  The  Turks  alone  of  Kutchuk- 
failed  to  take  advantage  of  the  embarrassments  ^^^"^'''^j^ 
of  Russia.  Though  Abdul  Hamid,  who  had  succeeded  Musta- 
pha  as  Sultan  in  1774,  was  determined  to  carry  on  the  war,  he 
was  even  less  successful    than    his    predecessor.     Rumiantsov 

1  See  Sorel,  La  Question  d' Orient  au  XVIIP'^^  Siecle, 


320  Etcropea7i  History^    171 5-1789 

routed  the  Turkish  forces  in  June,  and  in  July  the  Grand  Vizier 
sent  plenipotentiaries  to  demand  peace.  On  July  19,  1774, 
the  Treaty  of  Kutchuk-Kainardji  was  concluded.  Russia  re- 
stored to  Turkey  Georgia,  Bessarabia,  Wallachia,  and  Molda- 
via, and  the  islands  of  the  Archipelago.  She  retained,  however, 
Kinburn,  Jenikale,  Kertsch,  and  Azov,  with  their  adjacent  dis- 
tricts. The  Tartars  were  brought  under  Russian  influence, 
certain  privileges  for  Christians  in  Turkey  were  demanded, 
better  government  of  the  Principalities  was  insisted  upon,  and 
a  Russian  embassy  was  to  be  established  at  Constantinople. 
The  Treaty  of  Kainardji  marks  the  definite  beginning  of  the 
Eastern  Question.  Russia  had  obtained  a  firm  footing  on 
the  north  coasts  of  the  Black  Sea,  the  Turkish  frontier  being 
the  river  Boug,  and  she  had  obtained  a  declaration  of  her  right 
of  free  commercial  navigation  in  Turkish  waters.^  Before  the 
treaty  was  ratified,  the  Turks  had  hoped  for  the  intervention 
of  Prussia  and  Austria.  But  Frederick  confined  himself  to  a 
protest,  while  Joseph,  satisfied  with  the  extension  of  the  Aus- 
trian portion  of  Podolia  to  the  Sbrucz,  and  resolved  upon  the 
seizure  of  Bukovina,  was  already  inclining  to  a  Russian  alliance. 
In  September  the  x*\ustrian  forces  occupied  Bukovina,  and  its 
cession  was  ratified  by  the  helpless  Turks  by  the  treaty  of  May 
8,  1775.  The  Treaty  of  Kainardji,  and  the  First  Partition  of 
Poland,  are  both  signal  examples  of  the  methods  of  the  Rus- 
sian Government.  The  one  was  a  step  in  the  liberation  of  the 
Christian  subjects  of  Turkey,  the  other  a  step  in  the  enslave- 
ment of  an  ancient  and  brave  nation.  The  Partition  itself 
was  not  only  a  crime,  it  was  a  mistake.  The  necessity  of 
maintaining  peace  between  the  three  Imperial  Courts  was 
its  excuse,  the  anarchy  in  Poland  was  the  opportunity.  But 
though  the  rivalry  between  Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia  led 
to  their  alliance,  the  PoHsh  question  henceforward  served 
as  an  additional  cause  of  their  mutual  hostility.  It  did  not 
check  the  struggle  beween  Austria  and  Prussia  for  the  head- 

1  See    The   Treaty  Relations  between  Russia  and  Turkey.     By  T.  E. 
Holland,  D.C.L.  . 


The  Treaty  of  KiitcJuik-Kainardji  321 

;hip  in  Germany,  nor  has  it  rendered  Russia  less  dangerous  to 
jcrman  unity. 

During  these  years  France  had  been  unable  to  defend  either 
Poland  or  Turkey  from  defeat  and  territorial  loss.     Exhausted 
3y  the  losses  in  the  Seven  Years'  War,  and  busy   choiseui's 
vith  the  work  of  reorganisation,  with  the  expulsion   ^°^?  ^"'^ 
Df  the  Jesuits,  and  with  the  disputes  between  the   Policy. 
Z!rown  and  the  Fa?'lement  of  Paris,  it  was  impossible  for  the 
government  to  do  more  than  exercise  diplomacy  in  the  east 
ind  south-east  of  Europe.     The  history  of  France  from  1763 
;o  1770  is  the  history  of  the  ministry  of  Choiseul. 

That  energetic  minister,  after  an  interval  of  five  years,  had 
igain  in  1766  assumed  control  of  foreign  affairs.  He  had 
ihvays  opposed  the  idea  of  a  partition  of  Poland,  but,  absorbed 
n  his  preparations  for  regaining  naval  supremacy,  he  neg- 
ected  the  affairs  of  eastern  Europe ;  his  interference  came  too 
ate,  and  France  in  1772  was  not  in  a  position  to  do  more 
:han  remonstrate.  ^  Though  history  enumerates  a  number 
)f  factions  which  French  intrigue  stirred  up  and  supported  in 
Poland,  yet  at  the  decisive  moment  we  see  them  constantly 
leserted  and  abandoned.'  ^  After  the  close  of  the  Seven  Years' 
iVar,  Choiseul,  bent  on  avenging  the  losses  suffered  by  France 
It  the  hands  of  England,  began  a  great  work  of  reorganisation. 
England,'  he  declared  to  the  king,  '  is  the  avowed  enemy  of 
^our  power,  of  your  state,  and  so  she  will  ever  remain.  Her 
gasping  commercial  instincts,  her  arrogance,  her  jealousy  of 
^our  power,  ought  to  warn  you  that  many  years  must  elapse 
before  we  can  make  a  lasting  peace  with  such  a  country.'  And 
Choiseul  was  right.  Though  wanting  at  times  in  firmness,  he 
showed  a  proper  appreciation  of  the  nature  of  the  rivalry  be- 
:;ween  PYance  and  England.  He  ardently  desired  the  complete 
regeneration  of  France,  and  spared  no  pains  to  carry  out  his 
k^ast  projects.  He  encouraged  colonisation;  he  devoted  much 
ittention  to  the  Antilles,  fortifying  ^Martinique  with  great  care  ; 
tie  endeavoured  to  restore  the  finances.  Between  1 763  and  1 766 
'^Poland,  by  Field-Marshal  von  Moltke  (trans.),  p.  88. 

PERIOD   VI,  X 


322  Eiiropea7i  History^   171 5-1789 

he  introduced  considerable  reforms  in  the  army,  and  he  com- 
pletely reorganised  the  navy.  With  the  eye  of  a  statesman,  he 
recognised  that  for  a  successful  war  with  Great  Britain  a  power- 
ful navy  was  indispensable,  and  that  the  Spanish  alliance  would 
be  invaluable.  He  weakened  England's  influence  in  Portugal 
and  Holland,  and  hoped  by  means  of  alliances  with  these 
countries  to  set  up  an  effective  counterpoise  to  the  power  of 
Great  Britain.  Considerable  success  attended  his  efforts.  His 
example  was  followed  by  Grimaldi,  the  joint  author  with  Choi- 
seul  of  the  Family  Compact  of  1761,  and  Spain  began  the  work 
of  reorganising  her  navy  and  her  colonial  system.  In  1759  ^^ 
French  navy  had  been  practically  annihilated,  only  forty  ships 
of  the  line  remaining.  In  1770  Choiseul  could  boast  that  not 
only  were  there  afloat  sixty-four  ships  of  the  line  and  fifty  frig- 
ates, but  that  the  efficiency  of  the  officers  and  crews  had  greatly 
improved ;  that  the  artillery  of  the  fleet  had  been  renewed,  and 
that  the  arsenals  and  storehouses  were  filled  with  war  mate- 
rial. Choiseul  had  never  accepted  the  Peace  of  Paris  as  defini- 
tive and  final,  and  till  his  fall  the  main  object  of  his  policy  w^as, 
in  close  alliance  with  Spain,  to  prepare  for  the  inevitable  war 
with  England.  In  1766  Lorraine  and  Bar,  on  the  death  of 
Stanislas  Leszczynski,  became  definitely  a  portion  of  France, 
and  in  1768  the  French  purchased  the  island  of  Corsica  from 
Genoa.  England,  however,  occupied  with  internai  commo- 
tions and  with  the  colonial  controversy,  was  not  ready  for 
war ;  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  Paoli,  the  Corsicans  were  over- 
thrown by  the  Comte  de  Vaux  at  the  battle  of  Ponte  Nuovo. 
Choiseul  secured  for  France  a  valuable  acquisition,  and  Napo- 
leon Bonaparte  was  born  a  French  subject.  In  1770  a  dispute 
^,     ...  .     ,   between    England    and   Spain    over    the    Falkland 

The  Affair  of  or 

the  Falkland  Islaiids  brought  thcsc  two  countrics  to  the  verge 
of  war.  In  1766  a  British  force  had  taken  pos- 
session of  the  islands,  but  in  June  1770  a  Spanish  expedition 
appeared  before  Port  Egmont  and  expelled  the  small  English 
garrison.  The  attack  on  Port  Egmont  roused  the  English 
nation,  and  war  seemed  inevitable. 


The  Treaty  of  KtitcJmk-Kainardji  323 

Grimaldi,  who  had  already  on  behalf  of  Spain  negotiated  the 
Family  Compact  and  the  Peace  of  Paris,  had,  on  his  return  to 
Madrid  from  his  embassy  to  the  French  capital,  succeeded  Wall 
as  Secretary  of  State  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  The 
Marquis  Jeronymo  Grimaldi  was  a  Genoese  by  birth,  and  was 
declared  by  the  English  envoy  to  have  '  no  very  extraordinary 
talents  nor  extensive  notions.'  *  He  is,'  wrote  Harris  in  1770, 
*  dexterous  in  chicanery,  and  in  confounding  an  argument.'^ 
In  1766  a  popular  rising  in  Madrid  had  been  followed  by  the 
dismissal  of  the  Finance  Minister,  Squillacci,  an  Italian ;  but 
Grimaldi  had  ingratiated  himself  in  the  favour  of  Charles  iil, 
was  not  actually  unpopular,  and  remained  in  office.  Though 
Spanish  pubUc  opinion  relied  on  the  Family  Compact,  Grimaldi 
was  indisposed  to  support  Choiseul  against  England,  and,  with 
Charles  iil,  was  in  favour  of  an  accommodation ;  while  d'Aranda, 
the  successor  of  Squillacci,  and  an  admirer  of  Choiseul,  was 
anxious  for  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  Matters  assumed  a  very 
threatening  aspect,  and  Harris  left  Madrid.  The  fall  of  Choi- 
seul, however,  destroyed  all  chance  of  aid  from  France,  and 
Charles  iii.  agreed  to  restore  the  garrison,  reserving,  however, 
his  claims  to  the  rights  of  sovereignty. 

Naval  reorganisation  and  a  Spanish  alliance  had  been  the 
chief  features  of  Choiseul's  policy,  and  later  events  justified 
his  \\isdom.  The  importance  to  France  of  a  strong  navy 
was  proved  over  and  over  again  before  1815.  Spain  under 
Charles  iii.  was  progressing  rapidly  along  the  path  of  reform. 
With  good  administration,  Spain  was  marked  by  her  geograph- 
ical position,  by  the  family  connection  existing  between  her 
rulers  and  those  of  France,  and  by  her  fear  of  England's  sea 
power,  as  the  most  valuable  ally  that  Choiseul  could  possibly 
have  found  in  his  proposed  crusade  against  Great  Britain.  His 
sudden  fall  had  been  caused  partly  owing  to  the  conviction  of 
Louis  XV.  that  France  was  on  the  verge  of  war  with  England, 
and  partly  because  his  tenure  of  office  was  an  obstacle  to  the 
overthrow  of  the  Paiiements  by  the  CrowTi. 

^Diaries  and  Correspondence  of  the  Earl  of  Malmesbury^  vol.  i.  p.  56. 


324  European  History ^   17 15-1789 

Since  the  Seven  Years'  War  the  power  of  that  corporation 
had  steadily  grown.  The  disastrous  Peace  of  Paris  had  shaken 
the  royal  authority,  and  the  expulsion  of  the  Jesuits 
Suppression  from  France  had  still  further  increased  the  preten- 
Parie^ment  sions  of  the  magistrates.  Confident  in  the  strength 
of  Paris  of  their  position,  they  had  not  hesitated  to  continue 

Provincial  their  attacks  upon  both  the  royal  and  the  ecclesi- 
Pariements.  astical  authorities.  The  expulsion  of  the  Jesuits, 
the  growth  of  sceptical  writings,  the  demand  on  the  part  of  the 
Parleinent  for  the  entire  independence  of  the  civil  from  the 
ecclesiastical  power,  roused  the  indignation  of  the  clergy,  and 
necessitated  the  interference  of  the  Government.^  In  1766  the 
Council  ordered  the  GalHcan  maxims  of  1682  to  be  observed, 
and  endeavoured  to  enforce  silence  upon  the  combatants.  But 
the  attitude  of  the  Parlemcnt  towards  the  Crown  was  as  aggres- 
sive as  that  adopted  towards  the  clergy.  The  king's  right  to 
impose  taxes  without  its  consent  was  openly  questioned,  as 
was  his  right  to  hold  a  bed  of  justice,  or  to  arrest  and  exile 
members  of  the  Farle?}ie7it  if  they  refused  to  carry  out  his 
wishes.  In  1763  the  Parle77ient  oi  Paris  had  protested  against 
some  edicts  which  had  been  registered  by  the  royal  consent 
at  a  bed  of  justice,  and  had  received  the  support  of  the 
provincial  Pa7-lements.  Emboldened  by  the  weak  attitude  of 
the  Government,  the  Parle 77ie 7it  oiVdiUS  proceeded  iii  1766  to 
protest  against  the  arrest  of  some  members  of  l.ie  Pa7'le77ie7it 
of  Brittany.  This  audacity  was  at  once  met  by  a  declaration 
made  by  Louis  in  person  that  the  legislative  power  sprang  alone 
from  him  ;  but  the  magistrates,  undaunted,  gave  up  none  of  their 
pretensions,  and  the  quarrel  smouldered  on  till  a  series  of  in- 
trigues overthrew  their  supporter,  Choiseul,  and  left  them  at  the 
mercy  of  the  king.  At  the  beginning  of  1 770  these  intrigues  had 
developed  into  a  formidable  conspiracy  against  the  minister. 
The  Chancellor,  Maupeou,  and  the  Abb6  Terray,  Comptroller  of 
the  Finances,  had  formed  with  the  Due  d'Aiguillon  a  secret 
cabal,  which  received  valuable  support  from  Madame  du  Barry. 

1  Rocquain,  L' esprit  )-evoluiionnaire  avant  la  Revolution,  pp.  252-5. 


The  Treaty  of  Ktitchiik-Kainardji  325 

In  April  1770  d'Aiguillon,  accused  of  grave  abuses  in  his 
government  of  Brittany,  was,  by  his  own  and  the  king's  wish, 
tried  before  the  Parlement  of  Paris.  After  an  interval  of  two 
months  Louis  declared  him  exonerated  from  every  charge,  but 
the  Parlement  added  that  until  he  was  formally  acquitted  he 
was  not  to  exercise  any  of  the  functions  of  the  peerage. 
Furious  at  this  fresh  act  of  insubordination,  Louis  carried  away 
the  registers  of  the  Parle me7it ;  while  the  magistrates  on  their 
part  refused  to  perform  their  duties,  and  the  administration  of 
justice  was  suspended.  On  December  7  Maupeou,  the  Chan- 
cellor, denounced  the  conduct  of  the  Parle77ient  as  seditious. 
On  December  24  Choiseul  (who  had  steadily  refused  to  pay 
any  court  to  Madame  du  Barry)  fell,  his  place  being  given  to 
d'Aiguillon,  the  supporter  of  the  Jesuits  and  the  enemy  of  the 
Parle7nent.  On  January  20,  1771,  the  Pa7'le77ie7it  of  Paris  was 
suppressed,  its  fall  being  shortly  afterwards  followed  by  that  of 
the  provincial  Pa7'let7te7its  and  of  the  Coi/r  des  Aides,  while  the 
Chatelet  was  reorganised  and  made  subservient  to  the  Crown. 
The  energetic  action  of  the  Government  was  crowned  with 
success.^  All  talk  about  revolution  ceased,  while  Voltaire, 
hating  the  opposition  of  the  Parle77ie7it  to  toleration  and  reform, 
gave  a  vigorous  support  to  the  Government,  and  found  himself 
at  one  with  the  priests.  \\\  spite  of  the  success  which  attended 
this  coup  d'etat,  the  royal  authority,  though  unquestioned  as 
long  as  Louis  xv.  lived,  was  unpopular  and  contemptible.  '  The 
policy  of  Louis  xv.  towards  his  Parliaments,'  Mr.  Lecky  writes, 
'  was  of  a  kind  which  bevond  all  others  discredits  and  weakens 
governments.  Either  resistance  or  concession,  if  consistently 
carried  out  and  skilfully  conducted,  might  have  succeeded  j  but 
a  policy  of  alternate  resistance  and  concession,  of  bold  acts  of 
authority  repeatedly  and  ignorainiously  reversed,  could  have  no 
other  effect  than  to  uproot  all  feeling  of  reverence  for  the  Crown. '^ 

1  The  Parlement  of  Paris  had  many  enemies,  including  not  only  the 
priests,  but  also  men  like  Voltaire,  who  resented  the  judicial  murder  of 
Galas  in  1762,  and  other  cruel  and  intolerant  acts. 

2  Lecky,  History  of  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  vol.  v.  chap.  xx. 


326  European  History^   1715-17S9 

Choiseul's  fall  in  December  had  as  momentous  results  on 
the  course  of  events  beyond  the  borders  of  France  as  it  had 
The  FaU  of  ^^  internal  politics.  Occupied  with  vast  schemes, 
Choiseui.  ^g^  \^q.  Nicholas  Fouquet,  underrated  the  influence 
of  his  enemies,  and  paid  little  heed  to  their  intrigues.  For 
upwards  of  a  year  before  his  fall  his  position  had  been  under- 
mined by  Terray  and  Maupeou,  no  less  than  by  Madame  du 
Barry.  While  Choiseui  desired  to  secure,  by  a  policy  of  con- 
ciliation, peace  within  France  and  to  embark  upon  an  advent- 
urous foreign  policy,  his  opponents,  caring  little  for  the  honour 
of  France  abroad,  were  resolved  on  the  suppression  of  the 
Parlemetit  of  Paris.  In  consequence  of  their  representations, 
Louis  XV.  suddenly  reaUsed  that  the  dispute  between  England 
and  Spain  over  the  Falkland  Islands  was,  in  consequence  of  the 
existence  of  the  Family  Compact,  likely  to  involve  France  in 
war.  Choiseui  fell,  like  d'Argenson,  the  victim  of  a  series  of 
intrigues  and  of  the  incapacity  of  Louis  xv.  to  appreciate  the 
value  of  an  able  minister.  The  policy  of  Choiseui  was  based 
upon  considerations  for  the  welfare  of  France.  His  alliance  with 
Spain  was  statesmanlike  ;  his  endeavours  to  lessen  the  influence 
of  Austria  in  French  pohtics  requires  no  defence.  It  is  doubt- 
ful if  France  under  any  circumstances  would  have  acted  wisely 
in  interfering  energetically  in  the  East  of  Europe.^  A  memoir 
on  the  true  poHcy  of  France,  presented  by  him  in  February  1 763 
to  Louis  XV.,  is  marked  by  keen  pohtical  insight  and  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  European  politics.  In  it  he  appreciates  the  Aus- 
trian connection  at  its  real  value,  and  though  he  sees  that  the 
union  of  France  and  Austria  ensures  tranquillity  in  Italy,  he  is 
careful  to  point  out  that  Spain  is  the  true  ally  of  France,  and 
that  if  France  loses  the  Spanish  alliance  she  will  be  isolated 
in  Europe. 

His  attitude  with  regard  to  the  expulsion  of  the  Jesuits  and 

the  annexation  of  Corsica,  and  the  dignity  with  which,  when 

exiled,  he  retired   to  Chanteloup,  confirms  the  view   that   in 

Choiseui   France    had   a   minister  not  unworthy  of  her   best 

1  Sorel,  La  Question  d' Orient  an  XVI  11"^^  Steele. 


The   Treaty  of  KutcJmk-Kahiardji  327 

traditions.     His  fall  affected  not  only  the  foreign  and    home 
poHcy  of  France,  it  excited  deep  interest  in  Vienna  and  Berlin. 

At  the  same  time  it  must  be  remembered  that  Louis  xv., 
whose  knowledge  of  foreign  politics  was  considerable,  was 
probably  acting  in  the  best  interests  of  France  in  removing  a 
minister  who  was  bent  on  immediate  war  with  England.  It 
was  also  in  the  interests  of  the  Crown  and  nation  that  the 
Parlements  —  obstacles  to  all  real  reform  —  should  be  abolished. 
Choiseul's  friendly  relations  with  the  Parle7nent  of  Paris  ren- 
'  dered  his  fall  a  necessary  prehminar}^  to  any  energetic  move- 
ment against  the  rebeUious  and  reactionary  corporation  of 
lawyers. 

The  Government  was  carried  on  by  d'Aiguillon,  as  Secretary 
of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Terray,  and  INIaupeou,  and  numer- 
ous judicial  reforms  were  made.  Six  new  Tribunals  xhe  Trium- 
called  Conseils  Superieurs  were  instituted  at  Arras,  virate. 
Blois,  Chalons-sur-Marne,  Clermont,  Lyons,  and  Poitiers,  and 
a  central  court  of  justice  was  set  up  in  Paris,  composed  of 
seventy-five  nominees  of  the  Crown. 

This  Assembly  was  known  as  the  Pa7'le7nent  Maupeou,  or  the 
'  Great  Council,'  and  justice  was  administered  gratuitously.  In 
spite  of  its  magnitude  the  revolution  excited  no  serious  opposi- 
tion. jMalesherbes,  the  President  of  the  Cotir  des  Aides,  pro- 
tested, as  did  several  members  of  the  provincial  Parle7ne7its, 
but  the  discontent  was  mainly  confined  to  some  pamphlets  and 
a  few  witty  sayings.  To  these  feeble  protests  Louis  xv.  paid 
little  attention.  To  all  appearance  the  royal  power  had  won  a 
signal  victory ;  the  Chancellor  was  confident  ^nd  triumphant, 
and  the  only  organ  of  Hberty  by  which  the  nation  could  make 
itself  heard  was  destroyed. 

From  1 77 1  to  1774  the  French  Government  was  carried  on 
by  the  Triumvirate.  While  Maupeou  and  Terray  mismanaged 
internal  affairs,  the  latter's  desperate  remedies  to  improve  the 
state  of  the  finances  only  increasing  the  general  dislocation, 
d'Aiguillon  was  called  upon  to  deal  with  important  events 
abroad.     Though  French  agents  remained  in  Poland,  he  made 


328  European  History,   171 5-1789 

no  attempt  to  avert  the  partition  of  that  kingdom  which  took 
place  in  1773.  With  regard  to  Sweden,  however,  he  was  more 
successful.  Towards  that  country  he  continued  Choiseul's 
pohcy  of  giving  encouragement  to  Gustavus  in.,  who  on  the 
19th  of  August  1772,  aided  by  the  subsidies,  and  encouraged 
by  the  support  of  the  French  Government,  carried  out  one  of 
the  most  audacious  and  successful  revolutions  of  the  eighteenth 
century. 

On  February  12,  1771,  Adolphus  Frederick,  King  of  Sweden, 
had  died,  and  with  the  accession  of  his  son,  Gustavus  in.,  it  was 
Gustavus  III.  evident  that  a  critical  period  in  Swedish  history 
and  the  ^^^^  been  reached.     Since  the  death  of  Charles  xii. 

Swedish 

Revolution.  Sweden  had  been  the  prey  to  aristocratic  anarchy, 
and  after  the  disastrous  peace  of  Abo,  Russian  influence  had 
steadily  increased  among  the  governing  faction.  In  1766, 
after  some  thirty  years  of  government  by  the  Hats,  the  party 
of  the  Caps  came  into  power,  and,  in  order  to  counteract  the 
influence  of  France,  drew  near  to  Russia,  and  arranged  a 
marriage  between  the  Crown  Prince,  Gu5ta\ais,  and  Sophia 
Magdalena,  a  Danish  princess.  Though  the  economical  policy 
of  the  Caps  was  in  many  respects  commendable,  their  foreign 
policy  was  disastrous.  Instead  of  observing  a  careful  neutrahty, 
they,  under  the  leadership  of  Ostermann,  the  Russian  ambassa- 
dor, threw  themselves  on  the  side  of  Russia,  ignoring  the  fact 
that  the  Tsarina's  policy  implied  the  ultimate  destruction  of 
Swedish  independence. 

The  elections  of  1769  resulted  in  the  defeat  of  the  Caps,  and 
though  the  Crown  Prince,  supported  by  the  French  ambassa- 
dor, endeavoured,  but  in  vain,  to  carry  out  necessary  reforms  in 
the  Constitution,  the  success  of  the  Hats  or  French  party  en- 
couraged Gustavus  to  visit  Paris,  and  to  discuss  with  Choiseul 
the  political  situation  in  Sweden.  Gustavus  arrived  in  Paris  on 
February  4,  1771,  and  on  his  father's  death  Louis  xv.  under- 
took to  pay  large  subsidies  to  Sweden  annually,  and  sent  Ver- 
gennes,  the  leading  French  diplomatist,  to  Stockholm.  On 
June  6,  1 771,  Gustavus  arrived  at  his  capital.     The  overthrow 


TJie   Treaty  of  Kutchuk-Kamardji  ^2g 

of  the  anarchical  constitution  of  Sweden  was  absolutely  neces- 
sary if  the  countr}-  was  not  to  become  the  prey  of  Russia. 
Gustavus,  already  an  adept  in  the  arts  of  dissimulation,  con- 
scious of  the  possession  of  great  powers,  and  animated  by  a 
patriotic  ambition  to  save  his  country,  realised  that  the  postpone- 
ment of  a  revolution  would  destroy  all  hopes  of  securing  the 
independence  of  his  country.  In  an  interview  with  Frederick 
the  Great  on  his  way  from  Paris,  he  had  discovered  that  Russia, 
Prussia,  and  Denmark  were  leagued  together  to  uphold  the 
existing  Swedish  constitution. 

The  Partition  of  Poland  was  already  agreed  upon,  and  Cath- 
erine's success  against  the  Turks  was  assured.  Unless  a  revo- 
lution had  been  speedily  effected,  Sweden  would  undoubtedly 
have  shared  the  fate  of  Poland,  and  would  have  been  gradually 
dismembered.  From  that  fate  the  determination  of  Gustavus 
saved  her.  Supported  by  the  democracy,  he  engaged  in  a 
successful  struggle  with  the  priMileged  orders,  and  the  coup  d^eiat 
of  August  19  proved  an  inestimable  benefit  to  Sweden.  A  new 
constitution  was  drawn  up,  in  which  the  king  was  given  ex- 
traordinary prerogatives.  Many  of  the  abuses  hitherto  rampant 
in  Sweden  were  abolished,  and  an  attempt  was  made  to  intro- 
duce justice  and  order  into  the  kingdom.  It  would  probably 
have  been  better  for  Sweden  if  Gustavus  had  established  a  des- 
potism, instead  of  attempting  to  govern  constitutionally  a  peo- 
ple as  yet  unable  to  appreciate  the  meaning  of  constitutional 
Hberties.^ 

Very   striking   were    the    immediate    consequences    of  the 
Swedish  revolution.     Owing  to  the  coup  d'etat  of  Gustavus  111., 
Sweden  had  suddenly  emerged  from  the  compara-   The  Effects 
tive  obscmitv  in  which  she  had  remained  since  the   °^  ^^,^.  . 

Swedish 

death  of  Charles  xn.  The  plans  of  Russia,  Prussia,  Revolution, 
and  Denmark  had  received  a  rude  shock,  and  a  general  Euro- 
pean war  seemed  imminent.  Catherine  11.,  who  had  hoped  to 
form  a  '  Grand  Northern  Alliance '  of  all  the  states  dependent 
upon  Russia,  prepared  for  hostilities  against  Sweden,  and 
1  See  Geffroy,  Gustave  III.  et  la  Cotir  de  France. 


330  European  History^   1715-1789 

Denmark  hastily  armed.  No  war,  however,  took  place ;  the 
immunity  of  Sweden  from  attack,  and  the  preservation  of  tran- 
quillity in  the  north,  being  as  much  due  to  the  influence  of  the 
Courts  of  Berlin  and  St.  James  as  the  difficulties  in  which  Cath- 
erine found  herself  involved  in  Turkey.  Frederick  the  Great 
had  already  succeeded,  by  means  of  the  Partition  of  Poland,  in 
averting  a  war  between  Russia  and  Austria ;  he  now  exerted 
all  his  influence  to  preserve  peace  between  Russia  and  Sweden, 
fearing  for  his  gains  from  Poland  if  a  general  European  war 
broke  out.  His  efforts  to  prevent  an  outbreak  in  the  north 
were  vigorously  seconded  by  the  English  Government,  which 
determined  to  maintain  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Baltic, 
refused  to  co-operate  with  Russia,  and,  anticipating  the  views  of 
Canning,  discountenanced  any  interference  in  the  domestic 
affairs  of  Sweden,  and  adopted  a  pohcy  of  neutrality  and  non- 
interv^ention. 

The  hostile  preparations  of  Catherine,  however,  continued, 
and  an  attack  by  the  joint  forces  of  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Den- 
Attitude  of  mark  upon  Sweden  was  expected  in  the  spring. 
France.  jj^  ^|^g  autumu  of  1 772  Gustavus  had,  by  his  war- 

like attitude,  induced  the  Danish  Court  to  disarm,  but  matters 
at  the  close  of  the  year  assumed  so  threatening  an  aspect  that 
France  decided  to  aid  Sweden  by  diplomacy,  and  with  money 
and  men.  At  Paris  the  news  of  the  Swedish  RevoJution  had 
been  received  with  enthusiasm,  and  Gustavus  in.,  v/ho  during 
his  short  visit  had  made  himself  extremely  popular,  found  that 
even  the  degraded  French  Government,  to  some  of  the  mem- 
bers of  which  the  traditions  of  a  brihiant  foreign  policy  still 
appealed,  was  ready  to  enter  upon  a  European  war  on  his 
behalf.  Till  the  death  of  Louis  xv.  French  foreign  policy, 
guided  by  d'Aiguillon,  regained  some  of  its  former  prestige  by 
its  advocacy  of  the  Swedish  cause.  United  with  Spain,  and 
having  sent  Durrand,  an  experienced  diplomatist,  to  St.  Peters- 
burg, the  French  Government  warned  the  Courts  of  Vienna 
and  Copenhagen  of  its  intention  to  support  Sweden,  and  en- 
deavoured to  secure  England's  co-operation  in  maintaining  the 


TJie   Treaty  of  Ktitchiik-Kainai'dji  331 

balance  of  power  in  the  Baltic.     But  the  English  Government 
refused  to  allow  a  French  fleet  either  to  enter  the  Baltic  or  to 
act  in  the  Mediterranean  on  behalf  of  Turkey.     The  fear,  how- 
'  ever,  of  a  European  war  passed  away,  owing  to  the  unexpected 
.  obstinacy  of  the  Turks,  who  in  1773  gained  a  brilHant  victory 
I  over  the  Russians.     Catherine,  unable  to  deal  adequately  with 
'  the  northern  complications  so  long  as  she  had  the  Turkish  war 
,  on  her  hands,  listened  to  the  pacific  views  of  her  Chancellor, 
Panin.     Contenting  herself  with  the  Treaty  of  Tsarkoe-Selo,  by 
which  the  Grand  Duke  Paul  exchanged  with  the  King  of  Den- 
mark his  Holstein  possessions  for  Oldenburg  and  Delmanhorst, 
and  with  a  fresh  secret  alliance  with  Denmark  signed  on  August 
12,   1774,  Catherine  decided  to  wait  for  a  favourable  oppor- 
tunity for  carrying  out  that  policy  towards  Sweden  on  which 
'  she  had  set  her  heart.     To  some  extent  the  French  Govern- 
:  ment  had  atoned  for  its  apathy  with  regard  to  Poland  by  the 
readiness  with  which  it  was  prepared  to  defend  the  action  of 
!  Gustavus.     The  influence  of  Vergennes  at  Stockholm  became 
I  paramount.     D'Aiguillon,  in  addition  to  large  subsidies,  nego- 
tiated a  loan  to  enable  Sweden  to  reorganise  and  strengthen 
j  its  army ;  and  the  enhanced  prestige  of  France  in  the  north 
stands  out  in  relief  against  the  dark  background  of  Louis  xv.'s 
declining  years.     On  May  10,   1774,  Louis  xv.   died,  leaving 
to  his  successor  the    task   of  rescuing   the    country  from  the 
financial  and.  administrative  chaos  which  was  the  result  of  his 
long  reign,  and  the  duty  of   adopting  a  foreign  policy  which 
should  restore  to  France  her  position  among  the  great  European 
Powers. 


CHAPTER    XII 

EUROPE  AND  THE   WAR  OF  AMERICAN   INDEPENDENCE 

I 774-1 783 

After  the  Partition  of  Poland —  Outbreak  of  the  American  War  —  Vergennes  — 
His  Policy  in  1774  —  The  American  War  —  The  American  Declaration  of 
Independence — Vergennes'  Views  —  The  Value  of  French  Assistance  to 
the  Colonists  —  The  Effect  of  the  Capitulation  of  Saratoga  —  England  and 
France  at  War,  1778  —  European  Politics  in  1778  —  The  Bavarian  Succes- 
sion Question  —  The  Decline  of  the  House  of  Wittelsbach  —  The  War  of 
the  Bavarian  Succession — Mediation  of  France  and  Russia  —  The  Treaty 
ofTeschen — The  Armed  Neutrality  of  the  North— England's  Position  in 
1780  —  Events  in  1781 — Attempts  at  Peace  —  Rodney's  Victory,  and  the 
Defence  of  Gibraltar — Peace  Negotiations  —  The  Treaty  of  Versailles  — 
Results  of  the  American  War  upon  Western  Europe  and  upon  Russia  and 
Austria. 

The  Partition  of  Poland,  followed  by  the  Treaty  of  Kainardji, 

forced  upon  Europe  the  recognition  of  the  growing^influence  of 

Russia  in   Europe.     The  rise  of  this   new   Power 

After  the  _  ^  ^ 

Partition  of  fouud  Austria  and  Prussia  mutually  distrustful,  the 
Poland.  Bourbon  kingdoms  weak,  and    England   occupied 

with  her  own  affairs  at  home  and  in  the  colonies.  During  the 
ten  years  succeeding  the  Partition  of  Poland,  the  strained  rela- 
tions between  Prussia  and  Austria,  the  outbreak  of  the  Ameri- 
can war,  and  Joseph  11. 's  attempt  to  seize  Bavaria,  afforded 
Catherine  ii.  admirable  opportunities  for  establishing  Russia  as 
a  great  European  state.  Europe  remained  in  a  state  of  tension, 
aggravated  by  the  uneasy  activity  of  Joseph  11.,  the  ambition  of 
Catherine,  and  the  disHke  felt  by  Frederick  the  Grent  for  Eng- 
land.    In  April  1775  the  first  blood  in  the  American  struggle 

332 


-    Ew'ope  and  the  War  of  American  Independence     333 

was  shed  at  Lexington,  and  the  following  year  the  seizure  of 
Bukovina  by  Austria  almost  produced  a  war  with  Russia,  while 
at  the  same  time  Frederick  the  Great  was  endeav-   ^    ,.     ,     , 

Outbreak  of 

curing  to  excite  fresh  troubles  in  Poland,  in  order   the  Ameri- 
to  make  a  second  partition  necessary,  and  French 
agents  were  busy  in  the  East  attempting  to  induce  the  Turks  to 
enter  upon  fresh  hostilities  with  Russia. 

The  Declaration  of  American  Independence  on  July  4,  1776, 
led  to  an  alliance  between  France  and  the  revolted  colonists, 
which  deeply  affected  the  course  of  events  in  central  Europe, 
and  was  productive  of  several  unexpected  developments.  Ever 
since  the  Peace  of  Paris  Choiseul  had  ardently  desired  to  obtain 
from  England  reparation  for  the  losses  which  France  had  sus- 
tained ;  it  was  left  to  Vergennes  to  carry  out  his  aims,  and  to 
inflict  a  series  of  severe  blows  on  the  maritime  and  colonial 
power  of  Great  Britain.  On  May  10,  1774,  Louis  xv.  had  died, 
leaving  the  monarchy  weakened  in  reputation  abroad,  and  suf- 
fering terribly  from  financial  embarrassments.  In  the  balance 
of  power  in  the  east  of  Europe  France  had  httle  weight,  while 
in  the  west  court  intrigues  had  lessened  her  influence,  and  so 
far  rendered  the  Family  Compact  with  Spain  of  little  practical 
value.      No  sooner  had  Louis  x^^.  ascended    the 

Vergennes. 

throne  than  Vergennes,  who  was  then  in  Sweden, 
was  nominated  the  successor  of  d'Aiguillon  at  the  Foreign 
Office.  Charles  Gravier,  Comte  de  Vergennes,  descended  from 
an  ancient  Burgundian  family,  was  born  on  the  28th  of  Decem- 
ber 1 719,  at  Dijon.  An  ancestor,  Philibert  Gravier,  an  avocat 
in  the  Parleineni  of  Dijon,  had  married,  in  1652,  Rose  Perrault, 
who  brought  with  her  the  property  of  Vergennes,  which  lay  near 
Autun.  After  studying  law,  the  young  Vergennes  had,  under 
the  super\'ision  of  his  uncle,  Chavigny,  seen  something  of  diplo- 
matic life  in  Portugal,  and  in  Germany,  during  the  Austrian 
Succession  War.  After  the  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  the  young 
diplomatist  was  appointed  French  representative  at  the  Court 
of  the  Elector  of  Trier,  and  during  the  years  1750,  1751,  and 
1752  took  an  active  part  in  supporting  the  claims  of  the  Elector 


534  European  History,    17 15-1789 

Palatine  for  compensation  from  England  and  Austria.  In  1754, 
on  the  death  of  Des  Alleurs,  he  was  sent  to  Constantinople,  and 
till  the  diplomatic  revolution  of  1756  exerted  himself  with  suc- 
cess to  organise  an  attack  of  the  Turkish  forces  upon  the  Rus- 
sians whenever  the  latter  marched  westwards.  The  united  ac- 
tion of  France,  Austria,  and  Russia  in  the  Seven  Years'  War  upset 
all  his  preparations,  and  it  was  not  till  1768  that  an  opportunity 
was  given  him  of  inciting  the  Turks  to  declare  war  against  Rus- 
sia. He  had  crowned  his  diplomatic  services  to  France  by  his 
action  at  Stockholm,  during  and  after  the  coup  d'etat  of  Gusta- 
vus  III.  Russian  influence  received  a  severe  blow,  and  the 
appointment  of  Vergennes  to  the  Foreign  Office  was  a  wise 
recognition  of  his  admirable  services  and  undoubted  abilities. 
Though  not  a  statesman,  Vergennes  was  an  experienced  diplo- 
matist, possessed  of  a  considerable  knowledge  of  European 
politics.  Throughout  his  career  he  showed  great  sagacity  and 
acuteness  in  furthering  the  interests  of  France.  He  never 
allowed  his  patriotism  to  lead  him  into  attempting  what  was 
impracticable,  and  during  his  ministry  France  recovered  much 
of  the  prestige  which  she  lost  during  the  Seven  Years'  War. 
His  pohcy  was  a  continuance  and  expansion  of  that  of  Choiseul. 
To  avenge  the  losses  sustained  by  France  at  the  hands  of  Eng- 
land, and  to  slacken  the  ties  which  bound  France  to  Austria, 
were  objects  worthy  of  a  French  Foreign  Minister,  and  entirely 
consonant  with  the  views  of  the  French  nation. 

On  his  accession  to  office  France,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of 
Choiseul,  held  the  position  of  a  second-rate  Power.  The  Peace 
His  Policy  of  Paris,  followed  by  the  First  Partition  of  Poland 
in  1774.  ^j-j(^  1^^  Treaty  of  Kainardji,  had  demonstrated  the 

weakness  of  France,  and  the  failure  of  her  diplomacy.  In 
Poland  her  influence  was  destroyed,  at  Constantinople  her 
credit  had  declined.  Before,  however,  Louis  xvi.  had  been 
on  the  throne  many  years,  circumstances  enabled  Vergennes 
to  place  France  again  in  a  leading  position  in  Europe,  to  deal 
a  severe  blow  at  England's  maritime  supremacy,  and  to  still 
further  weaken  the  unpopular  Austrian  connection.     The  out- 


Ein'ope  and  the  War  of  American  Independence     335 

break   of  the  war  between   the   American   colonies   and  the 
mother  country  afforded  France  the  opportunity,  long  desired 
by  Choiseul,  of  avenging  the  losses  incurred  during   The  Ameri- 
the  Seven  Years'  War.     The  apathy,  divisions,  and   ^^"  ^^'■• 
exhaustion  of  the  Americans  during  the  early  phases  of  the 
war  had  weakened  their  resistance,  and  it  became  evident  that 
without  foreign  assistance  the  success  of  the  revolution  would 
be    seriously  endangered.     It   was    obvious    to   the   American 
leaders  that  no  French   aUiance  was    possible    unless    accom- 
panied  by  a  complete    severance   from    Great    Britain;   and, 
taking  advantage  of  the  indignation  roused  among  the  colonists 
by  England's  action  in  hiring  German  mercenaries,  Congress 
voted,  on  July  4,   1776,  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence.    The  importance  of  this  step  cannot  be   carf  D^"r'a- 


overestimated. /The  political  unitv  of  the  Ens^lish   tion  of  inde- 

^ —        ....''  pendence. 

race  was  for  the  first  time  in  its  history  broken  up ; 
the  rise  of  a  new  nation  was  proclaimed  to  the  world  ;  an 
independent  foreign  policy  was  rendered  possible ;  and  Con- 
gress determined  to  seek  a  French  alliance.  Before  Silas 
Deane,  the  American  representative,  had  arrived  in  Paris,  in 
July  1776,  Vergennes,  probably  influenced  by  Choiseul,  had 
written  a  memorial  on  American  affairs.)  In  the  vergennes' 
document  the  importance  of  maintaining  a  close  Views, 
alliance  between  the  different  branches  of  the  House  of  Bour- 
bon, and  of  opposing  on  all  occasions  the  interests  of  Great 
Britain,  was  clearly  demonstrated,  and  especial  stress  was  laid 
upon  the  necessity  of  aiding  the  Americans  in  their  struggle 
for  independence.  The  defeat  and  submission  of  the  colo- 
nists would,  Vergennes  declared,  be  followed  by  disastrous  con- 
sequences for  the  French  and  Spanish  possessions  in  the  West 
Indies.  If,  however,  the  Americans  won  by  their  own  exertions, 
they  would  be  themselves  disposed  to  conquer  the  French  and 
Spanish  West  Indies,  so  as  to  provide  fresh  outlets  for  their 
productions.  Hence  it  was  of  supreme  importance  that  France 
should  at  once  lay  the  colonists  under  a  debt  of  gratitude,  and 
at  the  same  time  avenge  upon  England  '  the  evils  which  since 


33^  Europea7i  History ,   171 5-1 789  1 

the  commencement  of  the  century  she  has  inflicted  upon  her 
neighbours  and  rivals.'  He  ended  by  urging  that  the  intentions 
of  the  French  Government  should  be  kept  secret,  and  that 
while  the  Americans  should  be  prevented  from  making  peace 
by  '  secret  favours  and  vague  hopes,'  the  English  Ministry  should 

be  dexterously  tranquillised  '  as  to  the  intentions  of 
F^^^hA^°^  France  and  Spain.' ^  Thus,  though  England  was 
sistanceto  at  pcacc  with  both  France  and  Spain,  the  insur- 
nists.°  °'         gents  were  to  be  aided  with  money  and  military 

stores,  and  the  Bourbon  forces  were  to  be  rapidly 
strengthened  with  a  view  to  open  hostilities  with  England.  In 
spite  of  the  pacific  views  of  Maurepas,  Malesherbes,  and  Turgot, 
who  realised  the  pressing  necessity  of  peace  for  France,  and 
notwithstanding  the  risks  which  an  absolute  monarchy  ran  in 
supporting  rebels  against  their  lawful  king,  Vergennes'  policy 
prevailed  ;  a  large  sum  of  money  was  secretly  furnished  to  the 
Americans  ;  Grimaldi,  the  Spanish  minister,  was  induced  to 
send  a  similar  amount,  and,  till  the  end  of  the  war,  the  colonists 
were  aided  by  loans  and  supplies  of  military  material.  What- 
ever may  be  thought  of  Vergennes'  underhand  methods,  there 
is  no  doubt  that,  between  1774  and  1778,  the  French  assistance 
proved  invaluable,  while  the  Bourbons  in  Spain  and  Tuscany, 
no  less  than  Frederick  the  Great,  Joseph  11.,  and  the  Dutch, 
aided  and  encouraged  in  various  degrees  the  American  resist- 
ance to  England.  '  Every  nation  in  Europe,'  wrote  Franklin 
and  Deane,  the  American  commissioners  at  Paris,  Svishes  to 
see  Britain  humbled,  having  all  in  their  turn  been  offended  by 
her  insolence,  which  in  prosperity  she  is  apt  to  discover  on  all 
occasions.'  Vergennes'  views  on  the  situation,  and  on  the  true 
policy  of  France,  were  supported  by  the  majority  of  French- 
men, who  were  inspired  either  by  resentment  for  former  defeats 
at  the  hands  of  England,  or,  like  Voltaire  and  Rousseau,  by 
feelings  of  sympathy  for  religious  and  political  liberty.  In 
spite  of  the  incongruity  of  a  despotic  government  supporting 

1  See  Lecky,  History  of  England  in  the  Eighteenth   Century^  vols.  iv. 
and  V. 


Eiijvpe  and  the  War  of  Aincricaji  Independence     337 

the  rise  of  a  great  republic  in  the  West  fv^unded  upon  rebelHon, 

the  French  enthusiasm  for  the  colonists  was  sincere,  and  showed 

:  itself  in  the  eagerness  with  which  multitudes  of  soldiers  crossed 

•the  Atlantic  to  reinforce  the  armies  of  the  insurgents.     It  only 

required    the    disastrous    capitulation  of  Saratoga, 

on    October    17,    1777,    to    convince    the    French   the^Capftuia- 

ministejrs  that  England's   greatness  was  over,  and   tio"  o^  Sara- 

to  decide  them  to  openly  join  the  colonists.     On 

February  6,  1778,  treaties,  in  which  the  Americans  engaged  to 

j  make  no  peace  with  England  unless  their  independence  was 

j  recognised,  were  signed  in  Paris.     Even  Vergennes  had  hesi- 

;  tated  to  take  this  decisive  action    till    he  was  assured  that  a 

!  reconciliation  between  Endand  and  her  colonists    r.    ,     ,      . 

^  England  and 

was  impossible.  He  was  well  aware  of  the  miser-  France  at 
I  able  state  of  the  French  finances,  while  many  of  ^^'  ^^"^  ' 
his  colleagues  dreaded  war  and  were  inclined  to  follow  the 
w^se  policy  indicated  by  Turgot.  But  the  overwhelming  disas- 
ter of  Saratoga  carried  all  before  it,  and  Vergennes  seized  the 
opportunity  of  still  further  humiliating  Great  Britain.  In  March 
1778  England  and  France  were  at  war,  and  the  isolation  of 
Great  Britain  seemed  complete.  The  German  Powers  were 
hostile,  Frederick  the  Great  being  an  avowed  enemy,  and 
while  Spain  was  preparing  to  aid  France,  the  attitude  of  Russia 
and  Holland  was  doubtful.  The  capitulation  of  Saratoga  had 
rendered  the  success  of  the  revolution  a  certainty.  During 
the  remaining  months  of  1778,  however,  England's  chances 
of  success  seemed  more  hopeful,  and  both  Washington  and 
Vergennes  recognised  with  apprehension  the  possibility  of  the 
failure  of  the  revolution.  Before  the  end  of  the  year  nearly 
all  the  French  possessions  in  India  had  been  lost ;  the  inde- 
cisive battle  of  Ushant  was  fought  on  July  2  7  ;  while,  in  the 
West  Indies,  the  gains  and  losses  of  the  English  and  French 
were  fairly  equalised.  But  with  the  beginning  of  1779  the 
prospects  of  the  colonial  cause  gradually  improved.  In  April 
Spain  signed  a  convention  with  France,  while  in  June  she 
declared  war  against  England  and  besieged  Gibraltar. 
PERIOD  VI.  y 


33^  European  History,   17 15-1789 

While  aiding  the  ^^  merican  colonists,  Vergennes  was  careful 
to  exert  all  his  influence  in  favour  of  the  preservation  of  the 
Euro  ean  peace  of  Europe.  It  was  equally  England's  in- 
Poiitics  in  tercst  to  securc  if  possible  the  aUiance  of  Russia, 
^^^  ■  and,  as  in  the  Seven  Years'  War,  to  involve  France 

in  continental  complications.  In  1778  there  seemed  every 
reason  to  expect  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  Europe.  The 
relations  between  Russia  and  Turkey  had  become  so  strained 
that  on  the  27th  of  February  Sir  James  Harris,  the  Enghsh 
ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  wrote  that  '  war  between  the 
Russian  Court  and  the  Porte  appears  inevitable.'  The  naval 
and  military  preparations  of  the  Turks  proceeded  on  a  consid- 
erable scale,  and  it  was  believed  in  England  that  France,  in 
order  to  draw  off  the  attention  of  Russia  from  the  politics  of 
western  Europe,  was  inducing  the  Turks  to  violate  the  Treaty 
of  Kainardji.  Nikolai  Ivanovich,  Count  Panin,  who  still  pre- 
sided over  the  Russian  Foreign  Office,  was  unwilling  to  take 
any  step  which  might  endanger  the  close  alliance  between 
Russia  and  Prussia.  He  still  hoped  to  carry  into  effect  his 
northern  system  which,  uniting  Russia,  Prussia,  Denmark,  and 
Sweden,  should  counteract  the  effects  of  the  Family  Compact. 
In  1778  Catherine,  still  irritated  with  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment, which  had  hampered  her  in  the  late  peace  negotiations 
with  the  Turks,  was  approached  by  the  English  Government 
through  the  medium  of  Sir  James  Harris,  and  invited  to  make 
an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance. '  But  the  opposition  of 
Panin,  influenced  by  Frederick  the  Great,  who  was  still  furious 
at  the  conduct  of  Bute,  prevented  any  close  rapprochejuejit 
between  England  and  Russia ;  and  Catherine  declared  her 
inabihty  to  join  England  against  France,  unless  the  English 
Government  bound  itself  to  support  her  against  the  Turks. 

*  Turkey,'  she  declared,  '  was  her  national  enemy  as  France 
was  ours.  ...  A  war  between  Russia  and  Turkey  was  almost 
certain,  and  she  would  find  herself  thus  with  two  enemies  upon 
her  hands,  and  no  corresponding  advantage  accruing  to  her 
from  her  Enghsh  alhance,  which  would  be  a  dead  letter  with 


Europe  and  the  War  of  American  Independence     339 

respect  to  the  Xorthern  Powers,  who  were  never  hkely  to  be  at 
war  with  Russia.'  ^ 

While  England,  without  an  ally  in  the  world,  was  at  war 
with  France,  and  engaged  in  a  desperate  attempt  to  reduce  the 
American  colonists  to  submission,  while  Russia  was  occupied 
in  preparing  for  a  fresh  struggle  against  Turkey,  while  Spain 
was  about  to  join  France  in  giving  aid  to  the  Americans,  cen- 
tral Europe  seemed  hkely  to  be  involved  in  a  great  contest 
over  the  question  of  the  Bavarian  Succession. 

On  the  30th  of  December  1777,  Maximilian  Joseph,  Elector 
of  Bavaria,  died,  and    the    younger  branch  of  the  House  of 
Wittelsbach    became    extinct.-       Austrian    troops   The 
occupied  Bavaria.     Frederick  the  Great  prepared   succession 
to  contest  the  Hapsburg  claims;    and  it  was  not   Question, 
till  the  Peace  of  Teschen.  in  May  1779,  that  a  serious  danger 
to  the  peace  of  Europe  was  removed. 

The  death  of  the  Elector,  and  the  subsequent  events,  re- 
vealed to  Europe  the  feeble  condition  of  the  House  of  Wit- 
telsbach. During  the  Thirty  Years'  War  the  Bava-  The  Decline 
rian  Duke  had  played  a  very  important  part ;  Ho^us^e  of 
and  till  the  close  of  the  Spanish  Succession  War  Witteisbach. 
Bavaria,  from  various  causes,  was  regarded  as  one  of  the  most 
powerful  of  the  secondary  states  in  the  Empire.  From  the 
Treaty  of  Utrecht,  however,  Bavaria  ceased  to  be  looked  upon 
as  the  principal  supporter  of  the  Catholics  in  Germany.  In 
spite  of  its  close  connection  with  France,  and  in  spite  of  the 
election  of  the  Elector  Charles  Albert  to  the  imperial  throne 
in  1742,  Bavaria,  after  his  death  in  1745,  continued  to  decUne 
in  the  consideration  of  Europe.  With  the  conclusion  of  the 
Franco- Austrian  alliance  of  1756,  the  French  Government  had 
no  longer  any  reason  to  support  Bavaria  against  Austria,  while 
the  Elector  himself  had  not  the  ability  and  enterprise  requisite 
to  elevate  his  country  into  the  position  which  it  held  in  the 
estimation  of  Europe  during  the  seventeenth  century. 

1  Diaries  and  Correspondence  of  the  Earl  of  Malmesbury,  vol.  i.  p. 
193,  note.  -  See  Appendix  D. 


340  Europeafi  History,   171 5-1789 

The  decadence  of  Bavaria  was  a  serious  matter  far  Germany, 
and  especially  so  at  a  time  when  the  Lorraine  policy  of  the 
House  of  Hapsburg,  under  Joseph  11.,  was  beginning  to  make 
itself  felt  in  consistent  efforts  at  consolidation  and  concentra- 
tion. Such  a  policy  could  not  be  adopted  without  meeting 
with  opposition  from  France  and  Prussia.  The  former  hoped 
to  regain  her  ancient  influence  at  the  Courts  of  the  smaller 
German  princes,  the  latter  was  jealous  of  any  interference  with 
the  ministers  or  constitution  of  the  Empire. 

Eastern  and  central  Europe  was  thus  in  a  state  of  tension, 
while  western  Europe  was  on  the  verge  of  becoming  deeply 
^..   ,.,      ,     involved  in  the  great  contest  in  America  and  in 

The  War  of  ° 

the  Bavarian  attempts  to  dcstroy  England's  maritime  supremacy. 
Succession,      j^  ^^^^^  ^^  ^^^^^  moment   that   Maximilian  Joseph, 

Elector  of  Bavaria,  died  (December  30,  1777),  and  his  heir, 
Charles  Theodore,  the  Elector  Palatine,  who  represented  the 
elder  branch  of  the  Wittelsbach  House,  signed  a  treaty  on 
January  3,  1778,  recognising  the  Austrian  claims.  Kaunitz  at 
once  took  advantage  of  the  fact  of  France  being  occupied  in 
the  American  struggle  ;  Austrian  troops  occupied  Bavaria ;  and 
Frederick  the  Great  was  face  to  face  with  a  state  of  things  most 
prejudicial  to  his  interests.  He  therefore  turned  to  Charles 
Augustus,  the  Duke  of  Zweibriicken,  or  Deux-Ponts,  head  of 
the  Birkenfeld  branch  and  heir  to  the  childless  Charfes  Theo- 
dore. Before  the  Austrians  could  legally  take  possession  of 
Bavaria,  the  ratification  of  Charles  Augustus  to  the  convention 
of  January  3,  1778,  was  necessary.  That  ratification  the  Duke 
was  not  prepared  to  give,  and  in  May  1778  protested  at  the 
Diet  against  the  convention,  and  invoked  the  aid  of  France  and 
Prussia.  Frederick,  thereupon,  undertook  to  defend  the  Duke's 
claims ;  he  and  Joseph  11.  entered  into  a  long  correspondence 
in  which  the  latter  set  forth  his  claims,  and  Prussian  and  Aus- 
trian armies  marched  into  Bohemia. 

War  seemed  inevitable,  and  likely  to  spread  over  the  north 
of  Europe.  In  the  quarrel  between  Russia  and  Turkey,  no  less 
than  in  the  Bavarian  Succession  question,  Gustavus  iii.  had  an 


Etirope  and  the  War  of  Americaji  hidependence     341 

interest.  Against  Russia  Turkey  was  his  natural  ally,  while,  as 
Duke  of  Pomerania,  he  had  a  voice  in  German  affairs.  Had 
war  broken  out  in  the  east  and  centre  of  Europe,  Sweden  would 
have  seized  the  opportunity  of  attacking  Denmark.  No  war, 
however,  took  place.  The  Partition  of  Poland  was  so  recent 
an  event  that  Catherine  feared  the  reopening  of  the  question 
might  result  from  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  She  therefore 
contented  herself  with  profiting  by  the  French  diplomatic 
efforts,  which,  at  the  instigation  of  Frederick  the  Great,  who 
wished  to  keep  Russia  unhampered  by  Eastern  troubles,  had 
been  employed  in  1777  to  avert  a  Russo-Turkish  war,  and  con- 
tinued to  gradually  extend  Russian  influence  over  the  Crimea 
by  means  of  intrigues.  Like  Frederick  the  Great,  she  was 
anxious  to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe,  and  watched  with 
some  anxiety  the  development  of  the  ambitious,  though  by 
no  means  unstatesmanlike,  design  of  Joseph  11.  to  strengthen 
Austria  by  the  incorporatior/of  Bavaria. 

In  the  summer  of  1778  two  Prussian  armies,  one  under 
Frederick  himself  and  the  other  under  Prince  Henry,  were  set 
in  motion,  the  king's  intention  being  to  march  on  Vienna  by 
way  of  Bohemia  and  Moravia.  But  he  found  the  Austrians 
ready  to  meet  him.  One  army  of  15,000  men,  commanded 
by  Joseph  11.,  who  was  supported  by  Lacy  and  Haddik,  opposed 
the  advance  of  Frederick  to  Glatz ;  while  50,000  men  under 
Loudon  were  detached  to  watch  Prince  Henry  and  prevent  his 
junction  with  the  king.  Loudon's  movements  were  masterly 
and  successful ;  and  though  no  serious  action  was  fought, 
Frederick  lost,  mainly  through  want  of  forage  and  food,  and 
the  autumnal  rains,  more  than  20,000  men. 

Both  the  Prussian  and  Austrian  armies  were  probably  inade- 
quate for  an  extended  campaign,  and  hostiHties  closed  in  the 
spring  of  1779  by  the  Treaty  of  Teschen.  The  principal  cause 
of  this  unexpected  result  was  Maria  Theresa's  repugnance  to 
war.  Aware  that  Austria  was  ill  prepared  for  the  resumption 
of  the  struggle  against  Prussia,  that  the  mass  of  the  people 
were  impoverished  and  heavily  taxed,  and  that  the  Hungarians 


342  Etiropeaji  History^    17 15-1789 

were  discontented  at  Joseph's  unconstitutional  attempt  to  em- 
ploy the  Hungarian  cavalry,  she  attempted  to  gain  over  Freder- 
ick by  negotiations,  and  sent  Thugut,  an  Austrian  diplomatist, 
secretly  to  Frederick  on  two  separate  occasions,  offering  to 
assure  him  the  succession  of  Anspach  and  Baireuth  if  he  would 
consent  to  the  incorporation  of  Bavaria  with  Austria.  Fred- 
erick and  his  minister,  Hertzberg,  refused  to  entertain  such 
propositions,  while  Joseph,  on  hearing  of  his  mother's  action, 
was  furious.  Maria  Theresa,  supported  by  Kaunitz,  was,  how- 
ever, resolved  on  peace,  and  appealed  to  France  and  Russia  to 
use  their  mediation.  Joseph  11.,  at  the  same  time,  demanded 
from  France  24,000  men,  basing  his  demand  on  the  terms  of 
the  treaty  of  1756.  But  Vergennes  replied  that  the  posses- 
„  J-  .•     "  r   sions  of  Austria  were  not  threatened,  and  that  the 

Mediation  of  ' 

France  and  present  trouble  was  caused  by  unheard-of  claims 
on  the  part  of  the  Emperor.  Joseph  then  secretly 
proposed  an  exchange  of  the  Low  Countries  for  Bavaria.  But 
Vergennes,  realising  the  importance  of  not  repeating  the  blun- 
ders of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  steadily  refused  to  be  drawn  into 
any  European  war,  and  declared  that  he  would  only  interfere 
to  preserve  peace.  Maria  Theresa  had  been  equally  unsuc- 
cessful in  her  negotiations  with  Russia.  In  the  spring  of  1778 
she  had  written  to  Catherine  asking  her  to  use  her  influence 
to  induce  Frederick  the  Great  to  withdraw  from  his 'position. 
But  Catherine,  closely  aUied  with  Prussia,  showed  no  desire  to 
aid  Maria  Theresa,  and  the  Austrian  Court  found  its  proposals 
declined  by  Prussia,  France,  and  Russia.  Eventually,  Russia 
and  France  having  agreed  to  mediate  between  the  contending 
Powers,  Catherine  moved  a  force  of  30,000  Russians  to  the 
frontier  of  Galicia,  and,  determined  to  support  Prussia,  notified 
to  Austria  that  she  had  appointed  Prince  Repnin  to  mediate, 
and  to  prevent,  if  necessary  by  force  of  arms,  the  absorption 
of  Bavaria  by  the  Hapsburgs.  Vergennes,  braving  the  wrath 
of  Marie  Antoinette  and  the  Austrian  party,  declined  to  sup- 
port the  proposed  exchange  of  Bavaria  and  the  Netherlands, 
and  insisted  on  the  maintenance  of  the  Treaty  of  Westphalia, 


Europe  mid  tJic  JVar  of  Ame^'icaji  hidependeiice     343 

The  prudent  and  moderate  policy  of  the  French  minister  and 
the  resokite  attitude  of  Catherine,  proved  successful,  and  con- 
iferences  were  held  at  Teschen  between  Prussia  and  The  Treaty 
I  Austria,  and  under  the  joint  mediation  of  Russia  of  Teschen. 
and  France.  On  the  13th  of  ]May  1779  peace  was  signed. 
Austria  paid  off  the  claims  of  Saxony,  restored  the  lands  seized 
from  Bavaria,  annulled  the  renunciation  of  Charles  Theodore, 
and  withdrew  its  opposition  to  the  reunion  of  Anspach  and 
Baireuth  to  the  Electorate  of  Brandenburg  on  the  extinction 
of  the  reigning  House.  On  the  other  hand,  Charles  Theodore 
ceded  to  Austria  the  'quarter  of  the  Inn,'  —  that  is,  the  country 
between  the  Danube,  the  Inn,  and  the  Salza,  comprising  about 
200  miles  of  territory,  and  inhabited  by  some  60,000  people. 

The  War  of  the  Bavarian  Succession  and  the  Peace  of 
Teschen  have  a  distinct  importance  both  in  throwing  light 
upon  the  political  condition  of  Europe,  and  in  affording  indica- 
tions of  future  developments.  Had  France  not  been  engaged 
in  assisting  the  American  colonists  and  in  combating  England, 
the  temptation  to  seize  the  opportunity  of  strengthening  her 
north-eastern  frontier  would  have  proved  irresistibly  strong. 
The  policy  pursued  by  France  is  as  creditable  to  the  foresight 
and  resolution  of  Vergennes  as  it  is  to  Louis  xvi.'s  wisdom  in 
supporting  his  minister  against  the  party  of  Marie  Antoinette. 
The  Peace  of  Teschen  afforded  Russia  that  opportunity  of  in- 
terfering in  the  affairs  of  Germany  which  had  been  refused  to 
her  in  1748.  Russia  was  admitted  as  a  guarantor  of  the  great 
Westphalian  settlement ;  the  growth  of  her  influence  in  Europe 
was  recognised,  and  future  events  tended  to  increase  her  pre- 
ponderance. Sir  James  Harris  had  no  hesitation  in  declaring 
that  Russia  had  become  a  leading  Power  in  Europe,  and  that 
the  concerns  of  Europe  were  the  concerns  of  Russia.^ 

To  Austria  the  conduct  of  Vergennes  came  as  a  surprise. 
In  Vienna  the  treaty  of  1756  was  as  unpopular  as  in  Paris,  and 
Joseph  II.  himself  disliked  it.  Though  Maria  Theresa  and 
Kaunitz  were  disinclined  to  take  any  step  which  should  in  any 

1  Diaries,  and  Correspondence  of  the  Earl  of  Malmesbury,  vol.  i.  p.  253. 


344  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

way  weaken  the  connection  with  the  Bourbons,  the  attitude 
of  France  plainly  indicated  that  the  Court  of  Versailles  would 
afford  Austria  no  assistance  in  any  schemes  of  aggrandisement 
The  ties  which  bound  the  two  Courts  became  sensibly  weakened, 
and  Austrian  policy  began  to  incline  towards  a  rapprochetneni 
with  England  and  Russia.^ 

To  Prussia  and  the  lesser  German  provinces  the  Treaty  of 
Teschen  was  eminently  satisfactory.  Though  the  war  had  cost 
Frederick  ^4,350,000,  in  addition  to  the  loss  of  men,  the  Prus- 
sian intervention  had  been  successful.  Austrian  aggrandisement 
had  been  checked,  and  the  reputation  of  Frederick  as  the  de- 
fender of  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  Empire  was  consider- 
ably enhanced.  By  the  union  of  Bavaria  and  the  Palatinate 
a  new  and  more  powerful  House  of  Bavaria  was  established, 
which,  in  spite  of  the  persistent  efforts  of  Joseph  11.  and  some 
of  his  successors,  has  remained  independent  of  Austria.  Joseph 
II. 's  scheme  had  been  foiled,  and  the  imperial  laws  and  consti- 
tution had  been  protected  by  Frederick  the  Great. 

The  wisdom  of  the  policy  of  Vergennes  during  the  Bavarian 
complications  was  undoubted.  At  St.  Petersburg,  Sir  James 
Harris  had  established  a  personal  and  political  friendship  with 
Potemkin,  the  rival  of  Panin,  and,  on  the  22nd  of  July  1779, 
had  a  private  interview  with  the  Tsarina,  the  result  of  which 
was  seen  in  an  order  that  each  member  of  the  Coujicil  should 
Th  Arm  d  ^^pctrately  give  his  opinion  on  the  affairs  of  Great 
Neutrality  of  Britain  to  Catherine.-  Instead,  however,  of  mak- 
ing an  alHance,  Catherine,  though  never  really 
hostile  to  England,  placed  herself  at  the  head  of  the  armed 
neutrality  of  the  North,  formed  in  consequence  of  England's 
claim  to  search  neutral  vessels  for  contraband  of  war.  In  Feb- 
ruary 1780  the  Tsarina  issued  a  manifesto  which  laid  down  the 
principle  that  a  blockade,  to  be  effectual,  must  be  real ;  that 
neutral  ships  may  sail  from  port  to  port,  and  along  the  coasts 
of  belligerents ;  and  that  all  goods,  except  contraband  of  war, 

1  Paganel,  Histoire  de  Joseph  IT.,  p.  326. 

^Diaries  and  Correspondence  of  the  Earl  of  Malmesbury,  vol.  i.  p.  255. 


{ 


Europe  and  the  War  of  Avierican  Independe7tce     345 

belonging  to  the  belligerent  Powers  shall  be  free  from  seizure 
in  neutral  vessels.  Russia  immediately  received  support  from 
Sweden  and  Denmark,  the  king  of  the  former  country  having 
already,  in  December  177C,  protested  against  the  high-handed 
manner  in  which  England  exercised  her  right  of  search.  In 
July  and  August  1 780,  Sweden  and  Denmark  respectively  united 
with  Russia ;  Prussia  and  Austria  joined  the  alliance  in  May 
and  October  1781,  Portugal  in  July  1782,  and  the  kingdom  of 
the  Two  Sicilies  in  February  i783.\Though  no  war  resulted 
from  the  armed  neutraHty,  the  chances  of  an  expansion  of 
hostilities  were  very  much  increased.  England  found  herself 
opposed  by  northern  Europe  ;  the  preponderance  of  Russia  in 
European  affairs  was  greatly  enhanced ;  the  Prussian  party, 
headed  by  Panin  at  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg,  had  won  its 
last  triumph ;  and  all  chance  of  an  Anglo-Russian  p^sj^j^jj  ^j 
alliance  had  for  the  moment  disappeared.  On  England  in 
December  20,  1780,  England  was  compelled,  by  ^^  °" 
the  constant  infractions  of  treaty  stipulations,  to  declare  war 
against  Holland,  which  did  not  join  the  armed  neutrality  of  the 
North  till  January  1781,  and  thus  found  arrayed  against  her 
almost  the  whole  of  Europe.  '  The  aspect  of  affairs  at  the  close 
of  1780.'  writes  Mr.  Lecky,  'might  indeed  well  have  appalled 
an  English  statesman.  Perfectly  isolated  in  the  world,  England 
was  confronted  by  the  united  arms  of  France,  Spain,  Holland, 
and  America  ;  while  the  Northern  League  threatened  her,  if  not 
with  another  war,  at  least  with  the  annihilation  of  her  most 
powerful  weapon  of  offence.  At  the  same  time,  in  Hindostan, 
Hyder  AU  was  desolating  the  Carnatic  and  menacing  Madras ; 
and  in  Ireland  the  connection  was  strained  to  its  utmost  Hmit.'  ^ 
In  1 781  a  French  attack  on  Jersey  was  repulsed;  and  in 
April  Gibraltar,  which  had  already  been  besieged  since  July 
1780,  was  reheved.  The  capture  of  St.  Eustatius  Events  in 
by  Rodney  and  Vaughan,  on  February  3,  proved  ^781. 
a  terrible  disaster  for  the  Dutch,  and  was  followed  by  the  loss 
of  Negapatam  and  other  settlements  on  the  Coromandel  Coast, 
1  Lecky,  History  of  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  vol.  iv.  p.  163. 


34^  European  History,   171 5-1789 

as  well  as  by  those  in  Sumatra.  At  sea,  while  a  drawn  battle  was 
fought  between  the  English  and  Dutch  on  the  Dogger  Danl^,  suc- 
cess attended  the  efforts  of  the  French  and  Spanish  fleets.  De 
Grasse  estabhshed  the  naval  ascendency  of  the  French  in  the 
West  Indies,  and,  after  capturing  Tobago,  landed  a  strong  force  of 
soldiers  in  America.  The  Spaniards  were  no  less  successful ;  they 
not  only  reconquered  West  Florida,  in  May,  but,  together  with  a 
French  contingent,  landed  a  force  in  Minorca,  while  a  combined 
French  and  Spanish  fleet  was  for  some  weeks  supreme  in  the  Eng- 
lish Channel.  It  was  only  the  energy  of  Warren  Hastings,  and 
the  skill  and  courage  of  Sir  Eyre  Coote,  who  overthrew  Hyder 
in  the  battle  of  Porto  Novo,  on  July  i,  1781,  that  prevented  the 
temporary  extinction  of  the  English  power  in  the  Carnatic. 

The  continuance  of  the  war  gave  an  increased  importance 
to  a  Russian  aUiance,  and  while  the  Dutch  appealed  to  Cathe- 
Attempts  at  ^^"^^  on  the  grouud  that  Great  Britain  had  broken 
Peace.  ^yith  Holland  solely  on  account  of  the  armed  neu- 

trality, the  English  Government  offered  to  hand  over  ^Minorca 
as  the  price  of  a  convention.  Catherine,  however,  refused  the 
appeals  of  both  England  and  Holland,  declaring  to  Sir  James 
Harris  that  '  nothing  could  be  stronger  than  her  friendship  for 
England,'  and  that  she  would  'be  most  happy  to  contribute  to 
obtain  for  Great  Britain  a  just  and  honourable  peace.'  ^  Both 
Russia  and  Austria  had  already  attempted  to  mediate  between 
the  belligerent  Powers,  but  it  was  not  till  after  the  surrender  of 
Cornwallis  at  Yorktown,  due  in  great  part  to  the  landing  of 
French  troops  by  De  Grasse  at  the  Chesapeake,  on  October  19, 
1 781,  that  proposals  for  peace  were  definitely  entertained. 
Hostilities,    however,    continued    through    a    o^reat 

The  Victory  '  '  &  & 

of  Rodney,  part  of  1 782.  Roducy's  great  victory  ou  April  1 2, 
April  12, 1782;    jyS2    near  DoiTnmca7~oveFlhe  French  fleet,  was 

and  the  '        '  '  ' 

Defence  of       followed   by  the  famous    defence  of  Gibraltar,  in 

September,    by   Sir   George    Elliot.      Though    the 

siege  continued  till  February  17 S3,  Gibraltar  was  never  again 

^  Diaries  and  Correspondence  of  the  Earl  of  Malmesbury ,  vol.  i.  pp.  401, 
402, 


Europe  ajid  the   War  of  American  Independence     34/ 

in  any  danger  from  the  French  or  Spaniards.  Spain  had  long 
been  desirous  of  retiring  from  the  war,  which  she  had  entered 
mainly  in  order  to  recover  Gibraltar.  The  hope  of  doing  so 
had  now  vanished,  and,  with  bankruptcy  imminent,  the  Span- 
ish Court,  which  had  always  disliked  the  idea  of  American 
independence,  was  ready  to  open  negotiations. 

Rodney's  victory  had  destroyed  the  French  hopes  of  the 
capture  of  Jamaica  ;  France,  like  Spain,  was  rapidly  drifting 
towards  bankruptcy ;  Maurepas  and  Necker  w'ere  Peace  Nego- 
extremely  desirous  of  peace ;  and  Vergennes,  tiations. 
though  determined  to  obtain  terms  satisfactory  to  France  and 
her  American  allies,  was  weary  of  the  war,  disillusioned  with 
the  Americans,  and  anxious  to  have  his  hands  free  to  deal  with 
the  Eastern  Question,  which  he  foresaw  was  being  skilfully 
reopened  by  the  Tsarina  and  her  ministers.  He  was  resolved 
not  to  support  the  desire  of  the  colonists  to  conquer  Canada,; 
he  was  equally  willing,  provided  the  independence  of  America 
was  recognised,  to  take  all  possitje  steps  to  prevent  the  com- 
plete ahenation  of  England.  •  Thoi]gh*»his  views  met  with  Httle 
response  from  George  iiia  who  was  opposed. ta^OXli'  recognition 
of  American  independence,  public  feehng  in  England  declared 
itself  in  favour  of  peacCj'^nd  recognised  the  necessity  of  ac- 
quiescing in  the  loss  of  the  revolted  States.  The  fall  of  the 
North  Ministry  cleared  the  way  for  peace  negotiations,  which 
were  at  once  taken  in  hand  by  Rockingham,  through  the 
medium  of  his  two  Secretaries  of  State,  Fox  and  Shelburne, 
in  the  spring  of  1782.  On  the  death  of  Rockingham,  on  July  i, 
Shelburne  became  Prime  Minister,  and  found  the  task  of  car- 
rying on  the  peace  negotiations  simplified  through  the  victory 
of  Rodney  and  the  defence  of  Gibraltar.  On  November  30, 
1782,  the  prehminaries  between  England  and  the  United  States 
were  signed,  those  between  England  and  France  and  Spain 
on  January  20,  1783;  while  a  truce  between  England  and 
Holland  ended  the  hostihties  between  those  Powers.  The 
Peace  of  Versailles,  which  included  treaties  between  England 
and  the  United  States,  France,  Spain,  and  Holland,  and  which 


348  European  History y   171 5-1 789 

confirmed  the  preliminaries,  was  signed  in  September  1783. 
England  ceded  to  France  St.  Lucia  and  Tobago,  Senegal  and 
n.,-    T,         t   Goree,  and  restored  the  French  establishments  at 

The  Peace  of  ' 

Versailles.  Surat  and  in  Orissa  and  Bengal,  Pondicherry,  to- 
sept.  1783.  gether  with  Calicut,  and  the  fort  of  Mah^ ;  she 
received  back,  however,  Dominica,  Grenada,  St.  Vincent,  St. 
Christopher,  Nevis,  and  Montserrat,  while  Spain  retained  West 
Florida,  and  received  East  Florida  and  Minorca.  England 
secured  the  right  to  cut  logwood  in  Honduras  Bay,  and  re- 
covered Providence  and  the  Bahama  Isles.  The  negotia- 
tions between  England  and  America  revealed  considerable 
differences  of  opinion  between  Vergennes  and  his  alKes. 
Neither  he  nor  Florida  Blanca  wished  to  secure  the  complete 
ascendency  of  the  United  States ;  the  latter  indeed  detested 
the  idea  of  American  independence.  The  war  had  been  to  a 
The  Results  great  extent  non-European,  but  its  effects  were  felt 
oftheAmeri-  Qver  the  wholc  civilised  world.  Western  Europe 
upon  West-  had  no  reason  to  look  back  on  the  American  war 
ern  Europe  ^yj^j^  satisfaction.  England  came  out  of  the  struggle 
with  her  prestige  diminished,  and  her  empire  cut  short.  She 
had  seen  the  northern  Powers  form  the  armed  neutrality  to 
contest  her  right  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  sea ;  hostile  fleets 
had  twice  sailed  supreme  in  the  English  Channel.  It  was  gen- 
erally beheved  in  Europe  that  England's  decadence  had  set  in. 
The  war  had  dealt  an  almost  fatal  blow  at  the  declining 
power  of  Holland.  The  half-hearted  conduct  of  WiUiam  v. 
during  the  struggle,  and  the  disasters  which  befell  the  Dutch, 
had  excited  the  so-called  '■  patriot '  party  to  oppose  the  Stadt- 
holder,  and  a  period  of  internal  turmoil  only  made  more  appar- 
ent the  weakness  of  the  Government  of  the  Hague.  Spain, 
which  had  entered  the  war  in  order  to  regain  Gibraltar,  had 
indeed  acquired  Minorca  and  Florida.  But,  as  Florida  Blanca 
had  anticipated,  the  example  of  America  was  soon  after  fol- 
lowed by  the  Spanish  colonies.  For, France  the  effects  of  the 
struggle  proved  still  more  disastrous.  Though  she  could  boast 
of  having  revenged  herself  upon  England,  and  though,  in  1783, 


Etirope  and  tJic  War  of  American  Independence     349 

she  appeared  to  have  secured  a  complete  preponderance  in 
Europe,  she  had  in  reahty  suffered  far  more  than  her  ancient 
rival.  Financial  ruin  and  bankruptcy  were  rendered  inevitable, 
and  revolution  was  brought  within  measurable  distance.  The 
American  war  had  been  genuinely  popular  in  France,  and  the 
people  were  becoming  inoculated  with  republican  and  revolu- 
tionary ideas.  The  predictions  of  Turgot  and  Gustavus  iii. 
were  amply  fulfilled.  The  former  had  warned  Louis  xvi.  that 
bankruptcy  must  result  from  war ;  the  latter  reahsed  clearly 
the  inconsistency  and  risk  involved  in  an  absolute  monarch 
supporting  rebels.  '  Such  an  example  '  (as  that  of  the  Ameri- 
can colonies) ,  he  wrote,  '  will  find  only  too  many  imitators  in 
an  age  when  it  is  the  fashion  to  overthrow  every  bulwark  of 
authority.'  ^ 

But  if  the  War  of  American  Independence  had  such  disas- 
trous results  upon  the  countries  of  western  Europe  which  en- 
gaged in  it,  far  different  were  the  indirect  effects  upon  Russia 
and  Austria.  The  death  of  Maria  Theresa,  on  the  29th  of 
November  1780,  had  freed  Joseph  11.  from  the  restraining  in- 
fluence of  the  great  Empress-Queen,  and  Catherine  11.,  now 
wearv  of  the  Prussian  alliance  and  secure  from  all 

and  upon 

interference  by  France  or  England,  was  preparing  Russia  and 
for  the  annexation  of  the  Crimea.  In  May  1 780 
the  Tsarina  and  Joseph  11.  had  met  at  Mohilev,  and  Vergennes' 
alarm  at  the  growing  power  and  schemes  of  Russia  was  fully 
justified.  He  had  hastened  on  the  Peace  of  Versailles,  and 
had  been  careful  not  to  make  harsh  demands  on  England,  in 
order  to  secure  for  France  the  co-operation  of  Great  Britain  in 
opposing  the  policy  of  Russia  in  eastern  Europe. 

1  Nisbet  Bain,  Gustavus  III.  and  his  Contemporaries,  vol.  i.  209. 


CHAPTER    XIII 

CATHERINE   II.   AND   JOSEPH  IL 

1783-1789 

The  Russo-Austrian  Alliance  —  The  Reforms  of  Joseph  II. —  Maria  Theresa's 
Reforms — Joseph's  Administrative  Reforms  —  Commercial  Reforms  — 
Judicial  Reforms  —  Religious  Reforms  —  Criticism  of  these  Reforms  — 
Reforms  in   the    Austrian    Netherlands  followed  by  an  Insurrection,  1787 

—  The  Aims  of  Joseph  II, 's  Foreign  Pohcy  —  Austrian    Influence   in   Italy 

—  Treatv  between  Joseph  II,  and  Catherine  II.,  1781 — The  Fall  of  Panin, 
and  the  End  of  the  Alliance  between  Russia  and  Prussia  —  Schemes  for  the 
Partition  of  Turkey  —  The  Annexation  of  the  Crimea,  1784  —  The  Attitude 
of  England  and  France  —  The  Treaty  of  Constantinople,  1784  —  Condi- 
tion of  Holland  :  Aggressions  of  Joseph  II.  in  the  Netherlands —  The  Treaty 
of  Fontainebleau,  1785  —  Alliance  between  France  and  Holland,  1785  — 
The  Designs  of  Joseph  II.  on  Bavaria,  1785  —  Frederick  the  Great  and 
the  League  of  Princes — Death  of  Frederick  the  Great,  1786  —  Frederick 
William  ll.  and  Holland  —  Death  of  Vergennes,  1787  —  Treaty  of  Com- 
merce between  England  and  France,  1786  —  Vergennes  is  succeeded  by 
Montmorin  —  The  Triple  Alliance  of  1788  —  The  Journey  of  Catherine  II. 
and  Joseph  Ii.  to  the  Crimea,  1787 — War  between  Russia  and  Turkey  — 
Joseph  II.  declares  War  with  Turkey  —  The  Capture  of  Ochakov  —  Sweden 
declares  War  with  Russia  —  The  Danes  attack  Sweden  —  The  Intervention 
of  the  Triple  Alliance  —  Revolution  in  Sweden  —  The  Continuance  of  the 
Russo-Turkish  War  —  Revolutionary  Movements  in  the  Austrian  Nether- 
lands —  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Prussia  in  1789  —  Death  of  Joseph  II.  —  How 
far  his  Reign  a  Failure  ?  —  Hostile  Attitude  of  Prussia  —  Hertzberg's  Schemes 

—  The  Convention  of  Reichenbach  —  Leopold  II.  and  the  Re-establishment 
of  the  Imperial  Authority  —  The  Peace  of  Sistova  —  The  Treaties  of 
Verela  and  Jassy  —  Europe  on  the  Verge  of  the  Wars  of  the  French 
Revolution. 

The  meeting  of  the  Emperor  and  the  Tsarina  at  Mohilev 
was  followed  by  a  visit  of  the  former  to  St.  Petersburg  and 
the  establishment  of  friendly  relations  between  the  Austrian 
and  Russian  Courts.     The  efforts  of  Frederick  the  Great,  who 

350 


NORTH  &  EAST  OF  EUROPE  IN  1780 


J^stad '     '^Abo 


40 


THE  |60 

FIRST    PARTITION  ! 
OF  I 

POLAND  [ 

1772 

1  To  Russia 

, !    ,,   Prussia 

!        I    ,,   Austria 


^Sosco^ 


"^  ^Q.  ^    lA    :x    d 


50 


'•\-Brzesc 

r  " 


^ 


:Bar      Ij 


?^-45 


Seyastupc 


lardp. 


fenegrg,. 


■i  VTo/iii, 


i^ 


CK        S  E\JL 


40 


25  l<,n„u,. 


w-ich        30 


PERIOD  VI. 


■TnWi  T^trrrl' "t'TTin^w- A  Co..£3iTiT 


Catherine  11.  mid  Joseph  IL  35 1 

sent  his  nephew,  Prince  Henry,  to  St.  Petersburg  to  preser\-e 
his  alHance  with  Catherine,  were  of  no  avail,  and  the  Tsarina 
testified  her  regard  for  the  Emperor  by  usins:  her   ^,    , 

°  .  °  The  Austro- 

influence  to  ensure  the  election  of  the  Archduke   Russian 
Maximilian  as  coadjutor  of  Munster.     On  Xovem-   •^^^^"'^"=- 
ber  29,   17S0,  shortly  after  Joseph's  return  to  Vienna,  Maria 
Theresa  died,  and  the  Emperor  was  free  to  carry  out  on  an 
extended   scale    his    reforming    schemes    and    his    ambitious 
projects.^ 

The  character  of  the  sovereign  who  now  attempted  to 
introduce  sweeping  reforms  into  the  Austrian  dominions  is  a 
curious  study.  With  abilities  above  those  of  xhe  Reforms 
the  average  European  ruler,  and  imbued  with  a  °^  Joseph  11. 
passion  for  ideal  justice,  Joseph  11.  is  by  far  the  most  interest- 
ing of  the  enlightened  reformers  of  the  centur}'.  Previous  to 
.his  mother's  death  his  energies  had  .been  confined  to  Impe- 
rial matters,  and  he  had  attempted  to  reform  the  Imperial 
Chamber,  which  sat  at  Wetzlar,  and  the  Aulic  Council,  which 
met  in  Vienna.  His  want  of  success  in  this  endeavour, 
followed  by  his  failure  to  annex  Bavaria,  had  disgusted  him 
with  the  Imperial  institutions;  and  after  1780  he  confined 
his  reforming  energies  to  the  Hapsburg  states.  His  policy, 
both  domestic  and  foreign,  was  often  statesmanlike  in  con- 
ception, but  marred  by  a  recklessness  and  impatience  which 
characterised  his  whole  career.  He  undertook  tasks  beyond 
human  strength,  and  '  his  history  is  therefore  only  the  long 
and  sorrowful  story  of  a  prince  animated  by  the  best  inten- 
tions,' who  failed  in  much  that  he  attempted.  He  was  per- 
meated with  the  ideas  of  the  century,  and  fascinated  with  the 
prospect  of  carrying  out  large,  comprehensive,  and  beneficent 
projects  for  the  good  of  his  subjects.  His  scheme  of  domestic 
policy  was  'no  less  than  to  consolidate  all  his  dominions  into 
one  homogeneous  whole  ;  to  abolish  all  privileges  and  exclu- 
sive rights  ;  to  obliterate  the  boundaries  of  nations,  and  sub- 
stitute for  them  a  mere  administrative  division  of  his  whole 
1  Paganel,  Histoire  de  Joseph  II.,  p.  332. 


352  European  History,   171 5-1789 

Empire ;  to  merge  all  nationalities,  and  establish  a  uniform 
code  of  justice  ;  to  raise  the  mass  of  the  community  to  legal 
equality  with  their  former  masters  ;  to  constitute  a  uniform 
level  of  democratic  simplicity  under  his  own  absolute  sway.'  ^ 

These    drastic    changes,  which    amounted    to  a  revolution, 
Joseph  resolved  to  carry  out  with  the  utmost  haste,    and    to 
*  alter    the    administrative    government,    education,    rehgious 
constitution,   legislation,   and   legal   procedure    of  his    states,' 
without  any  regard  for  the  prejudices    and    traditions  of  the 
people  for  whose  benefit   these    changes    were    to   be    made. 
^Wlnie  with  Frederick  the  Great  the  practical  statesman  was 
(  always  uppermost,  with    Joseph  poHtical  considerations  were 
\siit)ordinated    to  a   desire  to  carry  out  the  new  ideas  of  the 
century.      Generous,    conscientious,    and  well-meaning,    there 
was    nothing   profound    in    the    Emperor's    character.       His 
ambitions  were  often  admirable,  but  he  entirely  failed  in  his 
estimate    of  the  limits    of  his    powers.     His  desire  to  emu- 
late   and    excel    Frederick    the    Great  animated  him    all  his 
life,  and  coloured  much  of  his  policy.     Into  his  mind,  which 
hcked  a    sound    educational  training,  ideas    borrowed  hastily 
from  French   philosophers  had  sunk.     '  Since  I  mounted  the 
throne,'  he  wrote  in  1781,  'I  have  made  philosophy  the  legis- 
lator of  my  Empire.'     Influenced  by  the  ideas  of  the  century, 
and   his   desire,  in  imitation  of  Frederick  the   Great,  to  form 
a  well-organized    central  state,    Joseph  attempted   within  five 
years  to  check    the  influence  of    all  foreign  Powers,    includ- 
ing that    of    the    Roman  Church,  on  the  internal  affairs    of 
Austria,  and   to   abolish  all  old  institutions  and  usages  in  the 
assemblage    of    dominions    which    constituted    his    kingdom. 
Administrative,  judicial,  economic,  and  rehgious  reforms  were 
set  on  foot  simultaneously.     History,  tradition,  race,  counted 
for   nothing.     Anticipating    the    spirit    in    which    the    French 
National    x\ssembly  acted,  the    Emperor,  in    the  interests   of 
unity,  desired  to  make  a  clean  sweep  of  all  obstacles  which 
impeded  the  realisation  of  his  aims.     But  unlike  the  French 

^  Herman  Merivale,  Historical  Studies,  p.  12. 


Catherine  II.  and  Joseph  II.  353 

Revolutionists,  he  had  to  exercise  his  policy  in  a  state  com- 
posed of  the  most  diverse  and  heterogeneous  elements  in 
Europe.  His  d^^^^ns  were  only  held  together  by  the 
personal  tie^^BI^Breignty,  and  by  the  influence  of  the 
Church.  ^  f^^ai^ ^solved.'  writes  von  Sybel,  'that  Austria 
should  gain  well-rounded,  and,  if  possible,  extended  frontiers 
on  every  side,  and  thus  come  forth  from  the  centre  of  Europe 
as  the  first  of  European  Powers.  He  was  therefore  in  a  state 
of  continual  aggression  against  his  privileged  orders,  his  peo- 
ple, and  his  neighbours.'  ^ 

In  Galicia  and  Lombardy  Joseph  was  regarded  as  a  con- 
queror attempting  to  impose  his  rule  on  an  unwilling  people ; 
in  fl^ungary  he  was  opposed  by  the  dominant  nobility;  in  the 
Netherlands  his  influence  was  checked  by  the  independent  tone 
of  a  number  of  self-governing  commonwealths  ;  in  Bohemia  and 
Moravia  he  was  regarded  as  a  foreigner ;  in  the  Tyrol  his 
power  was  modified  by  the  existence  of  a  free  though  loyal 
peasantry. 

The  work  of  reform  had  already  been  taken  in  hand  by  his 
energetic  mother.     Maria  Theresa  had  swept  away  a  mass  of 
antiquated  customs,  and  had  destroyed  the  privi-         . 
leges  of  the  Provincial  Diets.    They  could  no  longer   Theresa's 
impose  indirect  taxation,  the  control  of  the  admin-    ^*'^°''"^^- 
istration  of  the  provinces  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  lieuten- 
ants and  intendants  sent  from  Vienna,  and  thus  their  functions 
were  confined  to  voting  the  taxes  demanded  by  the  Govern- 
ment, and  which  were  paid  into  the   Imperial  Exchequer  at 
Vienna.     A  body  of  magistrates,  whose  headquarters  were  also 
at  Vienna,  had   taken   the  place   of  the  old  local    , 

.  .  Joseph  s 

Courts  of  Justice.     This  policy  had  received  the   Admmistra- 
full  support  of  Joseph,  who  was   equally  bent  on   *'^^^^^°'""^s. 
destroying  the  privileges  of  the  towns  and  placing  them  under 
Imperial  bailiffs. - 

In  spite  of  the  difficulties  in  his  path,  Joseph  boldly  attempted 

1  Heinrich  von  Sybel,  History  of  the  French  Revolution,  vol.  i.  p.  i86 
(trans.).  ^  See  Appendix  A. 

PEiaOD   VI.  z 


354  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

to  form  out  of  these  discordant  elements  a  united  Empire. 
He  abolished  serfdom  in  Bohemia,  Moravia,  Galicia,  and  Hun- 
gary, putting  the  peasants  into  possession  of  the  lands  which 
they  cultivated  on  the  payment  of  a  fair  rent.  He  destroyed 
whatever  remained  of  the  rights  of  the  Diets,  and  introduced 
further  reforms  into  the  laws  of  land  tenure.  The  Austrian 
dominions  were  formed  into  one  single  state,  composed  of  the 
thirteen  districts  of  Galicia,  Bohemia,  Moravia,  Lower  i\ustria, 
Austria  Proper  (Styria,  Carinthia,  Carniola),  the  Tyrol,  the 
Austrian  possessions  in  Suabia,  Transylvania,  Hungary,  Croatia, 
Lombardy,  the  Austrian  Netherlands ;  lastly,  the  counties  of 
Gorz  and  Gradisca,  with  Trieste.  These  were  subdivided  into 
circles,  over  each  of  which  was  placed  a  governor  (Kreishaupt- 
mann) . 

All  these  different  nationalities  were  to  be  merged  into  one 
people,  and  the  German  language  ^  was  established  and  was 
alone  recognised  throughout  his  dominions.  The  Diets  were 
no  longer  convoked,  and  the  privileges  of  the  royal  towns  were 
Commercial  supprcsscd.  Joscph  was  no  Icss  activc  in  his  efforts 
Reforms.  ^q  improvc  the  trade  of  the  country  and  to  enrich 
the  state.  Two  commissions  were  appointed  for  the  revision 
of  taxation,  and  the  exemptions  of  the  nobles  and  the  clergy 
were  destroyed.  His  attempts  to  open  the  Scheldt  to  the  Aus- 
trian trade  are  well  known.  Roads  were  made  and  improved  ; 
and,  with  the  assistance  of  Zinzendorf,  the  late  governor  of 
Trieste,  Austrian  commerce  received  a  great  stimulus.  The 
ports  of  the  Adriatic  coast,  especially  that  of  Fiume,  were  im- 
proved ;  treaties  of  friendship  were  made  with  the  Emperor  of 
Morocco,  with  Turkey,  and  with  Russia.  The  Austrian  trade 
in  the  Levant  was  extended.  Factories  were  established  in 
China  and  the  Indies,  and  manufactories  were  built  in  Vienna. 
In  August  1784  a  strict  system  of  protection  was  estabhshed, 
and  which,  carried  on  in  a  manner  worthy  of  Napoleon,  proved 
very  disastrous  to  the  welfare  of  Austrian  trade. 

1  5<f^Wolf  undZwiedineck-Siidenhorst,  Oesterreichunter Maria  Theresia, 
/osef  11.,  und  Leopold II.  (Oncken  Series),  p.  293. 


Catherine  II.  and  Joseph  II,  355 

Joseph's  legislative  and  judicial  work  was  a  continuation 
and  development  of  that  of  Maria  Theresa.  His  civil  and 
criminal  codes  were  in  accordance  with  the  ideas  judicial 
of  the  time,  and  conferred  great  benefits  on  Aus-  Reforms, 
tria.  The  penalty  of  death  was  reserved  for  cases  of  rebelUon, 
and  torture  was  abolished.  Under  a  Supreme  Court,  six  Courts 
of  Appeal  were  established  at  Vienna,  Prague,  Klagenfurth, 
Freiburg  in  Breisgau,  Brlinn,  and  Lemberg.  In  religious  mat- 
ters he  showed  no  less  activity.  The  Jesuits  had  been  con- 
demned by  Maria  Theresa,  and  both  Joseph  and  his  brother 
Leopold  were  in  the  habit  of  giving  ecclesiastical  Religious 
appointments  to  men  of  Jansenist  opinions.  His  Reforms. 
Toleration  Edict,  published  on  October  13,  1781,  *  the  Magna 
Carta  of  Austrian  religious  liberty,'  checked  the  proselytising 
tendencies  of  the  Catholic  clergy,  which,  under  ]\Iaria  Theresa, 
were  allowed  full  play,  permitted  Protestants  to  erect  churches 
and  schools,  allowed  various  sects  to  acquire  property,  and 
improved  the  condition  of  the  Jews.  The  power  of  the  hitherto 
dominant  religion  was  abrogated,  the  idea  of  episcopal  inde- 
pendence in  opposition  to  the  pretensions  of  Papal  supremacy 
was  fostered,  and  the  legal  freedom  of  the  Dissidents  was  ren- 
dered secure. 

The  beneficent  results  of  this  measure  were  but  slightly 
interfered  with  by  certain  freaks  of  absolutism  which  not  in- 
frequently accompanied  Joseph's  acts.  In  Bohemia  a  sect  of 
'  Deists '  had  been  formed,  and  against  them  Joseph  issued  an 
ordinance  exempting  them  from  his  Toleration  Edict,  and 
ordering  immediate  punishment  upon  all  avowed  holders  of 
Deistic  opinions.  The  interference,  too,  of  the  Government 
with  some  of  the  Jewish  customs  tended  to  detract  from  the 
efforts  of  the  Emperor  to  improve  their  condition  and  to  satisfy 
their  aspirations. 

Alarmed  at  these  sweeping  reforms,  no  less  than  at  the  doc- 
trine preached  by  Joseph's  clerical  supporters,  '  that  the  suc- 
cessor of  St.  Peter  has  no  right  to  temporal  power,'  Pius  vi. 
paid  a  visit  to  Vienna  in  order  to  win  over  the  Emperor,  to 


356  European  History ^   1715-1789 

encourage  the  Catholics,  and  generally  to  avert  the  dangers 
which  threatened  the  Church  in  Austria.  The  powers  which 
the  Pope  had  hitherto  claimed  over  the  Austrian  clergy  had 
been  strictly  limited,  and  the  connection  between  the  religious 
houses  in  Austria  and  their  superiors  in  Rome  had  been  severed. 
It  was  Joseph's  av^owed  intention  to  destroy  the  influence  of 
the  Pontiff  over  his  subjects,  to  make  the  Church  the  subser- 
vient tool  of  the  state,  and  to  diminish  the  power  of  the  clergy 
over  the  laity. 

The  appearance  of  Pius  vi.  caused  great  excitement,  and 
roused  much  enthusiasm  among  the  people.  But  Joseph  11. 
refused  to  open  negotiations  with  the  Pope,  and  Kaunitz 
treated  him  with  contempt.  Though  the  Papal  visit  was,  to 
all  appearance,  a  failure,  and  though  Pius  gained  no  immediate 
advantage,  it  remains  true  that  the  presence  of  the  Pope  in- 
augurated a  South  German  religious  revival,  which  grew  in 
intensity,  and  against  which  Joseph  could  not  prevail. 

Edicts  were  published  in  1781,  1784,  and  1785  which  for- 
bade the  Bishops  to  appeal  to  Rome,  or  to  publish  any  Bull 
without  the  Imperial  sanction ;  and  exempted  all  monastic  in- 
stitutions from  obedience  to  any  foreign  authority.  Further- 
more, the  two  Bulls,  hi  Ccena  Domini  and  UnigeJiitus,  which 
defined  the  Pope's  prerogatives,  were  not  allowed  to  i)e  taught, 
no  money  was  to  be  sent  to  the  Papal  Court,  no  one  was  to 
study  at  the  German  college  in  Rome,  and  no  titles  conferred 
by  the  Papal  chancery  were  to  be  recognised.  Joseph  next 
attacked  the  convents,  first  dissolving  over  six  hundred  of  the 
monastic  Orders  which,  having  contemplative  religion  as  their 
sole  object,  were,  in  his  opinion,  of  no  practical  use  to  the  state. 
!Many  abbeys,  nunneries,  and  canonries  were  also  abolished ; 
the  number  of  monks  was  reduced  to  about  two  thousand, 
and  the  revenues  of  the  suppressed  monasteries  were  devoted 
to  works  of  charity.  The  Orders  left  untouched  were  placed 
under  the  strictest  surv^eillance,  and  compelled  to  carry  out 
the  Emperor's  ^vishes  in  every  detail  of  their  religious  observ- 
ances.     By  these  measures  Joseph  alienated  the  Universities, 


;  Catherine  II.  and  Joseph  II.  357 

the  Bishops,  and  the  regular  and  secular  clergy  no  less  than 
the  whole  body  of  the  people,  who  were  irritated  at  his  inter- 
ference with  religious  processions  and  pilgrimages. 

Many  of  these  reforms  were  most  beneficial  in  their  effects, 
and  continued  to  be  operative  after  the  Emperor's  death.  The 
suppres.-^ion  of  feudal  vassalage,  which  existed  in   ^  .  .  . 

^^  ,  °    '  Criticism 

all  the  Imperial  dominions  except  Austria  Proper,  of  these 
the  Netherlands,  and  the  Tyrol,  was  in  itself  an  ^*^°''"^5- 
immense  benefit ;  much  land  that  had  been  shut  up  in  mort- 
main was  restored  to  circulation ;  the  administration  of  justice 
in  the  provinces  by  royal  officials,  and  the  establishment  of 
facihties  for  a  regular  course  of  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court 
at  Vienna,  was  a  check  to  the  power  of  the  nobles.  But  many 
of  Joseph's  wisest  measures  were  nulhfied  by  his  irritating 
attacks  upon  the  national  sentiment  of  his  subjects.  The  use 
of  German  in  the  Courts  of  Bohemia  and  Croatia  was  very 
unpopular ;  his  refusal  to  be  crowned  King  of  Hungary,  and 
his  removal  of  the  Hungarian  regalia  from  Presburg,  alienated 
his  Mag}'ar  subjects ;  his  abohtion  of  the  provincial  Estates 
was  a  blunder;  his  endeavours  to  eradicate  by  edict  all 
national  distinctions  of  race,  language,  and  religion  had  never 
any  chance  of  success.  The  proclamation  of  the  equaUty  of 
all  men  before  the  law  failed  to  compensate  those  of  his  sub- 
jects who  were  threatened  with  the  substitution  of  German  for 
their  national  tongue,  and  who  disliked  the  prohibition  of 
many  religious  ceremonies  and  sendees. 

His  ecclesiastical  pohcy  was  especially  ill-judged.  The 
Austrian  monarchy  possessed  a  peculiarly  incoherent  char- 
acter, and  was  held  together  mainly  by  the  influence  of  the 
Church.  Without  the  support  of  the  Church  no  means  existed 
for  treating  the  various  nationalities  over  which  Joseph  ruled, 
and  it  became  impossible  for  the  Imperial  authority  to  carry 
out  its  edicts.  At  the  head  of  the  Ultramontane  opposition 
was  Cardinal  Migrazzi,  Archbishop  of  Vienna,  and  his  views 
found  an  echo  in  the  Netherlands,  where  the  University  of 
Louvain  declared  that  '  Toleration  is  the  parent  of  dissension.' 


358  Etiropean  History^   171 5-1 789 

In  January  1787  Joseph  promulgated  edicts  constitut- 
ing the  Netherlands  a  province  of  the  Austrian  monarchy, 
Reforms  in  and  dividing  it  into  nine  circles  governed  by  in- 
Netheriands  tcudauts,  and  sub-dividcd  into  districts  which  were 
followed  by     ruled  by  commissioners  appointed  by  the  intend- 

an  Insurrec-  .  -    .        . 

tion,  1787.  ants.  The  ancient  courts  of  justice  were  abol- 
ished, and  new  tribunals  with  new  forms  of  procedure  were 
substituted. 

This  flagrant  violation  of  the  charters  roused  general  discon- 
tent ;  and  van  der  Noot,  a  lawyer,  headed  the  opposition  of 
the  state  of  Brabant.  The  inhabitants  of  the  Austrian  Nether- 
lands armed,  some  wishing  to  imitate  America,  and,  while 
forming  a  republic,  to  apply  for  French  aid.  Joseph,  though 
he  believed  the  opposition  was  due,  not  to  national  aspirations, 
but  to  French  intrigues,  was  forced  to  give  way,  and  revoked 
the  edicts  in  the  summer  of  1787.  Finding,  however,  after  the 
death  of  Vergennes  that  financial  embarrassments  assured  the 
neutrality  of  France,  he  again  foolishly  reimposed  the  edicts 
relative  to  the  Church,  and  quartered  troops  all  over  the  coun- 
try. In  November  1788  the  Estates  of  Brabant  and  Hainault 
refused  to  pay  subsidies.  In  January  1789  the  Estates  of 
Hainault  were  abolished,  and  in  June  the  whole  constitution 
of  Brabant  was  annulled.  A  large  emigration  to  Holland,  in 
November  1 788,  was  followed  by  a  revolution  which-forced  the 
Austrian  soldiers  to  abandon  the  country,  with  the  exception  of 
Luxemburg  and  Limburg.  The  revolted  provinces  declared 
their  independence,  and  on  January  10,  1790,  formed  them- 
selves into  a  Federal  Republic. 

Since  the  visit  of  Pius  vi.  Joseph  had  begun  to  experience 
continued  opposition  to  his  plans.  He  became  impatient, 
violent,  and  suspicious ;  and  it  is  said  that  his  co-operation 
with  Russia  in  the  Turkish  war  in  1787  was  mainly  due  to 
his  disappointment  in  not  being  able  to  carry  out  his  exten- 
sive schemes  for  the  centralisation  and  improvement  of  his 
dominions. 

The  eventual  failure  of  most  of  Joseph  ii.'s  projects  was  due. 


CatJierine  It.   and  Joseph  II.  359 

in  great  measure,  to  his  attempts  to  carry  out  far-reaching 
schemes  of  foreign  pohcy  simultaneously  with  domestic  reforms. 
The  main  design  of  his  policy  was  the  consolida-  The  Aims  of 
tion  of  the  Hapsbura:  dominions,  and  the  restora-   Jp^^P*^  ^^'^ 

i  ^  '  Foreign 

tion  of  the  Hapsburg  supremacy  in  Germany.  For  Policy, 
the  successful  execution  of  this  policy  the  recover}-  of  Silesia, 
and  the  consequent  abasement  of  the  House  of  Hohenzollern, 
was  necessary.  It  was  also  requisite  that  the  Austrian  territory 
in  the  south  and  east  of  Europe  should  be  rendered  more  com- 
pact, and  Joseph  purposed  to  occupy  Venice  and  her  Italian 
possessions,  Istria,  and  Dalmatia,  as  well  as  Wallachia  as  far  as 
the  Aluta.  Widdin,  Orsova,  and  Belgrade.  Bosnia,  Herzegovina, 
Montenegro,  and  a  portion  of  Servia.  Realising  the  impossibil- 
ity of  defending  the  distant  Netherlands,  he  continued  to  scheme 
to  exchange  them  for  Bavaria,  on  the  possession  of  which  de- 
pended the  continued  influence  of  Austria  in  Germany. 

These  extensive  plans  were  certain  to  be  opposed  by  France 
and  Prussia,  and  it  was  only  when  circumstances  forced  the 
former  Power  to  adopt  a  neutral  position  that  Joseph  was  able 
to  attempt  to  carry  them  out  with  any  chance  of  success. 
Maria  Theresa  had  been  attached  to  the  French  alliance ; 
Joseph  11.  detested  it,  and  his  journey  to  Paris  in  1777  only 
confirmed  him  in  his  views. ^ 

The  whole  tendency  of  his  policy,  subsequent  to  his  mother's 
death,  was  to  strengthen  his  friendship  with  Russia ;  and  after 
his  successive  failures  in  17S4  in  the  Netherlands,  and  in  17S5 
in  respect  of  Bavaria,  Joseph  deliberately  adopted  a  policy 
with  enormous  danger  to  Austrian  interests  in  south- 
Europe,  and  decided  to  aid  Russia  in  her  policy  of 
Ibering  Turkey.  He  failed  to  recognise  that  the  true 
r  of  Austria  was  to  oppose  Russian  aggressions  upon  Tur- 
to  accept  the  loss  of  Silesia,  and  united  with  Prussia  to 
oifer  a  vigorous  resistance  to  the  advance  of  the  great  Slav 
Power  westwards.  It  was  not  till  after  Joseph's  death  that 
Austrian  statesmen,  realising  that  Russian  and  Austrian  inter- 

1  Arneth,  Maria  Theresia  und  Joseph  II.,  vol.  ii.  p.  132. 


360  European  History ^   171 5-1789 

ests  of  necessity  conflicted  in  the  East,  began  to  take  measures 
to  check  the  growing  influence  of  the  Tsars.  Joseph  11.  had 
accepted  the  Peace  of  Teschen  with  great  reluctance,  but  the 
continuance  of  the  American  war,  the  outbreak  of  hostilities 
between  England  and  Holland,  the  increasing  age  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  the  schemes  of  Catherine  11.  in  the  Crimea,  and  the 
strong  position  held  by  the  Hapsburgs  in  Italy,  afforded  favour- 
able opportunities  for  the  attempted  realisation  of  many  of  his 
favourite  schemes.  The  Italian  peninsula  was  already  domi- 
nated by  Austrian  influences.  The  Archduke  Leopold  reigned 
in  Tuscany  ;  Ferdinand,  another  of  Joseph's  broth- 
Influence  ers,  had  married  the  heiress  of  Modena ;  the  Duke 
in  Italy.  ^^  Parma  was  the  husband  of  one  of  Joseph's  sisters, 

while  another,  the  famous  Caroline,  had  married  Ferdinand, 
King  of  Naples.     It  was  not,  however,  till  1815  that  Metter- 
nich  realised  in  great  part  Joseph's  projects,  and  Venice  fell 
under  Austrian  rule, 
y    Fully  appreciative  of  the  commanding  position  occupied  by 
'Catherine  11.  in  the  late  negotiations  at  Teschen,  and  furious 
at  the  poHcy  of  Vergennes,  Joseph  had  already  determined  to 
act  independently  of  France,  and  to  seriously  modify  the  tradi- 
tions of  Austrian  foreign  poHcy.     In  June  1781   the  friendship 
of  the  Emperor  and  Catherine  11.  was  cemented  by  a  close  per- 
sonal alliance.     The  treaty,  which  was  drawn  up  in 

Treaty 

between  the  form  of  a  letter,  was  ostensibly  defensive,  and 

and^Cath  guaranteed  in  general  terms  the  possessions  of  the 
erine  II.,  two  Powcrs.^  Reciprocal  support  was  to  be  Ln\  en 
^'^  *■  when  either  of  the  contracting  parties  was  inj^agt  of 

assistance.-     In  case  the  Porte  proceeded  to  actual  wai 
vaded  Russian  territory,  Joseph  undertook  to  march  to 
rine's  aid.     In  return  for  Austrian  connivance  at  the  Stjssiau^ 
designs  against  Turkey,  and  for  the  promise  of  Austrian  aid  in  case 
the  Porte  invaded  Russian  territory,  Joseph  11.  hoped  to  involve 

1  Arneth,  Joseph  II.  unci  Catharina  von  Russland. 

2  Diaries  and   Con-espondence   of  the   Earl  of  Malmesbury,  p.  426  j 
Paganel,  Histoire  de  Joseph  II.,  p.  401. 


Cat  her  me  II.  and  JosepJi  II.  361 

Russia  in  his  scheme  for  the  annexation  of  Bavaria.  The  Turk- 
ish question  now  absorbed  all  Catherine's  attention,  and  before 
her  eyes  floated  the  project  of  estabhshing  a  Greek  empire 
dependent  on  Russia.  Though  the  expulsion  of  the  Turks 
from  Europe  had  long  been  the  dream  of  Christendom,  though 
the  extension  of  the  Russian  dominion  to  the  Mediterranean 
had  been,  since  the  days  of  Peter  the  Great,  one  of  the  objects 
of  Russian  foreign  policy,  to  Catherine  11.  belongs  the  credit  of 
having  definitely  opened  the  Eastern  Question  in  its  modern 
form,  and  of  having  installed  as  a  national  object  that  system 
of  an  unremitting  Slav  crusade  against  Turkey  which  has  so 
profoundly  affected  the  balance  of  power  in  the  east  of  Europe. 
In  place  of  the  latent  aims  of  the  houses  of  Rurik  and  Roma- 
nov, Russian  foreign  policy,  from  the  days  of  Catherine,  has 
been  animated  by  a  conscious  and  systematic  determination  to 
destroy  the  Turkish  empire  and  to  conquer  Constantinople. 
Catherine's  policy,  when  robbed  of  its  chimerical  and  fantas- 
tical elements,  aimed  simply  at  the  destruction  of  the  Turkish 
empire  and  the  advancement  of  the  solid  interests  of  Russia, 
and  was  calculated  to  rouse  the  susceptibilities  of  France  and 
England  and  to  revolutionise  the  balance  of  power  in  the 
Mediterranean.  Vergennes,  however,  being  fully  occupied  in 
the  West,  and  English  statesmen  continuing  to  view  with  com- 
placency the  extension  of  Russia  at  the  expense  of  Turkey, 
Catherine  was  enabled  to  annex  the  Crimea. 

This  new  development  of  the  Eastern  Question  had  not  only 
led  to  the  Austro-Russian  Alliance,  but  had  caused 
a  ministerial  revolution  in  St.  Petersburg.     Since   J^^.^^"  °f 

^^^  °  f  anin,  and 

^^^Count  Panin  had  been  the  head  of  the  Prus-   End  of  the 
alTTance 


irty  at  the  Russian  capital,  and  the  Prussian   between 


alHance    had   been   the    keystone    of  Catherine's   Russia  and 

Prussia. 

policy.     After  the  First  Partition  of  Poland,  which 
was   itself    a   result   of    this   alliance,    Frederick    the    Great, 
partly   by   the    aid   of  immense    bribes    to    Panin,    had   kept 
Catherine    true    to    the    existing    political    system,    and    had 
contributed    to  prevent  Russian  assistance  from    being  given 


362  European  History,   171 5-1789 

to  England  during  the  American  struggle.  He  had,  how- 
ever, as  early  as  1769,  decided  that  he  would  not  be  a  party  to 
the  partition  of  Turkey,  recognising  that  in  any  future  war 
with  Russia  or  Austria  the  alliance  of  the  Porte  might  be 
of  inestimable  value  to  Prussia.  For  the  furtherance  of  her 
schemes  against  Turkey,  Catherine  could  therefore  derive  no 
benefit  from  th§  Prussiaji^alliance,  and  httle  encouragement 
from  Panin,  who,  as  early  as  1779,  had  become  an  object  of 
her  aversion,  and  whose  influence  was  being  rapidly  under- 
mined by  that  of  Prince  Potemkin,  who  had  succeeded  Alexis 
Orlov  as  favourite.  Potemkin,  who  was  deficient  in  states- 
manUke  qualities,  had  thrown  himself  with  enthusiasm  into 
Catherine's  eastern  projects,  and  his  administration  was  marked 
by  the  definite  manifestation  of  hostility  against  Turkey.  The 
interview  of  Mohilev  had  overthrown  the  union  subsisting  be- 
tween the  Courts  of  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg;  the  alliance  of 
May  18,  1781,  completed  the  destruction  of  the  old  political 
system ;  on  September  2  Panin  was  removed  from  the  Foreign 
Office  ;  on  the  20th  he  was  formally  dismissed,  and  in  1783  he 
and  Alexis  Orlov  died. 

Bent  on  the  annexation  of  the  Crimea,  and  freed  from  the 
Prussian  connection,  the  Tsarina  hastened  to  test  the  value  of 
^  ^         ,       her  treaty  with  the  Emperor,  who  was  desirous,  in 

Schemes  for  ■'  .  .  .  ' 

the  Partition  retum  for  his  acquiescence  in  her  anti-Tujrkish  pol- 
o  urkey.  -^^^^  ^^  involve  her  in  his  own  German  schemes,  and, 
by  means  of  an  alliance  between  Russia,  France,  and  Austria, 
to  carry  out  his  plan  of  exchanging  part  of  the  Netherlands  for 
acquisitions  in  Bavaria,  and  of  bribing  France  with  an  extension 
of  her  north-eastern  frontier.  In  a  letter,  dated  Septembej 
1782,  Catherine,  while  her  troops  were  annexing  the  Crj 
unfolded  her  schemes  to  Joseph  11.  She  proposed  that 
davia,  Wallachia,  and  Bessarabia  should  form  an  independent 
Dacian  state,  under  a  hereditary  sovereign,  who  should  profess 
the  principles  of  the  Greek  religion.  Russia  would  be  satisfied 
with  Ochakov,  the  district  between  the  Boug  and  the  Dniester, 
and  an  island  or  two  in  the  Archipelago.     In  the  event  of  the 


msion 


Cathermc  II.  and  Joseph  II  363 

Russian  operations  in  the  Crimea  proving  overwhelmingly  suc- 
cessful, Catherine  expressed  a  hope  that  Joseph  would  aid  her 
in  freeing  Europe  from  the  Turk  and  driving  him  from  Con- 
stantinople. The  expulsion  of  the  infidel  would  be  followed 
by  the  re-establishment  of  the  ancient  Byzantine  Empire,  with 
her  grandson,  Constantine,  at  its  head.  She  probably  intended 
in  that  case  to  place  Potemkin  upon  the  Dacian  throne.  To 
satisfy  Joseph,  she  was  now  willing  that  certain  modifications 
in  the  Austrian  frontier  should  be  carried  out,  and  some  estab- 
lishments in  the  Mediterranean  secured.  Joseph  11.  did  not 
receive  this  plan  of  partition  with  enthusiasm.  He  replied, 
requiring  for  himself  Moldavia,  Wallachia  to  the  Aluta,  Choc- 
zim,  Nicopolis,  Orsova,  Widdin,  and  Belgrade ;  and  proposed 
that,  while  Venice  resumed  her  sway  over  the  Morea,  Candia, 
Cyprus,  and  other  Greek  islands,  he  should  occupy  Dalmatia, 
Istria,  and  other  Venetian  possessions  on  the  mainland,  with 
the  adjacent  islands.  Realising  that  the  traditional  alliance 
between  France  and  Turkey  would  lead  the  former  to  oppose 
the  annihilation  of  her  old  ally,  he  proposed  that  French  inter- 
ests in  the  east  of  Europe  should  be  compensated  by  Egypt. 
Potemkin  was  never  an  enthusiastic  admirer  of  the  Austrian 
alliance,,  and  Catherine,  dissatisfied  with  Joseph's  idees  dar- 
rondisseme?if,  and  opposed  to  the  possibility  of  an  Austrian 
occupation  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  was  determined  to 
keep  the  ^lorea  and  the  Archipelago  for  her  Hellenic  kingdom. 
Eventually  Joseph,  who,  according  to  Segur,  was  in  reality 
opposed  to  the  idea  of  a  Russian  occupation  of  Constantinople,^ 
and  who,  with  Kaunitz,  was  convinced  that  the  conquest  of 
Turkey  would  be  no  easy  matter,  wrote  to  Catherine,  pointing 
out  that  his  original  promises  referred  only  to  the  case  of  a 
war  forced  upon  her  by^Turkey,  of  which  there  was  then  no 
question.  ""^ 

Catherine,  disappointed  at  Joseph's  refusal  to  entertain  her 
plans,  did  not,  however,  confine  her  attention  to  extensive 
schemes  which  were   at   that   time  impossible   of  realisation. 

^Paganel,  Histoire  de  Joseph  11. ,  p.  329,  note. 


364  European  History y   171 5-1789 

On  April  8,  1783,  she  issued  a  manifesto  announcing  and  ex- 
cusing the  annexation  of  the  Crimea.  Kaunitz  had  declared, 
_^    ^  in  1770,  that  Catherine's  mind  was  irreversibly  set 

The  Annexa-  i  /     ?  y 

tion  of  the  ou  the  retention  of  Azov,  Ochakov,  certain  districts 
Crimea,  1784.  ^Qj-dering  on  the  Black  Sea,  and  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  Crimea.  By  the  Treaty  of  Kainardji,  Catherine 
had  secured  some  of  the  objects  of  her  pohcy.  By  a  clause  in 
that  treaty  the  Tartars  were  released  from  allegiance  to  Turkey, 
the  Crimea  being  established  as  an  independent  state.  In 
the  Crimea  itself  two  parties  had  arisen  among  the  Tartars  — 
one  desirous  of  preserving  the  independence  of  the  country, 
the  other  anxious  for  Russian  intervention.  The  opportunity 
thus  given  for  the  exercise  of  Muscovite  influence  was  at  once 
seized  upon.  Schahin,  the  Russian  nominee,  was  made  Khan, 
and  was  supported  by  Russian  troops,  who  butchered  the  in- 
habitants wholesale,  and  transplanted  thousands  of  Greeks  and 
Armenians  to  the  territory  between  the  Don  and  the  Boug, 
where  most  of  them  perished  miserably.  By  the  advice  of 
Vergennes  and  Frederick  the  Great,  the  Turks  contented 
themselves  with  making  a  Convention  explicative,  defining'  the 
supremacy  over  the  Tartars  as  being  of  a  purely  spiritual 
character,  ^  and  Schahin  was  formally  recognised  by  the  Porte. 
Fresh  confusion  ensued.  Schahin,  after  being  again  restored, 
was  compelled  by  the  Russians  to  abdicate,  and*  the  final 
annexation  of  the  Tauric  Chersonese  was  accompanied  by 
further  wholesale  butcheries  of  Tartar  prisoners,  the  destruction 
of  towns  and  villages,  and  the  assumption,  later,  by  Potemkin, 
of  the  title  of  '  The  Taurian.' 

In  offering  no  resistance  to  the  acquisition  of  the  Crimea  by 
Russia,  and  in  sending  an  army  to  the  frontier  to  intimidate 
the  Porte,  Joseph  ii.  was  deliberately  acting  in  opposition  to 
the  interests  of  Austria.  As  sovereign  of  Austria  and  Hungary, 
he  was  bound  to  check  Russian  ascendency  in  eastern  Europe. 
Ever  since  Charles  vi.  had,  in  an  unfortunate  moment  for  his 
dynasty  —  refusing  to  carry  out  the  views  of  Eugene  and  seize 
1  Holland,  The  Treaty  Relations  of  Russia  and  Turkey^  p.  II. 


CatJierine  II.  and  JosepJi  II.  365 

Moldavia,  Wallachia,  and  other  Turkish  territory  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Save  and  the  Danube — agreed  to  the  Peace  of 
Passarowitz,  Russian  and  Austrian  interests  conflicted  in  the 
East.  During  the  Russo-Turkish  war,  from  1768  to  1774, 
and  again  in  1775,  negotiations  between  Russia  and  Austria  on 
the  subject  of  the  partition  of  Turkey  had  indeed  taken  place, 
but  Maria  Theresa  had  persisted  in  the  statesmanhke  policy 
of  setting  her  face  resolutely  against  the  permanent  occupa- 
tion by  Russia  of  the  Danubian  Principalities.  It  was  equally 
the  interest  of  Joseph  11.,  after  Maria  Theresa's  death,  to  give 
Russia  no  assistance  in  her  projects  against  Turkey. 

The  two  other  Powers  most  directly  interested  were  Eng- 
land and  France.  But  England,  then  ruled  by  the  Coalition, 
showed  no    intention   of  reversing    that   policy  of  ^,     .    . 

°  r  J  The  Attitude 

friendship  with  Russia  which  had  prevailed  during  of  England 
the  greater  part  of  the  century.  Fox,  who  directed  ^^^  France, 
foreign  affairs,  was,  like  Chatham,  in  favour  of  a  league  of 
England,  Prussia,  Denmark,  and  Russia,  and  the  inclusion  of 
Austria,  if  Frederick  the  Great  declined  to  join.  In  spite  o" 
the  refusal  of  Catherine  to  aid  England  during  the  late  war, 
and  in  spite  of  the  conduct  of  Russia  in  the  matter  of  the 
armed  neutrahty,  it  seemed  as  though  English  statesmen, 
blinded  by  their  hostility  to  France,  were  ready  to  treat  the 
dismemberment  of  Turkey  as  lightly  as  they  had  treated  the 
First  Partition  of  Poland.  For  the  immoral  and  indefensible 
seizure  of  the  Crimea  in  time  of  peace,  and  for  the  occupation 
of  the  northern  shores  of  the  Black  Sea  by  Russia,  the  Coali- 
tion Government  was  equally  responsible  with  the  Austrian 
Court.^  Vergennes,  keenly  alive  to  the  dangers  impending  in 
eastern  Europe,  and  aware  how  important  to  France  was  the 
preservation  of  the  Turkish  empire,  showed  great  anxiety  to 
secure  the  co-operation  of  England  in  maintaining  the  exist- 
ing European  system  and  the  balance  of  power.  Realising 
that  the  break-up  of  the  Turkish  empire  would  lead  to  an 
attempt  on  the  part  of  Austria  to  secure  unquestioned  suprem- 
^  Diaries  and  Correspondence  of  the  Earl  of  Malmesbury,  vul.  ii.  p.  48. 


366  European  History,    17 15-1789 

acy  in  Italy,  and  to  the  total  change  of  the  existing  balance, 
he  had  hurried  on  the  Peace  of  Versailles,  and  striven  to 
avoid  permanently  alienating  England,  so  as  to  have  his  hands 
free  to  deal  —  if  possible,  in  conjunction  with  Great  Britain  — 
with  the  new  and  perplexing  developments  in  the  East.  Disap- 
pointed of  EngHsh  co-operation,  Vergennes  adopted  the  best 
possible  course.  The  Marquis  de  Noailles  was  sent,  in  October 
1783,  to  Vienna  to  warn  Joseph  that,  unless  he  rehnquished  his 
eastern  projects,  he  could  no  longer  count  upon  the  French 
alliance ;  while  Saint  Priest,  the  French  envoy  at  Constantino- 
ple, advised  the  Sultan  to  yield  to  the  inevitable.   On  January  6, 

1 784,  by  the  Treaty  of  Constantinople,  the  Porte 
of  Constant!-  rccognised  the  loss  of  the  Crimea  and  the  Kuban.^ 
nopie,  1784.  g^-^i  desirous  to  check  the  power  of  Russia,  Ver- 
gennes, aware  that  Gustavus  iii.  had  been  coquetting  with 
Catherine  before  his  journey  to  Rome,  in  1783,  invited  that 
monarch  to  Versailles;  and,  on  July  19,  1784,  an  alliance  was 
concluded  between  France  and  Sweden.  France  ceded  the  isle 
of  St.  Bartholomew,  and  agreed  to  give  Gustavus  an  annual 
subsidy,  and  assistance  in  case  of  war.  The  attempted  reali- 
sation of  Catherine's  great  schemes  in  south-eastern  Europe 
was  postponed  till  1787,  when  Turkey,  seizing  a  favourable  op- 
portunity for  renewing  the  inevitable  struggle,  declared  war  on 
Russia.  The  Eastern  Question  ceasing  for  the  moment  to 
occupy  the  attention  of  Europe,  Joseph  threw  himself  with 
ardour  into  extensive  schemes  in  the  Netherlands  and  Germany, 
which,  if  carried  out,  would  have  had  a  marked  influence  on  the 
future  history  of  Europe.     As  early  as  1781,  taking  advantage 

of  the  war  then  raging  between  England  and  Hol- 

Joseph  II.  s  ... 

Projects  in  land,  and  fortified  by  his  alliance  with  Russia,  he  at- 
the  West.  tempted  to  realise  to  their  fullest  extent  the  aims  of 
Charles  vi.  and  Maria  Theresa,  and  to  tear  up  the  Barrier  Treaty. 
In  1 784  he  insisted  upon  throwing  open  the  navigation  of  the 
Scheldt,  and  revived  an  ancient  claim  upon  Maestricht.^ 

1  Rambaud,  Histou'e  de  la  Rzissie,  p.  491. 

2  Paganel,    Histoire  de  Joseph  11. ,  p.  391. 


CatJicrijie  II.  and  Joseph  II.  367 

Holland,  torn  by  intestine  divisions  and  weakened  by  her 
conflict  with  England,  was  unable  to  offer  any  adequate  resist- 
ance to  Joseph's  schemes.  Throughout  the  greater  condition  of 
part  of  the  century  the  connection  between  the  Holland. 
Dutch  and  the  English  had  been  so  close  that  the  lesser  state 
was  regarded  as  a  satellite  of  its  more  powerful  neighbour. 
This  state  of  things  was  changed  through  the  skill  of  a  Frencl) 
diplomatist,  M.  de  la  Vauguyon,  who  came  to  the  Hague  in 
1776.  With  a  consistency  unparalleled  in  the  history  of  afly 
country,  the  people  of  Holland  had  for  centuries  been  divided 
into  an  oHgarchical  party  of  the  wealthy  burghers,  who,  styled 
the  '  patriots,'  relied  upon  France  for  support,  and  regarded 
the  power  of  the  House  of  Orange  with  jealousy,'  and  the 
popular  party,  which,  principally  composed  of  the  nobles  and 
the  lower  orders,  and  often  supported  by  the  six  provinces 
and  the  'generality,'  out  of  jealousy  of  Holland,  idoHsed  the 
Princes  of  Orange  as  the  founders  of  their  Hberties,  and  their 
defenders  against  the  burghers,  and  preferred  the  friendship 
to  the  hostility  of  England)  The  arrangement  by  which  the 
Stadtholdership  had  been  restored,  in  1747,  ^.nd  made  heredi- 
tary, both  for  males  and  females,  had  been  confirmed  in  1766. 
The  Stadtholder,  William  v.,  had,  in  October  1747,  married 
Sophia  Wilhelmina,  niece  of  Frederick  the  Great,  who  had 
assured  her,  on  her  departure  from  Prussia,  that  she  was  about 
to  settle  in  a  country  which  enjoyed  all  the  advantages,  and 
none  of  the  inconveniences,  usually  attached  to  royalty.-^  In 
Holland  Vauguyon  had  speedily  reorganised  the  oligarchical 
party,  the  commercial  interests  of  which  urged  them  into 
friendship  with  France,  and,  in  1779,  ^^^  Dutch  became  in- 
volved in  hostilities  with  England.  Taking  advantage  of  the 
English  sympathies  of  Wilham  v.,-  and  the  disasters  to  the 
Dutch  arms  during  the  war,  the  patriot  party  proposed  to 
abolish  the  office  of  Stadtholder,  or  to  deprive  it  of  many  of 
its  prerogatives,  so  as  to  render  William  v.  powerless. 

^De  Witt,  Une  Invasion  Prussienne  en  Hollander  p.  i, 
2  Ibid.,  p.  1 7. 


368  Einvpeaii  History,   1 71 5-1789 

Vergennes,  who  aimed  at  the  estabhshment  of  French  influ- 
ence in  Holland  on  a  permanent  basis,  favoured  these  projects, 
Aggressions  and  the  aggressions  of  Joseph  11.  gave  him  an  ad- 
"^th^^N^h  I'nirable  opportunity  for  carrying  out  his  schemes, 
eriands.  In   January  1782    the  Dutch  garrisons,  unable  to 

appeal  to  England  for  assistance,  or  to  offer  any  resistance 
to  the  Imperial  commands,  had  evacuated  the  Barrier  for- 
tresses, and  Joseph,  emboldened  by  his  success,  proceeded, 
at  the  close  of  1783  and  the  beginning  of  1784,  to  besiege 
several  Dutch  fortresses,  one  of  which,  Lillo,  commanded  the 
entrance  to  the  Scheldt,^  while  an  Austrian  army  was  ordered 
to  march  to  the  Netherlands.  The  Dutch  being  then  at  peace 
with  England,  offered  resistance  to  these  new  aggressions,  seized 
an  Imperial  vessel  in  the  Scheldt,  and  broke  down  the  dykes 
round  Lillo. 

In  April  1784  conferences  were  opened  at  Brussels,  but 
Joseph's  pretensions  were  so  extravagant  that  the  Dutch  de- 
manded the  mediation  of  France,  sent  troops  to  Maestricht, 
and  endeavoured  to  raise  an  adequate  army.  In  August 
Joseph  reduced  his  claims  to  a  demand  for  the  free  navigation 
of  the  Scheldt,  so  that  his  subjects  might  trade  directly  with 
India,  and  relying  on  the  weakness  of  the  Dutch,  declared 
that  any  opposition  to  the  opening  of  the  river  would  be  re- 
garded by  him  as  a  declaration  of  war.  Undeterred  by  this 
ultimatum,  the  Dutch  appealed  to  Article  14  of  the  Peace  of 
Westphalia,  ordering  the  closure  of  the  Scheldt,  and  on  Octo- 
ber 5  seized  an  Imperial  vessel.  Joseph,  who  was  in  Hun- 
gary, received  the  news  of  the  Dutch  action  with  astonishment 
and  indignation ;  the  conferences  at  Brussels  came  to  an  end, 
and  Austrian  troops  marched  to  the  Netherlands.  As  Cathe- 
rine had  declared  her  readiness  to  support  the  Emperor,  and 
on  September  20  had  sent  a  threatening  note  to  the  States- 
General,  and  as  France  prepared  to  support  the  Dutch,  a 
European  war  seemed  inevitable. 

Kaunitz,  however,  was  strongly  opposed  to  a  rupture  of  the 

^  Paganel,  Histoire  de  Joseph  II. y  p.  392. 


Catherine  II.  and  Joseph  II.  369 

Franco-Austrian  Alliance,  and  he  persuaded  Joseph  to  accept 
the  mediation  of  France.  England  disapproved  of  the  Em- 
peror's policy,  and  even  the  attitude  of  the  Russian  The  Treaty 
Court  had  changed.  Catherine,  in  spite  of  her  pre-  °f  ^on^aine- 
vious  declaration,  advised  the  Emperor,  '  de  ne  Nov.  8, 1785. 
pas  aller  trop  loin  et  d'accepter  la  conciliation,'  ^  and,  influ- 
enced by  the  French  envoy,  the  Comte  de  Segur,  confined 
herself,  in  a  second  note  to  the  States-General  on  December  2, 
1784,  to  urging  moderation.  Though  Vergennes  was  aware 
that  peace  was  a  vital  necessity  for  France,  the  French  Govern- 
ment strongly  supported  the  Dutch,  and  Joseph  11.  agreed  to 
the  Treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  signed  on  November  8,  1785. 
AVhile  the  Emperor  renounced  his  right  to  the  free  navigation 
(3f  the  Scheldt  outside  his  dominions,  the  States  recognised  his 
sovereignty  over  that  portion  of  the  river  which  flowed  from 
Antwerp  to  the  limits  of  Saftigen.  Joseph  also  renounced  his 
claims  upon  Maestricht  and  the  surrounding  country,  but  re- 
ceived the  forts  of  Lillo  and  Liefkenshoek.  Indian  trade  was 
thrown  open  to  the  Flemings,  a  few  unifications  of  territory 
took  place,  and  some  small  fortresses  were  dismantled.  The 
Imperial  demand  for  ten  millions  of  guilders  was  refused  by 
the  Dutch,  and  eventually  Vergennes  undertook  to  be  answer- 
able for  a  portion  of  the  sum.  Frederick  the  Great's  prophecy 
came  triie.  *  Vous  verrez,'  he  wrote  to  the  Marquis  de  Bouille, 
*  que  Vergennes  finira  pas  forcer  la  ser^nissime  Republique  a 
s'accomoder  avec  mon  frere  Joseph,  en  lui  donnant  pour 
boire.'  - 

The  Treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  to  which  Spain  gave  its  adhe- 
sion in  1786,  was  itself  a  triumph  of  French  diplomacy,  and 
in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  Sir  James  Harris,  who  had   Alliance 
been  in  1784  transferred  from  St.  Petersburg  to  the   between 
Hague,  was  followed,  on  the  loth  of  November,  by   Ho^uancT," 
a  close  military  and  commercial  alliance  between   ^785- 
France    and    the    States-General.      French    influence    became 

1  Quoted  by  De  Witt,  Une  Invasion  Prussienne  en  Hollander  p.  23. 

2  Quoted  by  Paganel,  Histoire  de  Joseph  II.,  p.  400. 

PERIOD  VI.  2  A 


370  European  History,   171 5-1789 

supreme  in  Holland,  and  the  prestige  of  England  suffered  a 
severe  blow. 

It  is  impossible  to  overrate  the  significance  to  England  and 
Europe  of  these  events  in  the  Netherlands  and  in  Holland. 
The  Barrier  Treaty  had  been  expressly  made  in  order  that 
Austria  might  be  brought  into  close  union  with  the  Maritime 
Powers,  and  that  both  Austria  and  the  Dutch  Provinces  might 
unite  in  checking  French  encroachments..  The  long  line  of 
Barrier  fortresses  were  now  either  dismantled  or  inadequately 
garrisoned,  the  Emperor  showed  no  interest  in  opposing  French 
aggression,  and  Holland,  one  of  the  Maritime  Powers,  was  itself 
closely  allied  with  France.  The  system  so  carefully  established 
at  the  time  of  the  Peace  of  Utrecht  had  always  been  a  source 
of  discord  between  England  and  Austria,  and  between  Austria 
and  Holland  ;  it  had  now  broken  down.  The  Austrian  Nether- 
lands lay  defenceless  before  any  French  invasion,  and  England, 
like  Prussia,  was  practically  isolated  in  Europe.  In  the  words 
of  Mr.  Lecky  :  '  One  of  her  (England's)  oldest  and  closest  allies, 
one  of  the  chief  Maritime  Powers  of  the  world,  had  thus  de- 
tached herself  from  the  Enghsh  connection,  thrown  her  influence 
into  the  scale  of  France,  and  virtually  became  a  party  of  the 
Bourbon  Family  Compact.'  ^ ,  For  upwards  of  a  century  England 
and  Holland  had  been  closely  united  in  support  of  the  balance  of 
power,  and  though  William  v.  remained  friendly  to  t!ie  English 
alliance,  he  and  his  party  were  powerless  against  the  trium- 
phant *  patriot '  faction,  which,  encouraged  by  success,  con- 
tinued its  attacks  on  the  House  of  Orange,  and  in  September 
1786  deprived  the  Stadtholder  of  the  command  of  the  garrison 
of  the  Hague,  and  the  office  of  Captain-General,  and  brought 
on  a  crisis  which  led  to  the  Triple  Alliance  of  1788. 

Before,  however,  that  event  took  place,  Joseph  11.,  with  a 
The  Designs  Creditable  pertinacity,  returned  to  the  policy  of 
of  Joseph  II.     inyg    and  endeavoured  to  carry  out  the  wise  and 

on  Bavaria,  . 

1785-  Statesmanlike,    though   premature,   design  of  con- 

solidating the  Austrian  possessions  in  southern  Germany,  and 
^  Lecky,  History  of  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  vol.  v.  p.  78. 


Catherine  II.   and  Joseph  II.  371 

erecting  the  greater  part  of  the  Austrian  Netherlands  into  a 
kingdom  of  Burgundy.  Had  this  plan  been  effected,  South 
Germany  would  have  been  united  into  one  powerful  consoli- 
dated state,  and  the  foundation  of  the  modern  kingdom  of 
Belgium  would  have  been  anticipated  by  some  fifty  years. 
X\'hat  the  Eastern  Question  was  to  Catherine,  the  Bavarian 
Question  was  to  Joseph.  He  wished  to  establish  the  Austrian 
supremacy  in  Germany  ;  he  was  determined  that  Austria  should 
become,  like  Prussia,  a  centralised  state ;  he  was  fully  alive  to 
the  danger  of  being  gradually  edged  out  of  Germany  by  the 
growth  of  the  Hohenzollern  Power.  Later  events  have  fully 
justified  his  farsightedness,  his  wisdom,  and  his  patriotic  regard 
for  the  interests  of  Austria. 

In  January  1785  the  Duke  of  Zweibriicken,  the  heir  of 
Charles  Theodore,  informed  Frederick  the  Great  that  the 
Count  Rumientzov,  a  Russian  envoy,  had  laid  before  him 
Joseph  II. 's  new  scheme  for  the  annexation  of  Bavaria.  In 
exchange  for  Bavaria,  the  Upper  Palatinate,  the  principalities 
of  Xeuburg  and  Sulzbach,  the  Landgraviate  of  Leuchtenberg, 
the  Elector  Palatine  was  to  receive  the  greater  part  of  the 
Austrian  Netherlands  with  the  title  of  king,  France  being 
bribed  with  Luxemburg  and  Namur.^  The  same  proposal  was 
made  to  the  Elector  Charles  Theodore,  at  Munich,  by  an  Im- 
perial envoy.  Frederick,  who  was  now  isolated  in  Europe, 
and  who  had  already  considered  a  project  for  forming  a 
League  of  German  Princes,  at  once  sent  protests  to  St.  Peters- 
burg, Vienna,  and  Versailles,  accusing  the  French  Court  of 
being  influenced  by  the  hope  of  securing  Luxemburg  and 
Xamur,  and  the  Emperor  of  proposing  to  infringe  the  Imperial 
Constitution.  The  Duke  of  Zweibriicken  also  appealed  to 
France,  Prussia,  and  Russia  as  the  guarantors  of  the  Peace  of 
Teschen.  Charles  Theodore,  alarmed  at  the  attitude  of  the 
Estates  of  Bavaria,  professed  to  have  no  knowledge  of  Joseph's 
projects ;  and  the  Emperor,  astonished  at  the  fierce  opposition 
to  his  scheme,  yielded,  declaring  that  he  only  had  in  view  an 
^  Paganel,  Histoire  de  Joseph  II.,  p.  406. 


372  Eiiropea^i  Histojjy   17 15-1789 

arrangement  suitable  for  all  parties,  but  that  as  the  Duke  of 
Zweibriicken  objected,  no  further  step  would  be  taken.     Cath- 
Frederick        erine    II.   made    similar  explanations,  and  shower 
the  Great        no  desire    to  involve    herself  in  German  politics 
League  of        Successful  in  this  his  last  contest  with  the  House 
Princes.  q|-  Hapsburg,  Frederick  determined  to  secure  Ger- 

many against  any  further  attacks  on  the  part  of  the  Emperor 
upon  its  Constitution.  In  March  1785  he  informed  the  Princes 
of  Saxony  and  Brunswick- Liineburg  of  his  plan  of  forming  a 
Confederation  of  Princes,  and  representatives  of  the  three 
Powers  drew  up  the  terms  of  Union.  Frederick  being  repre- 
sented by  Baron  von  Stein.  The  league  was  rapidly  joined 
by  the  Dukes  of  Saxe-Weimar  and  Gotha,  Zweibriicken  and 
Mecklenburg,  the  Princes  of  Anhalt,  the  Margrave  of  Baden, 
the  Archbishop-Elector  of  Mainz,  who  was  President  of  the 
Electoral  College  and  Arch-Chancellor  of  Germany,  the  Bishop 
of  Osnabriick,  the  Archbishop-Elector  of  Trier,  and  the  Land- 
grave of  Hesse-Cassel.  Thus  was  established  the  famous 
Furste7ibii7id,  which  owed  its  existence  to  Frederick's  success 
in  alarming  the  Princes  of  Germany,  by  setting  before  them 
Joseph's  manifest  intention  of  destroying  the  privileges  of  the 
Empire,  as  well  as  his  betrayal  of  German  interests  by  his  pro- 
posed cession  of  Luxemburg  to  France.  The  avowed  object 
of  the  Union  of  Princes  was  to  maintain  the  Constitution  of 
the  Empire  as  settled  by  the  Treaty  of  Westphalia,  and  to 
protect  individual  princes  against  aggression.  Secret  articles 
were  introduced  to  prevent  the  incorporation  of  Bavai'a  into 
the  Austrian  monarchy,  and  all  schemes  for  partition.  The 
league  was  not  regarded  with  favour  by  any  of  the  great 
Powers,  was  the  last  great  achievement  of  Frederick  the 
Great,  and,  after  his  death  and  the  outbreak  of  the  French 
Revolution,  ceased  to  have  any  importance.  The  annexa- 
tion of  Bavaria  continued  to  be  the  favourite  dream  of 
Joseph  and  his  successors,  till  the  adoption  of  Metternich's 
views  in  18 13  changed  the  whole  drift  of  Austrian  policy  in 
Germany. 


} 


Cathei'ine  II.  and  Joseph  IL  373 

On  the  lyth  of  August  1786  Frederick  the  Great  died  after 
a  reign  of  forty-six  years.     He  had  made  Prussia  one  of  the 
leading  Powers  in  Europe,  and  the  first  of  purely   Death  of 
German  states.      Like  Joseph  11.  his  aim  was  to   ^''^^^"'^^ 

■'  ^  _  the  Great, 

consolidate  the  monarchy  by  uniting  his  scattered  Aug.  17, 1786. 
dominions,  to  champion  the  national  interests  of  the  German 
people  against  the  aggression  of  the  Hapsburgs  and  Bourbons, 
and  to  assume  the  leadership  of  the  Empire. 

The  progress  of  the  Prussian  kingdom  during  Frederick's 
reign  had  been  marvellous.  Silesia  and  the  portions  of  Poland 
acquired  by  Prussia  in  1772  were  rapidly  assimilated  with  the 
rest  of  the  monarchy,  and  in  spite  of  the  long  and  exhausting 
Seven  Years'  War,  Frederick  left  his  country  with  its  resources 
developed,  with  its  population  increased  from  two  to  six  mill- 
ions, and  its  revenue  from  twelve  to  twenty-four  millions,  the 
army  numbering  200,000  men,  and  the  treasury  containing 
some  70,000  thalers. 

This  extraordinar}-  progress  was  due  to,  and  its  continuance 
depended  upon  the  presence  of  the  king  himself  at  the  head 
of  affairs.  Though  he  had  developed  a  wonderful  administra- 
tive system,  Frederick,  during  his  long  reign,  had  concentrated 
all  the  powers  of  government  in  himself.  No  sovereign  could 
say  with  more  truth,  '  L'etat  c'est  moi.'  ^  Of  his  acti\aty, 
energy,  determination,  and  foresight  it  is  impossible  to  speak 
too  highly.  He  stands  pre-eminent  among  the  great  rulers  of 
the  century.  But  his  cynicism,  his  selfishness,  his  utter  disre- 
gard for  the  maxims  of  justice  and  international  law,  were  con- 
spicuous even  in  an  age  when  respect  for  treaty  obligations 
and  dynastic  rights  sat  hghtly  upon  the  princes  of  Europe. 

His  foreign,  like  his  domestic  policy,  was  subordinated  to 
expedienc)Aj^  and  the  seizure  of  Silesia  and  the  First  Partition  of 
Poland  were'  fatal  blows  to  the  old  order  of  things  in  Europe. 

His  death  almost  at  once  revealed  the  weakness  of  his  mili- 
tary and  administrative  system.      The  army,  a  third  of  which 
was  formed  of  foreigners,  stood  apart  from  the  nation,  and  it 
1  Sorel,  L Europe  et  la  Revolution  Franfaise,  vol.  i.  p.  471. 


374  European  History^   171 5-1789 

was  not  till  its  overthrow  at  Jena  that  the  necessary  sweeping 
changes  were  carried  out  by  Schernhorst.  From  being  a  cos- 
mopolitan force,  'an  entity  independent  of  the  people,'  it  be- 
came a  national  army.  The  administrative  system,  deprived  of 
the  guiding  genius  of  Frederick,  showed  similar  weakness.  He 
left  behind  him  clerks  instead  of  ministers,  instruments  in  place 
of  administrators.  He  had  always  regarded  his  subjects  as  '  be- 
ings created  merely  to  be  subservient  to  his  will,  and  conducive 
to  the  carrying  into  execution  whatever  might  tend  to  augment 
his  power  and  extend  his  dominions.'  ^ 

By  the  aid  of  his  man'ellous  administrative  system,  and  the 
measures  taken  after  the  Seven  Years'  War  to  encourage  agri- 
culture and  manufactures,  to  rebuild  and  repeople  towns,  and 
to  re-estabHsh  the  finances,  Prussia  had  risen  to  her  high  posi- 
tion in  Europe ;  but  it  was  owing  to  the  absence  of  capable 
administrators  that,  on  the  king's  death,  the  faults  inherent  in 
that  system  hastened  the  temporary  decline  of  Prussia.  ^  Tout 
ira,  et  presque  de  soi-meme,  tant  que  la  politique  exterieure 
sera  calme  et  uniforme,  ecrivait  Mirabeau  apres  la  mort  du  Roi. 
Mais  au  premier  coup  de  canon  ou  a  la  premiere  circonstance 
orageuse,  tout  ce  petit  echafaudage  de  mediocrity  croulerait.'  ^ 

In  spite  of  the  truth  of  this  dictum  the  fact  remains  that  the 
Seven  Years'  War  proved  to  be  an  important  step  i«  the  mak- 
ing of  Germany.  Unconsciously  Frederick  had  steadily  pur- 
sued what  seems  to  have  been  the  mission  of  the  Hohenzollem 
princes.  'Austria,'  writes  Carlyle,  Most  Silesia.  Yes:  and 
Deutschland  found  Prussia ;  a  solid  and  living  State  round 
which  the  Teutonic  people  should  consolidate  itself.''^  Though 
the  miUtar}'  power  built  up  by  Frederick  collapsed  before  the 
Napoleonic  invasion,  the  Prussian  monarchy  owes  everything 
to  that  devotion  to  duty  which  animated  the  king  during  his 
long  reign.  Like  Stein,  he  was  dominated  by  a  keen  sense  of 
responsibility  to  the  State.     This  conception  of  the  royal  office 

1  Diaries  and  Correspondence  of  the  Earl  of  Mabnesbury,  vol.  i.  p.  142. 
^  Quoted  by  Sorel,  L Europe  et  la  Revolution  Fran^aise,  vol.  i.  p.  478. 
3  Carlyle,  History  of  Frederick  the  Great,  Book  xx.  c.  13. 


Cathe7'i7ie  II.  and  Joseph  II.  375 

was  shared  with  Frederick  by  other  enlightened  despots ;  no 
monarch  in  the  centur}-,  however,  can  compare  with  him  in 
the  consistent  manner  in  which  he  unswer\'ingly  and  unspar- 
ingly devoted  himself  to  ser\'ing  the  State,  of  which  he  said  he 
was  but  the  first  sen-ant. 

From  1 781  Prussia  had  remained  isolated  in  Europe.  Fred- 
erick had  regarded  the  Austro- Russian  alliance  with  grave 
mistrust ;  and  though,  since  the  fall  of  the  North  Ministry,  he 
was  not  unwilling  to  modify  his  hostility  to  England,  the  ten- 
dency of  his  policy  was  towards  the  establishment  of  friendly 
relations  with  Louis  xvi.  Till  his  death  he  confined  his  active 
operations  to  the  formation  of  the  Fiirstenbinid,  and  he  was 
probably  ready  to  sacrifice  the  Stadtholder  to  his  desire  to  secure 
the  alHance  of  France.  So  far  from  showing  any  disposition  to 
aid  the  Prince  of  Orange  in  his  struggle  against  French  influ- 
ence and  the  '  patriot '  party  in  Holland,  he  ad-  ^^  . 
vised  William  v.  to  make  no  opposition  to  France,  wiiiiam  11. 
The  accession  of  Frederick  William  11.,  the  brother 
of  the  Princess  of  Orange,  to  the  throne  of  Prussia  at  once 
changed  the  situation,  which  had  entered  a  very  critical  phase. 
The  deprivation  of  the  incapable  Prince  of  Orange,  in  Septem- 
ber, of  his  command  of  the  army  had  been  followed  by  renewed 
French  intrigues,  and  the  fidelity  of  several  of  the  Provinces  to 
William  v.  was  shaken.  The  movement  for  the  abolition  of 
the  office  of  hereditary  Stadtholder,  and  for  the  reversal  of  the 
measures  adopted  in  1747,  was,  however,  checked  by  the 
death  of  Frederick  the  Great,  followed  by  that  of  Vergennes. 

Sir  James  Harris  had  already  organised  resistance  to  the 
French  party,  and  under  very  difficult  circumstances  had 
maintained  English  interests  in  Holland.  Pitt  and  his  Gov- 
ernment had  so  far  refused  to  pledge  the  honour  of  England 
to  support  any  active  measures  taken  by  the  Orange  party. 
The  permanent  establishment  of  French  influence  in  Holland, 
and  with  it  the  complete  isolation  of  England  in  Europe, 
seemed  likely  to  be  speedily  accompHshed.  The  accession 
of  Frederick  WiUiam  11.,  however,  followed  five  months  later 


3/6  European  History^   171 5-1 789 

by  the  death  of  Vergennes,  put  a  new  complexion  upon  the 
poHtical  situation.  The  new  king,  in  spite  of  the  existence 
of  a  strong  French  party  in  Berhn,  was  favourably  inclined 
towards  an  English  alliance  ;  he  was  not  unwilling  to  support 
the  cause  of  his  sister  in  Holland.  For  a  time,  however,  he 
D    th  pursued    a   waiting    policy,    attempting    to    bring 

Vergennes,      about  a  pacific  Settlement  of  the  differences  be- 
•  13-17  7-    t;^yeen  parties  in  Holland.     On  February  13,  1787, 
Vergennes  died,  and  the  control  of  foreign  affairs  passed  into 
the  feeble  hands  of  Louis  xvi.  and  Montmorin. 

The  administration  of  Vergennes  had  been  eminently  suc- 
cessful. He  had  restored  France  to  the  position  which  she 
held  in  Europe  previous  to  the  Seven  Years'  War,  and  though 
unable  to  crush  England,  he  had,  by  favouring  the  revolt  of  the 
American  colonies,  taken  ample  vengeance  upon  Great  Britain, 
though  at  a  heavy  cost.  The  Franco-Austrian  AUiance  still 
held  good,  but  Vergennes  had  curbed  the  ambitious  projects 
of  Joseph  II.  in  central,  eastern,  and  north-western  Europe, 
and  had  pursued  the  ancient  French  policy  of  supporting  the 
lesser  German  states,  and  of  renewing  friendly  relations  with 
Prussia.  He  had  before  his  death  indirectly  inflicted  a  severe 
blow  on  English  prestige  in  Europe  by  his  successful  support 
of  the  French  aristocratic  party  in  Holland,  and  by  the  con- 
clusion of  a  treaty  with  the  States-General.  But  tRe  alliance 
between  Russia  and  Austria  filled  him  with  mistrust,  and  rec- 
ognising that  English  and  French  interests  in  the  eastern 
basin  of  the  ^Mediterranean  were  threatened  by  schemes  for 
the  overthrow  of  the  Turkish  empire,  he  endeavoured,  after 
the  conclusion  of  the  Peace  of  Versailles,  to  bring  about  a 
close  understanding    between    the    two   countries. 

Treaty  of  ° 

Commerce  Though  English  foreign  policy  between  1783  and 
nTn^and  ^7^7    lacked    clearness,   and   though    Carmarthen, 

and  France,     the   Foreign  ISIinister,  and  other  members  of  the 
Cabinet,  agreed  with  Fox  in  regarding  France  as 
England's   chief  enemy,  the  wisdom    of  Pitt,  who    like  Ver- 
gennes aimed  at   peace  and  retrenchment,  was    seen  in  the 


CatJieriiie  II.  and  Joseph  II.  377 

conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  commerce  with  France  in  September 
1786.  Like  Shelburne  and  Vergennes,  Pitt  held  that  France 
and  England,  so  far  from  being  natural  and  inevitable  enemies, 
were  *  from  their  circumstances  peculiarly  fitted  for  friendly 
connection.'  Vergennes,  like  Pitt,  strongly  favoured  a  policy 
of  free  trade,  and  the  commercial  treaty  does  infinite  credit  to 
both  statesmen.^ 

Though  Vergennes  cannot  be  compared  with  Richelieu,  he 
stands  high  among  the  French  foreign  ministers  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century.  The  policy  of  aiding  the  Americans,  though 
successful,  was,  considering  the  circumstances  of  France,  a  mis- 
taken one,  and  enormously  increased  the  financial  difiiculties 
of  the  country,  besides  introducing  a  revolutionary  spirit  which 
proved  disastrous  to  the  monarchy.  But  after  the  conclusion 
of  the  American  war,  Vergennes  reahsed  as  clearly  as  Turgot 
had  done  that  the  condition  of  France  necessitated  a  peace 
poHcy.  All  adventurous  schemes  were  steadily  eschewed,  and 
he  merits  the  distinction  of  never  attempting  projects  that  were 
not  feasible.  The  prestige  of  France  in  Europe  at  the  time  of 
his  death  stood  high.  Holland,  Spain,  and  Austria  were  her 
allies ;  Catherine  11.  was  anxious  for  her  friendship,  and  early 
in  1787  concluded  a  commercial  treaty  with  Louis  xvi.  It  is 
not  improbable  that,  had  Vergennes  lived  a  few  years  more,  his 
influence  might  have  prevailed  with  the  Assembly  of  Notables, 
and  that  the  grant  of  adequate  reforms,  combined  with  a  con- 
tinuance of  a  peaceful  but  dignified  foreign  policy,  might  have 
prevented  the  fall  of  the  monarchy.  A  French  writer  has  said 
of  him  :  — '  M.  de  Vergennes  n'etait  pas  un  grand  ministre  mais 
c'^tait  un  ministre  et  un  bon  ministre.'-  The  effects  of  his 
death  on  the  foreign  policy  of  France  were  immediately  felt, 
and  are  an  ample  testimony  to  his  European  influence; 

His  successor,  Montmorin,  was  a  loyal,  honest  servant  of  the 
Crown,  but  utterly  unfit  for  his  post  by  reason  of  his  indecision, 

1  For  arguments  for  and  against  the  Treaty  see  Lecky,  History  of  Eng- 
land in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  vol.  v.  pp.  37-46. 

-  De  Witt,  Uiie  Invasion  Priissienne  en  Hollande  en  jySy. 


373  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

timidity,  and  deference  to  the  king's  judgment.  Admitted 
into  favour  at  the  time  of  the  accession  of  Louis  xvi.,  he  had 
Vergennes  is  in  1 777  been  appointed  an  ambassador  at  Madrid, 
succeeded        q^  j^jg  retum  to  France  in   1784  he  was  given  a 

by  Mont-  _  '  _  ° 

morin.  miUtary  command  in  Brittany,  in  which  turbulent 

province  he  seems,  by  dint  of  infinite  tact,  to  have  pre- 
served order. 

The  most  pressing  question  with  which,  as  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs,  he  had  to  deal  was  connected  with  the  United 
Provinces.  The  missions  of  Rayneval  and  Goertz,  sent  by  Ver- 
gennes and  the  King  of  Prussia  respectively  to  try  and  effect  a 
reconciliation  between  the  contending  parties  in  Holland,  had 
proved  a  failure ;  the  opposition  of  Sir  James  Harris  to  French 
influence  was  unremitting ;  the  attitude  of  the  Prussian  king 
was  daily  becoming  less  friendly  to  France.  Instead  of  boldly 
deposing  the  Stadtholder  and  substituting  a  government  under 
French  protection,  ]\Iontmorin  and  Louis,  alarmed  at  the  in- 
crease of  the  revolutionary  spirit  in  the  United  Provinces,  allowed 
matters  to  drift,  and  contented  themselves  with  watching  events. 
An  attempt,  in  April,  to  effect  a  satisfactory  arrangement  be- 
tween the  Prince  and  his  opponents  at  Nimeguen  having  failed, 
it  became  apparent  to  Sir  James  Harris  that  the  immediate 
intervention  of  England  was  absolutely  necessary.  In  May 
he  returned  to  London,  was  consulted  by  the  Cabinet,  and 
^^2 0,000  was  advanced  to  the  Stadtholder.  Encouraged  by 
_     _  .  .        the  definite  action  of  Ensfland,  the  Kins:  of  Prussia 

The  Triple  .  .  . 

Alliance  of  prepared  to  abandon  his  uncertain  attitude.  On 
^^^^"  the  evening  of  June   28  the  Princess  Wilhelmina 

was  arrested  on  her  way  to  the  Hague  by  some  insurgents  near 
Gouda,  and  treated  as  a  prisoner  for  a  day. 

She  appealed  to  her  brother,  Frederick  William,  and  his 
decision  to  march  troops  into  Holland,  which  was  partly  due 
to  English  influence,  was  coincident  with  vigorous  protests  on 
the  part  of  the  English  envoy,  Eden,  to  the  French  Govern- 
ment. Pitt  was  now  determined  to  support  the  Stadtholder's 
cause  by  force  of  arms  ;  warlike  preparations  were  made  ;  and, 


t: 


Catherine  11.  ajid  Joseph  IT.  379 


on  September  19,  Prussian  troops  entered  Holland.  Hostilities 
with  France  seemed  on  the  verge  of  breaking  out ;  but  war 
was  averted  by  the  vigorous  action  of  England  and  Prussia, 
the  internal  condition  of  France,  and  the  weakness  of  Mont- 
morin,  who,  on  October  27,  signed  a  declaration  agreeing  to 
a  general  disarmament,  and  asserting  that  the  King  of  France 
had  never  any  intention  of  interfering  in  the  affairs  of  the  Dutch 
Republic.^  '  France  has  just  fallen,'  said  the  Emperor  Joseph, 
on  hearing  the  news,  '  I  doubt  if  she  will  ever  recover.' 

The  efforts  of  Harris  had  been  crowned  with  success.  Eng- 
land was  no  longer  isolated  in  Europe,  but,  united  with  Prussia 
and  Holland,  was  able  to  throw  the  weight  of  her  influence  in 
favour  of  peace.  In  Holland  the  Dutch  '  patriots '  had  been 
overthrown,  and  the  Stadtholder  restored  to  his  former  posi- 
tion, his  power  being  based  upon  the  friendship  of  England. 
In  place  of  the  aUiance  between  France  and  Holland,  a  treaty 
for  mutual  defence  was  signed  between  Prussia  and  the  States- 
General,  on  April  15,  1788.-  In  July  an  aUiance  between 
England  and  Prussia  completed  the  defeat  of  French  poHcy, 
and  consolidated  the  Triple  Alliance  of  1788,  between  Great 
Britain,  Prussia,  and  the  Netherlands,  for  '  preser\-ing  the 
public  tranquillity  and  security,  for  maintaining  their  common 
interests,  and  for  their  mutual  defence  and  guarantee  against 
ever}'  hostile  attack.'  During  the  ensuing  five  years  this  defen- 
sive alhance  exercised  an  immense  influence  on  European 
politics,  and  did  much  to  preser\'e  the  existing  balance  of 
power.  While,  however,  the  Triple  Alliance  strengthened 
Pitt's  endeavours  to  prevent  the  outbreak  of  a  general  Euro- 
pean war,  and  to  maintain  the  existing  balance  of  power,  it 
inspired  Frederick  William  11.  and  Hertzberg  \nth  undue  con- 
fidence in  the  power  of  Prussia,  and  it  moreover  tended  to 
bring  about  a  friendship  between  Russia  and  France,  to  the 
detriment  of  British   interests    in    the    Levant.     In  1788  the 

1  Quoted  by  the  Marquis  de  Barral-Montferrat,  Dix  Ans  de  Paix 
Armee  entre  la  France  et  V Anglcterre,  1 783-93,"  vol.  i.  p.  54. 

-  De  Witt,  Une  Invasion  Prussienne  en  Hollande  en  ijSj,  p.  299. 


380  European  Histo?y,  171 5-1 789 

tranquillity  of  the  eas^  of  Europe  was  threatened  by  the  Russo- 
Austrian  Alliance.    /True  to  her  policy  of  increasing  the  ter- 
ritory of  Russia  at  the  expense  of  Turkey,  Cathe- 

The  Journey        .        ',       ,  ,  r,  ^  •      ^  j    i 

of  Catherine  mie  had,  as  early  as  1786,  actively  resumed  her 
^^•^"'^^         intrisiues  throus^hout  the.  dominions  of  the  Sultan. 

Joseph  II.  to  °  ° 

the  Crimea,  In  Egypt,  Greece,  and  Moldavia  the  efforts  of  the 
^^^^'  Russian  agents  were  especially  successful,  and  in 

1786  the  Porte  began  definitely  to  prepare  to  resist  the  Mus- 
covite aggressions.  To  draw  still  more  closely  the  ties  which 
bound  her  to  Joseph  11.,  to  secure  France  as  an  ally,  and  to 
force  the  Turks  into  hostilities,  became  the  immediate  object 
of  Catherine.J  In  January  1787  she  undertook  her  famous 
journey  to  the  Crimea.  After  interviewing  the  King  of  Po- 
land on  the  route,  she  was  joined  by  Joseph  11.,  travelling 
incognito  under  the  title  of  Count  Falkenstein.  The  history 
of  this  picturesque  journey  is  important  as  exemplifying  the 
determination  of  Catherine  to  carry  out  the  project  —  which, 
according  to  Sir  James  Harris,  originated  with  Potemkin  —  of 
reviving  a  Greek  empire  at  Constantinople,  and  as  demon- 
strating the  reality  of  the  Austro-Russian  AUiance.  Nurses  for 
Catherine's  grandson,  Constantine,  had  already  been  pro- 
cured from  the  Archipelago ;  the  child  had  been  baptized  with 
special  Greek  rites ;  a  Greek  alphabet  and  primes'  had  been 
printed  and  distributed  in  the  Russian  miUtary  schools ;  and 
medals  had  been  struck  designating  Catherine  '  Propugnatrix 
Fidei,'  and  representing  the  destruction  of  the  chief  mosque 
of  Constantinople  by  lightning.  Notwithstanding  Frederick 
the  Great's  sarcasm,  that  '  the  execution  of  a  project  as  chi- 
merical and  difficult  as  that  of  the  Greek  empire  will  not  be 
faciUtated  by  means  of  medals,'  the  same  poHcy  was  continued 
in  1787.  At  Kherson,  the  capital  of  the  new  Greek  kingdom, 
one  of  the  gates  bore  the  inscription,  '  The  way  to  Byzantium,' 
and  Greek  were  substituted  for  the  Turkish  names  throughout 
the  newly  acquired  territory.  From  Kherson  Catherine  con- 
tinued her  progress  through  the  Crimea,  or  Taurida,  and  at 
Sevast6pol  '  viewed  with  pride  and  exultation  a  powerful  navy, 


Catherine  II.  and  Joseph  II.  381 

her  own  creation,  riding  in  the  finest  harbour  of  the  Black 
Sea.'^  Though  the  Tsarina  and  the  Emperor  discussed  future 
projects,  neither  sovereign  seems  to  have  desired  immediate 
war.  The  Austrian  Netherlands  were  in  a  state  bordering  on 
rebelhon  ;  while,  in  the  event  of  hostilities  between  Catherine 
and  the  Porte,  an  anti-Russian  diversion  on  the  part  of  Prussia 
and  Sweden  was  to  be  expected.  The  indignation  of  the 
^[ussulman  population  at  the  Russian  aggressions  outbreak  of 
had.  however,  been  roused  :  new  demands  on  the  ^^^  between 

.  Turkey  and 

part  of  Cathenne  were  immediately  refused  ;  and,  Russia,  1787. 
on  August  10,  the  Russian  ambassador  was  imprisoned  in  the 
Seven  Towers,  and  the  Sultan,  relying  on  the  support  of  Eng- 
land and  Prussia,  declared  war.  The  Eastern  Question,  thus 
reopened,  involved  half  Europe  in  hostilities ;  and  the  early 
scenes  of  the  war  recalled  in  some  measure  those  of  the  vear 
1737,  when  Russia  and  Austria  simultaneously  attacked  the 
Turks.  Since  1737,  however,  the  Eastern  Question  had  passed 
through  several  important  phases,  and  England  and  France 
were  now  ahve  to  the  serious  issues  involved  in  the  attitude 
of  Russia  and  Austria.  Catherine  herself  had  not  failed  to 
recognise  that  Russian  interests  were  threatened,  and  the 
Russian  advance  to  the  ^Mediterranean  checked,  by  the  sea 
power  of  England.  She  had  already  profited  by  the  occupation 
of  western  Europe  in  the  American  war  ;  she  now  cleverly 
attempted  to  turn  into  account  the  somewhat  strained  relations 
between  England  and  France.  Paul,  her  son  and  heir,  had 
been  sent,  in  1782,10  Versailles  on  a  visit  to  Marie  Antoinette  ; 
a  commercial  treaty  was  made  \nth  France  early  in  1787  ;  and, 
in  1 78S,  the  Tsarina  endeavoured  to  form  a  quadruple  alliance 
of  France,  Spain,  Austria,  and  Russia,  to  oppose  British  inter- 
ests. The  death  of  Vergennes,  however,  had  deprived  French 
foreign  policy  of  any  clearness  or  consistency.  Though  anxious 
to  maintain  friendship  with  Russia,  the  ideas  of  Vergennes  on 
the  necessity  of  preserving  the  Turkish  empire  still  carried 
weight ;  and  eventually  the  French  Government,  the  prey  to 
1  Coxe,  House  of  Austria,  vol.  ii.  p.  6i2. 


382  European  History,   171 5-1789 

indecision  and  divisions,  declared  its  determination  to  be  neutral. 
During  the  remainder  of  the  year  1787  Suv6rov  successfully 
defended  Kinburn  against  the  attacks  of  the  Turkish  fleet; 
Avhile  the  Emperor,  without  any  previous  declaration  of  war, 
attempted  to  surprise  Belgrade.  In  the  winter  the  French 
failed  to  mediate  a  peace,  and  the  Turks  in  vain  reminded 
Joseph  of  the  loyal  manner  in  which  they  had  observed  the 
Treaty  of  Belgrade,  and  how  they  had  never  attempted  to 
take  advantage  of  the  weak  condition  of  Austria  on  the  death 
of  Charles  vi. 

On  February  9,  1 788,  Joseph  11.,  no  longer  apprehensive  of 
French  opposition,  and  hoping  to  secure  Moldavia,  Wallachia, 
Ser/ia,  and  Bosnia,  and  to  avenge  the  disastrous  Peace  of  Bel- 
grade of  1739,  declared  war  against  the  Porte,  and  the  Turks 
found  themselves  attacked  simultaneously  by  the 
Joseph  II.        Austrian  and  Russian  armies.    Though  Loudon  took 

declares  War  ° 

against  Dubitza  on  August  26,  and  reduced  Novi  on  Octo- 

Feb^i788  ^^^  ^'  "^^^  Coburg,  in  conjunction  with  Saltikov, 
occupied  a  large  part  of  Moldavia,  taking  Choczim 
on  September  20,  the  campaign  was  unfavourable  to  the  Aus- 
trians.  The  Emperor  had  failed  to  capture  Belgrade,  and  a 
Turkish  army,  under  the  Grand  Vizier  Yussuf,  carried  devas- 
tation as  far  as  Temesvar.  In  September  a  Turkish  attack  on 
the  Austrian  camp  near  Slatina  was  followed  by  the  return  of 
Joseph  to  Vienna,  disillusioned  and  broken  down  in  health.^ 
The  failure  of  the  campaign  was  due  to  a  variety  of  causes. 
EngHsh  and  Dutch  seamen  had  been  forbidden  by  their  respec- 
tive Governments  to  enter  the  Russian  service  ;  Venice  declined 
to  desert  her  neutral  attitude  ;  and  the  Pacha  of  Scutari  refused 
to  revolt  against  the  Sultan.  Moreover,  the  Russians,  exposed  to 
an  attack  by  Sweden,  were  unable  to  support  Coburg  with  more 
than  10,000  men  under  Saltikov. 

During   the  year  1788  the  Russian    operations   against  the 
Turks  had  been  crowned  with  success.     The  Turkish  fleet  was 

1  Wolf  unci  Zwiedineck-Sudenhorst,  Oesterreich  tinter  Maria  Theresia, 
Joseph  I/.,  und  Leopold  II.  (Oncken  Series),  book  iii.  chap.  iv. 


Catherine  II.  and  Joseph  II.  383 

defeated  and  destroyed  on  June  26  in  the  Liman,  and  after  a 
long  siege,  begun  in  June,  Potemkin,  by  means  of  the  skill 
and  bravery  of  Suvorov  and  Repnin,  succeeded,  in  spite  of 
the  furious  resistance  of  the  Turks,  in  taking  Ochakov  on 
December  17.     These  successes,  however,  were  to   ^,    ^ 

'  '  The  Capture 

some  extent  neutrahsed  by  the  hostile  attitude  of  of  ochakov, 
almost  every  European  Power.    To  Gustavus  iii.  the   ^^^'  ^^'  ^'^^^' 
possibility  of  a  complete  Russian  triumph  over  the  Turks  was  a 
serious  consideration.     His  position  at  home  was  by  no  means 
secure,  and  he  was  aware  that  Catherine  would  seize  the  first 
favourable  opportunity  of  destroying  the  independence,  if  not 
of  absorbing  a  large  portion  of  the  territory,  of  Sweden.     Rus- 
sia   and    Denmark    had    agreed   to    overthrow  the 
Constitution    of   1772,  and    Gustavus    resolved   to   decui" 
attack  Catherine  without  delay,  and  by  means  of  'vvaron 

1        ^11  .  ,        ,      .  ,  Russia,  1788. 

successes  m  the  field  to  attam  absolutism  at  home. 
Ever  since  his  return  to  Sweden,  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
Treaty  of  1 784  with  France,  Sweden  had  remained  in  a  dis- 
turbed condition.  Bad  harvests,  and  excessive  taxation,  ren- 
dered necessary  by  the  extravagance  of  the  king  and  Court, 
plunged  the  lower  orders  into  destitution,  and  led  to  dangerous 
outbreaks.  ]Many  of  the  privileges  enjoyed  by  the  Orders  and 
the  Diet  had  been  infringed,  and  in  1786  a  deadlock  between 
the  king  and  the  Diet  brought  matters  to  a  crisis.  \  war  with 
Russia  seemed  the  best  way  to  escape  from  the  difficulties  of 
the  so-called  Constitutional  Government,  and  to  regain  some 
of  the  lost  provinces  of  Sweden.  A  secret  treaty  was  made 
with  Turkey,  and  the  cession  of  Carelia  and  Livonia  to  Sweden, 
and  of  the  Crimea  to  Turkey,  was  demanded  from  Catherine. 
On  July  2,  1 788,  Gustavus  arrived  in  Finland,  and  war  between 
Russia  and  Sweden  by  sea  and  by  land  at  once  broke  out. 
St.  Petersburg  was  defenceless,  and  a  single  decisive  success 
would  have  placed  the  Russian  capital  at  the  mercy  of  the 
Swedish  king.  But  Greig,  the  Scottish  admiral  of  the  Russian 
fleet,  held  his  own  in  the  naval  battle  of  Hogland,  on  July  i  7, 
and   a   mutiny  —  due   to    the    intrigues    of  Catherine  11.  —  in 


384  Etu'opean  History,   171 5-1789 

Finland  of  the  Swedish  officers  who  refused  to  take  part  in 
a  war  not  sanctioned  by  the  Diet,  and  who  signed  an  armistice 
with  the  Tsarina,  completely  reversed  the  position  of  affairs. 
^^    ^  From  his  desperate  pli2;ht  Gustavus  was  extricated 

The  Danes  ^  ^    ° 

attack  by  the  Danish  invasion  of  Sweden.     Denmark,  the 

Sweden.  traditional  foe   of  Sweden,  and   closely  bound   to 

Russia  by  treaties,  no  sooner  saw  her  ally  attacked  by  Gus- 
tavus than  she  prepared  to  come  to  her  assistance;  and  in 
September  1788  Sweden  was  invaded  by  a  Danish  army  under 
Prince  Charles  of  Hesse-Cassel.  Not  even  during  the  latter 
years  of  the  reign  of  Adolphus  Frederick  had  the  independence 
of  Sweden  been  in  similar  danger.  'The  army  was  in  open 
mutiny;  the  fleet  was  blockaded  in  Sveaborg;  a  Russian 
squadron  occupied  the  Gulf  of  Bothnia ;  a  combined  Russo- 
Danish  squadron  swept  the  Cattegat ;  a  Danish  army  .  .  . 
was  advancing  upon  Gothenburg.  .  .  .  Confusion  reigned  in 
the  capital,  panic  in  the  provinces.  A  perplexed  Senate,  a 
treacherous  nobility,  a  stupefied  population,  were  anxiously 
watching  every  movement  of  a  defenceless  king.'  ^  From  this 
desperate  position  Sweden  was  rescued  by  the  efforts  of  her 
king,  supported  by  the  Triple  Alliance.  Early  in  September 
Gustavus  hastened  to  Dalecarlia,  and  roused  the  peasants  of 
that  warhke  district  to  march  to  the  aid  of  Gothenburg,  which 
the  Danes  were  preparing  to  besiege. 

The  loyalty  of  the  Dalesmen  and  the  energy  of  Gustavus 
saved  Gothenburg  for  the  moment ;  while  the  members  of  the 
The  Inter-  Triple  Alliance,  all  of  whom  were  interested  in 
vention  of       maintaining   the   balance  of  power   in  the  north, 

the  Triple  °  _  ^  ' 

Alliance.  and  preventing  the  Baltic  from  becoming  a  Rus- 
sian Take,  intervened  actively  and  decisively  on  behalf  of 
Sweden.  Denmark,  threatened  by  the  Prussian  army  and  the 
English  fleet,  was  forced  to  yield,  and  an  armistice  was 
signed  between  Sweden  and  Denmark  in  October  1788. 
Before  the  end  of  November  the  entire  Danish  army  had  left 
Sweden,  and  Gustavus  took  advantage  of  his  popularity  to 
^  R.  Nisbet  Bain,  Gustavus  III.  and  his  Conievtporaries,  vol.  ii.  pp.  31-2. 


Cat Jic vine  II.  afid  Joseph  II.  385 

summon  the  Diet  in  February  1789,  and,  supported  by  the 
army  and  the  lower  orders,  drew  up  the  '  Act  of  Unity  and 
Security,'    which,    largely    augmenting:    the    royal   „ 

•".  r  J  1         1  Revolution 

prerogative,  conferred  on  the  king  the  right  of  in  Sweden, 
declaring  peace  and  war,  of  contracting  alliances,  ^^^^' 
and  of  summoning  the  Diet.  Though  the  Estates  still  had 
control  over  the  purse,  the  Diet  was  restricted  from  de- 
bating on  any  measures  not  introduced  by  the  king's  per- 
mission, and  the  Senate  was  practically  deprived  of  all  power. 
The  coup  ifetat  of  1789  was  the  complement  of  that  of  1772. 
From  a  limited  monarchy  the  Swedish  Government  had 
become  a  despotism.  Both  revolutions  can  be  justified  on 
the  ground  that  they  saved  Sweden  from  becoming  a  Russian 
province. 

Though  Gustavus,  ha\ang  overcome  his  domestic  opponents, 
continued  the  war  with  Russia,  all  immediate  danger  of  ab- 
sorption by  the  Muscovite  Power  had  passed  away.  ^j^^.  ^^^_ 
The  Triple  Alhance  had  exhibited  its  determina-  tinuance  of 
tion  to  preserve  the  balance  in  the  Baltic,  and,  as  Turkish 
far  as  possible,  to  set  limits  to  the  northern  war.  ^^^  ^°  ^'^9- 
It  now  endeavoured  to  emulate  the  successful  diplomacy  of 
Villeneuve  in  1739,  and  to  bring  about  a  separate  peace  between 
Austria  and  Turkey.  The  year  1789  proved  disastrous  to  the 
Turkish  cause.  On  the  7th  of  April  Abdul  Hamid  died,  and 
though  his  successor,  Selim  iii.,  showed  energy  and  determina- 
tion, the  Russians  and  Austrians  won  a  series  of  successes. 
Russian  troops  marched  through  Moldavia ;  Prince  Repnin 
defeated  the  Turks,  on  September  20,  at  Ismail;  and  Potemkin, 
after  winning  the  battle  of  Tobac  in  Bessarabia,  captured 
Bender  on  November  14.  The  Austrians  had  been  equally 
successful.  The  united  forces  of  Coburg  and  Suv6rov  over- 
threw the  Turks  at  Foksany  on  July  31,  and  in  a  most  over- 
whelming manner  on  the  Rymnik  on  September  22,  while 
Clerfait  drove  them  from  the  Banat,  and  the  veteran  Loudon, 
the  newly  appointed  Commander-in-Chief,  at  the  head  of  the 
Austrian  main  army,  on  October  9  carried  Belgrade  by  storm 

PERIOD    VL  2B 


386  European  History^   171 5-1789 

and  occupied  Servia.  Following  up  these  successes  Loudon 
besieged  Orsova,  while  Coburg  took  Bucharest,  and  the  Prince 
of  Hohenlohe  forced  the  passes  into  Wallachia.  The  whole 
Hne  of  fortresses  which  defended  the  Turkish  frontier  was  in 
the  hands  of  the  allies,  and  another  campaign  seemed  likely 
to  be  followed  by  the  overthrow  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  in 
Europe.  Turkey  was,  however,  saved  by  the  confusion  into 
which  Joseph's  policy  had  plunged  his  own  dominions,  and 
by  the  interposition  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 

Of  the  disturbances  in  the  Austrian  territories  those  in  the 
Netherlands  were  the  most  serious.     There,  by  a  reckless  in- 
difference   to    ancient  rights  and  liberties,  Joseph 

Revolu-  ,       J       .  •        r  1  i_         ^        r 

tionary  had  givcn  an  opportunity  for  the  outbreak  of  a  rev- 

Movements      olutiouarv  movement  which  the  events  of  the  late 

in  the 

Austrian  War  of  American  Independence  had  fostered,  and 

et  er  an  s.  ^^^  succcss  of  the  French  revolutionists  encouraged. 
By  the  end  of  the  year  1789  Flanders  had  shaken  itself  free 
from  the  Austrian  domination,  and  in  January  1790  an  Act 
of  Union  of  the  United  Belgian  Provinces  was  drawn  up. 
Hungary  had  already  entered  upon  the  revolutionary  stage ; 
Bohemia  and  Galicia  were  ripe  for  revolt ;  it  seemed  that  the 
Austrian  dominions  were  on  the  verge  of  dissolution.  These 
revolutionary  movements,  unlike  the  national  revok  then  pro- 
ceeding in  France,  were  religious  and  consen'ative,  the  dis- 
content being  caused  by  the  Emperor's  persistent  disregard 
of  the  rights  and  privileges  of  the  nobles  and  clergy,  and  his 
infraction  of  the  local  charters.  The  deposition  of  Joseph 
from  the  sovereignty  of  the  Austrian  Netherlands  was  occa- 
sioned by  his  violation  of  the  ancient  rights  of  the  Belgian 
people,  and  was  followed  by  the  restoration  of  those  customs 
which  he  had  rashlv  abolished.  The  s^ravitv  of  this  state  of 
things  in  the  Netherlands  cannot  be  over-estimated.  The 
Austrian  successes  in  Turkey  were  compromised,  and  an  op- 
portunity was  given  to  the  enemies  of  the  Hapsburgs  to 
attack  the  weakened  Emperor. 

During  the  year  17 89  the  Prussian  king  and  his  advisers  had 


Catherine  II.  and  Joseph  II.  387 

rapidly  matured  their  plans  for  taking  advantage  of  the  critical 
position  of  Joseph  11.  Frederick  William  11.  was  re-  The  Foreign 
solved  to  obtain  Danzig  and  Thorn,  and  hoped  by   ^^'"^^  °\ 

,    .  r  J     Prussia  in 

forcing  Austria  to  restore  Galicia  to  Poland  to  secure  1789. 
the  coveted  towns  from  the  Poles  in  return  for  the  cession  of 
the  province.  By  aiding  the  Turks  in  their  campaign  against  the 
Austrians,  and  by  supporting  the  revolt  in  the  Netherlands, 
he  anticipated  that  there  would  be  little  difficulty  in  compelling 
Joseph  II.  to  agree  to  his  wishes.  Without  consulting  his  alUes 
England  and  Holland,  the  Prussian  king  opened  negotiations 
with  the  Sultan,  and  at  the  same  time  suggested  to  England 
that  Austrian  Flanders  and  Holland  should  be  formed  into  one 
republic.  The  EngHsh  Government,  which  regarded  the  Triple 
Alliance  as  a  means  for  pacifying  Europe,  refused  to  agree  to 
the  policy  of  the  Prussian  king,  which,  if  carried  out,  seemed 
likely  to  lead  to  war  with  both  Austria  and  France,  and  attempted 
to  induce  the  Court  of  Berlin  to  desist  from  all  enterprises  in 
the  Netherlands  or  in  Gahcia.-^ 

The  Prussian  king,  however,  persisted  in  his  determination 
to  deprive  Austria  both  of  the  Netherlands  and  Galicia,  and  at 
the  close  of  1789,  and  during  the  early  part  of  1790,  Europe 
was  on  the  verge  of  a  general  European  war.  In  spite  of  the 
efforts  of  the  English  Government  to  prevent  Prussia  from 
acknowledging  the  independence  of  the  Netherlands,  and  from 
intervening  in  favour  of  Turkey,  Frederick  William,  who  was 
determined  on  war,  continued  his  preparations.  The  Triple 
Alliance,  which  had  been  primarily  formed  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  peace  of  Europe,  was  only  saved  from  dissolution 
by  the  energy  of  Pitt  and  the  death  of  Joseph  11.  While  agree- 
ing with  the  Prussian  king  in  his  determination  not  to  allow  the 
estabhshment  of  French  influence  in  the  Netherlands,  Pitt  op- 
posed any  immediate  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the 
revolted  Provinces  as  being  likely  to  involve  the  Triple  Alliance 
in  hostiUties  with  the  Emperor,  and  refused  to  join  in  any  offen- 
sive operations  against  Russia  and  Austria.     On  February  20, 

1  Lecky,  History  of  Euglandin  the  Eighteenth  Century.,  vol.  v.  p.  241. 


388  Europeaji  History,   171 5-1789 

1 790,  Joseph  II.  died  in  his  forty-ninth  year,  leaving  his  country 
at  war  with  Turkey,  on  the  verge  of  war  with  Prussia  and  Poland, 
^  and  honeycombed  with  discontent  and  revolution. 

Joseph  II.,  His  attempts  during  the  last  months  of  his  life  to 
■  ^'^^°'  undo  the  effects  of  some  of  his  reckless  acts  came 
too  late  to  secure  the  pacification  of  his  dominions.  His  re- 
estabUshment,  on  December  8,  1789,  of  the  ancient  Hungarian 
Constitution ;  his  endeavour  to  induce  Pius  vi.  to  aid  him  in 
recalling  the  Belgians  to  their  allegiance ;  his  willingness  to 
treat  with  Turkey ;  his  restoration  of  their  privileges  to  his 
Tyrolean  and  Gahcian  subjects,  all  implied  the  conviction  on 
the  part  of  the  Emperor  that  his  reign  had  been  a  failure. 
Nevertheless,  his  withdrawal  of  reforms  and  restoration  of  priv- 
ileges — though  a  painful  sacrifice  to  the  dying  monarch  —  did 
not  imply  that  he  had  '  failed  in  everything  he  undertook.'  His 
Edict  of  Toleration  and  his  national  system  of  education  re- 
mained ;  his  efforts  to  relieve  the  poor  from  serfdom  and 
feudal  burdens  proved  a  permanent  benefit  to  the  Austrian 
people,  while  the  value  of  his  administrative  reforms  is  now 
How  far  fully  recoguiscd.     His  reign  had  only  been  a  failure 

was  Joseph's  ^yif^in  certain  hmits.  In  the  Austrian  Nether- 
Reign  a 

Failure?  lands  and  in  Hungary  he  failed,  being  opposed  by 

'men  trained  in  the  school  of  political  resistance.'  ^  In  the 
xA.ustrian  Crown  lands  his  work  was  permanent.  While  in 
Hungary  the  old  regime,  on  the  whole,  held  its  ground,  and 
the  era  of  reform  was  postponed  till  the  middle  of  the  present 
century,  in  the  German  portion  of  the  dominions  of  the  Haps- 
burgs  the  material  and  social  condition  of  the  people  was 
vastly  improved,  though  at  the  expense  of  their  political  liberty. 
Of  Joseph's  reforms  some  were  premature,  and  others  were 
carried  out  with  an  unfortunate  precipitancy,  a  want  of  tact, 
and  a  disregard  of  the  temper  of  his  subjects. 

During  the  reign  of  the  Emperor  '  the  public  welfare  had 
gained  enormously  by  the  extirpation  of  serfdom  ;  agriculture, 
manufacturing  industry,  and  trade  had  received  a  mighty 
impulse ;    the    power   of  the   state   had    been  enormously  in- 


Catherifie  IL  ajid  Joseph  II.  389 

creased.'  ^  He  had  sought  the  good  of  his  people ;  he  had 
ever  been  the  champion  of  humanity.  Of  his  country's 
prospects  and  requirements  his  judgment  was  sound,  and 
later  generations  have  appreciated  his  realisation  of  the 
necessity  of  unity.  It  remains,  however,  an  undoubted  fact 
that  his  atteiapl_to  _carry  out  an  ambitious  foreign  policy 
simultaneously  with  the  promotion  of  drastic  reforms  not  only 
brought  about  revolution  in  his  own  dominions,  but  threatened 
to  involve  Europe  in  a  mighty  war. 

In  February  1790  Prussia  had  made  an  alliance  with  Turkey, 
and  had  promised  to  endeavour  to  induce  the  other  members 
of  the   Triple    Alliance,   as   well  as    Sweden  and   Hostile 
Poland,    to  ally   ^^ith   the   Porte.     On   March  29,   Attitude  of 

'  ''  ^^     Prussia, 

Prussia  made  a  treaty  with  Poland,  each  country  1790- 
guaranteeing  the  territories  of  the  other.  From  a  great  ex- 
tension of  the  war,  which  these  treaties  seemed  to  render 
inevitable,  Europe  was  saved  by  several  circumstances.  In 
the  Netherlands  the  rise  of  a  democratic  party,  obstacles! 
which,  headed  by  Francis  Vonck,  adopted  French  the  way  of 
revolutionary  principles,  entirely  upset  the  cal- 
culations of  England  and  Prussia  with  regard  to  the  future 
government  of  the  Belgian  Provinces.  Opposition  to  the 
cession  of  Danzig  and  Thorn  began  to  manifest  itself  in 
Poland,  while  the  Emperor  Leopold,  though  anxious  to  restore 
peace  to  his  dominions,  was  determined  not  to  sanction  the 
addition  of  those  towns  to  the  Prussian  kingdom.  England 
and  Holland,  delighted  at  the  firm  and  conciliatory  attitude 
of  Leopold,  at  once  decided  to  aid  him  to  regain  his  Belgian 
provinces,  due  provision  being  made  for  the  restoration  of 
the  Constitution  and  the  publication  of  an  amnesty.  In  spite, 
however,  of  the  change  in  the  European  situation  caused  by 
the  death  of  Joseph,  Prussia  was  still  bent  on  war,  and  the 
poHcy  of  her  king  remained  the  main  danger  to  the  peace  of 
Europe. 

1  Hausser,   Deutsche   Geschichte,   vol.   i.  p.    153.     Quoted    by   Herman 
Merivale,  Historical  Studies,  p.  46. 


390  European  History,   1715-17S9 

In  a  despatch  to  Leopold  the  views  of  Frederick  WilUam's 
^Minister,  Hertzberg,  were  enumerated.  Galicia  was  to  be 
Hertzberg's  restored  to  Poland,  and  Prussia  was  to  receive 
Scheme.  Danzig  and  Thorn.      As  compensation  for  her  loss 

of  Galicia,  Austria  was  to  receive  from  the  Porte  all  the  terri- 
tory gained  at  the  Peace  of  Passarowitz ;  and  Russia,  restoring 
to  Sweden  the  Hmits  of  Finland  at  the  time  of  the  Peace  of 
Nystad,  was  to  be  given  the  district  and  town  of  Ochakov. 
Undeterred  by  the  threat  of  the  Prussian  ratification  of  the 
treaty  with  Turkey,  or  by  the  possible  recognition  by  Frederick 
WilHam  of  the  independence  of  the  Austrian  Netherlands, 
Leopold  refused  to  cede  Galicia,  and  war  against  Turkey  was 
pursued  with  vigour.  In  May  he  expressed  to  the  British  envoy 
at  Vienna  his  readiness  to  make  peace  with  Turkey  without 
obtaining  more  than  a  small  extension  of  territory,  to  restore 
the  ancient  constitution  of  the  Netherlands,  and  to  observ-e 
the  Barrier  Treaty.  At  the  same  time,  he  intimated  that  an 
unsuccessful  war  might  drive  him  into  purchasing  the  French 
alliance  by  a  cession  of  a  portion  of  the  Belgian  Provinces.^ 
The  King  of  Prussia,  discovering  that  he  was  not  supported 
by  the  Maritime  Powers,  and  that  Poland  steadily  opposed 
The  Con-  ^^^  cessiou  of  Danzig  and  Thorn,  consented  to 
vention  of  make  overtures  to  Leopold.  Hertzberg's  elaborate 
bach,  '  pl^tt  fell  to  the  ground ;  and  the  Emperor  having, 
July  27, 1790.  \^\\}^  consummate  diplomatic  skill,  isolated  Prus- 
sia, opened  negotiations  at  Reichenbach.  Frederick  William 
was  induced  to  believe  that  Hertzberg  had  involved  him  in 
dangerous  complications,  and,  hastily  reversing  the  traditional 
poHcy  of  jealousy  of  Austria,  agreed,  on  July  27,  to  the  Con- 
vention of  Reichenbach.  Austria  undertook  to  give  up  all 
her  conquests,  to  make  peace  with  Turkey  under  the  media- 
tion of  the  Triple  Alliance,  to  restore  to  the  Netherlands  their 
ancient  constitution,  and  to  grant  an  amnesty ;  Prussia  prom- 
ised, while  guaranteeing  the  Austrian  rule  in  the  Nether- 
lands, to  relinquish  all  attempts  to  secure  Danzig  and  Thorn. 
^  Coxe,  House  of  Austria^  vol.  ii.  p.  671. 


Catherine  II.  afid  Joseph  II.  39! 

Hertzberg,  who,  like  Kaunitz,  had  thrown  serious  obstacles  in 
the  way  of  peace,  succeeded  in  introducing  a  clause  that  if 
Austria  extended  her  frontiers  on  the  side  of  Turkey,  she 
should  award  a  similar  advantage  to  Prussia.  Leopold  and 
his  Vice-Chancellor  Cobenzl  had  won  a  great  diplomatic 
victory  over  both  Kaunitz  and  the  Prussian  war  party,  and  the 
peace  policy  of  England  and  Holland  had  triumphed. 

On  October  4  Leopold  was  crowned  Emperor,  and  on  No- 
vember 15,  King  of  Hungary.     He  at  once  posed  as  head  of  the 
Empire,  protested  against  the  action  of  the  French   Leopold  re- 
Constituent  Assembly  with  regard  to  the  German   establishes 
princes   in  Alsace,  Lorraine,  and  French  Courts,^   Authority, 
established  his  power  firmly  in  Hungary,  and  hav-   ^79°. 
ing  satisfied  the  envoys  of  England,  Prussia,  and  Holland  at 
the  Congress  of  the  Hague  in  October,  rapidly  reconquered 
Belgium,  Brussels  capitulating  on  the  2d  of  December.- 

An    armistice  was  made   with   the   Turks   at    Giurgevo   on 
I  September  19,  1790,  and  after  many  delays  the  Treaty  of  Sis- 
:  tova   was  signed   on   August    14,   1791.     Loudon,   -^^6  Peace 
I  the   rival   of  Frederick   the    Great,  had  died  the   of  Sistova, 
I  previous  month  at  the  age  of  seventy-four,  and  his      "^"  ^'*'  ^^^^' 
death  and   the   conclusion  of  the  Turkish  war  closed  a  pe- 
riod of  struggles  which  had  grown  out  of  the  Eastern  ambitions 
of  Joseph  II.,  and  the  rivalry  of  Austria  and  Prussia.     In  spite 
of  the  terms  agreed  upon  at  Sistova,  and  in  violation  of  the 
Treaty  of  Reichenbach,  Austria  obtained  by  a  separate  Con- 
vention the    district    of  Orsova,  with  the   understanding  that 
Old  Orsova  was  not  to  be  fortified.^ 

Russia  had  already,  on  August  15,  1790,  agreed  to  the 
Peace  of  Verela  with  Sweden,  Gustavus  in.  being  anxious  to 
ally  with  Russia  in  order,  in  the  interests  of  monarchy,  to 
counteract  the   efforts  of  the    French   Revolution  which  had 

1  Sorel,  V Europe  et  la  Revolution  Franfaise,  vol.  ii.  p.  194,  note. 

2  Wolf  und  Zwiedineck-Sudenhorst,  Oesterreich  unter  Maria  Theresia^ 
Joseph  II.,  und  Leopold  II.  (Oncken  Series),  book  iv. 

3  Sybel,  History  of  the  French  Revolution  (translated),  vol.  i.  p.  352. 


392  European  Histcvw    17 15-1789 

broken  out  the  previous  year.  With  Turkey.  Russia  signed 
prehminaries  oi  peace  at  Galatz  on  August  11.  1791.  Though 
deprived  of  the  ser\-ice5  oi  her  ally,  Catherine  had  continued  to 
The  Treaties  ^vin  victories  in  1790.  On  December  2  2.  Suvorov 
of  vereia.  had  taken  Ismail,  and  in-  the  Kuban  and  Caucasus 
andjassy,  the  Russian  arms  were  equally  successful.  The 
Jan.  4,  1792.  anti-Russian  policy  oi  Pitt,  who  was  now  thor- 
oughly alive  to  the  danger  to  the  balance  of  power  from  the 
continued  successes  of  the  Musconte  arms,  failed  to  com- 
mand the  general  support  of  the  country,  and  he  was  compelled 
to  desist  from  his  attempt  to  force  the  Tsarina  to  restore  Ocha- 
kov.  Catherine,  however,  in  spite  of  her  two  brilliant  victories 
in  July  1 791.  and  notwithstanding  the  weakness  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  was  ready  for  peace.  Like  Gustavus  in.,  she  was 
anxious  to  observe  the  course  of  events  in  France,  and  to  take 
advantage  of  the  attack  on  the  French  revolutionists  by  Austria 
and  Prussia,  in  order  to  carry  out  her  policy  in  Poland.  On  | 
January  9,  1792.  rather  more  than  two  months  after  the  death 
of  Potemkin.  peace  vdui  the  Turks  was  signed  at  Jassy.  The  , 
Treaty  oi  Kainardji  was  confirmed,  the  Porte,  however,  recog- 
nising the  annexation  of  the  Crimea,  and  the  cession  of  Ocha- 
kov  and  its  districts  to  the  Dniester.  The  triumph  of  Catherine 
was  complete.  England  had  been  baffled  :  Sweden  was  no 
Europe  o.n  longer  hostile  ;  in  179S  Russia  and  Turkey  signed 
the  Verge  of  a  treaty  oi  alliance  for  eight  years  :  Prussia  had 
the  French  ceascd  to  be  a  danger.  The  Treat}-  of  Reichenbach 
Revolution.  ^^^^  dealt  a  serious  blow  to  the  position  of  the 
Hohenzollerns  in  Europe.  '  Prussia,  though  she  had  dictated 
the  conditions  of  the  Treaty  of  Reichenbach.  had  been  com- 
pletely duped."  By  consenting  to  that  treaty.  Frederick  William 
had  abandoned  the  clear  policy  of  Frederick  the  Great.  His 
treaties  %^uth  Poland  and  Turkey  fell  to  the  ground,  Sweden 
found  she  could  no  longer  rely  on  the  Triple  Alliance,  and 
Saxony  refused  :j  :"  '.'.  jw  the  lead  oi  Prussia.-^  Leopold  again 
secured  the  ascendency  of  Austria  in  Germany,  he  had  estab- 
^  See  Seely,  Life  and  Times  of  Stein,  vol.  i. 


Cath€7'ine  II.  and  Joseph  II.  393 

lished  his  hold  upon  Hungan-.  he  had  restored  the  Austrian 
rule  in  Belgium.  Frederick  WiUiam's  confidence  in  Austria 
was  entirely  misplaced,  and  for  some  years  Prussian  foreign 
policy  lost  its  independent  character.  Without  statesmen, 
diplomatists,  or  generals ;  without  a  ruler  capable  of  guiding 
the  country  with  vigour  and  resolution  during  the  stormy  revolu- 
tionary period,  Prussia  entered  upon  a  new  era  which  ended 
with  Jena  and  the  occupation  of  Berlin  by  the  French. 

The  years  between  1789  and  1792  close  one  period  of  Eu- 
ropean Histor}'  and  usher  in  another.  In  1789  the  French 
Revolution,  which  coloured  and  directed  the  policy  of  Europe, 
broke  out;  in  1790  Austria  deserted  the  Russian  alliance  and 
made  a  treat}^  with  Prussia;  in  1792  Austria  and  Prussia  em- 
barked on  a  war  with  France,  which  rapidly  involved  the  whole 
of  Europe. 

At  the  beginning  of  1792  Turkey  was  left  at  peace,  and 
Russia  determined  to  carr}'  out  the  final  partitions  of  Poland, 
while,  before  the  year  was  over,  England  was  preparing  for  that 
struggle  with  France,  which  affected  not  only  her  own  histor}', 
but  also  the  history  of  the  civilised  world.  In  that  struggle 
Russia  took  a  conspicuous  part,  and  justified  the  efforts  which 
Catherine  had  made  throughout  her  reign,  to  place  her  coun- 
try on  an  equality  with  the  great  western  nations.  With  the 
outbreak  of  the  French  Revolution,  the  eighteeth  century 
comes  to  an  end,  and  with  it  the  rule  of  the  enlightened  re- 
formers and  the  philanthropic  despots.  For  the  sudden  col- 
lapse of  the  European  system,  for  the  temporary  overthrow 
of  the  balance  of  power,  the  rising  of  the  French  nation  against 
its  rulers  was  mainly  responsible. 


CHAPTER   XIV 

FRANCE  BEFORE  THE   REVOLUTION 

I 774-1 789 

Louis  XVI.  —  Marie  Antoinette  —  Condition  of  France —  Opening  Years  of  the 
Reign  —  Turgot  —  His  Reforms  —  Resignation  of  Malesherbes  —  Fall  of 
Turgot  —  Saint-Germain's  Military  Reforms  —  Necker's  First  Ministry  — 
His  Fall  — Social,  Intellectual,  and  Material  State  of  France  in  1781  — 
Montesquieu  and  Voltaire  —  The  Encyclopaedists  —  Rosseau  —  The  Contrat 
Social — Influence  of  the  Queen  after  1781  —  The  Reaction  — Joly  de 
Fleury —  D'Ormesson  —  Calonne  —  Lomenie  de  Brienne  —  Exile  ofthePar- 
lement—T\\&  May  Edicts,  1788  —  Revolutionary  Movements  in  Dauphiny 
and  elsewhere  —  Necker's  Second  Ministry  —  The  Resultat  du  Conseil — 
The  Elections  of  1789  — The  States-General  at  Versailles,  May  i,  1769. 

Louis  xvi.  was  twenty  years  old  when  he  became  King  of 
France,  having  been  born  in  1754.  His  father,  the  eldest 
son  of  Louis  xv.,  had  died  in  1765  ;  his^mother 
Louis  XVI.  ^^^^  Maria  Josepha  of  Saxony.  In  1770  he  mar- 
ried Marie  Antoinette,  and  had  two  sons  and  one  daughter. 
Of  the  former  the  eldest  died  at  the  age  of  ten  in  1789,  the 
younger,  the  unfortunate  Louis  xvii.,  died  in  1795  ^  ^is  daugh- 
ter, known  as  Madame  Royale,  after  experiencing  the  horrors 
of  the  Revolution,  married  the  Due  d'Angouleme,  the  son  of 
Charles  x.  Though  virtuous,  honest,  pious,  and  well-meaning, 
and  endowed  with  many  of  those  qualities  which  in  quiet  times 
would  make  a  ruler  popular,  Louis  xvi.  was  peculiarly  unsuited 
to  guide  France  through  a  period  of  political  agitation  and 
financial  confusion.  He  had  no  knowledge  of  politics  ;  he  was 
feeble,  vacillating,  and  sluggish.  Fully  conscious  of  his  inca- 
pacity to  rule  a  great  people  in  critical  times,  his  efforts  were 

394 


France  before  the  Revolution  39 5 

ruined  by  a  want  of  confidence  in  himself  and  a  constitutional 
inability  to  arrive  at  a  decision.  No  man  had  better  intentions 
or  was  more  desirous  to  do  his  duty.  He  often  worked  twelve 
hours  a  day,  and  personally  supervised  the  correspondence  of 
his  ministers.  '  He  was,'  writes  Burke,  '  a  prince,  the  acts  of 
whose  whole  reign  were  a  series  of  concessions  to  his  subjects, 
who  was  willing  to  relax  his  authority,  to  remit  his  prerogatives, 
to  call  his  people  to  a  share  of  freedom  not  known,  perhaps  not 
desired,  by  their  ancestors.'  Without  any  power  of  initiation, 
he  showed  himself  always  ready  to  support  measures  designed 
to  benefit  the  French  people.  During  the  fifteen  years  between 
his  accession  and  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution,  many  admir- 
able reforms  were  carried  out  with  the  full  assent  of  the  king.^ 
As  soon  as  he  recognised  the  necessity  of  summoning  the  States- 
General,  he  was  fully  prepared  to  accept  loyally  the  conse- 
quences of  his  action.  Unfortunately  he  was  indolent,  weak, 
and  infirm  of  purpose ;  he  was  easily  influenced  by  others,  arid 
his  good  intentions  were  often  ruined  by  the  subordination  of 
his  own  will  to  that  of  his  advisers.  His  refusal  to  include 
Choiseul  among  his  ministers  was  mainly  due  to  the  action 
taken  by  the  Duke  against  the  Jesuits ;  while  his  decision  to 
remove  Turgot  was  caused  in  part  by  his  uneasiness  at  the 
latter's  religious  opinions,  in  part  by  his  reluctance  to  interfere 
with  the  property  and  the  feudal  rights  of  the  nobles.  Strongly 
impressed  with  his  position  as  an  absolute  monarch,  he  seems 
to  have  recognised  the  mistake  of  entering  into  the  American 
struggle,  but  in  this  as  in  many  other  matters  he  allowed  him- 
self to  be  overruled  by  his  advisers.  Good  sense,  benevolence, 
scrupulousness,  and  moderation  availed  nothing  at  a  time  when 
a  strong  Government  was  needed  to  save  the  French  monarchy. 
Only  of  foreign  politics  did  Louis  show  any  real  grasp.  Like 
Louis  XV.,  il  connaissaii  les  affaires  de  V Europe  infinimetit 
mieux  que  celles   de   la   France?     Marie  Antoinette  was  not 

1  For  the  reign  of  Louis  xvi.  see  generally  Droz,  Histoire  de  Louis  XVI. ; 
and  Rocquain,  L Esprit  Kevolutionnaire  avant  la  Revolution. 

2  Sorel,  L Europe  et  la  Revolution  Frati^aise,  vol.  i.  p.  299. 


396  European  History y   1715-1789 

permitted  to  exercise  any  influence  over  the  department  of 
foreign  affairs,  and,  in  spite  of  the  approach  of  national  bank- 
ruptcy, France  held,  till  the  death  of  Vergennes  in  1787,  a 
brilliant  position  in  European  politics. 

His  wife,  the  celebrated  Marie  Antoinette,  whose  character 
has  now  been  completely  cleared  from  the  malicious  charges 
Marie  brought  against  it  before  and  during  the  Revolu- 

Antoinette.  tion,  played  a  considerable  part  in  the  politics  of 
the  reign.  With  a  charming  manner,  she  was  well  suited  to 
preside  over  the  brilliant  Court  and  society  of  Paris.  Superior 
to  her  husband  in  ability,  she  constantly  interfered  with  minis- 
terial appointments,  and  her  love  of  political  intrigues  alarmed 
both  Maria  Theresa  and  Joseph  11.  Unfortunately,  she  made 
no  attempt  to  inspire  her  husband  with  that  amount  of  inde- 
pendence of  judgment  and  firmness  which  would  have  saved 
France  from  many  disasters,  and  her  influence  was  used,  as  a 
rule,  to  support  some  mistaken  policy  or  an  incompetent  min- 
ister. ^Vith  no  knowledge  or  experience  of  politics,  her  fate, 
at  the  hands  of  a  mob  of  irresponsible  fanatics  who  disgraced 
civilisation  by  their  ferocity  and  vandalism,  must  not  blind  us 
to  the  fact  that,  previous  to  the  Revolution,  Marie  Antoinette's 
frequent  interference  in  affairs  of  state,  especially  after  1781, 
was  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  France ;  while'her  extrava- 
gance, and  the  luxury  and  expenditure  of  the  French  Court, 
largely  accentuated  the  difficulties  of  the  Government. 

In  1774  France  was  divided  into  Pays  d'Etat  and  Pays 
dElection.  In  the  former,  the  five  outlying  provinces,  local 
The  Neces-  Estatcs  indeed  existed  ;  but  during  the  eighteenth 
sityfora^^^^  ccntury  those  of  Languedoc  and  Brittany  alone 
in  1774.  showed  any  signs  of  vitality.     The  remaining  prov- 

inces were  governed  by  intendants  and  their  subdelegues.  The 
nobles,  though  they  possessed  privileges,  had  no  longer  any 
governing  powers,  and  either  lived  in  Paris  or  served  in  the 
army.  A  very  large  number  of  small  peasant  proprietors  were 
to  be  found  all  over  the  country,  whose  lives  were  burdened 
by  the  exactions  of  their  lords,  by  the  Government  Coruees,  and 


France  before  the  Revolution  igj 

by  compulsory  semce  in  the  militia.  The  cleavage  between 
classes,  caused  by  the  absenteeism  and  exactions  of  the  nobles, 
together  with  the  almost  entire  exemption  from  taxntion  en- 
joyed by  the  privileged  orders,  had,  by  the  accession  of  Louis 
XVI.,  become  very  serious.  Revolution  could  only  be  averted 
by  sweeping  financial  reforms  and  honest  administration.  To 
carry  out  such  a  programme  an  able  and  energetic  ruler  was 
required,  who  would  appoint  competent  ministers  and  support 
wise  measures. 

On  his  accession,  Louis  attempted  to  satisfy  popular  expec- 
tation and  inaugurate  a  new  era  in  French  history.  Before 
the  year  was   closed,   the  Triumvirate    had    been   ^^    ^ 

^  '  .  The  Open- 

replaced  by  a  new  ministry.  Louis  xv.  had,  before  ing  of  the 
his  death,  regretted  the  loss  of  Choiseul ;  but  the  ^*^^"- 
young  king  passed  over  his  claims,  and,  after  hesitating  between 
Machault,  Bernis,  and  Maurepas,  decided,  by  the  advice  of 
his  aunt,  Madame  Adelaide,  who  had  frequently  counselled  his 
father,  to  place  Maurepas  at  the  head  of  affairs.  Jean  Fre- 
deric Phelypeaux,  Comte  de  Maurepas,  who  was  over  seventy 
years  of  age,  had  been,  from  his  youth,  trained  to  official 
life.  From  1723  to  1744  he  was  Minister  of  Marine,  and 
his  retirement  was  due  to  the  loss  of  the  favour  of  Madame 
de  Pompadour.  He  was  wanting  in  administrative  power, 
and  made  no  honest  attempt  to  grapple  with  the  difficul- 
ties of  the  situation.  His  influence  over  Louis,  which  was 
considerable,  was  used  to  the  detriment  of  the  national  inter- 
ests, for  he  encouraged  the  king  in  his  unwillingness  to  arrive 
at  a  decision. 

The  other  members  of  the  ministry  were  Hue  de  Miromenil, 
who  succeeded  Maupeou  in  November  1774  as  Chancellor; 
the  Mar^chal  Du  Muy,  who  was  soon  succeeded  by  the  Comte 
de  Saint-Germain,  Minister  of  War ;  the  Comte  de  Vergennes, 
who  in  June  took  the  place  of  d'Aiguillon  as  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs ;  the  Due  de  la  Vrilliere,  Nvho  was  given  the  charge 
of  the  King's  Household,  and  who  in  July  1775  was  succeeded 
by  Malesherbes ;  and  Turgot,  who  on  July  20  was  nominated  to 


398  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

the  Ministry  of  Marine,  which  office  he  held  till  August  24,  when 
he  replaced  Terray  as  Comptroller-General  of  the  Finances. 

Turgot's    ministry   lasted  till  May  12,   1776,  and  formed  a 
noteworthy  page  in  French  history.^     Never  had  the  necessity 
,  for   sweeping   reforms   been   more   urgent.      The 

Ministry,  partial  revival  of  enterprise  under  Louis  xv.  had 
1774-76.  come  too  late ;  France,  entangled  in  costly  cam- 

paigns in  Germany  during  the  Seven  Years'  War,  had  lost  all 
control  of  the  ocean  highways,  her  possessions  in  Canada,  and 
her  pretensions  to  supremacy  in  India.  The  coup  d'etat  of 
January  14,  1771,  had  not  been  followed  by  beneficial 
measures.  Terray  had  abrogated  the  royal  declaration  of  May 
25?  1763,  permitting  the  free  circulation  of  corn  throughout 
France,  and,  while  the  expenditure  of  the  Court  proceeded  un- 
checked, his  reckless  measures  hurried  France  along  in  the 
direction  of  bankruptcy.  Turgot  hoped  that  Louis  would  re- 
form abuses  by  his  own  spontaneous  acts.  On  May  30,  1774, 
Maria  Theresa  had  written  to  Marie  Antoinette  :  — '  France 
has  immense  resources ;  there  are  also  enormous  abuses,  but 
these  latter  are  themselves  a  resource,  since  by  their  abolition 
the  king  will  obtain  the  blessing  of  his  people.  The  prospect 
is  indeed  fair  and  noble.'-  It  was  not  too  late;  the  tradi- 
tional loyalty  of  the  French  to  their  king  still  existed ;  it  only 
required  a  judicious  course  of  conduct,  and  a  firmness  of  will, 
to  enable  Louis  xvi.  to  seize  the  opportunity  that  now  pre- 
sented itself,  and  to  make  himself  as  powerful  as  Louis  xrv. 
But,  unlike  Maria  Theresa,  Louis  xvi.  did  not  understand  the 
opportunity,  and  had  no  clear  grasp  of  the  situation.  In  Tur- 
got, however,  he  possessed  a  minister  who  had  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  existing  abuses,  and  who  was  animated  by 
a  desire  to  benefit  France. 

Turgot,  who  was  born  on  May  10,  1724,  was  a  disciple  of 
Quesnay,  the  founder  of  the  School  of  Physiocrats,  who  held 
that  land  was  the  sole  source  of  wealth,  and  had  been  the 

^  See  De  Tocqueville,  V Ancien  Regime.  ^ 

2  Correspondence,  published  by  MM.  d'Arneth  and  Geffroy,  vol.  ii.  p.  155, 


France  before  the  Revolution  399 

intendant  of  Limoges  from  1761  to  1774.  His  administration 
of  that  province  had  been  most  successful,  and  he  now  placed 
the  benefits  of  his  experience  at  the  service  of  the  king. 
Steeped  in  the  philosophic  ideas  of  his  time,  Turgot  was,  hke 
many  of  his  contemporaries,  determined  to  carry  out  his  bene- 
ficial measures  by  means  of  the  royal  authority.  A  martyr  to 
gout,  his  dictatorial  conduct  alienated  many  who  otherwise 
might  have  supported  him ;  while  his  disregard  of  the  state  of 
public  opinion  nullified  to  some  extent  his  knowledge  of  the 
necessary  remedies  for  the  existing  abuses  and  his  desire  for 
the  pubHc  good.  Prepared  with  a  number  of  reforms,  he  was 
resolved  to  practise  the  most  rigid  economy.  •  Had  he  been 
allowed  to  persevere  with  his  designs  there  is  no  reason  to 
doubt  that  revolutionary  movements  would  have  been  averted, 
and  necessary  reforms  gradually  effected.  -Liberal  aspirations 
v.ere,  at  this  period,  widely  diffused ;  the  Society  of  the  Econo- 
mists had  been  founded  in  1767,  and  the  taxation  of  the  priv- 
ileged classes  who  themselves  denounced  abuses,  was  recognised 
among  thinking  men  as  imperatively  demanded  by  the  disorder 
into  which  the  finances  had  fallen. 

The  first  acts  of  Louis  xvi.  had  encouraged  the  friends  of 
progress.  He  had  dispensed  with  his  right  to  'joyous  acces- 
sion,' and  the  queen  to  her  right  to  the  'royal  girdle,'  while 
his  dismissal  of  Maupeou  and  appointment  of  Turgot  had 
delighted  the  nation.  But  these  wise  measures  had  been  fol- 
lowed by  the  recall  of  the  Parlements  in  August  1 7  74,  in  direct 
opposition  to  the  wish  of  Turgot  and  Du  Muy.  This  rein- 
statement was  a  profound  blunder,  and  compHcated  and  ham- 
pered Turgot's  schemes  for  the  rearrangement  of  taxation  and 
the  commutation  of  feudal  rights. 

Turgot's   first    measures  were    the    re-establishment    of  the 
freedom  of  the  corn  trade  on  September  13,  1774,  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  gratuities   of  the   Farmers-General —   ^^^  ^^.^ 
who  were  contractors  for  the  collection  of  a  large   First  Meas- 
portion  of  the  taxes — to  the  courtiers,  the  reform 
of  the  abuses  in  the  assessment  and  collection  of  the  to\\T3 


400  European  History ^   171 5-1 789 

dues,  and  the  removal  of  the  disabihties  of  foreigners.  In 
1775  he  reheved  the  small  farmers  and  manufacturers,  put 
down  with  a  firm  hand  some  bread  riots,  probably  instigated 
by  the  nobles,  and  which  at  one  time  assumed  dangerous 
proportions,  and  removed  monopolies.  Supported  by  Male- 
sherbes,  who,  on  July  19,  1775,  had  succeeded  la  Vrilliere,  the 
old  minister  of  Louis  xv.,  Turgot  continued  his  work  of  reform. 
While  agreeing  in  their  belief  in  the  possibility  of  regenerating 
France,  the  two  ministers  differed  with  regard  to  the  position 
to  be  taken  by  the  king.  Malesherbes  advocated  the  convo- 
cation of  the  States-General ;  while  Turgot,  imbued  with  the 
spirit  of  the  eighteenth-century  reforms,  had  no  wish  to 
strengthen  the  popular  element  in  the  Government,  and  was 
anxious  that  Louis  should  pose  as  a  patriot  king,  and  reor- 
ganise the  nation  by  his  own  spontaneous  acts.  During  the 
remainder  of  his  administration  he  carried  out  numerous  re- 
forms, with  a  feverish  energy  worthy  of  Joseph  11.  The  reform 
of  Government  contracts,  the  abolition  of  sinecures,  the  free- 
The  Aboii-  ^^^^^  °^  ^^^^  wiue  trade  (April  1776),  and  the  sup- 
tion  of  the  prcssiou  of  the  Coivee  and  "OaQ.  Jurajides,  summarise 
the  ju-  the  chief  measures  enacted  during  the  latter  months 

randes.  q{  ^T]S  ^^^  ^he  early  days  of  1776.     Of  these,  the 

abolition  of  the  Corvee  and  \kiQ  Jurandes  was  the  most  jmpor- 
tant.  'The  institution  of  the  Corz^ee,  or  the  forced  employ- 
ment of  the  peasants,  without  payment,  upon  the  making  and 
repairing  of  the  roads,'  ^  was  a  glaring  abuse  which  had  been 
established  by  Orry  in  1737.  The  injustice  of  this  pernicious 
system,  which  threw  the  whole  burden  of  making  and  repairing 
the  roads  upon  the  peasantry,  was  undeniable,  and  Turgot 
proposed  to  substitute  a  tax  paid  by  all  landowners.  In  spite 
of  the  opposition  of  the  privileged  orders,  the  king  supported 
Turgot,  and  the  edict  was  signed  on  January  6,  1776.  He  was 
equally  successful  in  his  attack  on  the  Jin-andes,  or  the  govern- 
ment of  privileged  corporations.  In  France  the  old  compli- 
cated mediaeval  trade  laws  and  customs  still  held  their  ground, 
1  W.  Walker  Stephens,  Life  and  Writings  of  7'urgoi,  p.  41. 


France  before  the  Revolution  40 1 

and  on  February  5  the  edict  abrogating  the  system  was  en- 
acted, followed  by  four  other  edicts  having  for  their  object  the 
repeal  of  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  provisioning  Registration 
of  Paris.     These   six  edicts  were   strenuously  op-    o^^^'^six 

J       ^      Acts,  March 

posed  by  the  Parlement  of  Paris,  and  only  obtained  12, 1776. 
the  force  of  law  after  a  Lit  de  Justice  on  March  12.  The  dis- 
astrous effects  of  the  restoration  of  the  Far/e7?ients  were  at  once 
seen.  Round  the  Parlement  of  Paris  gathered  all  opponents 
of  reform,  including  the  queen,  the  king's  brother,  the  Comte 
de  Provence,  the  financiers,  the  ladies  of  the  Court,  the  clergy, 
and  the  merchants.  Maurepas  joined  the  ranks  of  the  oppo- 
sition, and  Marie  Antoinette,  furious  at  the  recall  of  her 
protege,  the  Comte  de  Guines,  the  French  Ambassador  in 
London,  and  unable  to  secure  the  overthrow  of  Vergennes, 
urged  the  dismissal  of  Turgot,  whose  manners  and  economies 
she  disliked,  and  who  had  opposed  her  favourite.^  All  the 
classes  who  were  affected  by  his  proposed  measures  of  tolera- 
tion, his  abolition  of  the  Jurandes,  his  attacks  on  privileges, 
conspired  against  him.  The  poorer  classes  themselves  had  not 
had  time  to  appreciate  the  value  of  his  reforms,  and  a  bad 
har\'est  rendered  him  temporarily  unpopular.  A  criticism  of 
his  so-called  budget  for  1776  was  laid  before  Louis,  who  had 
always  disliked  Turgot's  views  on  religion,  and  who  had  begun 
to  resent  the  dictatorial  tone  adopted  by  his  austere  and  some- 
what pedantic  minister.  Governed  by  general  maxims,  Tur- 
got, like  Joseph  11.,  failed  to  realise  the  impossibility  of 
carrying  out  a  vast  number  of  reforms  within  a  very  short 
period.  He  was  totally  devoid  of  the  art  of  managing  men ; 
and  had  he  shown  more  tact,  it  is  not  improbable  that,  supported 
by  Louis,  he  might  have  been  allowed  to  continue  his  reform- 
ing measures.-  The  king's  confidence  in  Turgot  had  been 
further  shaken  by  the  persistent  attacks  upon,  and  intrigues 
against,  his  policy ;  and  the  minister's  position  was  seriously 
affected  by  the  retirement,  on  May  10,  of  Malesherbes,  who, 

1  Maxime  de  la  Rocheterie,  //isioire  de  Marie  Antoinette,  p.  225. 

2  Nourrisson,  Trois  Revolutionnaires :    Turgot^  Necker^  Bailly^  p.  120. 
PERIOD   VI.  2C 


402  Eiiropea7i  History,   171 5-1 789 

despairing  of  overcoming  the  opposition  to  his  proposed  re- 
forms, refused  to  remain  in  office,  and  was  succeeded  by 
Retirement  Amelot,  One  of  Maurepas'  creatures.  Simultane- 
ofMaie-  ously  with   the   measures   of  Turcot,  Malesherbes 

sherbes,  -'  07 

May  10, 1776.  had  also  endeavoured  to  remove  abuses.  In  sym- 
pathy with  the  philosophers,  he  showed  tolerance  of  their  opin- 
ions, he  improved  the  condition  of  the  prisons  and  hospitals, 
he  released  many  prisoners  from  the  Bastille.  He  desired  the 
convocation  of  the  States-General,  and  he  attempted,  though 
without  success,  to  abolish  lettres  de  cachets,  to  prevent  arbi- 
trary imprisonment  in  the  future,  and  to  destroy  a  privilege 
often  accorded  to  the  courtiers  and  their  friends,  of  postponing 
the  payment  of  their  debts  (^arrets  de  su?'seance).  In  vain  he 
urged  the  re-establishment  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes,  or  at  least 
a  modification  in  the  treatment  meted  out  to  the  Protestants ; 
in  vain  he  pleaded  for  the  suppression  of  torture.  Though 
animated  with  a  real  wish  to  benefit  France,  Malesherbes,  who 
wanted  firmness  and  resolution,  was  not  strong  enough  to  force 
his  views  upon  the  Government  in  face  of  the  opposition  of  the 
queen  and  Maurepas ;  and  discouraged  at  his  failure  to  carry 
out  all  his  proposed  reforms,  he  retired  from  the  Government.^ 
On  May  12,  1776,  Turgot,  the  only  man  who  could  have 
saved  the  French  monarchy,  fell.  In  a  letter  to  Maria  Theresa, 
Mercy  expresses  the  truth  when  he  says  that  '  as 
Turgot,  the  Comptroller-General  enjoyed  a  great  reputation 

May  12, 177  .  ^^^  integrity,  and  was  beloved  by  the  people,  it  was 
a  melancholy  thing  that  his  dismissal  should  be  in  part  the 
queen's  work.* ^  And  he  declares  that  'the  king  is  compro- 
mised in  the  sight  of  the  public,  who  are  ignorant  of  none  of 
the  circumstances,  and  are  well  aware  that  the  responsible 
cause  of  them  is  the  will  of  the  queen.'  Turgot  had  not  been 
in  office  long  enough  to  submit  his  scheme  of  local  self-gov- 
ernment to  the  king  and  council.  According  to  this  scheme 
good  administration  was  to  be  arrived  at  by  means  of  a  series 

^  Nourrisson,  Trois  Revolutionnaires  :    Turgot,  iVecker,  Bailly,  p.  130. 
-  Mercy  to  Maria  Theresa,  May  16,  1776.     Arneth,  ii.  p.  446. 


France  before  the  Revolution  403 

of  councils,  beginning  with  the  villages  and  towns,  from  which 
deputies  were  to  be  sent  to  a  larger  municipality  of  the  arro7i- 
dissemejit,  or  district,  and  from  these  representatives  were  to 
be  sent  to  the  general  assembly  of  the  province.  This  series 
of  elective  assemblies,  parochial,  municipal,  and  provincial,  was 
to  culminate  in  a  grand  municipaHty  in  Paris,  formed ^of  the 
ministers  and  elected  members  from  the  provincial  assemblies. 
While  all  legislative  powers  were  to  remain  with  the  king  and 
council,  this  National  Assembly  was  to  *  have  the  ultimate  voice 
in  administrative  matters,'  to  inaugurate  a  system  of  national 
education,  and  to  advise  the  Government.  Like  Leopold  of 
Tuscany,  Joseph  11.,  Charles  iii.  of  Spain,  and  Gustavus  iii., 
Turgot  belonged  to  that  class  of  reformers  who,  while  strength- 
ening the  bonds  of  union  between  the  king  and  his  people, 
desired  that  all  reforms  should  proceed  from  the  ruler  himself. 
His  financial  measures  had  met  with  extraordinary  success. 
He  had  refused  to  impose  new  taxes  or  to  make  any  new 
loans  ;  he  had  restored  public  confidence  in  the  credit  of  the 
Government ;  and  by  means  of  the  strictest  economy,  he  left 
a  surplus  of  eleven  millions.  Writing  of  Malesherbes  and 
Turgot,  Voltaire  expressed  the  despair  of  the  reformers  when 
he  said  :  —  'I  shall  never  console  m.yself  for  having  seen  rise 
and  perish  the  golden  age  which  these  two  ministers  were 
preparing  for  us.'^ 

The  Comte  de  Saint-Germain  alone  of  the  reforming  minis- 
ters remained  in  office.     From  1775  to  1777  he  endeavoured, 
with  some  success,  to  return  to  the   traditions  of 
Louvois,  to  check  abuses,  and  to  render  the  army   Samt-Ger- 

main  s 

discipHne  efficient.    He  managed  to  carry  out  many   Military 
valuable  reforms,  all  in  the  direction  of  economy,   Jl^^^^' 
education,  drill,  and  the  diminution  of  the  privileges 
of  the  nobles.     But  though  a  man  of  great  ability,  and  fully 
alive  to  the  necessity  of  an  army  able  to  meet  that  of  Austria 
or  Prussia  on  equal  terms,  he  alienated  the  soldiers  by  intro- 

1  Voltaire,  quoted   by  Lecky,  History  of  England  in   the   Eighteenth 
Century ^  vol.  v.  p.  389. 


404  European  History^   171 5-1 789 

ducing  the  drill  and  rigid  discipline  of  Frederick  the  Great,  and 
the  nobles  by  abolishing  the  Mousquetaires  and  other  expen- 
sive bodies  of  household  troops,  and  by  compelling  the  younger 
officers  to  qualify  by  serving  as  non-commissioned  officers 
for  a  time.  His  successors,  especially  the  Comte  de  Brienne, 
Minister  of  War  from  September  1787  to  August  1788,  con- 
tinued and  developed  his  policy,  which,  in  spite  of  some  mis- 
takes, was  calculated  to  restore  the  prestige  of  the  French 
army. 

Turgot's  measures  met  with  a  different  fate.  His  fall  had 
caused  the  utmost  consternation  among  all  those  who  hoped 
Necker's  ^^^  reform,  and  was  speedily  followed  by  a  reaction. 
First  Clugny,  an  intendant  of  Bordeaux,  became  Comp- 

Oct.  1776'to  troller-General,  and  the  credit  of  the  French 
May  1781.  Government  was  sensibly  lowered.  On  August 
II  the  Corvees  were  re-established,  and  the  Jurandes  on 
August  19.  In  the  following  month,  free  trade  in  corn  was 
again  suppressed.  The  withdrawal  of  Turgot's  great  reforms 
caused  deep  dissatisfaction.  On  Clugny's  death  in  October 
1776,  he  was  succeeded  by  Taboureau  des  R^aux;  but  the 
management  of  the  finances  was  intrusted  to  Necker,  a 
Genevese  banker,  whose  first  term  of  office  extended  from 
October  1776  to  May  1781.  Narrow-minded  and  unsympa- 
thetic, Necker  had  little  knowledge  of  the  real  needs  of  the 
French  people.  Like  Turgot,  he  hoped,  by  administrative 
and  financial  reforms,  to  avert  any  serious  disturbances.  He 
did  not  belong  to  the  advanced  reforming  party,  nor  was  he 
in  accord  with  the  Court.  During  the  years  of  Necker's  first 
ministry,  the  reaction  against  Turgot's  measures  was  checked, 
and  the  policy  of  reform  was  continued  to  a  modified  extent. 
Under  the  title  of  Director  of  the  Finances,  Necker  attempted 
to  check  the  extravagance  of  the  Court,  to  restore  the  credit 
of  the  Government,  to  introduce  economies  into  the  public 
service,  and  to  carry  out  a  number  of  beneficial  measures.  A 
financier  rather  than  a  statesman,  he  inspired  confidence  among, 
the  commercial  classes.     He  was  strongly  opposed  to  all  con- 


Frajice  before  the  Revolution  405 

stitutional  changes,  and  did  not  sympathise  with  the  principles 
of  the  Contrat  Social.  Like  Turgot,  he  wished  to  revive  and 
utihse  the  provincial  assembUes,  and  proposed  to  give  them 
considerable  administrative  and  taxative  powers,  and  to  restrict 
the  Parlet7ients  to  judicial  work. 

At  first  his  measures  seemed  likely  to  have  advantageous 
results  for  the  monarchy.  To  meet  the  war  expenditure  he 
lessened  the  number  of  Receivers-General  and  Treasurers  of 
the  army  and  navy,  besides  making  large  reductions  in  the 
royal  household.  By  a  series  of  edicts  he  prepared  the  way 
for  the  abolition  of  tolls  on  roads  and  rivers,  and  the  sup- 
pression of  the  system  of  farming  the  taxes;  and  at  the  same 
time  he  endeavoured  to  prevent  the  increase  of  the  taille  and 
other  direct  taxes,  and  to  create  provincial  assemblies,  which 
should  gradually  absorb  the  duties  of  the  intendants  and  the 
subdelegues.  In  January  1781,  in  accordance  with  his  poHcy 
of  looking  to  public  opinion  for  support,  he  published  his 
famous  Co7npie  Rendu  de  TE fat  des  finances,  which  revealed  to 
the  nation  the  seriousness  of  the  financial  crisis.  His  Compte 
Rendu  was  seized  upon  by  the  opponents  of  the  monarchy;  and 
the  privileged  and  official  classes,  who  were  furious  at  Necker's 
reforming  ideas,  demanded  his  downfall.  The  Parlement  of 
Paris  joined  the  opposition,  which  included  Maurepas  and  Ver- 
gennes.  In  spite  of  the  support  of  the  queen,  Xecker  insisted 
on  resigning  his  ofiice  in  May  1781.  With  his  fall  ended  the 
period  of  administrative  reform. 

From  1 78 1  reactionary  and  progressive  tendencies  struggled 
for  the  mastery.     The  popularity  of  the  American  war  strength- 
ened the  Government,  and  all  anticipations  of  com-        . 
ing  evil  seemed  unlikely  to  be  realised.     '  No  one,'    Material, 
writes  Segur,  *  dreamed  of  a  Revolution,  though  it   fe"cturi*CoQ- 
was  forming  rapidly  in  opinions.'     The   king  and   dition  of 
queen  were  to  all   appearances  popular,  and   the   between 
birth  of  the  Dauphin  was  received  with  genuine   ^781  and  1789. 
expressions  of  loyalty.     The  French  Court  and  society  were 
never    so    brilliant,    intellectual    activity  was    never    so    great 


4o6  European  History^   171 5-1 789 

as  during  the  years  immediately  preceding  the  Revolution. 
Paris  itself  had  never  appeared  richer  or  more  prosperous. 
'  On  my  return  from  America,'  wrote  Segur,  ^  I  found  the  Court 
and  society  of  Paris  more  flourishing  than  ever ; '  and  he  con- 
tinues to  speak  of  the  extraordinary  progress  in  agriculture, 
manufactures,  commerce,  literature,  and  science.^  France  had 
increased  enormously  in  wealth  after  the  Peace  of  Versailles  ; 
commerce  and  industry  advanced  by  leaps  and  bounds.  '  The 
French  trade,'  wrote  Arthur  Young  in  1789,  'has  almost 
doubled  since  the  Peace  of  1763.'  Equally  rapid  was  the 
progress  in  science  and  art.  '  A  spirit  of  innovation  and  specu- 
lation, a  love  of  Hberty  and  toleration,  an  immense  hopeful- 
ness, and  a  disposition  to  underrate  all  difficulties,  almost 
universally  characterised  French  society.'' 

Into  this  society  the  new  spirit  of  enlightenment  had  already 
penetrated.  During  the  first  half  of  the  century,  while  the 
Montesquieu  Writings  of  IMontesquicu  gave  an  impetus  to  the 
and  Voltaire,  extraordinary  intellectual  development  in  France, 
the  effect  of  the  works  of  Voltaire,  upon  the  habits  and 
thoughts  of  his  contemporaries,  was  immense.  Influenced  by 
the  writings  of  English  philosophers  and  English  institutions, 
Montesquieu  and  Voltaire  attempted  respectively  to  limit  the 
despotism  of  the  Bourbons,  and  to  destroy  superstition  and 
intolerance  in  France.  Montesquieu  died  in  1755;  but  Vol- 
taire lived  through  the  reign  of  Louis  xv.,  and  did  not  die  till 
1778. 

Of  the  many  assailants  of  authority,  tradition,  and  custom, 
Voltaire  was  the  most  famous.  He  opposed  the  French  Parle- 
ments  equally  with  the  French  Church,  and  rejoiced  at  the 
overthrow  of  the  former  in  1771.  Monarchical  in  his  views 
on  government,  he  advocated  administrative  reforms,  and 
especially  the  hberty  of  the  press.     His  close  relations  with 

1  Vide  Aubertin,  L Esprit  public  au  XVIII'^^  Siecle,  p.  485. 

2  Lecky,  History  of  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  vol.  v.  p.  395. 
'He  who  did  not  live  before  1789,'  Talleyrand  once  said,  *had  never 
known  the  charm  of  life.' 


France  before  the  Revolution  ^^.^407 

Frederick  the  Great  and  Catherine  11.  during  certain  periods 

of  his  Hfe  were  incompatible  with  schemes  for  poHtical  equahty. 

He  had  no  sympathy  with   democratic  opinions ;    and,  while 

an  advocate  of  the  ideas  which  Turgot  had  attempted  to  realise, 

he    looked   to    an    enlightened   despot  to  check  ecclesiastical 

aggressions,    to    abohsh    barbarous    laws    and    the    remains  of 

feudalism,  and  to  initiate  and  carry  out  measures  for  the  good 

I  of  the  people.     Aiming  at  religious  and  intellectual  liberty,  and 

'  holding   a    cosmopolitan   position  in  Europe,  Voltaire  stands 

:  out  as  one  of  the  most  representative  figures  of  the  eighteenth 

■  century. 

Whilst  during  the  first  half  of  the  century,  Montesquieu, 
;  with  his  Lettres  Persanes  and  his  Esprit  des  Lois,  began  the 
attack  on  the  ancient  institutions  of  Prance,  and  TheEncycid- 
Voltaire  by  his  versatility  made  the  philosophic  p^dists. 
and  literary  movement  popular,  and  gave  it  that  tone  of  irre- 
hgion  which  stamped  it  for  so  many  years,  the  influence  of 
Diderot,  Rousseau,  and  their  followers  gradually  became  para- 
mount during  the  second  half  of  the  period.  In  1751  the 
famous  Encyclopedie  made  its  appearance,  and  included  among 
is  contributors  Diderot,  Rousseau,  d'Alembert,  Turgot,  Buftbn, 
and  Marmontel.  Though  suppressed  for  a  time,  during  the 
conflict  between  Louis  xv.  and  the  Parlement  of  Paris,  it  w^as 
allowed  to  appear  again  in  1754,  and  continued  its  attacks  on 
all  the  existing  institutions  and  behefs,  on  inequahties  of  tax- 
ation, wars,  the  corruption  of  justice,  and,  above  all,  upon  the 
system  of  thought  resting  on  authority.  The  emancipation  of 
mankind,  the  increase  of  the  influence  of  reason,  the  removal 
of  all  religious  and  political  errors,  were  the  objects  aimed  at 
by  this  bold  group  of  writers  who,  with  energy  and  brilhancy, 
attempted  to  introduce  sweeping  economic,  political,  and 
social  reforms. 

Of  the  Encyclopaedists,  Diderot  and  d'Alembert,  by  their 
ardent  eff"orts  for  the  improvement  of  mankind,  became  recog- 
nised as  the  foremost  champions  of  the  intellectual  revolution. 
They  aimed  at  nothing  less  than  the  establishment  of  a  com- 


c 


408  European  History y   171 5-1 789 

plete  system  of  education  succeeding  the  destruction  of  the 
monarchy  and  the  Church,  and  were  in  sympathy  with  the 
school  of  thinkers  known  as  the  Physiocrats,  who,  led  by  Ques-  I 
nay  and  Turgot,  advocated  free  trade,  free  agriculture,  and 
free  industry,  and  laid  down  the  maxim.,  Laissez  faire  et  laissez 
passer  as  the  only  cure  for  the  economic  evils  from  which 
France  was  suffering.  They  regarded  the  land  as  the  sole 
source  of  wealth,  they  urged  equality,  they  insisted  on  the 
necessity  of  national  education. 

In  spite  of  their  zeal  for  reforms,  neither  the  Encyclopaedists 
or  the  Physiocrats,  nor  Montesquieu  nor  Voltaire  reached  the 
masses,  who,  isolated  and  cut  off  from  communication  with 
the  upper  and  middle  classes,  remained  sunk  in  ignorance  or 
despair.  "\ 

It  was  feft  for  Rousseau  to  rouse  the  French  nation  and  to 
exercise  a  powerful  influence,  not  only  upon  all  sections  of  his 
Rousseau  countrymen,  but  also  upon  European  society.  In 
*c'^*t^*'t  ^7^^  ^^^   Cotifrat  Social  w2ls   pubhshed,  and   the 

Social.'  sovereignty  of  the  people  was  declared  to  the  world. 

'  Man  was  born  free,  and  is  everywhere  in  chains,'  said  Rous- 
seau, and  proceeded  to  trace  the  origin  of  society  to  a  social 
compact  between  all  the  members  of  a  community  who  thus 
collectively  formed  the  sovereign  power,  which  was  inalienable, 
and  the  will  of  which  was  expressed  in  laws.  Representative 
legislatures  were  rejected,  and  Rousseau's  scheme  of  govern- 
ment could  only  be  carried  out  in  a  small  state  in  which  every 
citizen  could  personally  participate  in  the  making  of  the  laws, 
and  in  which  alone  true  liberty  could  exist. 

In  France,  as  in  Europe,  Rousseau's  writings  were  widely 
read  by  a  society  which  prided  itself  on  its  education,  its  en- 
Hghtenment,  its  sensibihty,  its  philanthropy,  and  its  taste  for 
political  speculation.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  enthu- 
siasm for  the  author  of  the  Contrat  Social  among  all  classes 
in  France  was  unprecedented,  due  in  great  measure  to  his 
sympathy  with  the  wrongs  of  the  poor. 

From  the  overthrow  of  the  Parleme^its  in  1771  may  be  dated 


France  before  the  Revolution  409 

the  great  influence  of  the  Contra f  Social,  while  from  1787  the 
philosophy  of  Rousseau  held  unquestioned  sway  in  Franc'e. 
In  spite  of  his  opposition  to  cosmopoUtan  politics,  and  his 
insistence  on  every  act  of  sovereignty  being  assented  to  by  all 
members  of  the  state,  the  Jacobin  party  deduced  the  principle 
of  the  fraternity  of  democracies  from  his  doctrines,  and  in 
their  governmental  system  ran  directly  counter  to  the  teaching 
contained  in  his  works.  Though  the  causes  of  the  French 
Revolution  were  mainly  economical  and  political,  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  the  \\Titings  of  Rousseau  had  an  enormous  effect. 

The  death  of  Maria  Theresa  in  1780,  followed  by  that  of 
Maurepas  in  1781,  left  Louis  xvi.  and  Marie  Antoinette  with- 
out any  experienced  advisers.  The  first  period  of  „ 
the  reign,  in  which  the  influence  of  Maurepas  was  the  Queen 
predominant,  was  now  succeeded  by  a  second  pe-  ^  ^^^  ^^  ^' 
riod  during  which  Marie  Antoinette  attempted,  at  times  with 
success,  to  decide  important  questions  of  home  and  foreign 
pohcy.^  In  1778  she  had,  at  the  instigation  of  Maria  Theresa, 
endeavoured  to  secure  the  intervention  of  France  on  behalf 
of  the  Bavarian  scheme  of  Joseph  11.  After  1781  the  popular 
suspicion  of  the  queen's  predilection  for  a  close  Austrian 
alliance  at  the  expense  of  French  interests,  which  was  ex- 
pressed in  the  term  rAutrichierine,  found  ample  justification 
in  her  opposition  to  the  foreign  policy  of  Vergennes,  and  espe- 
cially in  her  determined  efforts  to  force  the  French  Government 
to  support  Joseph  11.,  in  1784,  in  his  designs  on  the  Low  Coun- 
tries.- Her  support  of  schemes  for  the  aggrandisement  of  the 
House  of  Hapsburg  only  intensified  the  opposition  to  her  influ- 
ence, while  her  interference  in  domestic  affairs,  combined  with 
her  want  of  firmness  and  sagacity,  enormously  increased  the 
difficulties  which  the  Government,  after  1781,  had  to  face. 

In  spite  of  the  general  disbelief  in  the  possibility  of  a  Revo- 
lution, in  spite  of  the  prosperity  of  the  country,  and  in  spite  of 
the  seemingly  stable  position  of  the  French  monarchy  as  late  as 

1  Aubertin,  U Esprit  public  au  XVIII"*^  Siecle,  pp.  444,  445,  475. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  474. 


4 10  Etiropean  History,   171 5-1789 

the  year  1787,  the  reaction  which  in  1781   followed  the  fall  of 
N'ecker,  led  by  rapid  steps  to  the  catastrophe  in  1789. 

The  king  had  committed  a  fatal  error  in  allowing  himself 
to  be  over-persuaded  to  embark  upon  the  American  war. 
French  finance,  as  Turgot  had  feared,  was  rendered  for  the 
first  time  irremediable  :  while  the  real  significance  of  the  Ameri- 
can example,  which  Diderot  had  early  perceived,  soon  became 
apparent  in  the  increased  determination  of  the  French  people 
to  secure  self-government  and  representation.  France  unfortu- 
nately adopted  ideas  which  belonged  exclusively  to  the  war 
period,  and  not  to  the  constitutional  period  which  followed 
the  war ;  while  Lafayette  and  other  French  officers  returned 
to  their  native  land,  inoculated  with  an  enthusiasm  for  equality, 
and  prepared  to  fight  for  liberty  in  France.  Necker  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Joly  de  Fleury,  whose  administration  increased  the 
financial  difficulties,  and  Louis  declared  that  he  would  have 
no  First  Minister.^  He  found  himself  forced  to  consult  Ver- 
gennes,  who  was  himself  unfitted  to  direct  home  affairs ;  and 
consequently  the  influence  of  the  queen,  who  presided  over  the 
brilliant  and  light-hearted  Court,  became  supreme  in  the  inter- 
nal affairs  of  France. 

The  period  of  reaction,  caused  by  the  greed  and  ambition  of 
the  privileged  orders,  and  definitely  begun  under  Maurepas  and 
Th  R  f  J*^^^  ^^  Fleury,  was  marked  in  178 1  by  a  regulation 
after  the  Fall  of  unspcakablc  folly  on  the  part  of  the  Marechal  de 
Segur,  to  the  effect  that,  while  Rofiiriers  were  ex- 
cluded even  from  the  rank  of  sub-lieutenant,  any  one  seeking 
to  become  a  captain  in  the  army  must  produce  proof  of  four 
degrees  of  nobihty,  not  including  the  applicant's  own.  The 
unpopularity  of  this  measure  was  great  among  the  members  of 
the  Third  Estate  and  the  less  ancient  nobility,  and  led  to  the 
increased  disorganisation  of  the  army. 

The  feudal  reaction  was  not  confined  to  military  matters  but 
affected  the  Church,  and  extended  into  the  provinces.  After 
the   expectations  roused  by  the   ministry  of  Turgot,  and  the 

^  Cherest,  La  Chute  de  l\incien  Ri^iine,  vol.  i.  p.  31. 


France  before  the  Revolution  4II 

promises  of  the  king,  the  disappjiiitment  felt  was  acute,  espe- 
cially as  the  former  evils  seemed  to  be  aggravated.  '  The 
very  prosperity  of  the  early  years  of  Louis  xvi.'s  reign  hurried 
on  the  (revolutionary)  movement,  causing  men  to  feel  more 
keenly  such  vexations  as  remained,  and  driving  them  more 
ardently  to  rid  themselves  of  them.  France  was  the  country 
wherein  ideas  of  reform  were  the  most  widely  spread,  minds 
were  most  cultivated,  men  were  the  most  alike,  the  government 
most  centralised,  the  nobihty  most  reduced  to  political  insig- 
nificance, the  corporate  bodies  most  subjected  to  control,  and 
the  nation  most  homogeneous.'  ^ 

It  was  the  cleavage  between  classes,  the  growth  of  ideas  of 
political  freedom,  and  the  weakness  of  the  Government,  that 
ruined  the  monarchy.  Men  realised  how  odious  were  the 
privileges  of  a  small  minority.  '  It  was  not  against  the  feudal 
system,  but  against  the  effete  survival  of  parts  of  the  system, 
that  the  Revolution  directed  its  destructive  energy.'  -  Practi- 
cal equahty  to  a  great  extent  existed  between  the  different 
orders,  and  the  middle  classes  had  become  the  equals  of  the 
nobles  in  education,  in  their  aims,  habits  of  thought  and  tastes, 
and  in  their  enlightenment.  Just  as  the  peasant  resented  the 
continuance  of  the  rights  and  powers  of  the  nobles,  so  the 
middle  classes  resented  the  existence  of  caste  privileges.  In 
these  years  of  enthusiasm  for  liberty  and  equality,  which  were 
marked  by  a  vague  but  widespread  agitation  and  by  an  expec- 
tation of  coming  changes,  a  wise  and  capable  Government  was 
absolutely  necessary.  Without  a  king  of  strong  personal  char- 
acter, anarchy  was  inevitable.  'The  French,'  said  Cardinal 
Richelieu,  '  are  capable  of  anything,  provided  that  those  who 
command  them  are  capable  of  directing  them.' 

While  the  reactionary  influences  were  carrying  all  before 
them,  the  financial  embarrassments  of  the  Government  rapidly 
increased,  and  Joly  de  Fleury  found  it  necessary  to  impose 
new  taxes.     Though  the  Farlement  of  Paris,  delighted  at  the 

1  Sorel,  L' Europe  et  la  Revolution  Fraji^aise,  vol.  i.  p.  145. 

2  Lodge,  History  of  Modern  Europe,  p.  474. 


412  Eiiropea^i  History^  171 5-1789 

overthrow  of  Necker,  accepted  the  edict,  some  of  the  provin- 
cial courts  began  to  resist  the  imposition  of  taxes,  and  that  of 
Besangon,  on  February  17,  1783,  demanded  the  convocation  of 
the  States-General  and  the  restoration  of  the  provincial  Estates. 
The  idea  of  a  confederation  of  the  various  Parlements  in 
the  kingdom  was  started,  the  object  of  the  movement  being 
the  restoration  of  the  magistracy  to  its  former  influence.  The 
signature  of  the  preliminaries  of  peace  with  England,  how- 
ever, tended  to  calm  the  agitation,  and  on  February  26  the 
Government  published  a  decree  promising  measures  for  the 
suppression  of  some  of  the  taxes.  On  March  29,  Joly  de 
^.^  Fleury  was  dismissed,  and  on  April   i   a  successor 

D  Ormes-  •'  '  ^^ 

son's  Minis-  was  found  in  d'Ormesson,  who  enjoyed  the  reputa- 
try,  17  3-  ^JQj^  q£  being  an  honest  and  hard-working  man.^ 
He  received  the  title  of  Controller-General  of  the  Finances, 
and  attempted  to  check  the  reckless  expenditure  of  the  Court. 
Finding  himself  powerless  to  control  the  expenses,  he  decided 
to  virtually  acknowledge  the  national  bankruptcy  by  postponing 
the  payment  of  the  public  obligations. 

After  a  ministry  of  seven  months,  he  fell  in  November,  in 
consequence  of  the  fierce  attacks  of  the  Vaudreuil,  Pohgnac, 
Guiche,  and  Perigord  families,  whose  credit  at  the  Court  was 
high,  and  who,  with  the  rest  of  the  nobles,  resented^  d'Ormes- 
son's  attempts  to  lessen  their  demands  on  the  Exchequer.  On 
his  fall,  the  influence  of  the  Comte  d'Artois  and  the  Court 
The  Minis-  ladics  prevailed  with  the  king,  and  Calonne  was 
caionne  appointed   Minister   at   the   close   of    1783.      M. 

1783-87.  Albert  Sorel  has  well  described  him  :  —  *  Une  sorte  • 

de  charlatan  politique,  Calonne,  dissipateur  frivole  d'argent  et 
d'idees,  qui  flatte  les  caprices  des  courtisans,  eblouit  le  grande 
monde  de  sa  forfanterie,  s'etourdit  de  sa  presomption,  prodigue 
les  dernieres  ressources  des  finances,  perd  les  derniers  enjeux 
de  la  politique,  et  achemine,  avec  impertinence,  la  monarchic 

1  D'Ormesson's  predecessors  in  the  control  of  the  finances  in  Louis 
XVI. 's  reign  were  Terray,  Turgot,  Clugny,  Taboureau,  Necker,  and  Joly  de 
Fleury. 


Fi'aiice  before  the  Revolution  413 

vers  le  catastrophe.'  ^  Of  Calonne's  abilities  and  character, 
Maurepas  had  a  poor  opinion,  Louis  agreed  to  his  appoint- 
ment very  reluctantly.  Till  1787  the  new  IVIinister  maintained 
himself  in  office,  and  completely  gained  the  king's  confidence. 
The  mysterious  affair  of  the  diamond  necklace,  which  was  said 
to  have  been  purchased  by  the  Cardinal  de  Rohan  for  Marie 
Antoinette,  belongs  to  this  period  (1785),  and  brought  upon 
the  queen  suspicion  and  obloquy.  During  these  years  the 
criminal  extravagance  of  Calonne  accentuated  the  financial 
crisis,  though  by  dexterous  management  he  dazzled  the  people 
with  an  appearance  of  prosperity.  St.  Cloud  was  bought  for 
the  queen,  the  debts  of  the  king's  brothers  were  paid,  and 
enormous  loans  at  an  extravagant  rate  of  interest  were  raised. 
The  country  seemed  tranquil  and  contented ;  through  the  in- 
dependence of  xA.merica  new  markets  for  French  commerce 
were  opened ;  the  harvests  of  1 784  and  1 786  were  excellent. 
This  bubble  of  apparent  prosperity  was,  however,  burst  in  the 
last  months  of  1786,  when  the  Minister,  already  attacked  by 
the  Parlemeiit  of  Paris  and  the  provincial  Parlejne?its,  con- 
fessed his  inabiHty  to  pay  the  interest  on  the  various  loans 
contracted  by  the  state.  Since  the  outbreak  of  the  American 
war,  the  deficit  had  grown  to  the  enormous  sum  of  140  mill- 
ions. Vergennes,  who  was  chief  of  the  Council  of  Finance 
as  well  as  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  agreed  with 
Calonne  as  to  the  necessity  of  summoning  to  Versailles  an 
Assembly  of  Notables,  composed  of  the  chief  persons  of  the 
realm,  to  constitute  a  Committee  of  Reform.  On  February  13, 
Vergennes  died,  leaving  no  one  of  ability  to  succeed  him.- 
The  Notables,  consisting  mainly  of  members  of  the  privileged 
orders,  met  on  February  22,  refused  to  agree  to  Calonne's  pro- 
posals, which  were  an  imitation  of  those  of  Necker  —  strict 
economy  in  the  Court,  the  taxation  of  the  clergy  and  nobihty, 
the  suppression  of  exemptions  and  privileges,  the  establishment 

1  Sorel,  L Europe  et  la  Revolution  Fran^aise,  vol.  i.  p.  213. 

2  Frederic  Masson,  Le  Department  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  pendant  la 
Revolution,  I'jSy-iSo^,  p.  2. 


414  European  History,   1715-1789 

of  provincial  Estates,  and  the  abolition  of  the  Corvee  and  other 
unpopular  taxes  —  insisted  on  an  investigation  of  the  Minister's 
financial  proceedings,  censured  the  proceedings  of  the  Govern- 
ment, and  on  April  1 7  drove  Calonne  from  office. 

On  May  3,  Lomenie  de  Brienne,  the  ambitious  and  unbe- 
lieving Archbishop  of  Toulouse,  succeeded  the  fallen  Minister, 
,,.  .         ,     who  was  exiled  to   Lorraine,  and  at   once  recoor- 

Ministry  of  ° 

Brienne,  nised  the  necessity  of  passing  many  of  Calonne's 
'^ '^     '  measures.     The  Notables  agreed    to    all  the  late 

Minister's  proposed  reforms  except  the  general  land  tax,  and 
were  dismissed  on  May  25,  Lafayette  having,  during  the  meet- 
ings of  one  of  the  committees  into  which  the  Notables  were 
divided,  demanded  the  convocation  of  the  States- General. 
Brienne's  next  task  was  to  get  his  edicts  registered  by  the 
Parletne7ii  of  Paris.  That  body  consented  to  the  registra- 
tion of  edicts  for  internal  free  trade  and  the  redemption  of  the 
Corvee,  but  refused  to  register  those  for  a  general  land  tax  and 
a  new  stamp  tax,  and  solemnly  demanded  the  convocation  of 
the  States-General.  The  king  replied  by  holding,  on  August  6, 
a  Lit  de  Justice,  in  which  the  decrees  were  registered.  On 
August  7  the  Parkme7it  declared  that  all  registrations  effected 
in  a  Lit  de  Justice  were  null  and  void  ;  on  August  14  the  king 
exiled  the  magistrates  to  Troyes.  Though  the  Parlelnejit  of 
Paris  was  more  concerned  about  maintaining  and  augmenting 
the  power  of  the  privileged  classes  than  about  the  welfare  of 
the  nation,  its  opposition  to  the  Government  roused  widespread 
enthusiasm  in  Paris  and  in  the  provinces ;  never  had  its  popu- 
larity been  greater,  and  at  no  previous  epoch  in  the  eighteenth 
century  had  a  strong  ruler  in  France  been  more  necessary. 
On  September  24  a  compromise  was  arrived  at,  and  the 
,,    r  .u     Pa)-le?7ieiit  was  recalled  amid  open  manifestations 

Recall  of  the  ^ 

Pariement,  of  joy.  On  November  19  the  Parktnent  refused 
the°Coup  ^     ^°    register   an  edict  for   raising   a   loan   for    420 

d'Etat  of  millions  of  francs,  upon  which  the  king  again  re- 
May   8,    1788.  ,  ^    .  ^  .  1  -VT  1  1 

sorted  to  a  Lit  ae  Justice,  and  on  November  20  he 
declared  that  the  States-General  should  be  summoned  for  July 


F?'ance  before  the  Revolution  415 

1792.  Determined  to  destroy  the  opposition  of  the  Parle- 
meiit,  Brienne,  on  May  8,  1788,  secured  the  registration,  in 
a  ///  de  justice,  of  six  edicts,  suppressing  all  the  Parlements  in 
France  and  establishing  a  Cour  Pletiiere,  consisting  of  great 
dignitaries  named  by  the  king  for  life.  The  States-General 
was  to  be  summoned  for  January  1791  ;  certain  reforms, 
based  on  Turgot's  ideas,  were  propounded. 

The  numerous  edicts  passed  by  means  of  this  coup  d^etat 
provoked  universal  opposition.  Riots  took  place  in  different 
parts  of  France  :    the  provincial  Parlements,  sup- 

j    n  II---  J  -1  Revolution- 

ported  by  public  opmion,  protested  agamst  their   ary  Move- 
suppression  ;    and   in   Brittany  and    Dauphiny,  no   2^"*!^?" 
less    than  in  Beam,    Franche-Comte,  Languedoc,   and  eise- 
and     Provence,     revolutionary     movements     took   ^  ^^^' 
place.      At   Vizille,    in    Dauphiny,    an   irregular   Assembly   of 
367  deputies   met,  and,  under  the   guidance    of  Mounier,  an 
able  advocate  of  Grenoble,  demanded  the  immediate  summons 
of  the    States-General.     The    army   was    no    less    disaffected. 
Attempts  made  in  1787  and  1788  by  the  Comte  de  Brienne, 
the  War  ^Minister,  to  introduce  the  Prussian  drill  had  proved 
most   distasteful   to   officers   and   men.     The   young  officers, 
headed    by    Charles    de    Lameth,   whose    loyalty   had    been 
affected   by   service    in   America,    declared    that    Brienne    in- 
tended, by  means  of  Prussian  discipline,  to  overthrow  French 
liberty.    The  general  discontent  of  the  army  at  the  new  military 
organisation  became  serious,  and  the  outbreak  of  the  French 
Revolution  found  a  large  proportion  of  the  officers  and  men  in 
a  very  disaffected  condition.     Alarmed  at  the  rebelhous  acts  of 
the  Assembly  of  Vizille,  which  seemed  to  portend  civil  war, 
Louis  XVI.  suspended  the  ]\lay  edicts,  and  on  August  8  sum- 
moned the  States-General  to  meet  on  May  i,  1789.     Mean- 
while Brienne,  whose    desperate    efforts  to  obtain   Necker's 
money  had    failed,  announced,    on   August    16,  a   ^^n°gf 
national  bankruptcy,  all  state  obligations  being  sus-   1788-89. 
pended  for  six  weeks ;  on  August  25  he  was  dismissed,  and 
two  days  later  Necker  was  appointed  his  successor.     Though 


4i6  European  History,   171 5-1 789 

both  Louis  XVI.  and  Necker  were  honest  and  well  meaning,  they 
lacked  those  qualities  of  statesmanship  required  for  the  crisis. 
*  The  foundations  of  authority  were  completely  sapped.  Con- 
cessions, which  at  an  earher  period  would  have  been  welcomed 
with  enthusiasm,  only  whetted  the  appetite  for  change.  A 
great  famine  occurring  at  a  time  of  great  political  excitement, 
immensely  strengthened  the  elements  of  disorder.  The  edi- 
fice of  government  tottered  and  fell,  and  all  Europe  resounded 
with  its  fall.'  ^  The  extravagance  of  Calonne,  followed  by  the 
financial  incapacity  of  Brienne,  whose  Ministry  destroyed  the 
last  chance  of  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  difficulties  of  France, 
together  with  the  famine  of  the  winter  of  1788-89,  gave  the 
'  revolutionary  movement  its  army,  and  its  impulse,  and  its 
character  of  desperate  and  savage  earnestness.'  ^  Necker,  on 
succeeding  to  office,  had  revoked  the  edict  announcing  a 
national  bankruptcy,  restored  the  Farkmefit,  and  looked  for- 
ward to  a  long  tenure  of  power  and  the  carrying  out  of  admin- 
istrative reforms.  His  return  to  office  restored  confidence  in 
the  Government,  and  the  funds  rose.  But  Necker  was  in- 
capable of  guiding  the  nation  through  the  crisis  in  which 
France  now  found  herself.  The  public  interest  was  concen- 
trated upon  the  coming  Assembly  of  the  States-General.  A 
royal  decree,  ordering  public  bodies  to  send  to  the' king  all 
Preparations  possible  information  as  to  the  previous  meetings  of 
for  the  Meet-  the  States-Gencral,  produced  a  flood  of  historical 
stat°es-  ^  treatises.  In  November  1788  the  Notables,  who 
General.  ^^^^  hoped  to  use  the  meeting  of  the  Estates  to 
consolidate  their  privileges,  were  again  summoned  to  assist 
the  king  with  their  advice  on  the  two  great  pohtical  problems 
awaiting  solution  —  whether  the  Tiers  Etat  should  have  double 
representation,  and  whether  the  votes  should  be  taken  par 
ordre  or  par  tete.  At  this  crisis  Necker  showed  clearly  that  he 
lacked  the  required  qualities  of  genius  and  statesmanship.  His 
timidity,  irresolution,  and  extreme  caution  ruined  a  magnificent 

1  Leckv,  History  of  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Ceiitury,  vol.  v.  p.  442. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  428. 


Finance  before  the  Revolution.  417 

opportunity  of  directing  and  defining  the  course  of  the  Revo- 
lution. He  produced  a  report  on  which  was  based  the  Resiiltat 
du  Co?tseil,^  which,  in  opposition  to  the  wish  of  the  nobles, 
gave  the  Tie?-s  Etat  a  double  representation,  but  left  undecided 
the  critical  question  —  whether  the  voting  should  be  pai-  ordre 
or  par  tete,-  The  appearance  of  the  Resultat  du  Couseil  was 
followed  by  numerous  pamphlets  of  a  political  and  revolutionary 
character,  which  asserted  the  superiority  of  the  Tiers  Etat  over 
the  orders  of  the  nobles  and  clergy.  On  January  2,  1789, 
the  elections  in  Dauphiny  were  completed,  but  it  was  not  till 
January  24,  1 789,  that  Necker  issued  a  7-egie??ie?it  to  settle  the 
procedure  of  the  elections  in  the  pays  d' election^  The  Close 
while  subsequent  regletnents  dealt  with  those  in  the  ^-^^^ 
pays  d'etat.  On  May  5  the  first  States-General  Century, 
held  in  France  since  the  year  1614  met  at  Versailles,  and 
inaugurated  the  revolutionary  epoch. 

The  eighteenth  century,  the  era  of  the  benevolent  despots, 
was  over ;  and  with  the  outbreak  of  the  French  Revolution 
were  introduced  new  political  and  social  conceptions  which, 
since  1815,  have  been  gradually  accepted  by  all  civiUsed 
countries. 

1  Morse  Stephens,  A  History  of  the  French  Revolution^  vol.  i.  p.  51. 

PERIOD  VI.  2D 


APPENDIX    A 

TERRITORIES   OF    THE    HOUSE   OF    HAPSBURG 

Five  Groups,  with  Separate  Governments. 
I.  Austria. 

A    Lower  Austria  I  ^^^°^^'  ^"^^  (.Unter  der^ms),  capital  Vienna, 


ria  L 


Above  Ems  (Ober  der  Ems) . 
f  Styria. 

■D    T  ^     *  ■      I  Carinthia.  / 

B.  Inner  Austria   -  ^^  „-  , 

Carniola. 

[  Gorz. 

r  Tyrol. 

C.  Upper  and  Further  Austria  -  Breisgau. 

[  Few  territories  in  Swabia, 
These  finally  declared  indivisible  and  hereditar)',  1621. 
II.    Bohemia  with  its  Dependencies  —  Silesia. 

Moravia. 

III.  Hungar)-  with  its  Dependencies  —  Croatia. 

Transylvania. 

IV.  Italy. 

V.   Austrian  Netherlands. 

Government  of  Territories  of  Hapsbl'rgs  before  Reforms  of 

Maria  Theresa. 

Only  three  Central  Bodies  with  general  control  — 

A.  Secret  Conference  (Geheime  Conferenz)  of  Ministers. 

B.  Council  of  War  (Hofkriegsrath). 

C.  Exchequer  (Hofkammer). 

Each  of  the  three  first  Groups  had  its  Chancery  (Kanzlei),  with 
Administrative  and  Judicial  Powers. 
Under  it  — 

1.  The  Regierung  or  Government  under  Stadthalter,  or  Palatine, 
or  Ban. 

2.  The  Provincial  Assemblies  (Landtage). 

13.   The  Provincial  Courts  (Standische  Landrechte). 
4.   The  Towns. 
5.   The  Manor  Courts. 
Hungan,-  its  separate  Exchequer,  under  the  Hofkammer. 

Austrian  Government  after  Maria  Theresa's  Reforms. 

Council  of  State  (Staats  Rath)  exercising  control  over 


Chancery  Exchequer 

(HofTcanzlei)         (Hofkammer) 

Executive.  Finance. 


Aulic  Council  of  War 

(Hofkriegsrath). 

In  Provinces. 


High  Court  of  Justice 
(Hofrath). 


Gubemium.  Court  of  Intermediate  Appeal  (Justizinstanz) . 

!  ■      .   .1 

Kreisamt.  Provincial  Courts. 


Town  Courts. 


Manorial  Courts. 


Authorities:  — Krones,  Handbuch  der  Geschichte  Oesterreichs. 
Von  Arneth,  Maria  Theresia. 
Paganel,  Histoire  de  Joseph  II.  419 


420  European  History,   17 15-1789 


APPENDIX    B 
DOMINIONS   OF   KING   OF   PRUSSIA,    1714 

f  Alt-Mark. 

I.  The  Kur-Mark.  formed  of   '  ^Pj^'-^J^^'^- 
'  j  Ucker-Mark. 

[  Priegnitz. 
II.  The  Neu-Mark,  finally  united  with  Kur-Mark  in  1571. 

III.  Cleves,  Mark,  Ravensburg,  1614. 

IV.  East  Prussia,  united  with  Electorate,  1618. 

V.   Further  (Hinter)  Pomerania,  1648. 

VI.   Halberstadt  and  Minden,  1648. 
Magdeburg,  1680. 

VII.   Guelders,  1713. 


SUBSEQUENT  ACQUISITIONS 

1.  Frederick  i.     1720,  Vor  (Nearer)   Pommern  up  to  R.  Peene  with  Pome- 

ranian Haff. 

2.  Frederick  11.   1742,  Silesia. 

1744,  East  Friesland. 

1772,  West  Prussia,  except  Danzig  and  Thorn. 

3.  Frederick  William  ll.     1791,  Bayreuth  and  Anspach. 

1793,  South  Prussia,  with  Danzig  and  Thorn. 
1795,  New  East  Prussia. 

4.  Frederick  William  III.   1815,  Lost—  (i)   New  East  Prussia  and  half  South 

Prussia. 
(2)  Anspach  and  Bayreuth. 
Gained —  (i)  Territories  of  Koln, 

Munster. 
Trier. 

(2)  North  part  of  Saxony. 

(3)  Rest  of  Vor  (Nearer)  Pommern, 

with  island  of  Riigen. 


Appendix  B 


421 


APPENDIX    B—Co?itifiued 

PRUSSIAN    GOVERNMENT   AFTER    THE    REFORMS 
OF   FREDERICK    WILLIAM    I. 

Geheime  Rath  (Privy  Council). 

Exchequer  Department  f  r  Geheime  Kriegs  Rath  Department  of  Justice. 

Department.  Foreign  Affairs.         (Secret  Council  of  War). 

I       .  .. 

Ober  Finanz  Kriezs  und  Domainen  Directorium 

(General  Direciorj-  of  Militiiry  and  Domains  Finance). 


4  Departments  supervising  Department 

certain  Territorial  Divisions.  of  Trade. 

I    .  , 

Kriegs  und  Domainen  Kammem 
(Provincial  Chambers;. 


Military  Department. 


Landrathe  in  Counties. 


Kriegs  Rathe  in  Towns. 
Burgomaster  in  Town  Council. 


Supreme  Appeal. 


Criminal  to  King. 


Civil. 
Ober  Appellations  Gericht. 

I 

Provincial  Courts. 
Hofgerichte. 


Consistorium 
(Education  and  Religion) . 

Local  Presbyteries 


Schulzen  in  Manors. 


Bailiffs  on  Domain. 


City  Courts. 


Authorities:  — Isaacsohn,  Geschichte  des  Preiissischeu  Rcantenthmns. 

Bornhall,  Geschichte  des  Preussischen  I'erivaUungs  Recht. 
Droysen,  Geschichte  der  Preussischen  Politik. 


422  European  History ^   17 15-1789 


APPENDIX    C 

IMPERIAL   CONSTITUTION 
IN   THE   EIGHTEENTH   CENTURY 

I.  Legislation. 

Imperial    Diet    [Reichstag],   consisting  of   three    Colleges,    sitting    at 
Ratisbon  since  1664. 

r Archbishop   of  Mainz  (Mayence),  Arch- 
J         chancellor. 
SpirituaH  Archbishop  of  Koln  (Cologne). 
I  Archbishop  of  Trier  (Treves). 

A.  Electors         I  [Duke  of  Saxony  (sometimes  elective  King 
(Kurfiirsten)  .1  of  Poland). 

Margrave     of     Brandenburg     (King     of 

Prussia,  1700). 
^Lay         {  Elector  Palatine. 

King  of  Bohemia  (in  hands  of  Archduke 

of  Austria). 
Duke  of  Bavaria. 
Elector  of  Hanover  (King  of  England) . 

B.  Princes  Lay  and  Spiritual.  ( individual  vote,  Virilstimme  (about  40). 

Some  with  (  collective  vote,  curiatstimme. 

(Reichsfiirsten).     Dukes,  Margraves, 

Palsgraves,  Graves,  Barons. 
Bishops. 

C.  Imperial  Cities  (Reichsstadte). 

N.B. —  Imperial  Knights  (Reichsritterschaft)  not  represented  in 
Diet,  but  in  Assembly  of  their  own  (Correspondenztag). 

II.  Administration. 

Circles  (Kreissen),  10  with  Diets  (Kreistage). 

III.  Justice. 

A.  Imperial  Chamber,  at  Wetzlar  since  1689  (Reichskammer). 

4  Presidents  (2  Protestant). 
50  Assessors  (24  Protestant) . 

B.  Aulic  Council,   at  Vienna    (Reichshofrath),    with    President    and 

18  Councillors. 

Authorities:  — Paganel,  Histoire  de  yoseph  II.,  and  the  authorities  therein  quoted. 
Haiisser,  Gesch.  Deittschlatids  von  Tode  Fred.  II. 
Biedermann,    Dentschlands   politische    materielle    und   sociale 
Ziist'dnde  i»i  achtzehnten   yahrhundert. 


Appendix  D 


423 


APPENDIX    D 

GENEALOGY   OF   THE   HOUSE   OF   ROMANOV 
IN   THE   EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY 

ALEXIS,  1645-1676. 

I  =(i)  Eudocia. 

PetertheGreat=(2)  Catherine  I. 
1689-1725-  1725-1727- 


Ivan  v. 
1682-1687. 


Charles      =Cat 
Leopold 
Duke  of 
Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin. 


r    I 

tnerine    Ann 


(0 


(2) 


(3) 


_^^_^„^.Co..    ^A^    A""«^CW5- .=-^: 


Peter  ii. 

1727-1730- 

ob.s.p. 


of  Holstein- 
I    Gottorp. 


Anne  =  Anton,  son  of  Frederick  Albert 
of  Brunswick-Bevera. 


Ivan,  1740-1741,  dep. 


Peter  in.  =  Catherine  ii.  (Sophia 
Jan.-July         of  Anhalt-Zerbst), 


1762. 


1762-1796. 


Pauu 


SWEDEN. 


CHARLES  XL 


Holstein-Eutia. 

Charles  Lgustus.   Fredirick  w.=Hedwiga  Sophia.   Charles -;  ^^^^^^^^ 

1  ob.s.p.         ob.s.p.         1719-1751 

1741.  ob.s.p. 

Charles  Frederick  =  Anne,  daughter  of 
Peter  the  Great. 


Adolphus  Frederick,  =  Louisa,  daughter  of 
King  of  Sweden,         Frederick  the  Great 
1751-1771. 


of  Prussia. 


Gustovus  III.  =  Sophia,  daughter  of 
177I-I7Q2.  Frederick  v. 

''       '^  of  Denmark. 


424    • 


£uropean  History,   17 15-1789 


APPENDIX    D—  Continued 
THE   BAVARIAN    SUCCESSION   QUESTION 

THE  HOUSE  OF  WITTELSBACH. 

(i)  In  the  Palatinate. 

Sulzbach  Branch. 

Charles  Theodore, 

1733-1799- 

Elector,  1742, 

Succeeded  to  Bavaria,  1777. 

Ob.s.p. 


Birkenfeld  Branch. 


Charles  Augustus, 

Duke  of  Zweibriicken 

(Deux  Fonts), 

1746-1795. 

Ob.s.p. 


Maximilian  I. 
1795-1825. 
Elector  of  Bavaria,  1799. 
King,  1805. 


(2)  In  Bavaria. 

Charles  Albert,  =  Maria  Amelia. 
Emperor. 
1742-1745. 

Maximilian  Joseph, 

1745-1777- 
Ob.s.p. 

On  the  death  of  Maximilian  Joseph,  Bavaria  revoked  to  the  Palatinate 

Wittelsbachs. 

See  lustnictions  aux  atnbassadeurs  de  France,  Baviere,  Palatinate,  Deux  Fonts, 
p.  528,  etc. 


Appctidix  E 


425 


r\: 


APPENDIX    E 


TABLE   OF   CONTEMPORARY    SOVEREIGNS 


{The  years  show  the  end  of  their  reigns.') 


THE   EMPIRE 


Charles  \T., 
Charles  vii., 
Francis  i., 
Joseph  II., 
Leopold  II., 


House  of  Hapsburg. 
Elector  of  Bavaria. 


1740, 

1745. 

'^   ^  '  House  of  Hapsburg 

1792  \ 


SPAIN 


Philip  v., 
Ferdinand  w. 
Charles  iii., 
Charles  iv.. 


1746. 

1759- 
17S8. 

iSo3. 


Lorraine. 


ENGLAND 

George  i.,  1727. 
George  11..  1760. 
George  111.,  1820. 


FRANCE 

Louis  XV.,    1774. 
Louis  XVI.,  1793. 


PORTUGAL 

John  v.,  1750. 

Joseph  I.,  1777. 

Maria  Francisca,  1816. 


SARDINIA 

Victor  Amadeus  11.,      1730  (res.). 
Charles  Emanuel  ill  ,  1773. 
Victor  Amadeus  iii.,     1796. 


RUSSIA 


Peter  the  Great, 
Catherine  i., 
Peter  11., 
Anne, 
Ivan  v., 
Elizabeth, 
Peter  ill., 
Catherine  11., 


1725. 
T727. 
1730. 
1740. 
1741. 
1762. 
1762. 
1796. 


PRUSSIA 

Frederick  William  i.,  1740. 

Frederick  ii.  (The  Great),  1786 
Frederick  William  11.,  1797- 


SWEDEN 

Charles  xii.,  1718. 

Ulrica  Eleanora,  1720  (res.). 
Frederick  i.,  i75t- 

Adolphus  Frederick,      1771. 
Gustavus  III.,  179^ 


DENMARK 

Frederick  iv.,  1730. 
Christian  VI.,  1746. 
Frederick  v.,  1766. 
Christian  vii.,   1808. 


THE  PAPACY 


Clement  xi., 

1721. 

Innocent  xiii. 

.  1724- 

Benedict  xiii. 

1730. 

Clement  xii., 

1740. 

Benedict  xiv. 

1758. 

Clement  xiii  , 

1769. 

Clement  xiv.. 

»774- 

Pius  VI., 

1800. 

TURKEY 

Achmet  iii.,  1730. 
Mahmoud  i  ,  1754. 
Osman  in.,  1756. 
Mustapha  iii.,  1773. 
Abdul  Hamid,  1789. 
Selim  HI.,  1807. 

POLAND 

Augustus  II.  of  Saxony,  1733. 
Augustus  III.  of  Saxony,  1763. 
Stanislas  Puniatowski,  1795  (deposed) 


t-lKU> 


INDEX 


Abbas,  Shah,  112. 

Abel  of  Mainz,  283. 

Abdul  Hamid,  319. 

Abo,  Treaty  of,  154. 

Adelaide,  Madame,  397. 

Adolphus  Frederick  of  Sweden,  154, 
228,  328,  384, 

Ahmed  ill.,  108,  111-113. 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  Treaty  of,  197-205, 
„  215,  216,  218,  226,  237,  277,  289,333. 

Aland,  Conference  of,  53. 

Alberoni,  28  ;  rise  of,  39  ;  foreign  pol- 
icy, 40,  41,  48-63,  71,  84,  109. 

Alcide,  capture  of  the,  232,  234. 

Amelot,  103,  154,  173,  402. 

American  Independence,  Declaration 

of,  333.  335- 
War,  the,  335,  etc.,  405,  410;  the 

effects  of  on  France,  349. 
Anne  Ivanovna,  98,  112,  114,  115,  121, 

124,  138. 
Anti-Machiavel,  the,  128. 
Apraksin,  251,  254. 
Aremberg,  Duke  of,  165. 
Armed  Neutrality  of  the  North,  the, 

344,  345.  365- 
Armenians,   they  appeal   to   Turkey, 

no;  treatment  of  by  Russia,  364. 
d'Artois,  Count,  412. 
Ashraf,  no,  in. 
Assiento,  the,  41,  90,  198. 
Aubeterre,  231,  248. 
Augustus  II.  of  Saxony  and  Poland, 

94. 
III.  of  Saxony  and  Poland,  97,  98, 

117,   178,   180,   192,   227,  2^,   278, 

304. 
Aulic  Council,  269,  351. 
Azov,  108,  118. 

Balta,  308. 

Bankipur,  69. 

Bar,  Confederation  of,  307,  311,  314. 

Barbara  of  Portugal,  Queen,  271. 


Barrier  Treaty,  the,  7-9,  44,  217,  368, 

390. 
Barry,  Madame  du,  324,  325, 
Bartenstein,  102,  127,  139,  214,  234. 
Bassignano,  battle  of,  184. 
Batthyani,  176,  179. 
Bavaria,  9,  13,  17,  100,  370-372,  376, 

379;    Charles   Albert   of,    138,   141, 

142, 144,  146,  150  {^see  Charles  VII.)  ; 

Alaximilian  Joseph  of,  339,  340. 
Bavarian  War  of  Succession,  339-343. 
Beaumont,  Archbishop  de,  219,  220. 
Belgrade,  Treaty  of,  125,  126,  140,  159, 

382;  siege  of,  112. 
Belleisle,  Marshal,  157,  160-162,  176, 

188,  253,  259. 
Benedict  XIV.,  92,  220,  292,  296. 
Berlin,  Treaty  of,  154,  156,  174,  175, 

180,  196. 
Bernis,  240,  249,  252,  263,  404. 
Bernsdorf  (Hanoverian  Minister),  46; 

(Danish  Minister),  245,  286;  Peter 

Andrew,  287. 
Berwick,  Marshal,  100. 
Bestuzhev,  153,  175,  224,  233,  243,251, 

254- 
Biren,  98,  115,  138,  275. 
Bitonto,  battle  of,  99. 
Blondel,  222. 
Bolingbroke,  48. 

Bonneval,  Pacha,  96,  119,  120,  227. 
Boscawen,  203,  234,  262. 
Botta,  Marquis  de,  188. 
Bourbon,  Due  de,  26,  64-66,  72,  73, 

78-80,  221. 
Braddock,  General,  226,  259. 
Bremen,  41. 

Breslau,  Preliminaries  of,  154,  156. 
Breteuil,  267. 

Brienne,  Lomenie  de,  404,  414,  415. 
Brittany,  rising  in,  54,  415. 
Broglie,  Comte  de,  229,  249,  257,  263, 

265,  269,  270;  Marquis  de,  151, 158, 

163-165. 


427 


428 


Etiropeaji  History,   171 5-1789 


Browne,  Marshal,  187,  242. 

Bruhl,  192,  193. 

Brunswick,    t'erdinand    of,   251,   253, 

257,  276. 
Bukovina,  318,  320. 
Burkersdorf,  battle  of,  275. 
Bute,  Lord,  273,  277,  302,  338. 
Buturlin,  270. 

Calonne,  412,  413,  416. 

Cambrai,  Congress  of,  66,  67,  69,  71. 

Campo  Santo,  battle  of,  166. 

Campomanes,  284,  285. 

Campredon,  115. 

Canada,  9,  262. 

Canning,  330. 

Carlos,  Don,  50,  51,  67,  68,  71,  81,  82, 

84,  85,  89,  99-101,  103,  168,  170,  271 
{see  Charles  111.). 

Carlowitz,  Treaty  of,  22,  24,  108. 

Caroline,  Matilda  of  Denmark,  286. 

of  Naples,  360. 

Carteret,  152,  162,  166,  167,  178,  195. 

Catherine  I.,  72,  73,  79,  113,  114. 

II.,   175,  266,  275,  281,  296,  297 

301-307,  309,  312,  313-316,  317,  319, 
33^^332,  338,  341-344.  346,  349-371, 
377.  380,  381.  383.  392,  393.  407- 

Cellamare,  31,  53,  55,  80. 

Charles  ill.  of  Spain,  271,  272,  284, 
285,  294,  295,  323. 

IV.  ol  Spain,  285. 

VI.  of  Austria,  48,  49,  63,  79,  83, 

85,  87,  91,  94,  104,  105,  109,  114, 122, 
125,  126,  133,  135,  137,  138,  199,  212, 
223,  364,  382. 

VII.   (Emperor),   161,  166,   167, 

172-174,  177,  178,  202. 

X.  of  Sweden,  313. 

XII,  of  Sweden,  45,  53,  57-60,  62, 

131- 

Theodore,  Elector  Palatme,  216  ; 

of  Zweibriicken,  340,  343,  371. 

Philip  of  Xeuburg,  216. 

• Edward,  170,  182,  186,  189,  195. 

Emanuel  of  Sardinia,  91-93,  99- 

loi.  103,  138,  148,  152,  153,  157,  162, 
167,  168,  185-190,  194,  197,  272,  289. 

of  Saxony  (son  of  Augustus  III.), 

304. 
Chateauneuf,  44,  47. 
Chateauroux,  Duchesse  de,  163,  169, 

170,  173. 
Chauvelin,  81,  91,  93,  102,  103, 
Chavigny,  173,  178,  333. 
Chevert,  157,  158,  257. 
Choiseul,  Due  de,  260-264,  267-270, 


272,  279,  283,  284,  294,  311-313, 
321-328,  333-335.  395-397. 

Choisy  de  Taules,  312. 

Chotek,  208,  210,  214. 

Chotusitz,  battle  of,  154. 

Clement  xi.,  49,  55 ;  XIII.,  292,  293, 
295  ;  XIV.,  282,  296,  297. 

Clermont,  Comte  de,  257. 

Chve,  225,  262. 

Coalition  Government,  the,  365. 

Cobenzl,  391. 

Coburg,  382. 

Coigny,  100,  171,  177. 

Colbert,  202. 

Colleredo,  179. 

Commercial  Treaty  of  1786,  376. 

Coynpte  Rendu,  Necker's,  405. 

Conclave,  the,  of  1769,  296. 

Constantinople,  idea  of  Russian  occu- 
pation of,  363  ;  Treaty  of,  366. 

Contades,  263. 

Conti,  180,  181,  190,  193,  227-229,  249, 
270. 

Contrats  Social,  the,  408,  409. 

Cornwallis,  Lord,  346. 

Corsica,  309. 

Corvee,  the,  400,  404,  414. 

Courland,  115,  251,  304. 

Crimea,  annexation  of,  361,  364,  365. 

Crocyka,  battle  of,  121,  125. 

Czartoriskis,  the,  305. 

Czernitcheff,  274. 

Damiens,  222. 

D'Aiguillon,  Due,  262,  324,  325,  327, 

330.  331.  397- 
Danubian  Principalities,  the,  363,  365. 
D'Aranda,  284,  285,  295,  323. 
D'Argenson,  Comte,  162, 193,  218,  232, 

238,  246,  251. 
Marquis,  103,  163,  173,  182,  185- 

193,  200,  326. 
Daun,  251,  256,  265,  266,  269,  275,  278, 

287. 
Dauphin,  the  (son  of  Louis  XV.),  192. 
Dauphiny,  415-417. 
Deane,  Silas,  335. 
De  la  Clue,  262. 
Denmark,  war  with  Sweden   (1788), 

383.  384- 
D'Eon,  Chevalier,  264. 
D'Estrees,  250,  270,  276. 
Des  Alleurs,  228,  334. 
Dettingen,  battle  of,  165. 
Diamond  necklace,  the,  413. 
Dohna,  Counts,  255. 
Diderot,  407. 


Index 


429 


Dresden,  Treaty  of,  183,  187,  196,  278. 

Dubois,  23,  28-63. 

Dumouriez,  312,  314,  318. 

Dunkirk,  7. 

Dupleix,  202,  203,  226,  259. 

Du  Tillot,  288. 

Eastern  Question,  the,   22,    107, 

320,  347,  361,  etc.;  366,  381,  etc. 
Economists,  the,  399. 
Edict  of  Nantes,  402. 
Eg)-pt,  idea  of  French  occupation  of, 

363- 
Elliot,  Sir  George,  346. 
Elizabeth   Farnese,  49,  62,  66-86,  89, 

100,  103,  138,  140,  153, 157,  161,  168, 

169,  1S4,  271. 
Elizabeth  of  Russia,  114,  153,  201,  223, 

224,  227,  235,  238,  243,  249,  260,  263, 

266,  267,  274 ;  death  of,  274. 
Empire,  the,  after  1763,  301. 
Encyclopedists,  the,  291,  407. 
Ensenada,  de  la,  248,  272. 
Elscurial,  Treaty  of,  93,  loi,  172. 
Eugene,  Prince,  49,  69,  71.  73,  95,  102, 

109,  119,  132,  133,  140,  364. 
Eyre  Coote,  269,  346. 

Falkland  Islands,  affair  of,  322, 

326. 
Family  Compact  of  1761,  the,  272,  279, 

322,' 323,  333. 
Farinelli,  247. 
Fermor,  254,  256,  263. 
Ferdinand  iv.  of  the  Two  Sicilies,  271, 

289. 

of  Parma,  289. 

VL,  188,  198,  223,  247,  248,  271, 

284. 
Finck,  266,  268. 
Firmian,  Archbishop,  131. 

Count,  290. 

Finland,  390. 

Fleury,  57,  65,  72,  79-82,  88,  89,  91,  94, 

96,  104,  115,  116,  119,  127,  140,  141, 

144,    145,    147,    148,    149,    151,    152, 

159-161,  169,  204,  214,  273. 

Joly  de,  410,  412. 

Florida  Blanca,  284,  285,  348. 
Foksany.  battle  of,  385. 
Fontainebleau,  Treat)' of,  169, 184, 191, 

369- 
Fontenoy,  battle  of,  180. 
Fouquet,  268  ;  Nicholas,  326. 
Fox,  C.  J.,  347  ;  foreign  policy  of,  365. 
Francis  L,  election  as  Emperor,  182, 

183,  243,  246,  313. 


Franklin,  336. 

Frederick  \.  of  Sweden,  60,  61. 

V.  of  Denmark,  245. 

the  Great,  2,  6,  9,  128,  129  ;  youth 

<jf,  132 ;  character,  133-135  ;  reforms 
of,  129,  130;  foreign  policy  in  1740, 
131, 133  :  claims  on  Silesian  Duchies, 
142 ;  invasion  of  Silesia,  142 ;  first 
Silesian  war,  142-155 ;  second  Si- 
lesian war,  175-183,  197,  200,  202, 
224-226,  229-240 ;  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  241-279,  282,  283;  alliance 
with  Russia,  302-305 ;  the  Partition 
of  Poland,  308-316 ;  opposition  of 
England,  338,  345,  346;  the  Ba- 
varian succession  war,  339-344;  the 
end  of  the  Russian  alliance,  361 ; 
his-4eath  and  character,  373-375. 

William  I.,  8,  57,  58,  94,105,  r29, 

142,  235. 

W  liham  IL, 375, 378, 379,  387, 390. 

Friesland,  East,  Duke  of,  174. 

Fiirstenbund,  the,  372,  375. 

Fiissen,  Treaty  of,  178,  189. 

George  l,  41-48. 

n.,  88, 136, 146, 152,  165-167,  182, 

194.  213,  215,  217,  225,  234,  263,  273. 

in.,  273,  347. 

Georgia,  169. 

Gibraltar,  68,  71,  93,  169,  272,  337,  345, 

347.  348. 
Girondists,  the,  278. 
Godeheu,  259, 
Goertz,  46,  58,  60,  62,  63. 
Grimaldi,  272,296,  322,323,  336. 
Grimaldo,  67,  68. 
Gross-Hennersdorf,  battle  of,  183. 

Jagersdorf,  battle  of,  250,  251. 

Guines,  Due  de,  401. 

Guldberg,  286,  287. 

Gustavus  III.,  132,  328-331,  349,  366, 

383-385,  392. 
Gyllenborg,  47,  58;  Count,  123-125. 

Hanau,  project  of,  166. 

Hanover,    18,   246,    253;    League   of, 

75-78,  83  ;  Convention  of,  181-183. 
Harrach,  139,  183,  215,  256. 
Hastenbeck,  battle  of,  250. 
Haug^vitz,  208-210. 
Hawke,  262,  279. 
Henry  of  Prussia,    Prince,  265,  275, 

341.  351- 
Hertzberg,  229,  379,  390. 
Hochkirchen,  battle  of,  256. 
Hohenfriedberg,  battle  of,  i8i. 


430 


European  History ^   171 5-1 789 


Holderness,  233. 

Holland,  4,  5,  42 ;  revolution  of  1747 

in,  194. 
Horn,  Count,  123-125. 
Hosier,  Admiral,  78. 
Hubertsberg,  Treaty  of,  278. 
Hungary,  200,  386. 
Huxelles,  27,  51,  52. 
Hyder  Ali,  134,  345. 
Hyndford,  Lord,  149,  154. 

Ivan  vi.,  147. 

Jacobins,  the,  409. 

Jacobites,  the,   55,   181    {see   Charles 

Edward). 
James  Edward,  the  Pretender,  38,  41, 

46, 58,  n- 

Jassy,  Treaty  of,  392. 

Jansenists,  the,  27,  28,  30-32,  220. 

Jena,  253,  374,  393. 

Jenkins,  Captain,  90. 

Jesuits,  the,  27,  28,  30-32,  288,  290-297, 
299,  300,  395. 

John  V.  of  Portugal,  21,  247. 

Joseph  II.,  6,  172,  209,  214,  217,  278, 
281,  287,  289,  300,  301,  314,  318,  336, 
339.  342,  343.  349.  351.  etc.;  reform 
of,  351-358;  foreign  policy  of,  359- 
361,  369-371,  373,  376,  379,  380, 
382 ;  death  of,  387 ;  review  of  his 
policy,  388,  389,  391,  396,  400,  401. 

I.  of  Portugal,  287,  288. 

Jiilich-Berg  Affair,  the,  105,  127,  131, 

133-  142. 
yurandes,  the,  400,  401,  404. 

Kaunitz,  139,  189,  199,  212,  218,  223, 
231,  233,  236,  238,  240,  309,  310,  312- 
314,  317,  318,  343,  363,  364,  368,  391. 

Keene,  89,  248. 

Keith,  215. 

Kesselsdorf,  battle  of,  183. 

Khoten,  battle  of,  125. 

Kinsley,  139,  209. 

Klaussen,  battle  of,  loi. 

Klein  Schnellendorf,  Convention  of, 
^o. 

Klostercampen,  battle  of,  269. 

Klosterseven,  Convention  of,  251. 

Knyphausen,  247. 

Kollin,  battle  of,  250,  251. 

Konigsegg,  78,  81. 

Krefeld,  battle  of,  257. 

Kunersdorf,  battle  of,  264,  265. 

Kutchuk-Kainardji,  Treaty  of,  23,  334, 
338,  364.  392. 


Labourdonnais,  161,  203. 
Lacy  (Austrian  General),  268. 

(Russian  General),  118-120. 

Lagos,  battle  of,  262. 

Lameth,  Charles  de,  415. 

La  Quadra,  104. 

Laufeld,  battle  of,  194. 

Law,  John,  32-37,  202. 

Leopold,    Archduke,    272,    283,   360; 

Emperor,  389. 
Lestocq,  147,  275. 
La  Chetardie,  127,  153,  223. 
Lexington,  battle  of,  333. 
L'Hopital,  264. 
Lobositz,  battle  of,  242. 
London,  Treaty  of,  56. 
Leszczynski,  Stanislas,  73,  88,  91,  93, 

94,  98,  115,  140,  158. 
Leignitz,  battle  of,  268. 
Liria,  Duke  of,  77. 
Leuthen,  battle  of,  252,  253. 
Lorraine,  Francis,  Duke  of,  70,  loi, 

138,    149,    150 :    Charles,    Duke   of, 

176,  251,  252,  278. 
Loudon,  254,  265,  268,  270,  278,  279, 

341.  385.  391- 
Louis  XIV.,  I,  10,  13,  25,  26,  47,  79,  88, 

96,  134,  136,  164,  204,  273,  398. 
XV.,  26,  88,  144,  162,  163 ;  secret 

diplomacy  of,  169,  218,  220,  222,  226, 

227,  236,  249,  254,  260,  264,  267,  283, 

303.  331.  394.  398- 
XVI.,  334,  349,  376,  378,  394,  398, 

399.  409-411.  414-416. 

XVII.,  394. 

Louvain,  University  of,  357. 
Luis,  Don,  of  Spain,  56,  67,  68. 
Lutterberg,  battle  of.  257. 
Lynar,  Count,  Project  of,  310. 

Machault,  218, 219, 238, 246, 251,397. 

Madame  Royale,  394. 

Maguire,  General,  256,  268,  269. 

Mahmud  I.,  110-112. 

Maillebois,  146,  158. 

Maine,  Duke  of,  26,  51. 

Malesherbes,  336,  397,  400,  402. 

Maria  Theresa,  101-104,  136, 138, 139; 
engaged  in  first  Silesian  war,  141- 
155 ;  at  war  with  France,  144-199 ; 
second  Silesian  war,  176-183 ;  re- 
forms in  Austria,  198-211,396,  398, 
399  ;  the  diplomatic  revolution,  211- 
240 ;  at  war  with  Prussia,  241-279 ; 
agrees  to  Partition  of  Poland,  312- 
315 ;  in  favour  of  peace  in  1778-9, 
341 ;  death,  349,  351. 


Lidex 


431 


Marie  Amelia,  Archduchess,  271,  272. 
Antoinette,   381,   395,   396,   398, 

401,  409,  413. 
Marmontel,  407. 
Matthews,  Admiral,  152,  170. 
Maupeou,  325,  327,  397,  399. 
Maurepas,  162,  246,  336,  347,  397. 
Maxen,  Capitulation  of,  266-268. 
Maximilian  II.,  313. 

Joseph  of  Bavaria,  179,  339,  340, 

Mecklenburg,  Duchy  of,  45,  58. 

Menzel,  225,  242. 

Mercy,  402. 

Metternich,  314,  360,  372. 

Minden,  battle  of,  263. 

Minorca,  68,  71. 

Miquelon,  island  of,  276. 

Mississippi  Scheme,  the,  35. 

Mohilev,  meeting  at,  349,  350. 

Molines,  49,  55. 

Molhvitz,  battle  of,  143-145,  148. 

Montcalm,  259,  279. 

Monteleone,  71. 

Montesquieu,  406-408. 

Montgelas,  285. 

Montgon,  80. 

Montmorin,  376-379. 

Montpensier,  Mile.,  56. 

Morville,  Comte  de,  66,  71,  72,  81. 

Munich,  Marshal,    115,    118-121,  125, 

127,  143,  147,  255. 
Mustapha  III.,  308,  319,  381. 
Muy,  Du,  397,  399. 

Nadir  Shah,  97,  111-113,  117,  119. 
Nancre,  Marquis  de,  53,  54. 
Napoleon   I.,   6,    136,    194,   252,    265, 

316. 
Necker,  347,  404,  410,  412,  416,  417. 
Neisse,  meeting  at,  310,  317. 
Netherlands,  Austrian,  the,  2,  8,  9,  13- 

15 ;  revolt  of,  in  1787,  357,  358,  386- 

390- 

eustadt,  meeting  at,  312. 

ewfoundland,  7. 

iederschonfels.  Convention  of,  164. 

imirof.  Congress  at,  119,  122. 

ivernais,  232,  237, 

oailles.  Cardinal,  29. 

—  Due  de,  33, 100, 163-165,  169,  171, 

173,  177,  192,  246,  366. 

orth,  Lord,  347. 

otables.  Assembly  of,  377,  413,  416. 

ova  Scotia,  7. 

ymphenberg,  Treaty  of,  146. 

ystad,  Peace  of,  7,  21,  61,  123,  124, 

390. 


OCHAKOV,  362,  364,  383,  390,  392. 

Olmiitz,  siege  of,  254. 

Orendayn,  69. 

Orleans,  the  Regent,  26,  27,  47,  48,  52, 

163,  273. 
Orlovs,  the,  275, 304,  and  notes ;  Alexis, 

311,  362. 
Orry,  158,  400. 
Orsova,  391. 
Ostend  East  India  Company,  the,  64, 

69-71,  76,  80,  82,  85,  87,  102,  159. 
Ostermann,  114,  115,  147. 

Panin,  304,  310,  316,  338,  344,  345, 

361,  362. 
Paoli,  309,  322. 
Pardo,  Convention  of  the,  81. 
Paris-Duverney,  65. 
Paris,  Peace  of  (1763),  276,  278,  301, 

324- 
Passarowitz,  Treaty    of,    54,    108-110, 

113,  117,  365,  390. 
Passaro,  Cape,  battle  of,  53. 
Patiho,  55,  81,  82,  84,  89,  103. 
Palatinate,  the,  17. 
Parletnent  Maupeou,  the,  327. 
Parleme7it  of  Paris,  the,  26,  32,  33,  36, 

37,  52,  90,  218-220,  294,  321,  401,  407, 

411-416, 
Paulmy,  264. 
Pelham,  Henry,  167,  195. 
Pentenriedter,  50. 
P^re  Beccaria,  289. 
Peter  the  Great,  4,  22,  42,  53,  58-61, 

95,  108,  114,  117,  118,  201,  281,  304, 

313.  361. 

II.,  79.  114. 

III.,  175, 266, 274,  275, 281,  301, 319. 

Peterwardein,  battle  of,  108. 

Pliihp,  Don,   138,  169,   184,  186,   188, 

198,  221,  239,  245,  271. 
v.,  49,  66,  67,  169,  188,  190,  198, 

271,  284, 
Physiocrats,  the,  398,  408. 
Pitt,  William  (the  Elder),  251,  270,  271, 

273- 

(the  Younger) ,  284,  387,  392. 

Pius  VI.,  355,  356,  358,  388  ;  VII.,  297. 

Plassey,  battle  of,  262. 

Plelo,  Comte  de,  97. 

Poland,  iS,  19;  Partition  of   105,  298- 

319.  365.  373  :  causes  of  fail  of,  315  ; 

second  and  third  partitions  of,  393. 
Polignacs.  the,  412. 
Polish   Succession  War,  the,  19,  24, 

87-106,  131. 
Poltava,  battle  of,  22. 


432 


Europe a7i  History^   171 5-1 789 


Pombal,  287-289,  292,  293. 
Pompadour,  Madame  de,  190, 193, 199, 

207,  218-223,  226,  231,  238,  251,  257, 

260,  293,  397. 
Poniatowski,  Stanislas.  304,  306. 
Ponte  Xuovo,  battle  of,  322. 
Potemkin,    275,    344,    362-364,    383, 

392. 
Potockis,  the,  306. 
Pragmatic   Sanction,   the,  64,  83,  84, 

122,  138,  140-142, 162,  168. 
Prague,  battle  of,  250. 
Prie,  Madame  de,  65,  73. 
Provence,  Comte  de,  401. 
Pruth,  Treaty  of  the,  108. 
Pugachev,  282,  319. 
Puisieux,  193,  194,  196,  216. 
Pulteney,  83. 

Quadruple  Alliance  of  1718,  the, 

51,  54,  62,  116. 
Quebec,  capture  of,  262. 
Quesnay,  408. 
Quiberon  Bay,  battle  of,  262. 

Radom,  Confederation  of,  307. 

Ragotsky,  53,  120. 

Rastadt,  Treaty  of,  2,  7-9,  55. 

Ratisbon,  Diet  of,  276. 

Raucoux,  battle  of,  189. 

Ravergo,  247. 

Repnin,  306,  342. 

Reichenbach,  Convention  of,  390-392. 

Regalisti,  the,  296. 

Residtat  du  Conseil,  the,  417. 

Revolution,  the  French,  28,  411,  417. 

in  Russia  (1741),  147. 

Ricci,  295. 

Richelieu,  Cardinal,  93,  411. 

Due  de,  163,  173,  189,  246,  250. 

Ripperda,  68,  70-74,  78,79-81,  84,  214. 
Robinson,  Sir  Thomas,  197. 
Rockingham,  Lord,  347. 
Rodney,  262,  345. 
Rohan,  Cardinal,  413. 
Rossbach,  battle  of,  252,  254. 
Rouille,  231,  237,  247. 
Rousseau,  336,  407-409. 
Rumiantsov,  270,  371. 
Rymnik,  battle  on  the,  385. 
Ryswick,  Treaty  of,  8. 

Saldanha,  Cardinal,  293. 
Saltikov,  263,  265. 
Salzburg,  Protestants  of,  131,  132. 
St.  Bartholomew,  cession  of,  by  France 
to  Sweden,  366. 


St.  Petersburg,  Convention  of,  243, 
245  ;  Treaty  of  (1744),  301,  302. 

St.  Pierre  Island,  276. 

Saint-Contest,  231. 

Saint-Germain,  Comte  de,  403,  404. 

Saint-Saphorin,  50. 

Saint-Severin,  124. 

Sandwich,  Lord,  197. 

Saratoga,  capitulation  of,  337. 

Sardinia,  capture  of,  49,  50. 

Saxe,  Maurice  de,  148,  157,  170,  171, 
180,  181,  188-190,  193,  194,  196, 
228. 

Xavier  de,  267. 

Schernhorst,  374. 

Schuwalow,  Treaty  of,  267. 

Selim  IIL,  385,  387. 

Serbelloni,  275. 

Seville,  Treaty  of,  82,  83,  158. 

Shah  Tahmas,  110-112. 

Shelburne,  347. 

Sicily,  53,  54. 

Sinclair,  Major,  125. 

Sistova,  Peace  of,  391. 

Six  Acts,  the,  401. 

Sohr,  battle  of,  182. 

Soissons,  Congress  of,  81. 

Solms,  Count,  310. 

Sonderhausen,  battle  of,  257. 

Soubise,  251,  257,  262,  270,  276. 

Spanish  Succession  War,  the,  25,  71. 

Squillacci,  284,  288,  295,  323. 

Stadion,  285. 

Stahremberg,  70,  73,  139,  236-238. 

Stair,  2,  165. 

Stanhope,  2,  49-51,  62. 

States-General  of  France,  the,  395, 
400,  402. 

Stavoretchani,     See  Khotin. 

Stein,  Baron  von,  372. 

Struensee,  285-287. 

Suffolk,  Lord,  317. 

Sully,  288. 

Sutherland,  Duke  of,  50. 

Suvorov,  312,  382,  383,  392. 

Sweden,  23,  24 ;  parties  in,  61 ;  Con- 
stitution of,  123  ;  Revolution  of  1773 
in,  328-331 ;  Revolution  of  1789  in, 
384.  385.  392. 

Taboureau  de  Reaux,  404. 
Talleyrand,  47,  406  n. 
Tanucci,  271,  284,  285,  288. 
Tchesme,  battle  of,  303,  311. 
Terray,  398. 

Teschen,  Treaty  of,  341-344,  360. 
Thugut,  342. 


Index 


433 


I  Thurot,  262. 

\  Tobac,  battle  of,  385. 

1  Torcy,  27,  51.  52.  55. 

Torgau,  battle  of,  269. 

Totleben,  General,  269. 

Tott,  Baron  de,  308. 

Townshend,  58,  83. 

Triple  Alliance  of  1717,  the,  45,  48,  52, 
59 ;  of  1788,  378,  379,  384.  385,  387, 

389.  392.     , 
Triumvirate,  the,  327,  397. 
Tsarkoe  Selo,  Treaty  of,  331. 
Turgot,  219,  336,  337,  349,  377,  395, 

397-405.  407.  410,  415. 
Turin,  Armistice  of,  187. 
Turkey,    war   of    1768-74,   308,   etc.; 

war  with  Russia  (1787),  381,  etc. 
Tuscan  Ports,  the,  8,  117,  168. 

Uhlfeld,  139,  182,  215. 

Ulrica  of  Sweden  (sister  of  Frederick 

the  Great),  132,  175. 

Eleanora  of  Sweden,  60,  61. 

Unigenitus,  the   Bull,  28,  29,  32,  36, 

219. 
University  of  Paris,  the,  219. 
Ushant,  battle  of,  337. 
Utrecht,  Peace  of,  49,  50,  55,  85,  91, 

94.  "6,  339. 

Van  der  Noot,  358. 

Vaudreuil,  412. 

Vaux,  Comte  de,  322. 

Verden,  41. 

Verela,  Treaty  of,  391. 

Vergennes,  23,  44,  216,  217,  235,  308, 

331.  333-337.  344.  349.  358,  360,  361, 

381.  396,  401,  405,  409,  413. 
Versailles,  Treaty  of  (1756),  238,  243, 

245,  248,  261,  347,  406;   (1757),  239, 

240,  245,  246. 
Victor  Amadeus  of  Sardinia,  8,  53,  91. 
Villars,  72,  83,  88,  91,  99,  160. 
Villeroy,  26. 
Villinghausen,  battle  of,  270. 


Viomesnil,  312,  314. 

Vienna,  First  Treaty  of  (1725),  74-77, 
79;  SecondTreaty  of  (i73i),84,  85, 
87;  Third  Treaty  of  (1735),  loi, 
106. 

Villeneuve,  95,  96,  120,  121,  125-127. 

Vizille,  Assembly  of,  415. 

Voltaire,  296,  325,  336,  403,  406-408. 

Vonck,  389. 

Vrilli^re,  de  la,  397,  400. 

Wade,  165. 

Wall,  248. 

Walpole,  79,  80,  82,  88,  89,  94,  123, 

145,  146,  162,  185. 
Wandewash,  battle  of,  262,  270. 
Washington,  George,  226,  357. 
Warsaw,  Treaty  of,  179. 
Weingarten,  225. 
Westminster,  Treaty  of    (1714),  42, 

48;     Convention    of    (1756),    234, 

235,  238,  249. 
Westphalia,  Peace  of,  10,  13,  214,  239, 

368. 
Wilhelmina  Sophia,  367,  378. 
William  V.  (of  Orange) ,  348,  367,  370. 
Williams,  C.  Hanbury,  217,  233. 
Wilmington,  152;  death  of,  167. 
Wittelsbach,  House  of,  339,  340. 
Wolfe,  General,  262, 
Worms,  Treaty  of,  167-169,  194,  196. 
Woronzov,  243,  254,  262. 
Wusterhausen,  Treaty  of,  'j'j,  131. 
Wyndham,  83. 

YORKTOWN,  surrender  of,  346. 
Young,  Arthur,  406. 

Zeidlitz,  255. 

Zelanti,  the,  296. 

Zinzendorf,  51,  70,  71,  74,  139. 

Zips,  county  of,  310-312. 

Zomdorf,  battle  of,  255. 

Ziillichau,  battle  of,  265. 

Zweibriicken,  Duke  of,  256,  340. 


PERIOD  VL 


2F 


^y 


•  14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below, 
or  on  the  date  to  which  renewed.  Renewals  only: 

Tel.  No.  642-3405 

Renewals  may  be  made  4  days  priod  to  date  due. 

Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


Kenewe 

Me 


D  LD     K 


NOV  2  2  1971  3^ 


/2  -2PN\4:3 


p£C'DLP    ^^^"^^ 


^PP    5^976 


IS^GO.  m  6'v 


— APR  09 1989 

AUTO.  DISC 


APR  1  8  iytf9 


LD21A-60m-8,'70 
(N8837sl0)476 — A-32 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


U.b.  BtHKbLtY  LlbHAMltd 


CDEDIOVnS 


V 

• 

LIBRARY 

■  '■«*  ■ 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

